Among the Insurgents

Posted on February 22, 2012 by jonathanspyer

Last Thursday afternoon, in the town square of Bini’ish in Idleb Province, northwest Syria, a small group gathered to protest against the dictatorship of Bashar al-Assad. It was drizzling, and the protesters, about 200 of them, were mostly schoolchildren. A group of young men in kaffiyehs soon arrived on the scene. They were carrying a large yellow-and-green flag—the flag of Hezbollah [1]. One of the protesters opened his motorcycle’s gas cap, and seconds later the flag was in flames. The youngsters gathered around the burning flag, whooping, cheering, and chanting slogans against the regime.

The flag burning in the main square in Bini’ish distilled in a single moment much of what I saw and experienced in Syria: The men fighting against the regime lack uniforms, a chain of command, and they have little by way of a unifying ideology. But they are fiercely united against Assad and his chief ally, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Several days before the flag-burning incident, on a black night with heavy rain, I had crossed into Syria. I had come to report on the Free Syrian Army, which has emerged as the most significant organization in the Syrian revolution—though it isn’t really an organization at all. It consists of a series of local armed initiatives centered around strongmen of various political orientations. These militias operate according to their own perceived needs, mainly seeing their job as protecting the precarious autonomous zones carved out from the Assad regime in Idleb, Homs, and other areas in the course of the uprising.

I came by way of the mountains on the Turkish-Syrian border, in the company of a group of Syrian smugglers whose assistance I had paid for. We rode horses laden with contraband in sealed boxes. For parts of the journey, stymied by rough trail, we had to lead the horses by rope. The smugglers moved at lightning speed, almost sprinting up the rocky ascents, and I was worried that I’d fall behind. But we reached Syria safely after a trek of an hour or so.

At a small stone house on the mountains just over the border, I met with a contact from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) who was due to take me down into Idleb Province, a deeply religious, conservative, Sunni Muslim region where I would spend the following week in the company of the FSA. The man, in his late 20s, was bespectacled, bearded, and polite, but reserved. His appearance and behavior were familiar to me: This young fighter was obviously a Salafi Islamist. I had heard that there were Salafis—radical Sunnis—among the FSA fighters but was surprised to meet one so soon.

An hour or so after, he and I arrived at one of the “liberated zones” of Idleb Province—one of the towns in this part of northern Syria where signs of the Assad regime have disappeared. The flag of the uprising [2], which is the flag of the pre-Baath Syrian republic, flies over the town. In the course of my time there, I met not a single fighter or officer who considered Col. Riyad Asaad, the nominal head of the FSA who is based in Antakya, Turkey, to constitute the real directing hand of the movement.

Instead, it is very clear that there is, in fact, no real leader. Armed resistance against the Assad regime has emerged out of the very basic need to protect the Syrian civilian population from their murderous dictator. A united, countrywide armed resistance movement does not yet exist in Syria. Nor do the rebels possess a single, uniting political idea, beyond bringing down the dictatorship. They seemed to be united by something more fundamental: They have all witnessed suffering caused by the regime. A good number of the fighters I spoke with were asked to carry out the violence themselves. The armed men of the FSA and the local civilian leadership of the uprising maintain law and order in the liberated zones of Idleb. It proved a good place from which to observe the Syria that may emerge when—or if—the Assad dictatorship falls.

***

Many of the FSA fighters are army deserters with similar stories. Mohammed, for example, a tall, brown-haired FSA fighter from Bini’ish, was formerly a soldier in the Syrian Army’s 9th Brigade. Sent to the southern town of Dera’a to suppress demonstrations in mid-2011, he decided to desert after being ordered to fire live ammunition at protesters. He found his way to the FSA in Dera’a and later returned home to Idleb Province. The reason, he told me, was simple: “I took an oath when I joined the army to protect the people. The people—not the regime. And that’s what I’m doing.”

Bilal Khabir, the formidable commander of the FSA in the town of Sarmeen in Idleb, abandoned his seven-year career as a member of Assad’s air force to join the insurgency. “The FSA is the real Syrian army,” he told me. “Law and justice is with our side, and we will fight to the end.” Khabir, like Mohammed, chose to desert after witnessing the suppression of demonstrations in Dera’a, where the uprising began. In his case, the precipitating incident for joining the FSA was when Iranian officers executed one of his friends when the friend refused to fire on demonstrators. (The presence of Iranian officers alongside Assad’s forces is one of the most noteworthy elements of the regime’s attempt to suppress the Syrian revolution, and it is a matter of particular anger to the insurgents.)

Not all the FSA fighters I met were army deserters. Some were local, relatively apolitical young men who had decided to join the FSA as part of a more general commitment to bring down the regime. Salafi Islamists, too, formed a recognizable sub-group within the broader ranks of the movement, though I saw no evidence that they dominated or set the tone. The Salafis I spoke to tended not to stress religious or ideological goals. Rather, like the others, they spoke of the cruelty of the regime and the need to destroy it.

But the overwhelming characteristic of the FSA is that it is Sunni. There is an unmistakable and strong sectarian element in the revolt against the Assad regime, even though this is something that FSA fighters and opposition activists prefer not to emphasize in front of visitors. They do not wish to be seen as a sectarian militia, but rather as an organization battling a dictatorship.

Yet the fact that the Assad regime now rests almost entirely on the support of the country’s 12 percent Alawi minority is not lost on the Sunni fighters of Idleb. “This is war between the clans, between the Sunni and the Shia and the Alawis,” a middle-aged civilian opposition activist said to me one evening as we sat drinking tea in his home. But then, a moment later, he corrected himself. “But the Sunnis reject the possibility of civil war between the clans. We don’t want it.”

***

The FSA fighters may lack a unified political ideology, but they do have a very clear set of shared tactical demands. As Bilal Khabir, commander of the FSA in Sarmeen, told me: “A buffer zone, a no-fly zone, and supply of weapons are the way to victory.” It was a sentence I’d hear again and again from FSA men and opposition activists. The FSA fighters know that unless international help comes in the form of a safe zone, the situation and the carnage could drag on for months or years. At the moment, the FSA has AK-47s, RPG-7s, heavy machine guns, and some mortars. They will need more than this to face down an assault from Assad’s Russian-supplied, modern weaponry.

The people I met were also acutely aware that an existing de facto international coalition is the single most important factor ensuring the dictator’s current survival. “Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, and China are against us,” a black-bearded Salafi fighter told me, shortly after he had returned from an attack on an army checkpoint outside Idleb City. When I asked Bilal Khabir to list the elements that had so far prevented Assad’s fall, he answered, “Iran and Hezbollah.” Ayham al-Kurdi claimed that FSA fighters had captured five Iranians in Hama.

Again and again, I heard stories of Lebanese Hezbollah men operating on the ground with Assad’s forces and of non-Arab-speaking advisers, likely Iranians, deployed with the government forces.

So, while FSA fighters may have little coherent idea of what they are for, they have a very clear and detailed conception of what they are against. And if what they are against is first and foremost the Assad regime itself, they are no less clearly and passionately opposed to the regional and international alliance that supports the dictator.

Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah are constantly cited as enemies of the Syrian revolution. Ayham al-Kurdi was clear that “if the revolution succeeds, we will neither depend on, nor have relations with, nor take weapons from Russia.” He also stressed that the Syrian revolution had come to “break the dream” of Iranian domination of the region—and more specifically, Tehran’s strategic ambition to create a contiguous line of pro-Iranian states stretching from Iran’s western borders to the Mediterranean Sea.

This all sounds like good news for Israel. But while the FSA may be resolute foes of the Iran-led regional bloc, there is little reason to think that the rebels and the broader opposition depart significantly from the usual Arab attitudes toward Israel and Jews. One older activist in Antakya said to me that a plan was under way to divide Syria into ethnic enclaves and that the opposition needed to be aware of this and counteract it. Who was responsible for this plan? Israel, he told me. “Zionism’s project is to divide the Arab world,” he said.

On a few occasions, I heard plaintive assertions that Assad was “worse than Israel.” Muhya-din, a young opposition organizer in Bini’ish, was more precise in his definition. “The Israelis kill Palestinians to protect their own people,” he said. “But we are Assad’s people, and he is killing us purely to retain power.” One of his friends then said, “The Israelis do what they do in the name of their God. Assad, however, thinks that he is God.”

I can think of a number of other throwaway remarks made to me regarding a desire to seek help from anyone—“even Israel,” said one fighter, if the situation continues. But the general and very clear sense was that Israel was simply not a relevant factor. The fury and hatred was reserved for Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah; the appeals for support were and are being made to the West. From Israel’s point of view, this is probably the best that can be hoped for from Arab opposition movements at the present time.

***

I left Idleb the way I came—over the mountains. There were no horses on the way out, and we had to wade through frozen streams and fields of mud. The day after I left, Assad’s army entered Idleb City with tanks, reportedly killing a number of FSA fighters.

I remember Muhya-Din’s dismissive response when I tried to ask him about his plans for his family and the child that his wife is due to give birth to in the spring, their third. “Right now, I just can’t think about anything,” he said. “I’m just waiting for the victory. Waiting for when we end this regime. After that, I’ll think only about my family again.”

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Inside Free Syria

Posted on February 18, 2012 by jonathanspyer

The mountains outside Antakya were wrapped in black clouds the day we crossed the border from Turkey into Syria. The smugglers said this was a good sign as the Syrian Army patrols don’t care for rain and mud, and would tend to stay in their huts, making our crossing safer. That was how it turned out. We pushed up the border fence and crawled through at around 9 p.m. There were horses heavily laden with contraband waiting for us just inside. We rode them across the mountains in the rain and arrived in Syria without being seen.

I had made contact with the smugglers in Antakya through Syrian opposition friends, some days previously. This is the only way into northern Syria for journalists at the present time. I wanted to head to Idleb Province, one of the centers of the insurgency against the Assad family dictatorship, and now one of the regime’s main targets. My purpose was to gain an impression of the Free Syrian Army, the increasingly important armed element in the revolt against Assad, from inside one of its heartland areas.

Antakya itself is buzzing with the semi-visible activities of both the Syrian regime and the opposition. The Free Syrian Army in Antakya is immensely security-conscious, particularly since the kidnapping and forced return to Syria of its founding member, Colonel Hussein Harmoush, last year. But the activities of the FSA are also severely restricted by the Turkish authorities, which watch it carefully, and whose gaze it seeks to avoid.

Antakya combines this sense of intrigue with the questionable charms of a mountain resort town in winter. Prior to crossing, I met with an FSA officer, Captain Ayham al-Kurdi, for an initial briefing.

I spoke with Kurdi in a rundown office in an apartment. A native of Hama, the 30-year-old former signals officer in a Syrian antiaircraft unit described to me how he came to the insurgency.

He was stationed near Daraa, a town close to the Jordanian border and the birthplace of the uprising, in mid-2011. He recalled his shock at witnessing the use of anti-aircraft munitions against civilian demonstrators in the area, as the Assad regime sought to murder the revolt in its cradle.

The use of these munitions was intended as a tool of terror. Their bullets kill people no more or less than regular ordnance. But from the regime’s point of view, they had the additional attraction of setting the bodies of those they hit on fire, turning the corpse into a symbol of deterrence to all who would challenge Assad’s rule. What they also did was to make Ayham al-Kurdi and others reassess their view of the government. Kurdi made his decision to desert, and help set up the beginnings of armed resistance to Assad.

Kurdi’s assessment of the strategic reality facing the Syrian revolution was grim: “If there is no international or Arab intervention,” he made clear, “this situation could continue for years.” The revolution has powerful enemies. The captain counted them on his hands, and the reasons for their enmity to the insurgency against Assad. First, Iran: “The Syrian revolution,” said Kurdi, “was a shock for the Iranian project. The Iranians want to control the region—Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, the Gulf. The Syrian revolution came to break this dream. So it is natural for the Iranians to help Assad.”

But together with the Iranians, there were their Lebanese clients, Hezbollah, and beyond this Russia and China, looming and impervious. “A great Arabic and international movement” is what Captain Kurdi wants to counteract this. He is not confident that it will come.

Before I left his office for the border and the smugglers, as a way of farewell, Kurdi shared with me a curious rumor—if it is a rumor—that I would hear repeated a number of times in the days ahead. It concerned the possible use of chemical warfare by Assad against protesters. The claim was made regarding the Homs area, which even more so than Idleb, is currently the main focus of the regime’s violence. Homs city is being subjected to a merciless pounding by government artillery.

In Talbisa, next to Homs city, Kurdi told me, they sprayed pesticides on demonstrators from the air. The soldiers were equipped with a new type of gas mask. “Assad said before that we were germs,” he concluded, “now we’re insects. I guess that’s progress.” He wished me luck inside.

On the highway, once in Syria, we were vulnerable to any sudden spotchecks the army cared to place. But once we entered Idleb Province, the extent of the precarious gains made by rebel fighters in recent weeks became apparent. In towns like Binnish and Sarmin, the regime of Bashar al-Assad no longer exists, at least in visible form.

The roadblock that meets you at the entry to Binnish is manned by Free Syrian Army fighters. Armed opposition activists are everywhere. A makeshift clubhouse established by Abu Steif, the big man in the opposition in this backwater town, is buzzing with armed young men going in and out until the early hours of the morning. The flag of the Syrian revolution, which is the flag of the Syrian republic before the Baath party took control in 1963, flies above the main square.

The limitations of the revolt are also immediately apparent from a perusal of the armory assembled by the Free Army fighters in their Binnish headquarters. The characterization often heard in the media of the FSA as armed only with Kalashnikovs is not quite accurate, but it’s not far from the truth. The AK-47 is indeed the main weapon of FSA fighters. In addition, I saw RPG-7s, heavy machine guns, and a mortar. Newly arrived body armor, smuggled over the mountains, was stacked up in boxes. There seemed to be no sign of first-aid kits, though, and little indication of any sophisticated communications equipment.

The weapons were the subject of much discussion, and discussion is what the Free Army members in Binnish do a lot of, in their clubhouse, drinking endless quantities of sweet tea and smoking.

The RPG-7, in particular, was an object of enthusiasm. I heard Abdo, a fighter of the FSA and a former Syrian tank corpsman, extolling its virtues to the heavily built, black-bearded Abu Steif on that first evening. “At 300 yards, Abu Steif, at 300 yards, and it can stop a tank. It can take a house down, too. You’ll see it when the time comes.” Abu Steif, a ruminative figure, a prominent local businessman before the revolt, reflected on this information before nodding and concluding, “Praise God.” Assad’s army last entered the town in force in October. No one thinks they won’t be back.

The fighters in Binnish are a mixed bunch. Many are army deserters, with harrowing tales similar to Ayham al-Kurdi’s. The names of the places differ. The details are largely the same: orders to shoot at civilians, a growing realization of having been lied to, and then the decision to escape. The defections are recalled in graphic detail. Sometimes they involve the deaths of friends who sought also to desert, sometimes the turning of guns on fellow Syrian soldiers or officers.

But there is another type of fighter in the ranks of the armed opposition in the town. On the first evening, away from the main opposition center, I met a group of FSA members returning from an attack on an army checkpoint outside Idleb city. Among them were representatives of a type of man immediately familiar to all observers of early 21st-century Middle East politics. A type of man very calm, often smiling, with a sort of serenity about him. Bearded, invoking the authority of holy text, though rarely in a histrionic way. Salafi Islamist fighters are prominent among the FSA men in Binnish. They tended to keep away from Abu Steif’s clubhouse and to have their own gatherings elsewhere. They were local men, though, not foreigners.

I interviewed one of the Salafis shortly after they had returned from the attack on the checkpoint. He was in his mid-30s, black-bearded, and with the attitude typical of FSA fighters, a gloomy assessment of the balance of forces combined with a kind of generalized optimism. “We have no support from any country, and we receive no weapons from anyone,” he told me. “The regime, meanwhile, has Iran, Hezbollah, Russia, and China.” How long until Assad is destroyed? I asked. “I give it,” he said, in the manner of a physician revealing a prognosis, “roughly a month.”

The activists in Idleb Province are keen to reassure you that the regime really has gone, without a trace, from the liberated zones. The reality is more complex. The creation of the free zones in Idleb, Homs Province, and elsewhere is the most significant achievement to date of the Syrian revolution. The Assad regime, it should be remembered, was until recently a synonym for the airless, locked-down Arab nationalist police state. In Idleb Province now, there is some room to breathe.

And yet, of course, the regime is still there. Its tanks and armored vehicles are deployed some distance away, in the surrounding fields. But the unseen mechanisms of the dictatorship are present far beyond the FSA roadblock meant to keep out intruders.

Each Friday, large demonstrations take place across Syria, under a single slogan chosen by the opposition. On the Friday I was in Binnish, the designated slogan was “Russia is killing us.” A British Sky TV crew had entered the town, and was doing a live broadcast from a rooftop next to the rally. All had been peaceful. But as the cameras began to roll, in the area behind them, a large brawl unaccountably erupted. Within seconds, the Sky reporter’s jaunty copy about the revolution in Idleb Province was being recited, absurdly, with a mass fistfight going on behind it.

Opposition activists stepped in, and to the fury of the crew, stopped the live broadcast. To the practiced eye, what had taken place was very apparent. This was a provocation straight out of the dog-eared East German playbook of the Baath regime. Primitive and lowtech, it may have been. But it succeeded in disrupting the only piece of live coverage coming out of Idleb Province that day and served notice that whatever flag flew above the town square, the Assad regime had not entirely left. It turned out that some members of an unruly local clan had been paid to start the fight.

That evening, Abu Steif and his activists began preparing a list of 200 families in the town who would send representatives to a new “security committee” to be formed in Binnish. It is a beginning.

Getting from Binnish to neighboring Sarmin requires venturing back onto the main highway to Damascus. We managed this without incident. In Sarmin, the armed element looks better organized, more professional than in Binnish. There is talk of around a thousand armed men in the town.

I met with one of the commanders, 25-year-old Lieutenant Bilal Khaibar, at a position prepared by the FSA at the entrance to the town. Khaibar, a seven-year veteran of Assad’s airborne forces, is impressive in the classic manner of an elite infantry officer—earnest, clipped, and precise. The outlines of his own story, and the reasons he joined the FSA, were by now familiar.

He and his unit were deployed in the south in the early months of the uprising. They were told that armed Israelis had crossed the border and that they were to engage them. On closing with the “enemy,” they discovered that it consisted of unarmed Syrian civilians. The troops were accompanied into the engagement by non-Arabic-speaking men, who Bilal later discovered were Iranians. These men were responsible for the execution of one of Bilal Khaibar’s brother officers, who refused to fire on civilians in the Daraa area. Khaibar made his way in June 2011 to the Free Syrian Army days after the killing of his friend.

Bilal Khaibar still wears his Syrian Army paratroopers’ wings on his FSA uniform, and was careful to explain to me that he does this because he regards himself as part of the legal army of Syria. “I am with the law, not against the law. The regime is fascist and criminal.” Nor does he have any illusions about what is to come. “We expect what happened in Homs to happen here. But even with our simple weapons, we are ready to fight. Either Bashar stays, or we stay.”

As for what can bring victory, again, the demands are familiar—above all, a buffer zone. A place to which refugees can flee, and from which fighters can organize. Without this, Khaibar sees no end to the situation.

And again, the curious rumor: Three times, he says, three times, in his clipped, officer’s way, the regime has used chemical weapons and pesticides against protesters in the Homs area.

“Freedom is the promise of God on earth,” Khaibar tells me. So if international help doesn’t come, he and his men will hold the Sarmin free zone for as long as they can, and afterwards fight, he says, “like peshmerga.” The regime, says Khaibar, “has the heavy weapons, but the people are with us.”

Lieutenant Bilal Khaibar of the Sarmin FSA was the most credible of the military men I met in Idleb Province. The presence of individuals of his type in the insurgency is an indication that it is real, it means business, and it will not easily be destroyed. However, without the buffer zone and the assistance that he and others repeatedly demanded, it is difficult to see how victory can come.

In October, when the army of Assad swept through Idleb Province, they began their attack on Binnish from the graveyard outside of the town. On my last day in Idleb, two young fighters of the FSA proudly recounted their own role in the bloody battle in the alleyways of the first neighborhood facing the graveyard, as the fighters sought to stop Assad’s army and irregulars from forcing their way in. “Assad wants to turn the whole of Syria into a graveyard,” one of them told me as we stood by the grave of Ahmed Abd el-Hakim, an FSA fighter killed by a sniper in the October clashes.

The Assad regime’s choice to launch the attack in a graveyard seemed particularly apt. Death and its political uses is the only currency in which this most brutal of dictatorships has ever learned to deal. It has traded in this coin, however, with vigor and skill, and it continues to do so.

Umm Maher, the mother of Ahmed Abd el-Hakim, later summed up for me what this has meant in human terms for the people of Syria.

Sitting in her front room, with her daughter seated next to her holding a picture of Ahmed, she told me that, “for 40 years we’ve lived like this—no law, no rights. We live with terror. We are made to live differently from all other people in the world by this regime. So we’re proud of our son, who was trying to end this. He was brave.”

Umm Maher’s words express a simple and obvious truth regarding the desire of human beings for dignity. As for the instruments in place in Syria for achieving this, the Free Syrian Army in Idleb Province includes many courageous and capable men. Some of them are committed to Salafi Islamist ideologies. They are nearly all Sunni Arabs. There is a clear sectarian logic at work—alongside a desire to see the end of a regime that denies them the most basic and minimal of rights.

In terms of their capabilities, the Free Syrian Army remains something of a fiction. What exists on the ground is a conglomeration of locally organized militias, lacking any coherent central direction or chain of command, and with no real strategy for victory beyond the “buffer zone” constantly referred to.

For the people and the fighters of Idleb, the fight goes on. They know that once Assad is finished with Homs and Hama, and once he thinks he can get away with it, he will turn his attention back to the north. Then it will be their turn, and the dictator will exact a bloody and terrible revenge for their effrontery.

What could prevent this is an effective coalition to counter the anti-Western one (Iran, Hezbollah, Russia) that currently underwrites the dictator. This Western coalition can only happen outside the auspices of the U.N., where Russia and China have already vetoed Security Council resolutions demanding Assad step down. Part of that Western response would involve turning the FSA from a collection of ragtag militias into a more formidable force. And it would commit to the creation of a free zone in Syria more solid and guaranteed than those zones currently held, with hope and courage, by fighters armed only with AK-47s and RPG-7s.

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Hizballah backs Assad – and pays the price

Posted on January 20, 2012 by jonathanspyer

In early January, 2011, Hizballah and its allies took up the reins of
government in Lebanon, having ensured the collapse of the coalition
led by March 14 leader and then Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri.
Hizballah needed a coalition which it thought would staunchly oppose the Special
Tribunal on Lebanon, investigating the killing of former Lebanese
Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri.

But many at the time discerned a more significant meaning in the rise
to government of the March 8 coalition. It looked like the latest
stage in the inexorable rise of the Lebanese Shia Islamist movement,
founded under the patronage of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in 1982.
Hizballah had survived Israel’s
onslaught in 2006, and gone on to successfully intimidate its internal
opponents in the mini civil war of May, 2008.

With a reputed yearly donation of $200 million from Teheran, Hizballah
had built a state within the state. it had developed a matchless
military and security capability, independent of the organs of the
Lebanese government, and in most ways more powerful. By January,
2011, Hizballah looked set to absorb its host.

Today, however, much of this is open to question. Hizballah no longer
looks so unassailable. The movement has been one of the less remarked
upon victims of the Arab upheavals of 2011. Let’s take a look at how
this has happened.

Over the last two decades, Hizballah defined itself along a number if
parallel lines, each of which before 2011 appeared to support the
other. The movement was simultaneously a sectarian representative of
the Lebanese Shia, a regional ally of Iran and Syria, a defender of
the Lebanese against the supposed aggressive intentions of Israel, and
a leader of a more generically defined Arab and Muslim ‘resistance’
against Israel and the west.

As a result of the events of 2011, these various lines, which seemed
mutually supportive, have begun to contradict one another. This is
diminishing Hizballah’s position – though it remains physically
unassailable for as long as the Assad regime in Syria survives.

When the ‘Arab Spring’ first broke out, Hizballah was able to happily
endorse it. This is because in its first three significant
manifestations – in Egypt, Tunisia and Bahrain – the ‘Arab Spring’ was
directed against pro-western, anti-Iranian regimes. And in Bahrain,
even better, a Shia populace was rising up against a pro-western,
Sunni monarch.

The problems began with the outbreak of the revolt against the Assad
regime in Syria. Syria is a charter member of the pro-Iranian
regional alliance to which Hizballah also belongs. It is also a vital
strategic conduit for the organization, providing a hinterland, a
potential safe haven in the event of war with Israel, and a route for
the supply of Iranian arms. For all these, reasons, Hizballah is
determined that Assad survive. Reliable sources suggest that
Hizballah men are involved in infiltrating opposition groups in Syria
and providing
intelligence.

This investment in the survival of Assad indicates which of the four
aspects of Hizballah’s identity mentioned above are most important to
it. The link with the Iran-led alliance and maintaining the ability
to wage war against Israel are the cardinal interests. To maintain
these, Hizballah has to a great extent sacrificed its more nebulous
self-image as a leader of pan-Islamic ‘resistance.’ Syrian Sunnis
leading the uprising against Assad now count Hizballah among their
enemies. The movement’s flag has been burnt at opposition rallies.

So the uprising in Syria has served to remove the veil of ‘resistance’
from the face of Hizballah. The sectarian visage beneath has been
revealed. Hizballah has been exposed as a sectarian, iran-aligned
Shia force, backing a vicious, non-Sunni dictatorship in its war
against its own, largely Sunni people.

Polls show the resulting disappearance of the high regard in which
Hizballah was once held across the Arab world.

Of course, for as long as the Assad dictatorship survives, this has no
immediate physical implications for Hizballah. And despite the
overenthusiastic predictions of some westerners and Israelis, the
Assad regime may well be around for some considerable time to come.

But in Lebanon, there are already signs that non-Shia communities,
long chafing under the heel of Hizballah, are beginning to grow
restive. The governing coalition is no longer unified on Syria. The
perennial political weathervane, Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, now
supports the Syrian dictator’s departure.

More ominously, there are signs of growing Sunni restiveness on the
ground. The sectarian nature of the conflict in Syria is spilling
across the border. Hizballah operatives have been engaged in the
arrest of Syrian oppositionists seeking refuge in Lebanon, and their
despatch back to Assad. The Lebanese government is claiming that the
border town of Arsal has become a haven for ‘al-Qaeda’ elements. In
the town of Tarshish, local residents in October physically prevented
Hizballah from extending its telecommunications networks into the
town.

Hizballah is also engaged in putting down opposition within its own
community. Two Shia clerics are set to face charges of ‘conspiring
with Israel’ later this month. The two, Sheikh Hassan Mchaymech and
Sayyed Mohammad Ali al-Hussein were known for their independent and
critical positions toward Hizballah.

None of this portends the imminent demise of Hizballah. What it does
reveal is a nervous, diminished organization, which has shed most of
the region-wide charisma it earned through its fight against Israel.

The logic of the emerging post 2011 Middle East is one of Islamism and
sectarianism. In this context, Hizballah is now exposed as a gendarme
in the Levant for Iran and the Shia Islamism it adheres to. The
movement, like its friend Bashar Assad, increasingly holds power by
force alone. This can be maintained while it is the stronger party.
For as long as Bashar is in his seat, it will be so. If he falls,
Hizballah’s enemies in Lebanon (and Syria) will be waiting.

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Hamas Seeks a New Patron

Posted on January 12, 2012 by jonathanspyer

PJmedia, 12/1/12

The emergent winner of the Arab upheavals of 2011 is Sunni Islamism. This is reflected most centrally in the election results in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood and the more extreme Salafi trend have won a landslide victory. Arab Sunni Islamist regimes are set to emerge in the period ahead as factors in the regional contest for power.

The emergence of regimes of this type is bad news for the West, but it also represents a setback for the main enemies of the West in the Mideast — namely, Iran and its allies. The rise of Sunni Islamism has implications in the Palestinian arena.

Hamas is currently seeking to exit the Shia, Iran-led bloc in the direction of Sunni Islamist power. Meanwhile, Iran is focusing on its solid link with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement as an alternative to the dying alliance with Hamas.

Over the previous decade, Tehran had hoped to unite Islamist and anti-Western forces in the region behind its banner, and thus to emerge as the main challenger to the U.S. This ambition contained a fairly obvious flaw: the Iranians are Shia Muslims and non-Arabs. They were hoping to lead an area consisting overwhelmingly of Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslims. The rise of Arab Sunni Islamism to prominence and dominance in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and perhaps soon Syria casts a spotlight on this contradiction.

This has placed Hamas in a decidedly uncomfortable position from which it is now trying to extricate itself. Hamas is an outgrowth of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood. Yet over the last decade, it had also become a card-carrying member of the Iran-led regional bloc. The movement’s leadership was domiciled in Syria, the long-term Arab ally of Iran. Iran provided money, weaponry, and training for Hamas’ sovereign Gaza enclave.

But in recent months, Hamas has faced a situation in which its fellow Sunni Muslim brothers in Syria are engaged in an uprising against a non-Sunni regime under whose patronage the Hamas leadership lives. The regime is seeking to suppress this revolt using methods of utmost viciousness and brutality. At the same time, as Sunni Islamism rises to power elsewhere, a number of attractive potential alternative patrons for Hamas seem to be emerging.

So Hamas is now trying to quietly exit the Iranian camp for pastures new. Leadership cadres in Damascus have in recent months moved themselves and their families out of Syria to a variety of regional destinations. Only a small staff remains in the Syrian capital. Hamas in Gaza has staunchly refused to hold demonstrations in support of the beleaguered Assad regime. The furious Iranians have threatened to cut vital funding from the Gaza enclave, to no avail.

Meanwhile, the search has been on for a new home. Among the possible destinations are Qatar, Egypt, and Jordan. The latest reports in Arabic media, however, have pointed to Tunisia as the most likely destination. A Muslim Brotherhood-associated party is already in unambiguous control of the country, unlike in the other countries listed. On the other hand, Tunis is a long way from the area of Hamas’ main interest.

In the latest semi-surreal episode in Hamas’ return to the Sunni Arab mainstream, the movement has been asked to mediate between the Arab League and the Syrian regime. Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal has sent a message to Bashar Assad, “advising” Assad to comply with the Arab League Memorandum of Understanding that he signed on December 19 and has been ignoring ever since.

It is easy to imagine the apoplectic reaction in Tehran to Meshaal’s promotion of himself from junior client to mediator, however there is little the Iranians can do to stop Hamas. Hamas’ Fatah rivals also reacted scornfully, but there is little they can do about it, either. The rise of Sunni Islamism in the Arab world is a net loss for both Iran and Fatah. Hamas sees it, correctly, as a potential net gain for itself and is maneuvering to extract maximum benefit.

The Iranians do not entirely lack cards in the Palestinian arena. Unlike Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad remains firmly committed to its alliance with Tehran and Damascus. Islamic Jihad, which has built up a powerful independent military capacity in Gaza, is an important tool of policy for the Iranians. It can be used, when its masters wish, to disturb the quiet that Hamas currently prefers. This was seen in October 2011 when Islamic Jihad engaged in a unilateral escalation against Israel, firing Grad rockets at Ashkelon and other population centers.

Islamic Jihad notwithstanding, the slow exit of Hamas from the pro-Iranian bloc offers a clue as to the direction of regional politics in the aftermath of the 2011 changes. The move is toward increased sectarianism and the rise of Sunni Arab Islamism. This new gathering of forces is a natural opponent both of the West and of the Iran-led regional bloc which before 2011 was the main enemy of the U.S. and its allies in the Mideast.

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Arab Observer Farce

Posted on January 7, 2012 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 6/1

Since the beginning of last week, a team of observers from Arab
countries have been in Syria. Their task is to monitor Syrian
compliance with the Arab League Memorandum of Understanding signed by
the Assad regime on December 19th. The Memorandum requires the regime
to withdraw its forces and heavy weapons from populated areas, release
political prisoners, allow journalists and aid workers to enter the
country and commence dialogue with the opposition.

To comply sincerely with any of these requirements would spell suicide
for the Syrian regime. Assad is aware that to permanently concede the
monopoly of force in any area of Syria is to accept the inevitability
that an alternative political and military leadership will begin to
emerge there. He has no intention of allowing this. The observers
are therefore on a mission doomed in advance to failure.

Syrian acceptance of the MoU and the Arab observers is a transparent
effort to gain time. The regime hopes that during the period in which
the observers serve to reduce international pressure, the savage
violence of the Syrian army and Alawi irregulars can begin to turn
back the tide of protest. As a number of regional media outlets have
observed, the proper term for the Arab team now inside Syria should be
‘spectators’, rather than observers.

Assad signed the MoU, after months of prevarication, on the advice of
his Russian allies. Syria is reliant on the Russians for ensuring that
there is no action against them at the UN Security Council. The Arab
League Memorandum provides an agreeably toothless alternative to such
action. Once it is decided upon, it must be given ‘time to succeed’
(or fail), thus negating any possibility of further diplomatic action,
before the observers submit their report.

The performance of the observers in their first week in the field did
not disappoint, from the Syrian regime’s point of view. The
delegation is led by former Sudanese Intelligence Minister Mustafa
al-Dabi. Al-Dabi’s main qualification for this position is that he
himself narrowly avoided an arrest warrant, on charges related to his
suspected involvement in the genocide in Darfur.

Al-Dabi’s actions on the ground in Syria were a clumsy and obvious
charade. The Syrian Army removed its armor from the besieged city of
Homs for a day. Al-Dabi and his colleagues toured the city, initially
accompanied by an officer of the notorious 4th Armored Division.
Al-Dabi then reported that he had found nothing ‘frightening’ in Homs,
and that overall the impression he had gained was ‘reassuring.’

In the period since the observers entered Syria, 390 people have been
killed, including 30 children, according to the Local Coordination
Committees, which organize protests.

The obvious impotence and irrelevance of the observer force led to
calls for its withdrawal later in the week from the grandly-named
‘Arab parliament’. This Arab League-created advisory body, however,
has no power to insist or decide on anything.

In a press conference in Cairo, Egyptian Arab League Secretary-General
Nabil El-Araby sought to defend the role of the observers. This press
conference did little to build confidence in the mission.

The shooting and sniping in Syria, El-Araby declared, must end. He
added, however, that the problem in Syria is that it is so hard to
know who is shooting at who.

A close statistical analysis of the 6000 people killed in the course
of the Syrian uprising might disabuse Mr El-Araby of this impression.
It is the Syrian regime’s forces who are doing the shooting. Syrian
civilians are the ones being shot at. This was so prior to the
regime’s commitment to the MoU and the arrival of the observers. It
has remained the case subsequently.

The reasons behind the curious spectacle of Arab League non-activity
masquerading as activity vis a vis Syria are to be found in the realm
of intra-Arab diplomacy.

Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, which are centrally concerned with facing
down Iranian ambitions in the region, want to see the defeat of Assad
in the shortest possible time. They are keen to swiftly move on from
the Arab League level to the UN Security Council.

This has been reflected in a series of scathing editorials in Saudi
media outlets this week, criticizing the performance of the observers.
Influential columnist Tariq Al Homayed, for example, writing in Sharq
al-Awsat, said that the current performance of the observers
represents a ‘blatant attempt to save Assad.’ He called for Syria to
be given three days to comply with the provisions of the Arab
Memorandum. If this is not done, Al-Homayed recommended the transfer
of the Syrian ‘file’ to the UN Security Council, and the subsequent
imposition of a no-fly zone and buffer area.

Al-Homayed listed a number of regional states who he would like to see
involved in this effort – including Turkey, Morocco, Kuwait, UAE,
Libya and Qatar. He notes specifically that the Arab League as an
entity need not necessarily be involved.

Other Arab states, however, do not in any way adhere to this view.
Some, such as Lebanon and Iraq, are themselves allied with Syria and
Iran, and therefore share Assad’s interesting in stalling and
preventing any coherent action. Others, including Egypt, do not hold
to the Saudi sense of urgency regarding the need to deal a blow to
Iran and its regional assets. Rather, they are mainly concerned to
prevent the possibility of western intervention into Syria, at the
heart of the Arab world. The Arab League Memorandum of Understanding
and the subsequent dispatch of the observers reflect this agenda.

Until now, the net result of this has been the farcical performance of
the Arab observers, under the command of the redoubtable al-Dabi of
Darfur. Meanwhile, Assad is continuing to slaughter his civilian
population with abandon. Whatever the outcome of the crisis in Syria,
it can be said with certainty that the Arab League will not be the
instrument that brings the slaughter to an end.

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Rebels against the Pasdaran

Posted on December 28, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post Magazine, 23/12/11

In July, 2011, as the world focused on the bright hopes raised by the Arab Spring, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps launched a large-scale assault across the Iran-Iraq border. Their intention was to wipe out an armed challenge to the Islamist regime in Teheran. The target was PJAK (Party for a Free Life In Kurdistan), an Iranian Kurdish organization engaged in both political and military struggle against the regime. PJAK, closely aligned with the PKK, maintains bases in the southern Qandil mountain area, from where its fighters launched raids across the border into Iran. The intention of the Revolutionary Guards forces was to destroy this infrastructure. The operation would continue, an Iranian official told state television, ‘until all PJAK members were killed.’

The subsequent fighting was fierce, with heavy losses on both sides. For two months, the IRGC shelled the Qandil area. Hundreds of families were forced to leave their homes in the Choman and Qalat Diza districts, close to the border.

This conflict was almost entirely ignored by the international media, which was chasing the phantom of democracy across the Arab Middle East at the time.

The battle ended inconclusively. A ceasefire was restored on September 12th. Iranian official propaganda claimed to have captured three PJAK camps and to have destroyed PJAK’s military capability. The organization dismissed this, asserting that its fighters had defeated an Iranian attempt to seize the Qandil area.

Amid claim and counter-claim, a number of facts were clear. The Revolutionary Guards had crossed an international border in force. The Iraqi government had said nothing in protest. Civilians had been targeted and killed. The world had remained silent.

It is also clear that despite the claims of the Iranians to have destroyed PJAK, the organization has survived the assault. It is now reported to be engaged in the construction of new defensive positions close to the border.

Two months after the renewed ceasefire, I traveled to a European city to interview the leader of PJAK, Abdul Rahman Haji-Ahmadi. Haji-Ahmadi is officially a resident of Cologne, Germany. We did not meet in that city, however – the PJAK leader having departed it after indications that the Iranian regime were seeking to assassinate him there.

Concerns regarding security are not an idle conceit where opponents of the Iranian regime are concerned. The mullahs have a history of killing their exiled opponents. Kurdish activists have formed a particular target for its attentions. In September, 1992, three prominent Iranian Kurdish leaders, Sadegh Sharafkandi, Fattah Abdoli and Homayoun Ardalan, and their translator were shot dead in a restaurant in Berlin. A mixed Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah team in the employ of the Islamic Republic of Iran was responsible.

These killings form part of a longer story of resistance by Iranian Kurds to the regime of the mullahs. PJAK has been active since 2004. Iran’s 12 million Kurds, however, have stood against and been targeted by the Islamist regime since its inception. And,of course, the Kurdish fight for recognition and rights precedes the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Haji-Ahmadi, however, was concerned with the here and now, as we began our conversation in a quiet side-room in the bustling offices of a Kurdish political organization. First and foremost, he wanted to communicate the little-documented reality of life for the inhabitants of Iranian Kurdistan.

The picture he painted was a grim, disturbing and unfamiliar one. Speaking in Kurdish, via an interpreter, Haji-Ahmadi described an impoverished, isolated region, in which the imprint of the Revolutionary Guards extends far beyond political repression. The IRGC controls key economic concerns in the area, giving the organization leverage over the inhabitants. Those wishing to improve their own lives and that of their families are required to collaborate with the organization. Economic dependence is supposed to produce political quiescence. It works, however, only partially – so the heavy hand of repression is also required.

The IRGC regularly executes impoverished Iranian Kurds seeking to make a living by smuggling across the Iran-Iraq border. The Corps’ enthusiasm for killing doesn’t stop with smugglers. Earlier this year, a wave of executions of incarcerated Kurdish activists took place. According to the International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran: “Execution of Kurdish activists, without fair trials and following torture, increasingly appears as a systematic, politically motivated process.”

Haji-Ahmadi stressed that his movement sees itself as part of the larger Iranian opposition. He noted the generally dire situation for national minorities in Iran – listing Baluchis, Turks, Azeris and Arabs – and dismissed claims that the regime enjoys support among broad sections of the Iranian population: ‘There are 75 million people in Iran – and 70 million support the opposition,’ he told me. The problem, however, is organization. The opposition are ‘not united, not organized.’ And the ‘organizations of the Iranian opposition are outside Iran, and Iran itself is organized among them.’

Compounding the bleak situation facing the Iranian opposition, said Haji-Ahmadi, is what he considers to be the mistaken strategy employed by the international community regarding the country. The PJAK leader is critical of what he regards as the exclusive emphasis on the Iranian nuclear issue, at the expense of a focus on the broader crimes of the regime. ‘You cant’, he asserted, ‘turn the Iranian population against the regime with the nuclear issue.’ Instead, he recommends that the international focus on Iran concentrate on ‘human rights, minority rights and national rights.’

Later, our discussion turned to broader regional issues – Syria, Turkey, and Israel.

On Turkey’s current role as the US Administration’s preferred regional partner, Haji Ahmed was predictably scathing. ‘America,’ he noted, ‘cites Turkey as a model for regional democracy – Turkey, with its use of chemical weapons against Kurds and its napalm bombs and its internment of thousands of people. This is the model for democracy?’ He also dismisses claims by the Turkish government that the Kurds have been assisting the Syrian regime as ‘Turkish propaganda.’

He notes Israel’s (now discontinued) provision of drone aircraft to Turkey, and their replacement by US equipment. How, he asked, can Israel repair relations with the ‘AKP and its so-called ‘modern-Islamic’ approach. The AKP and Gulen groups, he suggested, are ‘apparently modern now – tomorrow, who knows?’

On Israel, the PJAK leader expressed his support for the ‘right of the Jewish People to have their own nation and their own country.’ ‘Our success,’ he added, ‘will be useful also for you.’ He dismissed, however, the oft-made claims by the Iranian state media of Israeli assistance to PJAK. ‘Anyone in Iran who is against theocracy,’ he says, ‘is immediately accused of being a US or Israeli agent.’

Given the recently emergent evidence of someone or other engaging in paramilitary operations deep inside Iran, it is of course impossible to draw any clear conclusions regarding possible links between armed opposition groups in Iran and Iran’s external enemies.

It is usual for Kurdish leaders to speak in warm and supportive terms about Israel, but the terms Haji-Ahmed used were ones I had never heard before. He stressed the similarity of the situation facing the Kurds and the Israelis. Both Kurds and Israeli Jews, he suggested, were ‘surrounded on all sides by states that are opposed to them.’ And ‘Persians, Arabs and Turks,’ will never be ‘friends’ to either people.

Such a comparison might appear tenuous, given the vastly differing levels of strength of these two peoples. Still, the Kurds today command a semi-sovereign enclave in northern Iraq. The rulers of the Kurdish Regional Government may have little common ground with the socialist PJAK and PKK. But on the national level, the activities of these organizations against the Iranian and Turkish regimes are made possible only because of the tacit tolerance afforded them by the Kurdish authorities. There is an underlying shared national hope.

The stakes are very high. With the US departed from Iraq, the Kurds find themselves at the center of a complex strategic game – and, as ever, surrounded by enemies. Iran to the east, Turkey to the north, a pro-Iranian regime in Baghdad to the south, and the beleaguered, Iran-aligned regime in Damascus to the west. They have few allies. Yet Haji-Ahmadi is not pessimistic.

He considers that in the long term, the Islamist regime in Iran is doomed. In the shorter term, if the Iranian Revolutionary Guards cross the border again – well, as he told me by way of conclusion, his movement will fight them once more. As in summer 2011.

With the Middle East currently in flux, the Iranian Kurds are poised between hope and trepidation. The concerns are detailed above and are well-justified. The hope is that the latest shift in the tectonic plates of the Middle East may finally result in the creation of a sovereign space for the people of Kurdistan. In the meantime, PJAK is rebuilding – in the Qandil mountains on the Iraq-Iran border, and in its offices on quiet side streets in European cities. Rebuilding and waiting.

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Syria: a word of caution

Posted on December 28, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Defense Minister Ehud Barak was reported as predicting that the regime of Bashar Assad would fall within weeks.

Certainly things are not going well for the Assad family dictatorship. The bloodletting continues as the Free Syrian Army and other insurgent groups continue to strike at government forces. Economic sanctions endorsed by the Arab League are to take effect December 27. The economy is expected to sharply contract in the year ahead, in the wake of EU sanctions already in place and the collapse of the tourism industry.

RELATED:
UN human rights chief: Syria death toll reaches 5,000

And yet, observers should be careful before confidently predicting the imminent fall of the house of Assad. They have being doing so since April, but the dictator is still there. Notwithstanding his recent absurd performance on ABC News, he may well be with us for some time to come. The factors that have kept him in place so far largely remain.

Firstly, the Assad regime is not friendless or isolated, despite the sanctions. Most importantly, its Iranian strategic partner is still there.

The mullahs stick by their allies. The Iranians have been providing material, advice and possibly also personnel to help Assad’s bloody fight against his own people since it began. This patronage has just been publicly reaffirmed and shows no sign of tailing off.

Russia and China are still there too. Their support is preventing any effective response to the bloodletting from coming through the UN Security Council.

Syria maintains its friends in the Arab world, too. The Maliki government in Iraq is developing as a close ally and trading partner.

In line with its orientation toward Iran, Baghdad voted against the Arab sanctions on Damascus. Hezbollah in Lebanon, of course, depends on Assad’s survival to maintain its strategic position. So Assad is not alone.

Secondly, the half-hearted Arab League “protocol” for resolving the issue is intended largely to prevent a more determined international response.

The Arabs do not want to see another Western military intervention into the heart of the Arab world. The League’s plan is intended to prevent this, by pretending to represent an alternative Arab road to reform in Syria. It is, meanwhile, bogged down in endless quibbling and prevarication over the issue of Arab observers in Syria.

Even if Assad were to agree to these, they would make no discernible difference. Leaving the Syrian issue in the hands of the Arab League means leaving Assad in power.

Thirdly, Assad’s security forces, despite the large number of desertions, remain structurally intact. In the Syrian Arab Army the dictator possesses large and effective instruments of suppression, including the four large security services and the amorphous and brutal gathering of Alawi gunmen known as the “Shabiha.”

By contrast, the opposition remains divided and unsure of its strategy. Its armed capacity, while determined, is vastly smaller and less powerful than that available to the dictator.

Political power, ultimately, derives from superior force.

The Syrian opposition lacks this, and hence possesses no mechanism for seizing power.

It also remains divided against itself, with the main political and armed wings disagreeing over tactics, and a number of smaller political groupings declining to accept the authority of the Syrian National Council.

So reports of Assad’s demise have been much exaggerated.

If things are left as they are, the prospect in Syria is for a bloody civil war, the outcome of which remains uncertain.

The move that could change this would be an internationally backed establishment of a buffer zone in northern Syria, and sponsorship and training for the opposition. This would provide ground and cover for the growth of a coherent political and military challenge to Assad. It does not look immediately imminent.

Short of this, despite the latest optimistic predictions, Assad will probably be around for a while yet.

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Iraq pays the entry fee to the Iran-led bloc

Posted on December 28, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 20/12/11

As the Assad regime in Syria fights for its life, it is important to remember that it still possesses a considerable number of assets. Perhaps most important among these is the fact that its regional allies have not abandoned it. As has been made clear in recent days, both the Iranian regime and its Lebanese client Hezbollah are sticking with their troubled Ba’ath colleague in Syria. But the list of President Bashar Assad’s friends does not end with these two.

A third local addition to the roster of influential players still backing Assad is the government of Nouri al-Maliki in Iraq.

Maliki’s backing of Assad is of significance beyond merely the Syrian context. It is an indication that Shia-led Iraq is drawing closer to Iran.

This is taking place simultaneously with the gains made by Sunni Islamism in a variety of Arab countries as a result of the upheavals of 2011. The direction in which Maliki is moving Iraq reflects an emergent reality of sharpened sectarian divisions in the increasingly Islamized political landscape of the Middle East.

From the outset, the Maliki government refused to join in the growing chorus of international and regional Arab condemnation of Assad’s brutal methods. While the Saudis, Tunisians, Kuwaitis and Bahrainis rapidly withdrew their ambassadors from Damascus, the government of Iraq made do with expressions of mild hope that Assad would “quicken” the pace of reforms.

The position of the Iraqi government has remained constant. As the bloodshed in Syria increased and the Western world called for the isolation of the regime, Maliki entertained a high-profile delegation of Syrian officials and entrepreneurs.

Iraq abstained on the vote in the Arab League to suspend Syrian membership. Baghdad abstained in the same forum in late November on the vote to impose sanctions on Syria.

Iraq, together with Hezbollah-dominated Lebanon, has made clear that it does not consider itself obligated by the sanctions. There are fears that Iraqi and Lebanese cooperation with Syria to circumvent the restrictions will empty them of all content. Certainly, the Syrian regime is banking on this.

Iraq is Syria’s second-largest trading partner (after the EU). It accounts for fully 13 percent of Syria’s total trade – a value of $5.3 billion in 2010.

Maliki’s steadfast support for Assad is particularly striking because it is in stark contrast to the situation that existed until very recently. In 2009, Baghdad cut off relations with Syria. Maliki was furious at evidence that Assad had sponsored bombings in Baghdad. The Assad regime had also been a strong supporter of the Sunni insurgency against US forces in Iraq.

Now all this has changed. Maliki, who managed to form his second coalition after elections in 2010, is one of the few remaining Arab allies of the Syrian regime.

Why? The keys to understanding the Iraqi shift are the imminent departure of US forces from Iraq and the long political game that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been playing in both Iraq and Syria.

While the US and its allies were engaged in military activity in Iraq, the Iranians were pursuing an altogether more subtle strategy.

This involved the sponsorship of political movements and the amassing of political power and influence for use on the day after the US pulls out of Iraq.

Following elections, Maliki was only able to form his government – after months of wrangling – because the Iranian-backed movement of Moqtada al-Sadr chose eventually to back him.

This took place after Iran brokered a deal between Sadr and Maliki. Negotiations for the deal took place in Qom, in Iran.

Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Revolutionary Guard’s Qods Force, and Muhammad Kawtharani, a senior Lebanese Hezbollah member, were instrumental in brokering the agreement.

In other words, Maliki is able to rule because he is in coalition with an Iranian proxy.

There is an economic factor alongside the politics. Iranian firms have invested heavily in reconstruction projects in Iraq. In July, 2011, for example, a contract was signed for the construction of a 2,500-kilometer gas pipeline that will carry Iranian gas along the breadth of Iraq to Syria.

Add to these political and economic elements the seismic shock of the Arab upheavals of 2011, which are benefiting Sunni Islamist forces in country after country, and it becomes easier to understand Maliki’s interest in moving closer to the Shia regional alliance led by Iran.

Acquiring Iranian patronage involves helping out other clients. One favor deserves another.

Assad, a key member of the club, is in trouble. So, against all the odds, the Iraqis are getting on board with the task of trying to preserve his regime.

There has been much reporting in recent weeks of Hamas’s scramble to extricate itself from the Shia alliance led by Iran and to relocate itself with the currently embryonic Sunni Islamist bloc that looks like it will be the main legacy of the Arab Spring. Iraq appears to be traveling in the opposite direction, its motivation a mirror-image of that of Hamas.

Iraq is about to return to full sovereignty. As it does so, it is also about to present the region and the world with an entity of a type previously unknown in modernity – a Shia-majority Arab state under Shia rule. In a Middle East region in which Islamic politics is moving ever closer to center- stage, it is therefore not surprising that a Shia-ruled Iraq should choose to align itself with the regional bloc led by Iran. The Iranians skillfully prepared the pathway. The logic of events make Maliki more than willing to walk down it.

The assistance that Maliki’s Iraq is currently affording its beleaguered former arch-enemy in Damascus should be seen as a type of entry fee into the Iranled regional alliance. The Iraqi prime minister has evidently done his accounting and decided that the price is a fair one.

Whether the replacement of Saddam Hussein’s regime by a Shia-led Iraq now aligning with Iran was worth the loss of 4,478 US lives and an investment of $750b. is of course an entirely different calculation.

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Hizballah and the Arab Spring

Posted on December 28, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 6/12/11

Before the Arab upheavals of 2011, the Middle East was dominated by a cold war, pitting US-aligned regional states against a self-designated “Muqawama (resistance) Axis” of states and movements led by Iran. Both these blocs still exist. Both have been in different ways diminished by the ferment currently under way in the Arabic-speaking world.

The Iran-led Resistance Axis liked to portray itself as the representative of authentic local Muslim forces, arrayed against a corrupt and declining alliance of local collaborators aligned with the US and Israel. Contrary to its preferred script, however, various components of this bloc now find themselves under siege and threatened by forces unleashed by the Arab Spring.

This was not how it looked at the start. The first two casualties of the 2011 ferment were staunchly pro- Western Arab leaders – Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt. The Iranian leadership at that point heralded the “Islamic Awakening” across the region. Syrian President Bashar Assad explained in a seminal interview with The Wall Street Journal on January 31 that Syria and its allies would remain untouched by the ferment because of their identification with the deeper desires of the peoples of the region; namely, opposing the West and supporting the Palestinians.

The Resistance Axis was looking forward to settling down and enjoying the sight of the rival bloc tearing itself apart. It hasn’t quite turned out like that.

The only Arab state member of the axis – the Assad regime in Syria – is currently fighting for its life. Far from remaining immune to the winds of change, the Syrian dictator is battling a growing Sunni-led insurgency. Syria is a vital component of Iranian regional strategy. The Iranians hoped, once the US left Iraq, to build an uninterrupted chain of supportive states from the Iranian border to the Mediterranean.

To keep this ambition alive, they need the Assad dictatorship in place.

The Iranians are consequently busy at work aiding Assad’s repression. Representatives of both the Qods Force of the Revolutionary Guard, and domestic Iranian law enforcement agencies have been identified in Syria, helping to suppress the uprising. Sophisticated eavesdropping equipment has been provided. Eyewitnesses have reported the presence of Iranian snipers among the forces suppressing demonstrations.

Syrian opposition sources are currently claiming that Iran-aligned Shia militiamen from the Sadrist movement in Iraq and the Lebanese Hezbollah are also taking part in the repression.

But while this assistance has helped keep Assad in power, it is also making Iran and its allies increasingly hated throughout the Sunni Arab world. This is visible in Assad’s growing diplomatic isolation. From the Iranian point of view, the disappearance of its resistance image in the eyes of masses of Sunni Arabs is no less important. The Resistance Axis currently appears to be energetically and brutally resisting the will of an Arab people.

The consequent public statements from Tehran encouraging reform and even reaching out to the opposition are transparent exercises in PR. Tehran is with Assad to the end.

The most significant fallout of this process so far is the attempt by Hamas to extricate itself from the Iran-led bloc.

Hamas is a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. It has found itself in recent months facing a situation wherein its hosts and sponsors – Syria and Iran – are jointly engaged in a bloody crackdown against a rebellion in Syria at least partly led by its fellow Muslim Brothers. This is an untenable state of affairs for the Palestinian Islamist group. Hamas was always the Sunni odd-man-out in an alliance led by a Shia state and consisting overwhelmingly of Shia forces. Now it wants out.

Hamas is consequently attempting to re-align itself. The movement’s natural new sponsors would be a Muslim-Brotherhood dominated Egypt. This is also its preferred choice, as shown by the Egypt-sponsored reconciliation process and the Egyptian-brokered deal to release Gilad Schalit. Iran is angry but powerless to prevent this shift.

The jewel in Iran’s crown – the Lebanese Hezbollah – is also feeling the chill. Syrian refugees are finding their way in increased numbers across the border into Lebanon. The Hezbollah-backed government remains staunchly behind the Assad regime. The Lebanese Armed Forces are busily rounding up Syrian refugees and oppositionists. In a notable incident last week, local residents of the town of Arsal in the Bekaa Valley physically prevented the Lebanese army from apprehending Syrian fugitives. A number of military vehicles were burned. The opposition Future movement, led by former prime minister Said Hariri, held a huge rally in the Sunni town of Tripoli. Anti-Hezbollah, anti- Assad and anti-Iranian placards were displayed.

Hezbollah’s physical domination of Lebanon is not at risk as long as Assad remains in place. But the movement is storing up growing resentment of it on the part of non-Shia Lebanese, which may well have consequences if the Syrian dictator falls.

So the Resistance Axis is buffeted by a storm blowing across the region. Add to these examples the failure to make any real headway in sustaining dissent in Bahrain, or fermenting it in eastern Saudi Arabia, and the result is a somewhat bleak picture.

Mysterious explosions in security facilities and the curious deaths of research scientists on the streets of Teheran are not reassuring either.

Iran and its allies, suffering the blows of a covert war, are not succeeding in turning the “Islamic Awakening” into an asset. Iran’s leaders and its regional loyalists are aware of this and are concerned.

One of the Resistance Axis’s most eloquent spokesmen, Ibrahim al- Amin, editor of the pro-Hezbollah Al-Akhbar newspaper, described the Iran-led bloc as currently “focused on withstanding the war of attrition waged against it forced to hunker down and fend off threats.” He promised, however, that Iran was preparing to take on a “new regional role.”

Amin concluded with characteristic bombast that “fire cannot be stopped by steel walls or multinational forces.” The Iran-led Resistance Axis is currently finding out, to its evident dismay, that this latter point works both ways.

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Civil war begins in Syria; Turkey’s stance will prove crucial

Posted on November 27, 2011 by jonathanspyer

A civil war is now under way in Syria. It is a contest in which the two sides are vastly mis-matched. Without increased international pressure and possible intervention, the blood-letting looks set to continue for a long time ahead. The divided Syrian opposition, meanwhile, remains unable to articulate a coherent strategy for removing the dictator. The stance of external powers is now the decisive factor.

Despite an ongoing haemorrhage of desertions, the Assad regime maintains overall control of the 220,000 strong Syrian Arab Army. The Alawi 4th Armored Division and Republican Guard still constitute fearsome tools of repression. In addition, Assad possesses four powerful security agencies, as well as the amorphous and brutal gathering of irregular Alawi gunmen known as the ‘Shabiha.’

In the face of this formidable killing machine’s onslaught, the Syrian opposition continues to find it impossible to unite.

Personal ambitions and rivalries are a major element of this. But substantive divisions also exist. The main opposition factions are divided in particular on the question of foreign intervention. The Turkish-influenced and Islamist-heavy Syrian National Council has a vague and non-committal policy on this matter, in line with the ambiguous position of Turkey itself and of the Gulf Arab states. The smaller, leftist-dominated National Coordination Committee, meanwhile, is staunchly opposed to any external interference.

But for all the divisions, a more fundamental absence remains common to the opposition groups. This is the lack of a coherent policy for the attainment of power.

The Syrian National Council this week outlined what has been called its ‘transitional’ program for a new Syria. According to the plan, Assad would be replaced by an interim government supported by the army, which would organize internationally supervised elections within a year. These would elect a ‘founding assembly’, which would draw up a new constitution. The new constitution would then be put to a referendum. Parliamentary elections would be organized within six months.

That all sounds eminently sensible. It fails, however, to make clear exactly how the dictator is to be removed, to enable this orderly transition to take place. This fundamental drawback remains common to the myriad of opposition groups, and a more general blind spot in commentary on Syria.

Some Arab commentators have suggested that the regime’s clear lack of popular legitimacy will lead to its unraveling suddenly and rapidly. Rami Khoury, for example, writing in the Beirut Daily Star, contended that if the violence increases, the regime is likely to find its pillars of support shifting. Khoury lists these ‘pillars’ as the military, the business class, the Alawis, other minorities, and the ‘Aleppo-Damascus silent middle classes.’

It is of course impossible to predict what will happen, but certainly until now, there are few serious signs of these ‘pillars’ shifting over to the opposition – despite the undoubted courage and resolve of the protestors and insurgents. This may well be partly because the opposition has failed to present a credible and united alternative leadership around which to rally.

Absent this, the violence is set to continue. When the guns talk, the muses fall silent. For this reason, it is important to note the emergence of the rebel Free Syrian Army of Colonel Riad Asaad as an alternative opposition movement in its own right in recent weeks. Asaad’s group lacks the political sophistication of the civilian movements. But in Syria, force tends to have the final word. The Free Syrian Army is likely to emerge as a key player. But in this case, too, a 15-20,000 strong militia cannot hope to destroy a well-entrenched regime unless the regime crumbles from within – or a superior external force enters the fray to assist it.

So the key question remains the international response. France has now declared itself in favor of the establishment of secure areas to protect Syrian civilians. But Turkey is likely to be the main player if such ideas reach the implementation stage. Ankara cleverly maintained unseen links to the Syrian Sunni opposition even as it overtly developed its much heralded rapprochement with the Assad regime prior to the uprising. It has played a central role in building the external opposition from the onset of the uprising. Turkey hosted the initial conferences of the opposition, took in refugees, helped coordinate the foundation of the Syrian National Council, and is offering bases and assistance to the Free Syrian Army.

But all this is only sufficient to maintain the pressure on Assad. To tip the balance is likely to require more direct involvement.

Assad’s forces this week opened fire on two buses carrying Turkish citizens in Syria. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s response was to call for the first time on the Syrian dictator to resign immediately. In a potentially far-reaching move, Turkey is now reported to be considering the establishment of a buffer zone in the border area between the two countries. Such an area could provide a foothold for Syrian insurgents to organize and build their challenge to Assad’s rule. But it could also raise the possibility of Syrian-Turkish clashes. Turkey will not act without international support and an international mandate. It may be that the statement by the French foreign minister was the first step in an attempt to assemble such a mandate. With the opposition divided and the regime defiant, the crisis in Syria seems nowhere near conclusion. The direction of events in the next phase will be decided in Ankara.

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