Spectator, 19/8: The current, troubled and glacial diplomatic process between Israel, the US/‘Board of Peace’ and the de facto Hamas authority in Gaza is a derivative of a fact which is difficult to swallow for Israelis: namely, that despite two years of war in Gaza, the jihadi authority in Gaza was not destroyed in its entirety.  As a result, Hamas remains the dominant force on the Palestinian side in the Strip.  Following the meeting between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US Envoy Jared Kushner, the Israel Prime Ministers’ Office released a terse statement (in English only) commending the ‘deep and constructive’ discussions which it declared to have taken place.   This statement plasters a thin covering of paper over substantial gaps in perception between Washington and Jerusalem regarding Gaza.  Hamas, meanwhile, is pursuing its own strategy intended to ensure its survival as a key player in Palestinian politics and the continued advancement of its long war against Israel.  So what are the substantive differences between the US/Board of Peace and Israeli sides, and what do we know about Hamas’s strategy for the next period?

Firstly, and relevantly, why was Hamas, despite its vast military inferiority to Israel, not comprehensively defeated in the 2023-2025 period?  The absence of any clear Israeli strategy for what would replace the Islamist authority played a role here.  But the key element was the organization’s taking of Israeli civilian hostages.  The safe return of civilian captives is a non-negotiable part of the State of Israel’s contract with its citizens.  Hamas was aware of this, and exploited it to buy itself time.  It isn’t possible to conduct a serious hostage negotiation with  an enemy, while at the same time seeking to destroy that enemy.  In practice, Israel as a result favored the former option.  Hamas sought to run out the clock until international pressure forced Israel to conclude its campaign short of the complete destruction of the Hamas authority and military.  The strategy worked.  As a result, though massively weakened and damaged, the Palestinian Islamists were still on their feet and able to maintain their grip over Gaza’s population when the ceasefire came in October, 2025. 

From the point of view of the government of Israel, this situation represents something considerably short of the ‘complete victory’ which Netanyahu declared to be the war’s aim.  The memory of the barbaric massacre carried out by Hamas on October 7, 2023 remains fresh for Israelis.  More tangibly, the nature of Hamas as an Islamist organisation embarked implacably on a long war intended to result in Israel’s destruction remains front and centre for Israelis. The government of Israel’s preferred situation, therefore, perhaps especially in the build up to elections scheduled for October 27, is one in which Israel continues the war against Hamas on a low flame.  This involves ongoing assassinations of Hamas cadres, and incremental territorial gains within Gaza.  Near daily airstrikes and other targeted operations have been under way since October, 2025.  The Hamas-controlled Gaza health ministry reports that 1250 Palestinians have been killed in this period.  The ministry does not differentiate between civilians and jihadis. 

Israel’s desire to continue operations against an un-destroyed Hamas runs counter to the intentions of the US-led ‘post war’ diplomatic process represented by the Board of Peace and President Trump’s 15 point plan.  According to the plan, in return for Hamas’s disarmament, Israel is to carry out a phased withdrawal to a limited ‘security buffer zone’ in Gaza, in return for Hamas’s transfer of its weapons to an independent Palestinian committee.  The plan runs contrary to Israel’s security interests, as perceived by the current government.  It also interferes with Netanyahu’s election campaign, in which he wants to present his government as implacably committed to the defeat of Hamas and the destruction of those responsible for October 7.  Netanyahu thus took the rare step of publicly rejecting the 15 point plan in a statement on August 9.  In practice, though, Israel is not in a position simply to dismiss the preferred path of the US Administration.  Hence the ‘deep and constructive’ discussions in Jerusalem. 

What is the thinking behind the US approach? The 15 point plan fairly obviously belongs with the June 17 MOU that supposedly ended the war with Iran, and the June 26 Framework deal intended to result in the disarming of Lebanese Hizballah.  In all three cases, these are arrangements intended to rapidly enable a US declaration that the conflict is at an end, while ignoring the underlying dynamics that produced the conflicts in the first place, and most importantly ignoring the nature of the forces against which the US and its allies have engaged.  The 15 point plan and the June 26 framework envisage the ‘disarming’ of two undefeated Iran-aligned Islamist militias (Hamas and the Lebanese Hizballah).  The MOU, meanwhile, established a 60 day window for negotiating a permanent peace.  The 60 days have already passed.  No peace deal appears in sight. 

The result is that in Gaza, Lebanon and on the Iran front, the conflicts are set to continue, in altered form.  Iran appears to be realizing that its blockade of Hormuz is not producing a US climbdown, raising the possibility of escalation in the period ahead.  In Lebanon, Hizballah shows no signs of acquiescing to the demands of the government of President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam for its disarmament.  Rather, it is warning of ‘internal strife’ if any effort at taking its weapons is undertaken. 

And what of Hamas?  The organisation is similarly intent on continuing its struggle in somewhat altered circumstances.  As of now,  Hamas appears to be playing for time, announcing its acceptance of the 15 point plan, while disputing the sequencing of its implementation.  The organisation appears willing and perhaps eager to give up exclusive control of government and administration over the Gazan population.  Instead, it looks set to re-assume its previous form, as a political movement with a clandestine armed wing.  Its new leader, Khalil Hayya, is closely linked to Iran and comes from the same core Gaza leadership  group which produced previous leader and architect of October 7, the late Yahya Sinwar.  Palestinian elections are set for November 28.  Hamas will be looking to participate, while preserving its core structures, regardless of formal declarations.  As on the other fronts, the long war will continue, adjusted in accordance with tactical circumstances.