The Transforming Fire: review by Joseph Morrison Skelly, 9/5

Posted on May 10, 2012 by jonathanspyer

The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the Israel–Islamist Conflict
by Jonathan Spyer
(New York: Continuum, 2010), 227 pages
Reviewed by Joseph Morrison Skelly
Treasurer, Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa /
US Army Reserve
“People walked from tank to tank, shaking hands with friends,
wishing each other luck. I remember standing with my friend
Ariel Ronen and exchanging a few brief words before we boarded.
Blond Ariel, in civilian life the owner of a marketing business in
Petah Tikva, was a tank driver from platoon 2. Unlike me, he
had a practical, military bent to him, and was standing, watching
affairs with a worried furrow to his brow. ‘We aren’t ready for
this,’ he said, as we shook hands. I looked at him quizzically,
but he declined to elaborate, adding simply, ‘Not all of us will be
coming back.’ ‘We will,’ I reassured him, assuming the fatherconfessor role that I had awarded myself in the previous days. He didn’t reply.” (p. 13).

With this passage, and others like it, Jonathan Spyer recounts his experiences serving in the Lebanon War of 2006. A soldier in an Israeli armored reserve unit,
a columnist with The Jerusalem Post, and a research fellow in civilian life, Spyer
deftly interweaves his battlefield recollections with a sustained assessment of the
strategic challenges facing Israel. The result is an insightful, important, and at
times pensive volume, one that is part memoir and part sophisticated political
analysis. The main threats facing Israel today, Spyer asserts, are Islamist states
and organizations—enemies that not only loom on the horizon, such as Iran, but
ones such as Hamas and Hizbullah that lurk closer to home, raining down rockets
into the nation’s heartland. The Jewish State operates within a daunting strategic
environment. In confronting those challenges, Spyer rightly draws strength from
his comrades-in-arms in the Israeli Defense Forces, whose powerful and poignant
stories he sympathetically retells. Israel, too, can draw strength from their stoic
determination as it formulates and executes a national strategy for defeating the
Islamist threats arrayed against it.
In one of the early chapters of his book, Spyer contrasts the nature of Israel’s
current Islamist enemies with its previous opponents—secular Arab regimes and
organizations such as Egypt and the Palestinian Liberation Organization—and
traces the demise of the pan-Arab nationalism that animated these earlier foes. He
recalls the false hopes and hard realities of the Oslo era, a time when many Israelis erroneously concluded that the strategic forecast was improving. If the “collapse
of the Oslo process in 2000, and the four-year low-intensity conflict that followed,
put this assumption into question,” Spyer notes, the “events of 2006—the Hamas
election victory and then the Hizbullah war—all with nuclear-bound Iran lurking
in the background, conclusively buried it. It was clear that the rejection of Israel
had mutated again, and found a new form” (p. 7). With the demise of Israel’s secular
enemies, the threat to Israel did not cease, but morphed into new adversaries of
an Islamist bent. “The problem, as we have seen, was that the deeply felt Arab
rejection of Israel’s presence did not vanish with the fading of its Arab nationalist
carrier. Rather, it was inherited by the enemy and successor of Arab nationalism
within regional politics—the movements of radical Islam” (p. 74).
A vanguard in this transformation has been Hizbullah, which stalks Israel’s
northern border. This organization, which “seared itself into the consciousness
of a whole generation of Israelis who had served in the fighting units of the IDF
in the 1990s,” has been committed to “a stark, uncompromising ideology in which
support for the destruction of Israel formed a centerpiece. This was embedded in
a Shia Islamist worldview, which looked to the Iranian model of rule by clerics.
Optimists had supposed that much of the movement’s focus on this was a matter
of mere rhetoric” (p. 5), but events proved otherwise, especially following Israel’s
unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000. Hizbullah exploited
this retreat to its own strategic and tactical advantages, as the 2006 conflict
demonstrated.
While the nature of Israel’s enemies has altered over the past decade, so too has
Israeli society. In an important chapter in his book, Spyer perceptively delineates
how Israel is changing in response to the strategic threats arrayed against it—how
it is passing through a “transforming fire” of its own, in other words. He places
this transition in historical perspective:
… the European style Zionist ideologies which had shaped the country
and battled each other were being replaced by something new, more
amorphous, less recognizable, which was emerging from below, and from
outside the recognizable ideological divisions of the country. This new,
Israeli nationalism was at once more ethnic, more provincial, less European,
less clearly defined, less open than the country had previously seemed. It
was neither recognizably Ashkenazi, nor recognizably Sephardi, neither
rigorously secular nor strictly observant. The mass of Israelis could find
themselves somewhere within its broad and loosely defined borders (p. 80).
According to Spyer, “the version of Israeli national identity that holds the Israeli
center is entirely inseparable from Jewishness—even among its secular adherents.
Jewish Israel does not see itself as a new country. It is a self-consciously newold
one” (pp. 81–82). And this Israel, Spyer believes, is as determined to defend
itself against its enemies as were previous generations. It “has remained a far
more mobilized, committed society than it superficially may appear. Seventynine
percent of Israelis, when asked, said they would fight for their country.
This contrasts with just over 60 percent of Americans and just over 40 percent
of Britons. Israel scored first in a survey of citizens of twenty-six democratic
countries who were asked this question” (pp. 7–8).
Where does Spyer stand in relation to this process? He poignantly notes that
“I am neither an advocate, nor really an inhabitant, of the new Israeli-Jewish
identity which I have been trying to describe and encapsulate here.” At the time
he emigrated from London to Israel twenty years ago, he was attached to “an
ingrained and largely imaginary place that existed in our minds as a fertile, strong,
proud, and beautiful answer to the sufferings of the Jews in Europe, and to the
long humiliations of exile” (p. 89). But he has come to embrace the “real, breathing,
living country that gets up in the morning and works and argues and reconciles
and makes its loyalties, in its own language and in its own interests” (p. 91). Spyer
zeroes in on the key strategic question, that is, whether the country “the Jews
have built up in Israel over the last century will be sufficient to carry it through
the latest version of the rejection of its presence by the Arab and Muslim cultural
milieu that surrounds it” (p. 92).
Partly in search of an answer to this question, Spyer consistently returns to his
experiences in the IDF. He discusses what he learned about militant Palestinian
culture while serving as a guard at Mahaneh Ofer prison after his reserve unit was
mobilized in 2002. He often revisits the 2006 war in Lebanon. He deals with it on
several levels, revealing in each case his expertise borne of military experience
and intellectual analysis. He honestly assesses the campaign’s flaws; analyzes his
own unit’s controversial mission near the towns of el Khaim and Marjayoun in
southern Lebanon; distills professional advice for future conflicts; addresses the
hybrid mode of combat developed by Hizbullah and the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps; and opens a window onto the tactical experiences of the battlefield.
He spares no one he deems responsible for the war’s shortcomings, and slings his
harshest arrows at “the smug intellectual consensus and the sense of superiority”
(p. 177) of the Israeli and foreign intelligentsia. This war, he writes, “is full of
lessons, which can only be located through a long and unsparing process of
reflection” (p. 165).
In retrospect, Israel’s battle with Hizbullah was at some level a proxy war with
its sponsor, Iran, the greatest threat now facing the nation. In this context Spyer
opens his book with a recollection from 2006 that is, in some ways, a metaphor for Israel writ large today. He talks of his unit on the eve of its operation into
Lebanon. They had assembled in an orchard just south of the Lebanese border.
They prepped their equipment, conducted their pre-combat inspections, tuned up
the engines of their tanks—and waited. “The company was positioned on a field
next to an avocado grove, on lands belonging to a border kibbutz,” Spyer writes.
“We had been waiting there for three days. Twice, the entry into Lebanon had
been postponed. We’d spent the days checking our equipment, eating sandwiches,
smoking cigarettes. Waiting. The routine of tense expectation and prolonged
activity was one you got used to” (p. 1).
Here Spyer captures the common experience of soldiering: periods of intense
preparation combined with anticipation, apprehension, impatience, and then a
calm resolve to complete the mission once the orders to move out arrive. In a sense,
this is a metaphor for Israel today, as it responds to the danger posed by Iran. It
is quietly preparing for all contingencies, making its case abroad, conducting the
nation’s business at home—and waiting. The flare may go up at any time. If it
does, one can hope that Israeli society has internalized the insights into Islamism
that Jonathan Spyer has spelled out in his book. Should that be the case, Israel
will successfully pass through the next transforming fire in its national history—
and in part will have Mr. Spyer to thank.

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The Killing Grounds of Idlib

Posted on May 6, 2012 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 4/5.

Human Rights Watch released this week a report that offers a devastating picture of the activities of the Syrian regime in suppressing the revolt underway against it.

The report also stands as an indictment of the impotency of Western and international policy vis a vis the regime.

The HRW document details the actions of the Syrian 76th Brigade, which forms part of the 4th Armored Division in the Idlib governate in northwest Syria, in the days leading up to the “cease-fire” that supposedly came on April 10th. It reveals a regime determined to crush dissent by all means deemed necessary in the time available to it. The picture that emerges is one of a country in the midst of a civil war, albeit one in which the two participant sides are grossly mismatched.

In February, the Assad regime began a sustained counter-attack against areas of support for the revolution against it. The brutal pacification of Homs was the first phase of this counter-revolution. The regime then turned its attention toward the rebellious Idlib province.

As United Nations Special Envoy Kofi Annan quibbled with the Assad regime over the precise terms of the cease-fire, the 76th Brigade moved from town to town in Idlib, leaving a trail of destruction in its wake.

The HRW report shows how 95 civilians died and hundreds were wounded in the period between March 22 and April 6, as Syrian armor and infantry swept methodically through the towns of Sarmin, Saraqeb, Taftanaz, Hazano and Kelly. These areas had hitherto been precariously controlled by disparate elements of the rebel Free Syrian Army and civilian opposition networks.

Of those killed, the report suggests that 35 were the victims of summary execution by the army or by the Alawi Shabiha paramilitaries who followed it into the towns.

The methods used by the regime forces were the same as those witnessed by the world in Homs. But because of the terrorizing of Western journalists who remained in Homs, no one was present in Idlib to convey the reality of what was happening in real time.

In line with the Homs precedent, the towns targeted were first softened up by sustained artillery fire.

Once this phase was completed, infantry and armor entered the area, accompanied by operatives of Syrian Military Intelligence and supported by helicopters.

In some areas, Free Syrian Army forces put up sustained and determined resistance. In others, the rebels conducted orderly, rapid retreats, aware of their inability to successfully hold back armor and artillery.

But in either case, the result was the same. The civilians of these restive Idlib towns were, after a short interlude, left alone and defenseless before the forces of the regime.

At this point, the process of summary executions, random arrests and terrorizing of civilians began.

The government assault was not characterized by blind rage. Rather, a methodical approach was adopted in which approximately three days were allocated for the pacification of each town. Sarmeen was the first to be targeted, beginning on March 22. Operations in Kelly, the last area to be reduced, were neatly completed by April 6. Taftanaz, the subject of the regime’s attention between April 2 and 4, was the main site of mass executions.

In the dry legalese of the HRW report, “The fighting in Idlib appeared to reach the level of an armed conflict under international law, given the intensity of the fighting and the level of organization on both sides. This would mean that international humanitarian law (the law of armed conflict) would apply in addition to human rights law.”

The report goes on to note that “Serious violations of international humanitarian law are classified as war crimes.”

As an example of the kind of activities unearthed, the execution of 19 members of a single family, the Ghazals of Taftanaz, on a single day, April 3, is described in detail.

According to an eyewitness report, at 3:30 p.m, 20 men in civilian clothes entered a house where the members of the Ghazal extended family had sought refuge from the shelling. The women and elderly were forced to go down to the basement. The men and boys were held upstairs for “questioning.” Female members of the family later reported hearing gunfire.

At 8:30, they ventured back above. They discovered 16 bodies of male members of their family who had been executed. Five of the corpses had been taken to a deserted shop next door and burned. An additional nine, with bullet wounds to the back and head, were in the house itself.

Three more members of the family, including 75- year-old Ghassan Ghazal, were executed by the roving killer squads of the regime in the hours that followed.

This is one representative story from the 76th Brigade’s pacification of Idlib.

In early February, I spent a week in what were then, with defiant hope, called the “liberated zones” of Idlib. My stay included two days in Sarmeen, one of the towns that witnessed the rampage of the 76th Brigade. I spoke to FSA fighters, civilian activists and ordinary residents of the town.

The mood at that time was one of infectious but entirely unwarranted optimism. The contrast between the determined self-belief of the FSA fighters and the obvious inadequacy of their AK-47s and RPG-7s in the face of regime armor, artillery and helicopters was obvious even then. The men I interviewed were the ones who later sought – and, of course, failed – to protect the people of Sarmeen from the assault. Some of them are now dead. The remainder are in the countryside of Idlib, trying to continue the war, or over the border in Turkey. The mood now is one of fury.

The failure of the West to adequately engage with the Syrian opposition, and to act to prevent the war crimes committed by the Assad regime in Idlib, has not meant the death of the uprising.

Rather, it is serving to turn the revolt against Assad’s rule into what the regime always said it was – namely, an increasingly Sunni Islamist cause.

By avoiding engagement, except though the pathetic offices of Kofi Annan and his UN observers, the West has effectively abdicated the field to three Sunni regional powers and Turkey is sponsoring the political opposition. Qatar and Saudi Arabia, through frontmen and in a chaotic and haphazard way, are seeking to aid the armed rebellion.

Unsurprisingly, the main beneficiaries of these states’ assistance are Sunni Islamist forces. Reports from Antakya on the Turkish border suggest that in addition to sectarianism, Saudi and Qatari efforts are characterized by incompetence.

Rival local militias from northern Syria have their representatives in this border town, all seeking to establish their own channel of weapons and money to their own particular fiefdom. It is a recipe for the deterioration of the rebel forces in Idlib into a series of armed sectarian gangs, rather than their consolidation into a united armed body.

This may suit the agenda of the Assad regime’s regional enemies. It is also a gift to the regime itself.

Assad has long portrayed the opposition to him as “armed, terrorist gangs.” The hands-off approach of the West is helping to make this characterization not entirely a fabrication. The end result will be to allow the members of the 76th Brigade and their comrades to continue the systematic slaughter of civilians in Syria.

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Iran and Saudi Arabia duel over Bahrain

Posted on April 29, 2012 by jonathanspyer

The Saudi-sponsored newspaper Alsharq Alawsat this week reported a meeting in Qom between Iraqi Shi’ite Islamist leader Moqtada al-Sadr and leaders of the Bahraini opposition. Alsharq Alawsat, based in London, was keen to cast a spotlight on this meeting because it appears to offer evidence of the involvement of Iran and its allies in the uprising against the rule of King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa in Bahrain.

Riyadh and its allies have long alleged that the unrest in Bahrain is the work of a hidden Iranian hand. Their contention is that Iran is artificially fomenting the protests in order to replace the ruling al-Khalifa monarchy with an Iranian-style Islamic republic.

But the Qom meeting notwithstanding, the real picture is rather more complex and ambiguous.

The response to events in Bahrain reflects the reality of a sectarian power contest between Saudi Arabia and Tehran in the Gulf area and beyond.

This contest has little or nothing to do with democracy, popular rule, Arab Springs or any of the other hopeful themes of 2011. It is a battle between a non-democratic Shi’ite Islamic republic and a non-democratic Sunni monarchy. This battle is taking place in an area of vital strategic interest to the world.

But events within Bahrain itself are not simply the reflection of the machinations of Saudi or Iranian puppet-masters. They derive from the genuine discontent of a majority Shi’ite population, ruled over by an oppressive, super-wealthy Sunni monarchy and a rich Sunni elite.

The tiny archipelago of Bahrain is situated in the Persian Gulf, off the coast of Saudi Arabia. Some 67 percent of global proven crude oil reserves are in the Gulf, while 30% of daily crude oil exports from the Gulf pass through Bahraini coastal waters.

The US Navy’s 5th Fleet, which ensures the security of the area, has been based in Bahrain since 1995.

Iran’s reasons for wishing to exert influence and achieve dominance in Bahrain are not difficult to fathom. The key goal of the Islamic Republic is to replace the US as the guarantor of Gulf energy resources. As part of this, Tehran is determined to gain a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia, fearful of Iranian ambitions, is equally determined to prevent this.

Iran has a long history of claiming ownership over Bahrain and seeking to profit from internal political unrest there. As early as 1957, the Iranian parliament declared Bahrain to be the “14th province” of Iran. In 2009, Nateq Nuri, a senior adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, restated this long-held claim.

The Islamic Republic also has a lengthy history of active attempts at subversion in Bahrain. In 1981, Tehran launched a coup via a proxy Shi’ite Islamist group, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain. The coup was intended to establish a Shi’ite theocracy under the leadership of an Iran-based cleric, Hojat-al Islam al-Mudarissi. It failed. The attempt led to a tightening of joint security arrangements between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. It was also a factor in bringing about the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Iranian support for Shi’ite opposition in Bahrain has continued in subsequent decades.

Yet the current protests are not a production made purely in Tehran. An independent inquiry established by King Hamad to locate the cause of the uprising failed to find any proof of Iranian material support.

The popular al-Wifaq opposition movement that led the protests is Shi’ite Islamist but has little sympathy for Tehran and cannot realistically be presented as a tool of the mullahs. Demonstrators, initially at least, demanded a transition to constitutional monarchy, though this rapidly extended to calls for an end to the monarchy.

From the point of view of Bahrain’s Saudi neighbors, there was no room for ambiguity. The Saudis, in any case, are both anti-democracy and anti-Shi’ite. On March 14, 2011, a Saudi-led intervention entered the country at King Hamad’s request and crushed the protests, using live ammunition.

The reason for the Saudi intervention was succinctly expressed by an unnamed Saudi official to The Washington Post: “We don’t want Iran 14 miles off our coast.”

The Bahraini authorities continue to maintain that Iran is engaging in subversion and helping the protests. In November, the authorities arrested five men under suspicion of plotting to blow up the King Fahd Bridge – the only bridge connecting Bahrain with Saudi Arabia. The Manama authorities now say that these men are connected to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and received military training in Syria.

Protests have broken out again, against the background of the Formula 1 Grand Prix, which was recently held in Bahrain. The authorities are continuing their heavy-handed approach to suppressing them.

Whatever the truth of the claim regarding the King Fahd Bridge plot, it is a fact that many or most of the participants in the protests are not consciously following an Iranian line.

But at the same time, it is also a fact that the sectarian logic expressed by the Saudis (and the Iranians) reflects a reality likely to trump the hopes for reform and greater freedoms sincerely held by many of the Bahraini protesters. As in Egypt, the genuine nature and groundedness of the protesters’ demands should not be allowed to obscure the fact that sectarian political Islam represents the strongest force in the region and any mass political campaign in the Arab world today will almost inevitably take on its colors.

The demonstrators want the downfall of the monarchy. The leading elements in the protest are Shi’ite Islamist. If they come to power, they will almost certainly align with Iran. By doing so, they will establish the long sought-after Iranian foothold on the Arabian peninsula.

The Saudi-Iran cold war in the Gulf is a sectarian contest in which one side, that of the Saudis, is ambiguously and problematically aligned with the West, while the other is openly anti-Western. The Saudi and GCC interest is thus, problematically and for now, the Western interest. The US administration appears to understand this, mainly because it has no desire to involve itself further in any part of the Middle East. It is therefore happy to allow Riyadh to coordinate the Sunni response. The increasingly stark Sunni-Shi’ite rivalry in the Gulf and beyond, meanwhile, may well be the key strategic dynamic in the region.

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Tragedy and farce in Syria

Posted on April 7, 2012 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 05/04/2012

Recent developments show that the West appears to have acquiesced to the continued rule of the Assad family dictatorship.

The supposed acceptance by the regime of Bashar Assad of UN Special Envoy Kofi Annan’s six-point plan represents the latest phase of the Syrian dictator’s strategy to buy time in order to crush the uprising against his rule. According to the plan, the regime is obliged to withdraw troops and armor from Syrian urban centers by April 10th.

On Sunday, the second “Friends of Syria” conference in Istanbul issued a deadline for Assad to begin implementing the plan. Assad, the conference declared, would be judged on his “deeds, rather than his promises.”

A Norwegian major-general, described as a “veteran Middle East peacemaker” has been appointed to lead the UN support team that will soon depart for Syria. UN press releases have not yet clarified to which areas of the Middle East Major-General Robert Mood has actually brought peace in the course of his career. In any case, he and his team are to evaluate the situation on the ground and hold talks with both sides in order to assess the prospects for the deployment of a team of unarmed observers in Syria.

Having accepted Annan’s plan, the regime is now ramping up its attacks on centers of the uprising. The army is continuing its rampage through defiant Idleb Province and the Deraa area.

On the day following the regime’s announcement of its latest acceptance of Annan’s proposals, 60 Syrian civilians were killed by Assad’s forces.

Assad wants to achieve the maximum level of pacification before offering whatever gesture he chooses to make toward implementing the Annan plan. There is no reason at all to think that Assad’s notional acceptance of the UN envoy’s proposals will have any serious effect on the bloody counterattack currently being conducted by the Assad regime.

THE PATTERN is familiar. In November, the regime proclaimed acceptance of an Arab League plan. The blood-letting, however, continued apace.

A team of hapless Arab League spectators, led by a suspected Sudanese war criminal, General Mustafa al-Dabi, were dispatched to the country.

These men spent a few weeks watching Assad’s forces butcher Syrian civilians before being quietly withdrawn. The regime has also twice before announced its acceptance of proposals by Annan – to no noticeable effect.

The current plan envisages the commencement of an “inclusive, Syrian-led political process” that will follow a “cease-fire including the withdrawal of troops and heavy weapons from inside and around populated areas.”

These are the key elements of the Annan proposal, which also calls for the release of “arbitrarily detained persons,” free movement across Syria for journalists, provision of humanitarian aid via a UN mechanism and respect for “freedom of association” and the right to peacefully demonstrate.

The most immediately notable aspect of these proposals is their somewhat otherwordly quality.

They envisage no timetable for a transition of power and do not even call for the dictator to step down. Rather, Assad is supposed to begin an openended process of dialogue with the opposition.

The Assad regime has taken the trouble over the last year to develop tame opposition elements, with which it will be happy to continue talking and to broadcast the talks via its official media outlets to the world. The regime can then claim that it is complying with the demands of the international community. A small percentage of the very large volume of Syrian citizens rounded up and detained without charge by the regime over the last year may be released. At the same time, the slaughter of the real opposition, mobilized by local coordinating committees and by the Free Syrian Army, will continue.

The regime will proclaim that while it accepts Annan’s plan, it cannot be expected not to take action against “armed gangs.” A few carefully marshalled international journalists may be permitted to enter, as took place after the acceptance of the Arab League plan.

These journalists will be encouraged to film scenes of normality in Damascus.

Assad’s allies in Russia and China will be pleased with the turn of events and will make encouraging noises. It is possible that the UN Security Council may even succeed in passing a watered-down resolution setting out a timetable for further progress in Syria. None of this will have the slightest effect on the civil war already under way in the country.

All of this is quite obvious, and is disputed by hardly anyone among serious observers of events in Syria. It is therefore difficult not to conclude that there is simply no real interest on the part of the West to help bring about the end of the Assad dictatorship.

Assad has benefited throughout from a de facto international coalition that supports him. Iran and Hezbollah provide the assistance on the ground. Russia and China are responsible for the diplomatic cover.

Either opposing international efforts will be made to help the Syrian rebels transform themselves into a real, physical threat to the dictatorship, or the dictatorship is likely to survive.

This reality is quite clear, and has been clear throughout the uprising. Arms and training for the Free Syrian Army and moves toward a buffer zone in the north, or acquiescence to the continued rule of the Assad family dictatorship. Currently the West is choosing the latter course.

Karl Marx, in the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, famously asserted that “great world-historic facts and personages appear twice. The first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.” Marx, however, did not foresee the current international response to the situation in Syria. This manages, uniquely, to combine the essential qualities of tragedy and farce into a single picture.

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Lecture in Berlin on Syria, 8/11.

Posted on April 4, 2012 by jonathanspyer
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Taking note of Yemen

Posted on March 31, 2012 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 29/03/2012

The US is waking up to Iran’s support for Shi’ite rebels and its attempts to gain influence through proxy warfare.

In a notable shift in the US public stance, Washington’s Ambassador to Yemen Gerald Feierstein this week accused Iran of supporting Shi’ite Houthi rebels in north Yemen and separatist elements in the south of the country. Both Israel and Saudi Arabia have long maintained that north Yemen constitutes an additional front in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s region-wide attempt to build regional influence through aiding proxy forces. Until now the US had remained agnostic on this point.

The Houthi insurgency has been under way in north Yemen since 2004. The Houthi clan, based in the Saada province of north Yemen, are Zaidis, an offshoot of Shia Islam. The rebels are Islamist. Their stated aim is the establishment of an “Imamate” in Yemen, to replace what they regard as the illegitimate regime of of president Ali Abdullah Saleh and his successors.

They number tens of thousands of fighters, and in 2009 fought a bloody and inconclusive series of battles with Saudi forces who sought and failed to destroy the insurgency.

US officials until now had been wont to say that while it was theoretically possible that Tehran might support the Shia Houthi insurgents battling the Sana’a government, no actual evidence had emerged to establish that this was the case. They are not saying this anymore. What has shifted?

First of all, it is worth noting that Feierstein’s public remarks this week are not the first indication of a changing American view with regard to Iranian support for the Houthis. On March 15, The New York Times quoted an un-named senior US official (probably Feierstein himself) on this matter.

The nameless official specifically accused the Iranians of dispatching a special unit of the Revolutionary Guards Corps to aid the Houthis. This force, according to the official, was using small boats to smuggle assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades to the rebels.

In an interview with the London-based Arabic newspaper al-Hayat this week, Ambassador Feierstein broadened and clarified the US position. He asserted that Washington possesses “evidence that the Iranians provide military assistance and training” both to the Shia Houthi rebels in the north and to a separatist insurgency in the south of the country. The Iranians, Feierstein suggested, seek to prevent an orderly transition of power following Saleh’s resignation.

More broadly, said the US ambassador, Teheran wants to build “influence and impact on the developments in Yemen through gaining influence internally or in the wider region by establishing a foothold in Arabia, a matter that is normally seen as a security threat to Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries.”

Asked whether the Iranians provide this support to the Yemeni insurgencies directly or via proxies, Feierstein replied that “available evidence” confirmed that both Hezbollah and Hamas support the Iranian “role and effort.” He particularly noted the presence of southern Yemenis in Beirut who act as a conduit for Iranian support to the separatist insurgency in the south.

Feierstein’s interview was significant on a number of levels. Firstly, US ambassadors do not simply take it upon themselves to suddenly announce to the media a significant shift in the American understanding of events. The increasingly public US acknowledgement of the Iranian- Saudi cold war in the region, and more broadly of Iranian attempts to build political influence through the activation of proxies, is part of the more generally hardening US stance toward Iran.

It represents a growing awareness on the part of the US administration that its allies in this region – Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf emirates – were not simply engaging in paranoid fantasy when they sought to warn US emissaries of the dangers of Iranian political and proxy warfare to the regional order.

Feierstein in public this week sounded like the Saudi and Israeli officials whose private talks with their US counterparts were revealed by Wikileaks. The awareness of and concern at Iran’s adroit use of proxy forces to stir the regional cauldron and build power and influence was the point of commonality.

Whether this growing awareness will produce a corresponding shift in the administration’s currently somewhat rudderless regional policy remains to be seen.

Secondly, the remarks reflect real and justified US worry regarding the chaotic situation in Yemen. Even prior to the political unrest of 2011, the country was reeling under the impact of three separate insurgent movements (the Houthis, the southern separatists and Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula – AQAP). In addition, Yemen faced a serious water crisis, growing lawlessness, tribal defiance of the central authorities outside of Sana’a and dwindling oil supplies.

This situation has now been vastly complicated by Saleh’s departure and moves toward political reform. In Yemen, as elsewhere, the departure of the military dictator has not brought a smooth transition to a new political order. Rather, Islamist forces have moved to exploit the vacuum.

As Saleh’s forces sought to maintain control of the capital last year, the Houthis, who professed support for the anti-government uprising, expanded their area of control from Saada to al-Jawf and parts of Hajjah governates.

Some Yemeni officials believe that the goal of the Houthis is to take the Midi seaport in the Hajja governate. If this fell into their hands, it would open up the possibility of a permanent Red Sea route for the transport of Iranian heavy weapons to the insurgents. This, in turn, would make feasible a Houthi push toward the capital, Sana’a. It may well be that this prospect has served to attract the attention of the US administration and induce a sudden clarity.

From an Israeli (and Saudi) point of view, the claim that no evidence existed linking Iran to the Houthis was always a strange and tenuous one. Indications to the contrary have been accumulating in recent years. In October 2009, the Yemeni authorities reported that they had intercepted an Iranian arms carrying vessel on its way to Midi. The Saudi al-Arabiya news network noted a visit by the former South Yemeni president to Beirut, where he petitioned Hezbollah for support for the Houthis and for South Yemeni independence. The Houthis, meanwhile, claim that Saudi Arabia is itself arming Salafi Islamist elements in north Yemen as a means of pressuring them.

North Yemen today constitutes a largely ignored but important arena for the wider regional cold war between Iranian- and Westernaligned blocs. This contest has survived the Arab upheavals of 2011 and is continuing. Ambassador Feierstein’s remarks, meanwhile, show that this reality is becoming harder to deny. Even for those who in the past have found denial of this sort to be a preferred approach to regional policy.

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Clip of an interview on Syria

Posted on March 15, 2012 by jonathanspyer

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Islamic Jihad attacks, Hamas’s dilemmas

Posted on March 13, 2012 by jonathanspyer

In by far the sharpest escalation since late 2008, scores of rockets have been fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel during recent days following Israel’s killing of the Gaza-based leader of the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) Zuhair al-Qaisi and one of his lieutenants. Al-Qaisi was in the last stages of planning a major terror attack when he was killed.

The rocket attacks, creating a dilemma for Gaza’s Hamas rulers, are mainly being carried out by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad with involvement from the smaller PRC.

From Hamas’ standpoint the escalation comes at an unwelcome time. The movement is in the midst of a tricky political process whereby it is seeking to extricate itself from the regional bloc led by Iran and to realign with the Sunni rulers of Egypt and Qatar. This move comes as a result of both problems and opportunities opened up by political upheavals in the Arab world — especially the largely Islamist revolution in Egypt — and by Iran’s backing for the Syrian government’s assault on the largely Sunni Arab population in the civil war there.

This already difficult transformation is further complicated by the fact that Hamas is now in the midst of an internal power struggle. The rulers of Gaza are pursuing a policy opposed by the official Hamas leadership of Khaled Mashaal, who rules over nothing at all. The battle is over whether Egypt or Iran is to be Hamas’ patron.

In the midst of this complex situation the escalation and rocket fire has erupted.

The dilemma from Hamas’ point of view is as follows: until now, the impressive performance of Israel’s Iron Dome system has minimized Israeli casualties and thus enabled Israel to calibrate its response accordingly. But if Israeli civilians are killed, the government may well opt for a significant ground invasion. Consequently, if Gaza’s rulers continue to let Islamic Jihad and the PRC escalate the situation, at a certain point an Israeli ground incursion will become inevitable.

This will then potentially place the survival of the Hamas regime in jeopardy at a time when the Gaza rulers perceive a historic opportunity to achieve dominance within their movement, including control over the West Bank. Moreover, Hamas would also prefer to wait until a time when the Muslim Brotherhood has more control over Egypt and can offer it stronger backing.

So Hamas doesn’t want to see a major IDF operation into Gaza right now.

However, if Hamas appears too eager to secure a renewed ceasefire with Israel, Gaza’s leaders risk being presented by their rivals as a client regime of America and Israel in exactly the same way that Hamas has historically used to excoriate the PA. Islamic Jihad, once a marginal group, is now emerging as a major force in Gaza. This movement, unlike Hamas, has no problem working with Iran and getting money, guns, and orders from Tehran.

It is quite possible, though one doesn’t know for sure, that Iran is involved in some way in the Islamic Jihad decision to escalate. This would constitute a shrewd message to Hamas regarding the potential cost of leaving its patronage. And it could also be taken as an Iranian response to threats from Israel, and the United States as well, about attacking Iranian nuclear facilities. The message: Iran has resources for striking back against Israel.

So Hamas needs to make a decision with no easy options.

From Israel’s viewpoint, the disruption caused to a million Israeli citizens’ lives in the south of the country is intolerable. Israel is aware of Hamas’ dilemma, but has no reason to do the movement any favors. So Israel’s message is clear and uncompromising: for as long as the rocket fire continues, Israel will continue to retaliate. If the Hamas regime wants to engineer a return to the de facto ceasefire, then it better go ahead and do so before it’s too late.

So which course will Hamas choose? The indications are that Hamas, fearing a major Israeli attack more than the potential political loss of face of a renewed ceasefire, is hurrying to secure a return to the shaky and partial calm that preceded the current escalation. The Hamas rulers have rushed to the authorities in Cairo to ask them to broker a renewed ceasefire.

Hamas spokesman Taher al-Nunu stated March 10 that “all Palestinian factions” wanted a renewed truce but that Israel must stop firing first. Hamas is also currently insisting that Israel commit to avoid targeted killings in Gaza in the future — a condition entirely unacceptable to Jerusalem. Islamic Jihad spokesman Daud Shihab, however, denied that the organization was involved in any contacts to end the clashes.

The political game in which each group tries to claim the mantle of greater militancy against Israel is once again in play. But the words of the Hamas spokesman suggested that the stage of bargaining had begun. So this round is likely to end in the coming days — barring unforeseen developments — with a return to an uneasy de facto ceasefire.

If this happens, the Israel defense establishment will be able to register an achievement. It will have showed it can act decisively to ensure the security of Israeli citizens, and then use sophisticated techniques to minimize the damage of the response from Gaza and force a return to quiet.

Meanwhile, the Hamas authorities in Gaza remain in an uncomfortable dilemma, caught between their desire to keep control of Gaza and the lure of militant violence against Israel. For its part, Islamic Jihad will have proved its worth as an asset for Iran to remind everyone in the locality of its continued presence and possibly of what might happen if Israel attacks Iranian nuclear facilities.

A bigger issue is how changes in Egypt — including the projected turnover of power from the military to an elected president — will affect the Gaza Strip and the situation on Israel’s southern border. If Cairo turns toward greater Islamist militancy, the chance for a major confrontation being sparked in Gaza would exponentially increase. For now, though, efforts have begun to end this current round of fighting.

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Confusion in the Ranks

Posted on March 10, 2012 by jonathanspyer

This week, leading Gaza- Hamas activist Salah al-Bardawil told The Guardian newspaper that in the event of a war between Iran and Israel, Hamas would not back Teheran. Hamas Foreign Minister in Gaza Mahmoud Zahar later appeared to refute Bardawil’s stance, saying that Hamas would respond “with utmost power” to any “Zionist war on Iran.”

These statements reflect confusion and divisions in the main Palestinian- Islamist movement. The confusion derives from the variety of options which the Arab upheavals of 2011 have placed before Hamas.

The divisions also reflect the resultant opening of separate and competing power structures in the movement, with the leaders of the Gaza statelet opposing the overall leadership, and also quarreling among themselves.

The Teheran-led “resistance axis,” with which Hamas was aligned, is one of the main victims of the Arab upheavals of the last year. Meanwhile, the clear winner from the upheavals so far is the ideological trend of which Hamas is a representative – namely, Sunni Islamism.

Revolt in Iran-aligned Syria has left the Iranians exposed as a narrow, sectarian force. Their claim to represent a general Muslim interest against the West and Israel is in disarray. In Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, Sunni Islamist elements are moving to benefit from the fall of authoritarian leaders.

Hamas’s close relationship with Iran is of long standing, dating back to the mid 1990s. Iranian help formed a vital factor in turning the Palestinian Islamist movement into a formidable terrorist force in the second intifada of 2000-2004. Following Hamas’s takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Iranian aid increased in both volume and importance for Hamas.

Yet with all this, the alliance between Iran and Hamas always had the nature of a marriage of convenience. Unlike Hezbollah, the Sunni Hamas was not a creation of the Iranians, and did not subscribe to the Shiaderived Iranian-ruling ideology of Wilayat al-Faqih (leadership of the jurisprudent).

Hamas still has a deep connection to Palestinian politics. It emerged from the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and inherited the extensive social and educational network and the ideological outlook of the Brotherhood.

There are also those within the movement – particularly within its armed wing – who adhere to the radically anti-Shia Salafi trend within Sunni Islamism.

Hamas’s relationship with Iran derived from the somewhat binary nature of regional politics prior to 2011. The US-led and Iran-led regional blocs were facing off against one another. As Hamas PLC member Musehir al-Masri put it in 2007, Hamas and Iran had their differences, yet alliance with Iran was “a thousand times more preferable than relying on the Americans and Zionists.”

Implicitly, there were only two choices, and Hamas’s preference was obvious. As a result of the events of 2011, there are no longer only two choices. Hamas is split regarding which path to take.

The situation in Syria was the immediate spark for Hamas’s move away from the “resistance axis.” The movement was placed in an impossible situation, in which its host, the Assad regime, was engaged in the wholesale slaughter of a largely Sunni-Arab uprising.

The signs of discomfort have been apparent for months.

Hamas’s Damascus offices are empty and Khaled Masha’al left the Syrian capital for Doha. The movement’s key leaders are now in Qatar, Cairo, or its Gaza fiefdom.

The move has left Mashaal weakened. A power struggle is consequently under way between the Gaza-based leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Mahmoud. Zahar, on the one hand, and Masha’al and the formerly Damascus-based element, on the other. Attitudes toward Iran are one of the elements in this disagreement.

The distancing from Iran appears to imply a move away from a focus on military methods and toward an emphasis on anti- Israel propaganda and popular agitation. But there is no overall agreement regarding the extent of the shift, and attitudes toward it have become enveloped in the larger power struggle under way.

Important elements among the Gaza leadership do not wish to stray too far from the Iranians. Hamas, to maintain its Gaza fiefdom, still needs Iran’s expertise and its weaponry. There is no obvious Qatari or Saudi substitute for this.

The latest reports suggest that a new terrorist body, the “Aqsa Defenders” is emerging from within Hamas in Gaza. Like Fatah’s Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, this body may be used for deniable paramilitary activity, even as Hamas pursues other avenues of activity.

Haniyeh’s visit to Iran and Zahar’s latest statement suggest that in the period ahead, Hamas will seek to maintain some level of Iranian support, while at the same time developing relations with the authorities in Egypt and Qatar. Being in the midst of an internal contest, Hamas lacks the consensus necessary for a hard “either-or” decision with regard to its alliances.

Therefore Hamas’s move away from the resistance axis should not be seen in terms of a clean break, and a clean break with political violence is equally unlikely.

Still, the distancing by Hamas from the Iran-led bloc, and its move back in the direction of the Sunni-Arabs, is reason for some quiet satisfaction in Israel. It represents a considerable setback for the regional alliance, which still constitutes by far the most serious strategic threat to Jerusalem.

A Hamas aligned more closely with Qatar would be equally politically intransigent, and if the Qatar and Egypt-sponsored reconciliation with Fatah succeeds, this will end any realistic hopes for a diplomatic process between Israelis and Palestinians in the foreseeable future. Nor will Hamas entirely eschew violence.

The Qataris and their ilk deal in a politics of gesture and propaganda vis-a-vis Israel, but remain dependent on the West for protection against the real menace of Iran. They lack the genuine ideological fervor, seriousness and readiness for real war of the Iran-led regional alliance.

Hamas’s move in the direction of Doha and Cairo, and subsequent internal squabbling, means the weakening of the most important alliance arrayed against Israel – and the beginning of a period of flux and division for the main Palestinian Islamist movement.

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The West should help Syrian rebels

Posted on March 2, 2012 by jonathanspyer

The Australian, 1/3/12

In recent days the world has witnessed the Assad regime in Syria pretending to inquire as to its citizens’ opinion in a referendum on constitutional reform, while enthusiastically slaughtering the opposition with advanced artillery.

About 100 civilians were shot or blown up by the security forces in the 48-hour period during which the vote was conducted.

This simultaneous referendum and bloodbath was a uniquely Assad-type production. It combined the clunky, very 20th-century and transparent propaganda methods of the regime with the relentless willingness for savage violence against opponents that has characterised the Assad family dictatorship throughout its existence.

These methods may appear old-fashioned. President Bashar al-Assad is determined to prove his government is sufficiently strong to hold back the wave of change that began last year with the Arab Spring uprisings.

A united and anti-Western international coalition stands behind Assad. The rebels, as I saw on a recent trip into northern Syria, are determined and brave, but under-equipped, badly organised and lacking real external help.

Which means that unless the West sharply changes its approach to the crisis in Syria, Assad may well succeed and survive.

However, no change in the Western approach looks to be on the horizon.

The pro-Assad international coalition consists of Russia, China, Iran and Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon. The actions of its components in supporting the Syrian regime effectively complement one another.

Russia and China have succeeded in preventing any meaningful diplomatic response to the Syrian crisis through the exercise of their veto power in the UN Security Council.

State-of-the-art Russian weaponry is being employed against the Syrian rebels; T-72 tanks, the M240 mortar system, all have been used in recent days in the brutal suppression of the rebel forces in Homs.

Meanwhile, the Syrian army has been shelling the rebel strongholds of Idleb city, Binnish and Sarmin.

More weaponry is arriving by sea. Russian and Iranian ships, laden with weapons, have docked at Syria’s Mediterranean port of Tartous. Iranian and Hezbollah personnel are in Syria on the ground, and have been there since the start of the uprising.

Two weeks ago I interviewed an officer of the rebel Free Syrian Army in the town of Sarmin, in Idleb province. He told me of non-Arabic speaking advisers who accompanied his airborne unit into Deraa in the first weeks of the uprising.

He described the execution of one of his brother officers who refused to fire on the crowds of demonstrators. It was this that made him end his seven-year career as an officer in the Syrian paratroops and go over to the rebels.

In Binnish, I spoke to a young civilian opposition activist who described the entry of the army and paramilitaries in force, accompanied by men with Lebanese accents. The latter were Hezbollah men, he said.

These witness accounts of Iranian and Hezbollah involvement are amply confirmed by official but insufficiently publicised reports. Iran, well versed in the practice of internal repression, has been happy to share its knowledge with its Syrian allies.

For example, the US Treasury Department last year imposed sanctions against Iranian Revolutionary Guards Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and the senior Quds Force officer in charge of operations and training, Mohsen Chizari, citing their involvement in the repression of the Syrian uprising.

The US sanctions list described the Quds Force as a “conduit for providing material support to the GID”, the Syrian intelligence service.

So it is not in doubt that a determined, focused coalition is doing all it can to ensure that Assad survives. From his point of view, this coalition is testimony to the wisdom of his decision not to be tempted away from the pro-Iranian regional bloc by the inducements offered to him by current and previous US administrations to get him to switch sides.

The Iran-led regional bloc has a keen understanding of power politics and its obligations. Unfortunately for the Syrian rebels, the West has no such clarity of vision.

The US administration wants above all to avoid getting entangled into another Middle Eastern conflict. Such a desire is entirely understandable, but its consequences are likely to be disastrous for Western interests.

Western and US hesitancy was on full display at the “Friends of Syria” gathering in Tunisia recently. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued various excuses as to why no real assistance would be made available to the rebels: they are supported by Hamas and al-Qa’ida, they failed to help their beleaguered comrades in Homs, and so on.

The Syrian rebels are indeed supported by Sunni Islamist elements. Some of them (although not all, or even a majority) are radical Sunni Islamists themselves, as I saw when I was there. They are also a divided force, unable to achieve Syria-wide mobilisation in any kind of unison.

But to achieve unity, and indeed to avoid Sunni Islamist domination, the rebels urgently need more help from the West. If this is not forthcoming, as was made clear in Tunisia, the Saudis and the Qataris will move to extend their assistance. In that eventuality, it is likely Syria’s armed opposition forces will indeed become dominated by the Sunni jihadists.

If this happens, the available outcomes for the West will then all be disastrous: victory for the Assad regime, and therefore the Iran-led regional bloc, victory for the Sunni Islamists; or a prolonged and bloody sectarian civil war.

To avoid this, what is needed is a clear program of support for the Syrian rebels from the West, led by the US, bypassing the UN. This would include the establishment of safe zones in Syria, guaranteed by Western air power, and the provision of arms and military expertise to the rebels.

It is highly unlikely any of this will happen.

The current leadership of the West doesn’t think in terms of power politics. Regarding Syria, it thinks in terms of avoiding trouble. In which case, Assad, Iran and Russia will win, or the victors will be the Sunni jihadists.

In which case, either way, the losers will be the people of Syria, and of course the West and its remaining Middle Eastern allies.

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