Jonathan Spyer

Lebanon 2006: Unfinished War

Posted on March 15, 2011 by jonathanspyer

22/02/2008

The Lebanon war of 2006 failed to resolve any of the issues over which it was fought. Ultimately, the war may be understood as a single campaign within a broader Middle Eastern conflict–between pro-Western and democratic states on the one hand, and an alliance of Islamist and Arab nationalist forces on the other. The latter alignment has as one of its strategic goals the eventual demise of the State of Israel. While such a goal may appear delusional, the inconclusive results of the 2006 war did much to confirm the representatives of the latter camp in their belief that they have discovered a method capable of eventually producing a strategic defeat for Israel.

INTRODUCTION

The 2006 war between Israel and the Lebanese Hizballah organization, known in Israel as the “Second Lebanon War,” and in Lebanon as “the July War,” formed part of a larger strategic confrontation taking place in the Middle East. This confrontation places the United States and its allies in opposition to Iran and its allies and client organizations. Israel is part of the former camp, while Hizballah is part of the latter. The 2006 war was complicated by the fact that the Lebanese government, which acted as an unwilling host to Hizballah, is also an important U.S. regional ally.

The war has been the center of a number of interlinked, heated controversies almost from the moment of the implementation of the UN-sponsored ceasefire, which brought it to an end on August 14, 2006. The controversies have been both between partisans of the sides in the war–often in basic disputes over the facts of the case, numbers of casualties on each side, etc.–and on a more conceptual level, concerning the correct interpretation and characterization of the war.

Some analysts have seen the war as the harbinger of a new type of “post-modern” conflict–with important implications for the future effective use of force others have sought to view the war and its results through the lens of more conventional strategic assessments. Still others view the 2006 war as unique in the Middle Eastern context, in that it saw a conventional state army– the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)–engaged against Hizballah–a force which was neither a conventional army in the full sense, nor a guerrilla force in the sense in which that term has usually been understood (i.e. as an irregular agency engaged in low-intensity operations).This article will briefly look at the events of the war itself over which the argument is taking place and will close with an attempt to draw some conclusions regarding the strategic significance and lessons of the war.

THE COURSE OF THE WAR

The Second Lebanon War began on July 12, 2006, with the shelling by Hizballah of the Israeli border villages of Zarit and Shlomi. The shelling was intended to act as a diversion for the commencement of a cross-border raid. The objective of the raid was the abduction of IDF soldiers for use as bargaining chips to secure the release of Lebanese citizens convicted of terrorist acts and incarcerated in Israel. A contingent of Hizballah fighters attacked two armored Humvees manned by IDF reservists from a combat engineering unit. Three IDF soldiers were killed, two more injured, and two abducted by the Hizballah men and taken back across the border to Lebanon. Five additional soldiers were killed, and a Merkava tank destroyed, as the IDF attempted to rescue the soldiers^.

The IDF carried out air and artillery strikes on targets in southern Lebanon in the course of the day. Israel’s cabinet convened on July 12, 2006, in order to decide on Israel’s response to the abductions. On the same day, the cabinet authorized the bombing of targets in south Lebanon. This included both attacks on Hizballah’s long and medium-range missile capabilities, and strikes on infrastructural targets in southern Lebanon and beyond it. Over the next few days and weeks, Israeli aircraft struck at Hizballah missile capabilities, at Nasrallah’s headquarters in southern Beirut, and also bombed the Rafiq Hariri International Airport and roads leading out of Lebanon.

Hizballah leaders were undoubtedly surprised by the extent and ferocity of the Israeli response. However, once its dimensions became clear, the movement was able to mobilize according to prior existing plans and to await the Israeli ground assault. In the following days, the movement reinforced the border villages, moving in elements of its regular force. At an early stage, however, the Israeli political leadership chose to rule out a major ground assault to the Litani River. Instead, an intensive air campaign commenced.

Limited ground operations began only on July 17, 2006, with the entry of IDF troops into Marun al-Ras.^[6] The task of the defenders was made much easier by the Israeli decision to concentrate its attacks in a very narrow area. This enabled Hizballah to reinforce the area under attack with forces from adjacent sectors. This pattern was repeated in the coming days in other towns such as Bint Jubayl and Ayt al-Sha’b.The Hizballah units were also able to benefit from an extensive storage, tunnel, and bunker system put in place prior to the war. Due to Israel’s decision to concentrate on confronting Hizballah in the villages and towns close to the border, the IDF was unable to utilize fully its advantages in terms of armor, artillery, and air power.

The result was a series of bloody encounters between Israeli infantry on the one hand and Hizballah fighters on the other. Hizballah’s ability in tactical maneuvering under fire was noted, as was the creative effect with which the movement used antitank weapons in the infantry combat^. While Israel managed, after concerted efforts, to gain ground in these areas, the subsequent withdrawal of IDF forces meant that the village-based Hizballah units were able to reemerge. Israel’s apparent lack of awareness of the system of bunkers and tunnels built by Hizballah represented a serious intelligence failure on Israel’s part, which further benefited Hizballah’s efforts.

The Israeli decision to concentrate in the first part of the war on an air campaign, accompanied by what were in effect large-scale raids into populated areas of southern Lebanon, also enabled Hizballah to maintain a constant stream of short-range rockets onto populated areas of northern Israel. No clear response to the threat represented by short-range rockets deployed south of the Litani River existed–other than a large-scale ground incursion. Since the political leadership did not order such an incursion, the result was that Hizballah was able to maintain a steady stream of Katyusha rockets throughout the war, through to the ceasefire. Hizballah would fire just under 4,000 rockets in the course of the fighting, with over 200 rockets a day fired in the final days of the war.^[9] Hizballah was not able to adjust or coordinate its rocket fire in a sophisticated fashion, and hence the rockets were employed in essence as a terror weapon, designed to produce panic and disorientation among Israel’s civilian population in the north. This appears to have been precisely the intention of Hizballah, which places stress on what it considers to be the weakness of Israeli society and its susceptibility to casualties. The idea, in line with the classic aim of both strategic bombing and terrorism, was to use civilian casualties and the resulting public unrest as a tool to pressure the government of the enemy country.

However, the IDF also enjoyed notable successes in the early stages of the war. The Israeli Air Force was able to commence swiftly its air campaign and succeeded in destroying a substantial part of Hizballah’s medium and long-range weapons capability during the first two days of the war. Israeli defense sources claim to have destroyed around 80 percent of this capability.

Hizballah forces within the populated areas consisted mainly of part-time “village guards” mobilized for the war. Hizballah forces were also aided by fighters representing its rival for the loyalty of Lebanese Shi’a–Amal. In addition, smaller factions such as the Lebanese Communist Party, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party also took part. Hizballah ground forces were organized into teams of seven to ten men, and these groupings appear to have operated with a large degree of autonomy , making full use of their knowledge of the local area, as well as of the system of bunkers and tunnels available to them.</span

These forces were augmented by the presence of members of Hizballah’s full-time “elite” forces, which number in total around 1,000 men. The full-time forces appear to have been engaged largely in antitank operations in the open countryside and in rocket firing. On the few occasions in which Hizballah forces attempted to take the initiative and launch attacks on IDF troops, their efforts were unsuccessful. For example, on July 28, 2006, an attack by an elite Hizballah unit on Israeli airborne forces in Bint Jubayl resulted in a costly setback for Hizballah, in which it lost 20 men. The overall performance of the “village guards,” however, has been praised by military analysts.

A much-noted element of the ground combat was Hizballah’s successful employment of antitank missiles. The organization used these not only against Israeli armor, but also employed them in a creative way in the infantry combat in built-up areas. The missiles themselves were Russian systems, purchased by Hizballah from Syria with Iranian funds.Hizballah used AT-3 Sagger missiles to collapse buildings in which IDF forces were sheltered, as well as against tanks. Meanwhile, the AT-14 E Kornet missile, one of the most advanced Russian anti-armor systems, took a considerable toll on Israeli armor in the confused, sporadic ground war that raged close to the border. Hizballah also employed the RPG 29, the AT-4 Spigot, the AT-5Spandrel, and the AT-13 METIS-M systems. In all, around 40 tanks were damaged in the course of the war, resulting in the deaths of 30 tank crewmen–25 percent of the IDF’s entire combat losses in the war.Of the 40 tanks damaged, however, the great majority were not totally destroyed and were withdrawn and repaired.

Together with the air campaign and the war on the ground close to the border, the Israeli navy imposed a blockade on the Lebanese coast, which Hizballah proved unable to dislodge–despite its early success in hitting an Israeli ship, the Hanit, with a C-802 missile, badly damaging it.

These, then, were the contours of the war for the greater part of its duration: limited ground operations by the IDF in an area adjoining the border, air operations up to Beirut, as well as a naval blockade; and on Hizballah’s side, defense of areas under ground attack and a successful effort to maintain a constant barrage of short-range rockets on northern Israel.

This situation changed somewhat in the final days of the war, as the IDF began larger-scale and more ambitious ground operations. This phase saw the IDF push for the Litani River, achieving some tactical objectives, though with considerable loss of life.The targeting of IDF armored forces in the Wadi Saluqi area, with resultant heavy IDF losses, received much publicity.A ceasefire came into effect at 8:00 a.m. on August 14, 2006, following the passing of UN Resolution 1701. The end of the fighting found some IDF forces deployed at the Litani River, but with Israel far from control of the entire area between the river and the Israeli-Lebanese border. Symbolic of this was Hizballah’s continued ability to fire short-range missiles into Israel, which the group demonstrated by continuing the barrage until the very minute that the ceasefire went into effect.

ASSESSING THE WAR

The conduct of the Second Lebanon War, and in particular the perceived failure of Israel to achieve its stated objectives, such as the freeing of the two kidnapped soldiers and the disarming of Hizballah, led to a mood of deep disquiet in Israel in the months that followed the war.

The aims of the war from Israel’s point of view had been defined in the cabinet on July 19, 2006. They included:

Freeing the kidnapped soldiers and bringing them back to Israel, with no conditions.

The cessation of the firing of missiles and rockets against the citizens of Israel and against Israeli targets.

Complete implementation of Resolution 1559, including the disarming of all the militias as well as the imposition of its sovereignty by the Lebanese government throughout its territory, and also the deployment of the Lebanese army along the border with Israel.

Following the ceasefire, it was clear that of these objectives, only the second half of the third had been achieved. This led to the widespread and clearly justified sense later summed up in the final report of the Winograd Committee, of the war as a “great and grave missed opportunity.^“

There was a general sense of surprise at the losses encountered by the ground forces, at the failure to end the short-range rocket attacks, and at what was widely seen as the failure of the political echelon to set a coherent, achievable set of political goals which could clearly be achieved by the reaching of a defined, coherent set of military objectives. Rather, the impression was one of general confusion among both the military and political leaderships. Demonstrations by demobilized reserve soldiers commenced in the weeks following the ceasefire, and a committee of enquiry into the conduct of the political and military echelon was appointed, chaired by Judge Eliyahu Winograd.

Many international observers felt that the mood of pessimism that very noticeably descended on Israel in the weeks following the war was exaggerated. Resolution 1701, which ended the fighting, changed the situation in southern Lebanon to Israel’s advantage, in that it ended the de facto Hizballah domination of the southern border area which had pertained since the unilateral Israeli withdrawal in May 2000. According to the resolution, control of the south and of the border would be taken over by a beefed up UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) force and by the Lebanese army’s deployment in the south for the first time since 2000. The loss of the control of the border and of freedom of operation south of the Litani was a significant setback for Hizballah. Clearly, however, much would depend on the extent to which the international community would prove determined in ensuring the implementation of the resolution. It was also evident that these achievements notwithstanding, Israel had failed to achieve the greater number of its goals as the Israeli government itself had defined them, and the performance of the army–in particular the ground forces–was cause for deep concern and disquiet regardless of the clear damage inflicted on Hizballah in the course of the war and by its outcome.

Hizballah, for its part, declared that the war represented a “divine victory” for the movement. The movement initially claimed to have suffered minimal losses. As the underdog, it was able to point to the generally acknowledged impressive performance of its fighters in the defense of southern Lebanese towns and the failure of Israel to destroy the organization’s infrastructure of command or to kill any of the senior leaders of the movement. A statement made by Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah in an interview with a Lebanese TV channel shortly after the war, however, indicated a more complex response to the war within Hizballah. Nasrallah said that had the movement known of the likely IDF response to the kidnapping operation, it would have never have carried out the kidnappings. This statement became the subject of much interpretation and speculation.

Since, clearly, neither side had won a “knock-out” victory in the war, the way was open for differing interpretation and rival claims. The very different nature of the analysis emerging from individuals identified with the rival camps, however, became apparent in the months following the war. To some extent, these differences derived from the varying nature of the protagonists. Israel is a democratic society, with a free media and an independent research community. Hizballah is a closed movement committed to a totalitarian ideology and possessing the ability to control the flow of information regarding its situation and regarding important facts concerning its performance in the war. The result was that different analysis sometimes rested on contrasting factual claims emerging from the sides.

An example of this was in the dispute over the number of Hizballah casualties in the war. From the outset, as noted above, Hizballah claimed to have suffered very few losses. The propaganda value of such a claim is obvious. Hizballah was concerned to promote the idea that it had won a “divine victory.” Israel lost 119 servicemen killed in the course of the war.Israel estimated that between 500 to -600 Hizballah fighters had been killed. Such a ratio–five Hizballah fighters killed for every IDF fatality–would tend to raise questions regarding Hizballah claims of “victory.”

The movement therefore initially admitted only to have lost around 150 fighters. Alistair Crooke and Mark Perry assert that the “most telling” evidence of Israel’s failure in the war was in the “nearly equal” numbers of killed and wounded. Crooke and Perry note that counting the funerals of Shi’a fighters killed in the war would be the most reliable method of ascertaining numbers, and using this method, they conclude that 184 Hizballah fighters died. (It is not clear where their figure of 184 funerals comes from, and they accept the possibility that further funerals may increase the total). However, it has transpired that Hizballah deliberately staggered the burial of fighters killed in order to create the impression of fewer casualties. Hizballah fighters were interred without ceremony for later reburial. Lebanese and UN officials now concur with the initial Israeli suggestion that around 500 Hizballah fighters were killed. The organization itself now admits to losing 250 men.

The cost to Hizballah notwithstanding, Israeli analyses of the war cast an unstinting focus on Israeli operational failures and errors. Observation of Israeli analyses of the failures and achievements of the war, however, show the emergence of a number of schools of thought, critical of the IDF performance, but differing in their explanations of it, and thus in their proposed remedies.

All Israeli and international accounts of the war concur that the Israeli performance contained serious problems at every level: the political planning and setting of objectives for the war, the military strategy adopted for the war, the performance of some of the senior commanders, and the preparedness of elements of the fighting troops.

Some analysts have focused on the hard military aspects of Israeli failure: above all, the excessive capabilities attributed to air power–as a result of a mistaken reading of what was achieved by NATO in Kosovo in 1999. This failure may be attributed largely to the top military echelon, which appears to have given the impression to the politicians that a decision could be achieved through weakening Hizballah from the air.

This failure was then compounded by the serious problems encountered by the IDF in its performance in ground combat, in which a lack of preparation, particularly among reserve forces, was visible.

Finally, because of the mistaken belief that air power could deliver victory, Israel failed to follow through with the massive commitment of ground forces, which alone would have enabled it to conquer the area of land up to the Litani River and then to hold this land for sufficient time to clear it of short-range rocket launching teams and Hizballah fighters.The completion of such an operation would have taken several weeks and would have required a larger commitment of forces by Israel. As noted above, Israel’s ground operations for the greater part of the war consisted of sporadic operations in an area up to ten kilometers from the border. The IDF in fact began a more extensive ground operation only in the period immediately preceding the ceasefire. This more extensive ground operation made some headway, but with considerable losses, and with questionable political purpose, and was called off 24 hours before the ceasefire on August 14, 2006.

This critique, which could be called the “military critique,” thus lays down some serious but manageable criticisms of the IDF –criticisms which point to an erroneous strategy, hesitant execution, and considerable tactical errors. These errors reflect back to an erroneous conception that took hold in the IDF in the years preceding the war of the likely nature of future conflict. There was a general sense that the likelihood of Israel’s needing to commit large numbers of conventional infantry and armored forces in a future conflict was very low. Rather, future conflicts would be dominated by air power and would involve relatively small numbers of highly trained specialists on the ground.This, combined with the demands made by the intifada after September 2000 for large numbers of men for what were essentially constabulary duties in the West Bank, meant that the training regimen for reserve units in particular, but also for regular infantry and armored units, was deficient. Resources were not put into this, because it was assumed that they would not be needed.

The result was that when in 2006 the IDF was faced with a very different kind of war from the one anticipated, it was ill-prepared–on every level. Among the more extreme examples: Some reserve armored units were called into combat having taken part in only one full-scale training exercise in the preceding five years. Such a force might well have incurred heavy losses against Hizballah if called upon to take part in a large scale conquest of southern Lebanon to the Litani– given the impressive showing of Hizballah’s village fighters.

There is little doubt, however, that such a conquest could eventually have been achieved–even with the under-trained, problematic IDF that went to war in 2006. The fact is that such an assault was not ordered at a point when there was still time for it to be achieved.

Hence, according to the “military critique,” the IDF needed to reorder its priorities, abandon the idea that wars could be won “on the cheap” through air power and special forces alone, and begin to pour resources back into winning wars in the way that it had won them in the past–through high-speed, maneuver warfare, and commitment to achieving objectives despite losses.To accomplish this, the troops needed to be trained for the mission, and society needed to be made aware that sacrifices, including considerable loss of life for front line troops, were an integral element of large-scale ground operations.

This latter point of concern over societal ability to withstand losses is crucial, but hard to quantify. Certainly, statements by senior Israeli officers and politicians appeared to indicate that a sense of an Israeli society unwilling to bear losses did exist and may have influenced decision making. (The fact that this view of course perfectly parallels Hizballah’s view of Israeli society should be noted.) Such a view relates to a much larger discussion in Israeli society, which will be addressed in the conclusion.

Since it is clear that, difficulties notwithstanding, the IDF would have been capable of carrying out a conquest and consolidation of southern Lebanon if it had been ordered to do so, the failure is not in the final instance a military one. The fact is that ultimate responsibility must lie with the political echelon for the failure to calibrate coherently military operations with political objectives–which would surely have meant a major ground operation, in terms of the stated goals of the war. The final Winograd Report located a failure to “understand and fully internalize the fact that the fighting in Lebanon was a real war” as opposed to a routine security operation of the type that Israel had become used to. Winograd held both the military and political echelons responsible for this failure, which the report identified as a central element in the “unsatisfactory results” of the use of military force in the war.

SINCE THE CEASEFIRE

With the implementation of the ceasefire and the passing of Resolution 1701, it was noted that in assessing the final results of the war, much would depend on the implementation of 1701. Israeli leaders made statements after the war that expressed clearly what they considered to be essential elements of the implementation. Thus, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni noted that she expected the increased UN military force to be deployed according to the resolution in order to “control the passages on the Lebanese-Syrian border, to aid the Lebanese army in deploying properly, and to fully implement UNSCR 1559, particularly in disarming the Hezbollah.”Prime Minister Ehud Olmert concurred with this view. The deployment of the Lebanese army to the south together with the increased UNIFIL forces did represent an achievement–reducing the total freedom of activity in the south that Hizballah had possessed prior to the war. The movement would henceforth need to take the international presence into account. Yet the key issue would be whether the new arrangements would serve to reduce Hizballah’s capabilities permanently or whether the movement would–through intimidation of the UNIFIL and Lebanese army forces and adaptation–succeed in rebuilding its strength.

A year after the war, it was clear that the new arrangements put in place by Resolution 1701 had failed to prevent Hizballah from largely replenishing its strength and replacing the losses incurred in the 2006 war, although the movement’s freedom of activity was curtailed in the area between the Litani and the southern border.

UNIFIL and the Lebanese army made little effort to prevent the smuggling of arms and equipment across Lebanon’s eastern border with Syria. Hizballah has thus been able to rebuild its medium- and long-range missile teams north of the Litani, replacing the Iranian Zelzal and the Fajr systems destroyed during the war. The Zelzal has a range of 250 kilometers, enabling it to reach Tel Aviv. Israel also considers that Hizballah has tripled the number of C-802 land to sea missiles in its possession, and has created an anti-aircraft unit. Israel has provided the UN with evidence for these claims and has raised the issue of arms smuggling across the Syrian-Lebanese border. A team sent by the UN Security Council has largely confirmed the Israeli allegations.Nevertheless, the presence of Lebanese and UN forces along the southern border undoubtedly significantly curtails the freedom of operation of Hizballah, and may be considered a positive achievement of the war from an Israeli point of view.

Hizballah’s rebuilding of its capabilities does not mean that the next round of fighting is necessarily imminent. Hizballah’s capabilities were clearly badly damaged in the war, and the movement faces a long process of reconstruction. Hizballah has also since the war been embroiled in internal political battles in Lebanon, which have served to cost it much of the kudos it gained as a result of the 2006 conflict. In November 2006, Hizballah sent its supporters onto the streets of Beirut, in an effort to secure for itself a veto power over government decisions. Hizballah actions led to the real threat of serious sectarian violence in early 2007 and were part of the larger political standoff in Lebanon, which sees Hizballah and the forces of Christian General Michel Aoun aligned with Syria against the pro-Western forces of the March 14 movement, which forms the current Lebanese government. The internal tension continued throughout 2007.

Hizballah clearly wishes to justify its continued bearing of arms and to make use of the status deriving from its self-declared status as challenger to Israel. In November 2007, the movement held a three day military exercise in southern Lebanon, observed by Israel and unmolested by UNIFIL, in spite of Resolution 1701’s stipulation prohibiting the organization from operating south of the Litani River. The role of Hizballah’s Iranian patrons in choosing the moment when the movement may wish to reignite hostilities should also be taken into account. Given the damage and losses incurred by the movement as a result of the kidnapping operation in July 2006, it is likely that Iran will be impressing upon its clients the need for caution and patience, as it finances and facilitates the rebuilding and equipping of Hizballah. It is noticeable that despite Hizballah claims of massive investment in reconstruction in the areas hit by the war, the evidence of the damage caused is still very visible in the towns and villages of southern Lebanon. In Marun al-Ras, for example, the scene of some of the heaviest fighting, a section of the town remained in rubble and uninhabited a year and a half after the war. Iran is likely to be keen to rebuild and to keep its Hizballah client intact for use in line with Iranian broader policy objectives at some future date.

The war of 2006 failed to resolve any of the issues over which it was fought. Israel did not succeed in recovering its prisoners, completely removing the military threat of an Iranian-backed militia from its borders, or in disarming Hizballah. It may have succeeded in setting the price for future Hizballah incursions at a rate higher than the organization or its sponsors will wish to pay, but this is by no means certain. Hizballah also achieved little of tangible value. The Lebanese prisoners for whom it claimed to have carried out the July kidnappings remain incarcerated in Israel. The group lost control of the border with Israel, and was forced to adapt to the restricting presence of Lebanese and international forces in the south. The group also suffered heavy losses in terms of personnel and equipment.

In a military sense, the war revealed serious deficiencies in the IDF as well as in the political and military decision making process in Israel. The failure to understand and internalize fully the different requirements of war when compared to the low-intensity operations in which the IDF has been engaged in recent years, the setting of unrealistic goals, the failure to decide on a clear policy, the pursuit of goals in an unsuitable and unrealistic way (e.g through excessive use of air power and illogical and half-hearted use of ground forces), and the lack of readiness of some units because of a misapplication of resources for training were all apparent. Both the interim and final Reports of the Winograd Committee confirmed the criticism in all these areas. The reports were also harshly critical of the hasty Israeli decision to go to war, the failure to make a clear decision at an early stage between a limited operation reliant on standoff fire and a full-scale ground incursion, and the evident lack of knowledge and failure to consult on the part of Israel’s political leadership.

The heavy cull in Israeli commanders following the 2006 war (from the division commander of the area, where the kidnappings took place, via the OC Northern Command and the chief of staff and up to the defense minister) indicated the Israeli concern at the poor performance and the desire to rectify such errors urgently. The appointment of Major-General Gabi Ashkenazi as chief of staff and the replacement at the helm of Amir Peretz’s Ministry of Defense by Ehud Barak offered a pointer to Israel’s response to the new situation. Dan Halutz, the first Israeli chief of staff to come from the air force, had been expected to preside over an increasing focus on the ballistic missile challenge and the issue of Iranian nuclear ambitions, in the context of generally quiet borders for Israel. Ashkenazi, Israel’s first chief of staff to have begun his career in the Golani Infantry Brigade, clearly represented a desire to focus, in addition to the above issues, on preparing the army for large-scale potential ground campaigning. Barak’s replacement of Peretz, meanwhile, signaled recognition that Israel was entering a period of new uncertainty and potential conflict, such that it was essential that somebody experienced be at the head of Israel’s defense establishment.

STRATEGIC INDICATORS FROM THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

While lacking in air power, armor, and artillery, Hizballah forces engaged in high intensity combat in southern Lebanon in 2006. Due to Israel’s decision not to launch a large-scale ground assault and conquest of southern Lebanon, the impression was created that somehow Hizballah had succeeded in “stopping” the IDF–that is, in engaging in a frontal clash with Israeli forces which prevented the IDF from advancing further into Lebanon. Hizballah’s ability to fire short-range rockets into Israel up to the ceasefire enhanced this impression. However, it was a misleading one. The IDF’s hesitant approach toward the ground combat played to Hizballah’s strengths. The small, pinpointed scale of attacks enabled the organization to concentrate its forces in limited areas. Yet a small organization of a few thousand fighters would not have been able to resist a full-scale ground assault of the four divisions with which Israel fought the war. Such an assault, however, was never ordered.

The model adopted by Hizballah has been promoted in the propaganda of the movement and its backers as representing a new approach to armed conflict with Israel that maximizes the benefits enjoyed by the Arab side while neutralizing the advantages enjoyed by Israel. In the propaganda of Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas, this new model of muqawama (resistance) is constantly returned to. It derives from an ideological view according to which Israel is particularly unable and unwilling to absorb casualties and make sacrifices. Hence, the relentless willingness to sacrifice of the muqawama forces, combined with their indiscriminatory terror attacks on civilian targets, can force Israel to concede, despite its greater conventional military capability.

From this point of view, the fact that Israel, if it pours its full strength into the fight, cannot be prevented from reaching its objectives is not the crucial issue. The point is that Israel will not be able to initiate full-scale operations of this kind, because it will be unwilling or unable to absorb the casualties inherent in such a decision. The muqawama’s ability, meanwhile, to maintain a steady stream of Israeli civilian casualties will in time force Israel to concede to the will of its enemies, once it realizes that its initial attempts to assert its will have not succeeded. The failure of Israel to achieve its self-defined goals in the war of 2006 is held up as a vindication of this strategy and enables Hizballah and its supporters to consider themselves victorious–in spite of the far greater losses they suffered when compared to Israel, their inability to prevent damage to Lebanon’s infrastructure, and their inability to have prevented Israel from attaining its objectives had it clearly defined them and committed itself to their achievement.

This military-political strategy of muqawama is related to a broader ideological conception of Israel as a weak, artificial society beset by contradictions and lacking inner reserves. This view of Israel is not new and has formed a constant in Arab nationalist views of the country, and before this in Arab views of the Jewish national movement. Ultimately, it rests on a very widespread and deeply felt ideological belief in the Arab world and among the Iranian ruling elite that Israel is a temporary phenomenon, artificially implanted in the region by Western colonialism.

Thus, the Muqawama strategy rests on an article of faith–namely, that Israel’s perceived “weakness” will ultimately serve to cancel out its advantages in the fields of technology, societal organization, conventional military strength, and so on. The events of the Second Lebanon War have been arranged to fit with this view in the interpretations of Hizballah and the larger regional camp to which it belongs.

From Israel’s point of view, the significant problems in the functioning of both the political echelon and the military in the war of 2006 derived from deep structural and ideological factors, which were nevertheless rectifiable. The military had grown rusty from constabulary duties in the territories, and had adopted a faulty conception of the war it was likely to be called to fight. As a result, certain units were under-prepared for the task ahead. In the war, it overestimated the ability of air power to force a decision–particularly within the anomalous political parameters, which limited its application (i.e. that Israel was at war with an organization controlling territory within a state, but not with the state itself. Lebanon itself could therefore not be defined as a hostile entity.) It underestimated the ability of Hizballah fighters in tactical maneuvers and in the application of weapons systems, in particular antitank missiles.

The political echelon displayed an excessive reluctance to commit to a large scale ground operation in line with existing plans. It also did not clearly commit to the avoidance of ground operations and a strategy based purely on standoff fire. Rather, the political echelon seems to have failed to internalize immediately that Israel was at war. The result was a slow, incremental increase in ground operations, which achieved little. Furthermore, the political echelon underestimated the strategic importance of leaving Hizballah’s short-range rocket capacity intact. At certain points, it defined ill thought out, unrealistic goals for the war, (such as the recovery of the kidnapped soldiers, or the permanent disarming of Hizballah), which it did not then seriously pursue. Since the ceasefire, Israel has observed the ongoing rebuilding of Hizballah’s strength north of the Litani, which makes an eventual next round of fighting likely.

Israel will thus need in the time available to overhaul its military–training and preparing it adequately for the relevant challenges ahead. It will need to ensure that it has a national leadership that understands the capabilities of the military and that knows how to integrate this knowledge into a clear, stable national strategy with clearly defined goals and parameters, and to which it then adheres. It will need to prepare its public for the awareness that the country is engaged with an enemy pursuing a clearly thought out “long war” strategy, which may take years and may require further sacrifices–such as, for example, the inevitable cost in the lives of soldiers that would accompany a large-scale ground operation into southern Lebanon of the type which could deal a real military blow to Hizballah.

The indicators are that as far as Israeli society is concerned, the basis exists for this. No decline in the numbers of Israelis volunteering for combat units was noticeable in the period following the 2006 war. The civilian public remained supportive of the war throughout, although they began to question the strategy being pursued to win it. The lesson of Israeli public resilience in the period of the Palestinian attacks on civilians in urban areas in 2001-2003 indicates that the Israeli public–the views of its enemies notwithstanding–is able to absorb blows and continue to function, if it is convinced that no alternative to conflict exists.

These factors, however, are necessary but not sufficient elements in the process of reform that needs to take place in the Israeli national security structure. Crucial to all this is a factor pointed to by the Winograd Committee and other critiques of Israel’s performance in the war–namely, the urgent need for a properly integrated structure in Israel for the formulation of a long-term national security strategy. The failure to create a body capable of overlooking this process and providing a coherent framework within which decision makers can and must operate is undoubtedly one of the central sources for the vagueness of conceptual thinking that underlies the failure of the war, from Israel’s point of view.

Ultimately, the 2006 war must be understood as a single campaign within a broader Middle Eastern conflict, between pro-Western and democratic states on the one hand, and an alliance of Islamist and Arab nationalist forces on the other. The latter alignment has as one of its strategic goals the eventual demise of the State of Israel. While such a goal may appear delusional, given the true balance of forces involved, the inconclusive results of the 2006 war did much to confirm the representatives of the latter camp in their belief that they have discovered a method capable of eventually producing a strategic defeat for Israel. It is therefore expected that a further round of conflict is only a matter of time. Israel, meanwhile, must endeavor to develop a strategy capable of striking a blow in a future engagement sufficient to make any subsequent ambiguity untenable.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged Amir Peretz, Ehud Olmert, Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah, IDF, Iran, Lebanon, Litani River, Resolution 1701, Syria, UNIFIL, Winograd Committee | Leave a comment

The Question of Power in Lebanon

Posted on March 10, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Global Politician- 12/05/2008

When recent events in Beirut pose a simple, fundamental question: Who rules in Lebanon. The answer proposed by Hizbullah last week is that the government of Fuad Saniora and Saad Hariri is to be permitted to hold the formal reins of administration – on condition that they well understand the inherent limits of their position. Most important, any attempt to interfere with the Iranian-created and Iranian- and Syrian-sponsored military infrastructure in the country will result in a swift, disproportionate and bloody response.

Hizbullah and its backers have made clear that if the choice is between civil war and accepting limitations on the autonomy of their military infrastructure, they will choose the former. At the same time, their actions in Beirut last week made clear that as long as this point is accepted by the March 14 government, they will permit a return to the former stalemate.

Recall the sequence of events: Lebanon has been locked in a standoff between the pro-US March 14 Movement and the pro-Iran and pro-Syria opposition ever since the latter launched a campaign to achieve veto power over government decisions, in the months following the war of 2006.

The Saniora government refused to bow to the opposition’s demands. The result has been ongoing political tension punctuated by periodic flare-ups, such as that of January 2007, which have brought the country to the brink of civil war.

The latest tension emerged from a Hizbullah-sponsored series of labor union protests.

But the key event precipitating Hizbullah’s military takeover of West Beirut was the decision by the government to act against Hizbullah’s independent military infrastructure through two bold moves: First, the government sought to dismiss the security chief at Rafik Hariri International Airport, Wafiq Choukair, who is known to be close to Hizbullah.

This move came after prominent March 14 leader and Druse strongman Walid Jumblatt revealed that Hizbullah had installed surveillance cameras at the airport’s Runway 17. The runway overlooks the hangars containing private jets, an air force base, and the VIP visitors building. Jumblatt further argued that Iranian flights to Beirut should be stopped, as they could be carrying equipment for Hizbullah, and called for the Iranian ambassador to be expelled.

In a second, related move, the government launched a judicial investigation into the Iranian-built independent telecommunications network maintained by Hizbullah. This network is thought to extend from Beirut across the south of the country, and into the Bekaa.

For Hizbullah, these actions by the government clearly trespassed beyond a red line: namely, the tacit acceptance by the Saniora government that the means by which Hizbullah and its backers conduct their activities in Lebanon are off-limits to the organs of the Lebanese state.

The response was swift and furious. Hizbullah gunmen poured onto the streets of West Beirut and engaged the untrained pro-government Sunnis who sought to oppose them. Eleven people were killed and 30 were wounded in the subsequent fighting, which ended with the surrender or flight of the pro-government elements.

Hizbullah simultaneously carried out a series of acts designed to humiliate the government and to demonstrate its ineffectiveness. Hizbullah men blocked the roads to and from the airport, cutting Lebanon off from the outside world, forced the pro-government Al-Mustaqbal TV station and other pro-government news outlets off the air, and burned the offices of the Al-Mustaqbal newspaper. The headquarters of Saniora and Saad Hariri was besieged. Following this demonstration of strength, Hizbullah expressed its willingness to hand all captured areas over to the Lebanese army.

The message was clear. The events of the past days are an attempt by the pro-Iranian regional alliance to guard the perimeters of its main asset in Lebanon – namely, the well financed and trained Hizbullah military infrastructure. Iran wishes to maintain this structure, but not to seize formal power in Lebanon. Rather, it is an instrument to be activated against Israel, at the appropriate moment. In the meantime, Teheran and Hizbullah are content to leave the Saniora government to continue the administration of Lebanon’s internal affairs, on condition it understands its limits.

The first question now is whether the Saniora government is prepared to accept this situation. (The original dispute over the dismissal of Choukair and the closing of the telecommunications network remains unresolved.) The second question is whether, if it is not, March 14 possesses the will and the tools to mount an effective opposition to the Hizbullah state within a state.

Hizbullah’s latest action brings the movement closer to openly pitting Lebanon’s Shi’ites against its Druse, Christian and Sunni communities. The opposition’s Christian component – the Free Patriotic Movement of Gen. Michel Aoun – appears largely an irrelevance in the developing dynamic. Instead, the allies that matter to Hizbullah now are the Shi’ite Amal movement and the small pro-Syrian and Palestinian militias that have mobilized to support the opposition in the past days.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia have expressed support for the Saniora government. The Sunni mufti of Lebanon has harshly condemned Hizbullah’s actions. But it appears that Hizbullah feels strong enough to contemplate such a situation, and to dismiss the possibility of the coalition of communities backing the government mounting an effective response. The coming weeks will show if Hizbullah’s confidence in this regard was misplaced.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged Beirut, Fuad Saniora, Hizbullah, Lebanon, March 14 movement, Saad Hariri, Shi'ites, Walid Jumblatt | Leave a comment

Homecoming for a Child-killer

Posted on March 10, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Global Politician -17/07/2008

The deal for the return of convicted terrorist Samir Kuntar, four Hizbullah men captured in the 2006 Second Lebanon War and a number of corpses in return for the remains of kidnapped IDF soldiers Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser comes at an opportune moment for the Hizbullah leadership.

Indeed, some analysts have suggested that group leader Hassan Nasrallah accepted a less favourable deal than he had originally held out for, in order to conclude the negotiations as speedily as possible. What is clear is that the prisoner swap is having the desired effect for Hizbullah – rebuilding its legitimacy. Most (though not all) of the leaders of the pro-western and pro-Saudi March 14 movement appear to be accepting the portrayal of the swap as a victory for Lebanon, and the consequent depiction of the infanticidal Kuntar as a Lebanese national hero.

Why did Nasrallah need the deal so badly? In May of this year, Hizbullah brought 18 months of smoldering political tension to a head. The March 14-led government had attempted to move against Hizbullah’s control of security at Rafik Hariri Airport in Beirut, and to limit the growth of Hizbullah’s extensive internal communication system within Lebanon.

Hizbullah saw this as an assault on its independent military infrastructure. The movement, which had been engaged in a campaign to bring down the Saniora government since the end of 2006, reacted swiftly. Hizbullah and its allied forces poured onto the streets of West Beirut and other key parts of the country – inflicting an unambiguous military humiliation on their enemies in the Sunni-led al-Mustaqbal movement of Saad Hariri and Prime Minister Fuad Saniora, which leads the March 14 coalition. Hizbullah then went on to negotiate a deal reflecting this victory with Qatari mediation in Doha.

But Hizbullah’s achievement had come with a substantial price. Throughout its history, the movement, despite its Shi’ite nature, had tried to claim for itself a role above the Lebanese sectarian framework. It had justified its uniquely-tolerated military infrastructure by claiming that it existed for the sole purpose of fighting Israel – and would never be turned against fellow Lebanese. This pledge had now been broken. Hizbullah was in increasing danger of appearing unambiguously as a Shi’ite Islamist client of Iran.

The attempts to swiftly form a government following Doha have also run aground, amid wrangling over portfolios. Hizbullah was therefore in need of a gesture, a spectacle which could enable it to recall the 2006 war, and wrap itself in the flag of victory against Israel.

The prisoner swap looks set to provide this opportunity. Hizbullah long ago made the cause of Samir Kuntar its own. Kuntar, a Lebanese Druse and member of the Palestine Liberation Front, took part in an operation in Israel in 1979, in which he was responsible, among other things, for the murder with his own hands of a four-year-old girl, Einat Haran. Prior to killing Einat, Kuntar had shot and killed her father, Danny, before the child’s eyes.

The freeing of Kuntar was the purpose for which Hizbullah carried out the raids – intended to secure captive IDF soldiers for use as bargaining chips – which began the Second Lebanon War. Securing his release would thus add significant weight to Nasrallah’s claims of victory in 2006, despite the extensive damage and loss of life among Lebanese Shi’ites.

The news of the planned swap has been greeted with enthusiasm from politicians on both sides of the divide. Lebanese President Michel Suleiman has told Hizbullah that he would like to take part in the welcome-home ceremony for Kuntar. Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druse Progressive Socialist Party and a major March 14 figure, said that a PSP delegation would visit Kuntar to welcome him home and congratulate him on his release. He called the return of the Lebanese prisoners a “national occasion” which would bring people together.

Other March 14 leaders spoke in similarly glowing terms. Saniora said that “the success of Hizbullah in the negotiations led by a third party is a national success for the party and for the struggle of the Lebanese because it secured national goals which Israel always refused to respect.”

Saniora, according to one Lebanese newspaper, As-Safir, is “inclined in principle” toward taking part in planned events to welcome the prisoners home. As-Safir also reported that there are plans to make the day of the return of the prisoners a national holiday.

From Israel’s point of view, the remarks made by the March 14 leaders, while edifying, are of secondary interest. Israel has never placed a great deal of faith in either the intentions or the abilities of the individuals in question. Of greater importance, however, is the extent to which the prisoner swap is serving to strengthen Hizbullah. In so doing, it is delivering a very significant achievement to the movement, and to its regional supporters – Israel’s sworn foes – in Damascus and Teheran.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged Damascus, Einat Haran, Fuad Saniora, Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah, President Michel Suleiman, Samir Kuntar, Teheran, Walid Jumblatt | Leave a comment

Subtly and determinedly, Syria is taking over Lebanon

Posted on March 10, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Global Politician 08/08/2008

Lebanese President Michel Suleiman is to visit Syria next week, to discuss the opening of diplomatic relations between the countries, a Lebanese official told reporters this week. French President Nicolas Sarkozy last month hailed President Bashar Assad’s expression of willingness in principle to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon as “historic progress.”

The establishment of a first-ever Syrian Embassy in Beirut is probably not imminent, for various reasons. Nevertheless, the signs of normalization in relations between Syria and Lebanon are significant. They are the latest indication of Syria’s growing confidence, and far from being a harbinger of more peaceful times in the neighborhood, they offer clues as to the shape of possible further strife.

The formation of the new Lebanese government after the Beirut clashes in May represented a very significant gain for the pro-Syria element in Lebanese politics. Hizbullah now controls a blocking 11 of the 30 cabinet seats. With a Lebanese government of this type, there is no reason for Syria to be in dispute there. The short period when Damascus felt the need to express its will in Lebanon solely in a clandestine way is drawing to a close.

Still, Western hopes for the rapid establishment of formal relations between the two countries are probably exaggerated. Damascus is in no hurry. Syria’s return to Lebanon is a work in progress. Assad has listed the preconditions for the establishment of diplomatic relations to become a real possibility. These include the passing of an election law, and the holding of the scheduled May 2009 general election.

Behind Assad’s honeyed words, one may glimpse the contours of Syrian strategy in the next stage. The election of May 2009 will be conducted under the shadow of Hizbullah’s independent and now untouchable military capability.

Intimidation will go hand in hand with the real kudos gained by the movement and its allies because of recent events – including the prisoner swap with Israel, and the Doha agreement that followed the fighting in May. The result, the Syrians hope, will be the establishment of a government more fully dominated by Hizbullah and its allies, in which the pro-Western element will have been marginalized.

Such a government would mark the effective final reversal of the events of the spring of 2005, when the Cedar Revolution compelled the Syrian army to leave Lebanon. Damascus would then go on to conduct friendly and fraternal relations with the new order in Beirut. Mission accomplished.

If this strategy plays out, however, it will represent not the normalization of Syrian-Lebanese relations, but rather the enveloping of Lebanon into the regional alliance led by Iran, of which Syria is a senior member.

On the ground in Lebanon, this regional alliance is still engaged in consolidating its gains. The lines separating the official Lebanese state from the para-state established by Hizbullah continue to blur. The new government’s draft policy statement, which is still to be discussed by the parliament, supports the “right of Lebanon’s people, the army and the Resistance to liberate all its territories.”

This statement thus nominally affords the Resistance. i.e. Hizbullah, equal status with the Lebanese Armed Forces, and appears to consider it an organ of official government policy.

The new organ of government policy, meanwhile, is building its strength. Ostensibly for the mission of “liberating” 20 square kilometers of border farmland, Hizbullah has built a capability of 40,000 missiles and rockets, is frenziedly recruiting and training new fighters, and is expanding and developing its command and logistics center in the Bekaa.

The latest talk is of Iranian-Syrian plans to supply Hizbullah with an advanced anti-aircraft capacity that would provide aerial defense to the investment in rockets and missiles. Such a move would represent a grave altering of the balance of power. Serious moves towards it could well prove the spark for the next confrontation.

In all its moves, the Iranian-Syrian-Hizbullah alliance has known how to combine brutal military tactics on the ground with subtle and determined diplomacy. Its willingness to throw away the rule book governing the normal relations between states has been perhaps its greatest advantage. While the West sees states as fixed entities possessing certain basic rights, Iran and Syria see only processes of rising and falling power. They see themselves as the force on the rise, and the niceties of internationally fixed borders as a trifle unworthy of consideration.

The region has known the rise of similar systems of power and ideology in the past. Experience shows that such states and alliances have become amenable to change and compromise – if at all – only after experiencing defeat, setback and frustration.

The Syrians and their allies, of course, are far weaker in measurable military and societal terms than their rhetoric would suggest. Western (including Israeli) actions over the last years have tended to blur this fact. The general acceptance of the transformation of Lebanon into a platform for this alliance – and the lauding of it as ‘historical progress’ – is the latest example of this. The re acquaintance of rhetoric with reality on all sides is long overdue.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged Beirut, Bekaa, Hizbullah, President Bashar Assad, President Michel Suleiman, Syria | Leave a comment

Assad’s Shopping List

Posted on March 10, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Global Politician- 27/08/2008

President Bashar Assad of Syria began a trip to Russia this week. Russian news agency RIA Novosti has quoted the Syrian Information Ministry as confirming that the trip will last two days.

According to the statement, the purpose of the trip is to discuss bilateral relations and the latest world and regional developments, particularly relating to the Middle East peace process and to Iraq.

Assad’s trip to Moscow comes at a particularly opportune time. Russia is in the process of completing what looks like a successful, contemptuous defiance of international will over its actions in Georgia. In the Caucasus, Moscow has thrown down a direct challenge to the US-dominated post Cold-war international order.

Syria, meanwhile, is part of an Iran-led regional bloc which seeks to issue a similar challenge in the Middle East, albeit on a smaller scale. But Assad is not in Moscow purely to compare notes with the Russians. Rather, his trip has a list of clear and practical objectives.

During the Cold War, the USSR was of course Syria’s main arms supplier. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Damascus was left with an outstanding debt of $13.4 billion to Moscow for weapons purchased. Throughout the 1990s, with Syria stagnant and Russia plunged into economic and political chaos, this outstanding debt cast a chill over relations between the two countries. This chill has now thawed. In 2005, Moscow agreed to write off 73 percent of the debt. This reduced Syria’s foreign debt to less than 10% of its GDP, allowing Damascus once more to focus on arms procurement. Large-scale purchases of arms from Russia began that same year.

Over the following two years, according to Israeli sources, Syria purchased 50 Pantsir SE-1 and Tor-M1 air-defense systems from Moscow. Sophisticated anti-tank guided weapons systems were also acquired. There are conflicting reports as to whether the Pantsir air defense systems had been fully deployed at the time of the successful IAF raid on a suspected Syrian plutonium reactor in September, 2007. The raid, in any case, undoubtedly represented a significant failure for the Syrians.

The Syrian response has been to accelerate the pace of arms purchases from willing Russia. In May, a senior Syrian delegation headed by air force commander General Akhmad al-Ratyb visited the Russian capital. The delegation secured the purchase of Mig-29 SMT fighter aircraft.

This time around, the leading item on Assad’s shopping list is thought to be the sophisticated S-300 long range anti-aircraft missile system. This state-of-the-art system has already been purchased from Russia by Iran. Iran is expected to deploy it by March, 2009. The Iranian intention, clearly, is for this system to be used in defense of Teheran’s nuclear program.

Assad, in his previous visit to Moscow in December, 2006, made unsuccessful attempts to purchase the S-300. Israeli diplomats have been working to try to prevent a successful Syrian acquisition this time around. The outcome is not yet clear. The S-300 is thought to be the leading item on Assad’s list of planned purchases in Moscow. A series of public statements by Russian officials over the past days stressing (and exaggerating) Israel’s defense relationship with Georgia could be interpreted as a negative sign, but nothing is yet certain.

What lies behind Russia’s growing interest in arms supplies to the Middle East? This is part of a larger picture – Russia’s return as a player on the global diplomatic stage. The Russians would like to leverage their supply of arms to Iran and Syria into influence, forming an alternative address for diplomatic mediation – or for help in challenging enemies. Either way, Russia intends not to have its voice ignored. The days when all other countries automatically accepted US predominance on issues of Middle East statecraft have passed.

Of course, Russia is still far too weak a state to be able to provide a real challenge to the western system of alliances in the Middle East. Syria, too, for all its rhetoric, possesses armed forces which still suffer from acute structural and educational problems, as well as the problem of norms which limit their ability to successfully absorb and operate ultra-modern systems. Still, something is changing.

The regional alliance of Iran and its allies is currently acting as a ‘spoiler’ in many flashpoints across the region – Iraq, Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian arena, Kuwait and the Israel-Syria-Hizbullah triangle. In all these linked arenas, influence is being built through the exacerbation of conflict, and the preventing of peaceful development. Iran and Syria have had the good fortune to meet a major power – Russia – whose interests happen to currently coincide with the strengthening of anti-status-quo powers in the Middle East. The result is a relationship based on mutual benefit. President Assad will be hoping to reap tangible gains from this as he makes his way through meetings with the power elite in Moscow over the next two weeks.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged arms supplier, Iran, Moscow, President Bashar Assad, Russia, Syria, USSR | Leave a comment

Damascus Gets What it Needs

Posted on March 10, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Global Politician- 25/05/2009

In his letter to Congress announcing the renewal of US sanctions on Syria, President Barack Obama was specific regarding the reasons for his decision.
Syria, the President said, was “supporting terrorism, pursuing weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, and undermining US and international efforts with respect to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq.”

These three accusations are related to verifiable activity currently being undertaken by the Damascus regime. Syria’s activity in turn reflects the firmness of the regime’s strategic choice to align itself with the regional alliance led by Iran.

Syria’s actions should be observed well by all those currently promoting the feasibility of a “grand bargain” between Israel and the Arab world. They are evidence of the reality of a Middle East Cold War, in which the fault lines are growing ever clearer.

First, let’s recall the details. With regard to supporting terrorism, it is well known that the leaderships of Hamas and Islamic Jihad are domiciled in Damascus. Syria has over the last decade built a close, mutually beneficial strategic relationship with Hizbullah. Damascus also serves as a large care home for various superannuated leftist Palestinian groups.

On weapons of mass destruction, reports have surfaced in recent days suggesting that the Syrians have constructed a biological weapons facility, on the site of the al-Kibar plutonium reactor destroyed by Israel in 2007. Certainly, Damascus’s interest in both biological and chemical weapons is long-standing.

Syria possesses one of the largest and most advanced chemical warfare programs in the Arab world – including chemical warheads for all its major missile systems. It is known to possess a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, and is in the process of attempting to develop the more powerful VX nerve agent, according to the CIA’s bi-annual report on WMD proliferation. Damascus is also thought by western governments to possess a biological warfare development program.

On the “stabilization and reconstruction” of Iraq – the latest news is that after a short pause, Damascus has in the last month recommenced its practice of facilitating the entry of Sunni jihadi fighters into Iraq by way of Syria’s eastern border. At the height of the Sunni insurgency, Damascus airport became a transit point for fighters from across the Arab world and beyond it seeking to make their way to Iraq. In mid 2007, 80-100 fighters per month were crossing into Iraq from Syria. Having fallen to close to zero earlier this year, the numbers are now up to 20 per month.

The charge sheet is both substantial, and formidable. It isn’t hard to see why the US administration found it necessary to renew the sanctions. But the interesting question remains that of Syria’s motive.

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, and NSC senior official Daniel Shapiro have visited Damascus twice in the last two months. Feltman noted that the two sides found “lots of common ground” between them. Syrian Ambassador to the US Imad Moustapha happily described the “new spirit of serious discussion” that he found in his meetings with Obama administration officials.

So why, four months into Washington’s courting of the Assad regime, has there been no improvement of any kind in Syria’s stances regarding issues of concern to the US? Rather, where there has been change, it has been for the worse – as in the situation on the Iraqi border, and perhaps with regard to al-Kibar.

The regime has evidently done its calculations, and concluded that it has nothing to gain by loosening its relationship with the Iranians at the present time. US sanctions are not toothless. Oil and gas production in Syria has been hit because of lack of access to US technology. The aviation and banking sectors have also been affected. Damascus would substantively gain from seeing the sanctions lifted.

But Syria is also aware that with the region polarized between US and Iranian blocs, moving toward the former entails moving away from the latter. And it is not at all clear that the US could, or would, wish to provide Syria with the very tangible strategic benefits it currently gains from its close relations with Iran.

Washington wants a free Lebanon, a stable, strong Iraq, and progress towards peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Syria opposes all of these. Damascus seeks to rebuild its own power in Lebanon, to keep Iraq weak and strife-torn, and to benefit from its own self-proclaimed stance as the expression of pride and defiance in the Arab dispute with Israel.

Allies of Iran and Syria may be about to win elections in Lebanon, and are growing daily more powerful among the Palestinians. The alliance with Iran also makes Syrian meddling in Iraq a possibility, and may well prevent the reemergence of a strong and independent Baghdad.

The firmness of the Syrian stance suggests that Damascus expects US attempts at engagement with Iran to fail – making the issue a zero-sum game. On that basis, the reasons for the Syrian choice become clear. While rapprochement with the US might give the Assad regime something of what it wants, its alliance with Iran gives it most of what it needs.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged Damascus, Hamas, Hizbullah, Iran, Jeffrey Feltman, President Barack Obama, Sunni jihadi, Syria, WMD | Leave a comment

Syria’s Goose Lays a Golden Egg

Posted on March 10, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Global Politician- 27/07/2009

Washington’s decision to return its ambassador to Syria is the latest stage in the present administration’s policy of engagement with Damascus. It relates most importantly to the US desire to secure Syrian cooperation in the build-up to the departure of American combat troops from urban areas in Iraq.

The decision is related to the broader American ambition of drawing Damascus away from Iran. Hopes for a revival of talks between Israel and Syria, and the desire to enlist Syria in the ongoing effort to bring about a rapprochement between the Palestinian Fatah movement and the Damascus-domiciled Hamas may also have played a role.

Regarding Iraq, the US is aware that Sunni insurgents will have an interest in ratcheting up the level of violence as the US prepares to draw down its combat forces – to give the impression that it is they who are bringing about the American redeployment. Syria has served as a key ally of the Sunni insurgency since its beginnings. For a period, the route between Damascus airport and the Syrian-Iraqi border was a favorite one for Sunni jihadis seeking to enter Iraq to take part in the insurgency.

In recent months, US officials have reported an improvement in Syrian control on the border, and a reduction in the number of insurgents crossing over. In the familiar Syrian fashion, Damascus’s promotion of violence against Americans, and its subsequent willingness to partially reduce this promotion, is used as a tool to reap diplomatic rewards.

Regarding the Palestinian angle: ongoing Palestinian unity talks in Cairo have so far proved fruitless. Despite its focus on a revived Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the administration is aware that for as long as an openly rejectionist Hamas entity continues to rule over 40 percent of the Palestinian population, hopes for a meaningful negotiating process belong largely to the realm of fantasy.

There is therefore a real determination, shared by Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, to make a success of the unity effort. Hamas’s leadership is based in Damascus, so efforts to bring Syria closer to Washington may also be intended to enlist Syrian support in pressuring Hamas towards greater flexibility.

The revival of Israeli-Syrian talks is likely to feature on the administration’s agenda at some stage in the coming period. The presence of a US representative in Damascus would facilitate US mediation.

The biggest prize, however – a Syrian strategic reorientation away from alliance with Iran – is likely to continue to prove elusive.
An angry, more openly militant Iranian regime is likely to emerge in the coming weeks from the current unrest. It will be hated by a large section of its people. But this will not harm either its desire or its ability to support radical forces in the region.

For the Syrians, the maintenance of alliances with various Islamist and radical regional elements forms a key element of national strategy. It is one which continues to pay dividends. The past months have shown that the Syrians may repair relations with the West at little cost to themselves, while maintaining this stance.

One does not, as the saying goes, kill the goose that lays the golden egg. The Syrian “goose” combines alliance with Iran and support for regional instability with occasional gestures of cooperation to the West. It has just delivered the “golden egg” of a new US ambassador in Damascus in return for no concessions on issues of core importance to the Assad regime.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged Damascus, Hamas, Iran, jihadis, Sunni, Syria | Leave a comment

Hezbollah’s Delusions

Posted on March 10, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Global Politician- 12/10/2009

The latest events in Lebanon offer an image in miniature of larger regional developments. The Iranian-backed Shi’ite Islamist movement Hezbollah is pursuing a long-term strategy intended to eventually deliver Lebanon into its hands. In the short term, the greater commitment of the movement’s cadres and its public is delivering impressive results. But at the core of the strategic thinking of Hezbollah and its patrons lie a series of delusions, which are likely to bring about the defeat of the movement over time. Between that point and the present, however, further strife and conflict are likely.

The pro-Western March 14 movement won an unexpected victory in elections in Lebanon in June. But the subsequent protracted coalition negotiations succeeded in emptying that victory of most of its content. The composition of the new Lebanese government will enable the Hezbollah-led opposition to block any legislation not to its liking. More important, the new government’s official mission statement will include a commitment to maintain Hezbollah’s independent, Iran-facilitated military capacity.

Supporters of March 14 had little choice but to concede to the demands of the “losing” side in the election. The violence of May 2008 proved conclusively that they are incapable of resisting the armed might of Hezbollah. Hezbollah may have paid a price in terms of its legitimacy in the eyes of non-Shi’ite Lebanese for demonstrating its power, but it acquired the ability to silence any further dissent on issues it deems of cardinal importance.

But the foundation of the new Lebanese government is ultimately only one small element within a larger process taking place in Lebanon. This is the way the power of Hezbollah and its constituency is growing in all areas of life in the country. The organization recently released a new manifesto. A particularly notable aspect of the document was the call for an end to “sectarianism” in Lebanon and the expression of the desire for rule by an “elected majority.” This demand reflects the self-confidence of the movement, rather than a newfound appreciation for democratic principles.

While it is impossible to carry out accurate demographic surveys in Lebanon, Hezbollah certainly believes that the Shi’ites are on the rise demographically, due to their high birthrate and low(er) emigration rate. Senior Israeli officials who are knowledgeable about the country concur with this assessment. They also note the growing strength of Shi’ite officers in the Lebanese Armed Forces, particularly at mid-level. This development, alongside the latest political moves, is slowly blurring the borders between the official Lebanese state and the parallel state maintained by Hezbollah.

The slow, full-spectrum advance of the Shi’ite Islamist camp in Lebanon resembles developments elsewhere. No one situation is exactly like any other, of course, but it is not hard to detect the common elements in the steady advancement of Islamic politics in Turkey, the rise of Islamist radicals within the Iranian clerical regime, the onward march of Hezbollah and the strides made in recent years by Palestinian Islamism. In all cases, this is not the delusional, apocalyptic Islamism of Al-Qaida and its ilk. The rising Islamic forces in the region do not go in for violence-as-gesture, nor do they envisage the triumph of the rule of righteousness in the immediate future.
The significant differences between these rising forces and the delusional Salafi fringe has led many in the West to believe that “pragmatic,” localized Islamism can be accommodated rather than confronted. Such a belief ignores a large part of the picture. Certainly in the case of the regime in Iran – in particular in the form it has assumed since the disputed election of last June – and its ally in Lebanon, the political methods may at times be slow and cumulative, but the ends are serious and sincere, and note should be taken.

Hezbollah’s new manifesto condemns the United States as the “root of all terror,” and a “danger that threatens the whole world.” The document also reiterates the call for the destruction of Israel, describing the need to “liberate Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa” as a “religious duty” for all Muslims. There is not a shred of evidence to suggest that these sentiments are intended for the printed page only. Indeed, recent visitors to Lebanon speak of a high, almost delusional state of morale among circles affiliated with Hezbollah. In the closed world around the movement, it is sincerely believed that the next war between Israel and Hezbollah will be part of a greater conflict in which Israel will be destroyed.

The true balance of power is rather different, of course. And as Hezbollah slowly swallows other elements of the Lebanese system, the conclusion being reached in Israel is that any differentiation between the movement and the nest it has taken over is increasingly artificial – and will not be maintained in a future conflict.

The history of the region shows that anti-Western ideological waves can indeed eventually be accommodated and dealt with pragmatically – but this cannot be achieved at the moment of their rise. The examples of pan-Arabism and Palestinian nationalism suggest that only following military defeat and socioeconomic failure are flexibility and pragmatism likely to make an appearance. Political Islam has not yet reached this stage. Current events in Lebanon show its local Shi’ite manifestation to be in a state of rude health. It is brushing aside local foes, marching through the institutions, as tactically agile as it is strategically deluded. Yet its latest manifesto suggests that it remains the prisoner of its ideological perceptions. The recent history of the Middle East, meanwhile, indicates that gaps between reality and perception tend to be decided – eventually – in favor of the former.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged al-Qaida, Hezbollah, Iran, Lebanon, March 14 movement, Salafi, Shi'ites | Leave a comment

Welcome to the New Israeli Politics

Posted on March 9, 2011 by jonathanspyer

The Guardian- 29/03/2006

You will need to forget a large amount of what you thought you knew about Israel. The clash between Gush Emunim and Peace Now, between Labour and Likud, between the Whole Land of Israel and the New Middle East – is over. Neither side won. Impatience with the old ideas, with the old parties, and with the political system as a whole has meant that one of the most boring election campaigns in Israeli history has brought forth a fascinating, new, strangely unfamiliar political map.

Some old parties have ridden the storm by transforming themselves. Others, locked in old definitions, have fallen to the sidelines. The external policy debate will now be dominated by two relatively recent creations (Kadima and Yisrael Beiteinu – I’ll explain in a moment). The internal debate, meanwhile, has finally started to matter again after a 40 year hiatus.

Let’s look at some of the details. The Kadima Party, the vehicle of Ariel Sharon for the pursuit of strategic unilateralism, is the clear winner of the elections. Without its charismatic founder to lead it, the party’s victory is much narrower than expected. But the idea on which the party ran – the ‘Convergence Plan’ for additional, Gaza style withdrawals from much of the West Bank – is now the only serious contender on the Israeli policy menu of proposals for how to deal with the conflict with the Palestinians.

The Likud Party, which stood for staying, at least for the moment, in all territories and fighting Hamas, has been decimated in the elections. The Labour Party – which was once the party of the Oslo Accords and Geneva – appears to have largely abandoned any focus on external issues in favor of a stress on socio-economic affairs. This means that they will join Olmert’s coalition, and the policy haggling will be on social and economic issues, not on approaches to the conflict. Meretz – the only party still committed to Geneva and the 1990s peace process idea – received 4 seats.

It is interesting to note that the other original policy approach to the conflict to have received significant endorsement by the electorate is also a strange new creature, hard to place according to the definitions we’ve grown familiar to since 1967.

This is the idea of Avigdor Lieberman – for two states, but a moving of the border, placing certain towns inhabited by Palestinian Israelis in the Palestinian state, in return for annexing settlement blocs to Israel. Lieberman is opposed to unilateral withdrawals, which he regards as dangerous, because unreciprocated.

Yet his idea, too, is a creature of the new post-peace process, post-settlement movement period. He too shares the key notions of a wish to retain a Jewish, democratic state, concern at demographics, and an estimation that there is no Palestinian partner for peace. (It is by the way superficial to regard Lieberman’s party as a ‘Russian immigrant’ party. Senior figures on its list and, reportedly, a significant section of its support, come from outside of the Russian immigrant population.)

The range of options between Kadima’s ‘Convergence Plan and Lieberman’s idea is the look of the new Israeli politics regarding the conflict. Both ideas share the three elements mentioned above, to which a huge majority of Israeli Jews subscribe. The representatives of other ideas are on the sidelines.

But yesterday’s elections may signal other deep movements and shifts in Israeli politics. The very low turnout – at 63% the lowest in the history of the country – and the general absence of public rancor in the campaign indicate that a second disengagement has already taken place: namely, the disengagement of a large part of the Israeli public from the political process.

The other surprise winner in the elections apart from Lieberman was the Pensioners Party, led by the only-superficially-cuddly former senior Mossad official Rafi Eitan. This party’s success was partially due to the fact that it became a means for some younger voters to register their cynicism toward the larger parties (and their affection for their grandparents) by voting for it.

Such phenomena reinforce the sense in which Israeli politics has entered a post-heroic phase. Gimmicks, legitimate internal differences, cynical detachment and playfulness may all find their place here. Yet perhaps to a greater extent than other democracies, Israel still faces existential policy issues of grave import. The rise of radical Islamism among the Palestinians, the Iranian nuclear threat, the issue of territorial re-arrangements in the face of these threats – have not gone away.

The Convergence and unilateralist ideas are themselves enormously problematic, with many cardinal questions on them remaining unanswered. But Israelis have shown this time around that they prefer to elect a contractor to bring his team to focus on the technical aspects of dealing with such issues. For their part, they would mainly like politics to leave them alone. And if it must be dealt with – then it is to be a politics on a human level, dealing also with daily issues. The politics of a mature and sophisticated population – accustomed to, rather than thrilled by its own sovereignty.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged Ariel Sharon, Avigdor Lieberman, Kadima, Labour Party, Likud, Meretz, Olmert, Yisrael Beiteinu | Leave a comment

What is Israel’s Endgame in Gaza

Posted on March 9, 2011 by jonathanspyer

The Guardian- 12/01/2009

As Israel’s operation Cast Lead in Gaza enters its third week, questions are increasingly being asked regarding its aims. Is Israel’s ultimate objective the fall of the Hamas regime in Gaza? Or is Israel maintaining military pressure on Hamas in order to conclude the operation with a set of de facto ceasefire arrangements intended to prevent Hamas re-arming? The Israeli cabinet is itself divided on this issue. The operation is being guided by the triumvirate of prime minister Ehud Olmert, defence minister Ehud Barak and foreign minister Tzipi Livni. All three are thought to have differing conceptions as to what should happen now, though there are fewer differences regarding the outcome of the operation.

Barak had hoped to avoid a major ground operation of any kind into Gaza, and would like to see the operation wrapped up. Livni also wants to see the ground operation rapidly concluded. She would like to see the Israel Defence Forces withdrawn from Gaza without renewed understandings with Hamas but on the clear assumption that further military operations will take place if rocket fire resumes. Olmert, however, favors maintaining the military pressure on Hamas; he is due to ask for cabinet approval for continuing the ground operation.

Israeli reservists have now been introduced into the fighting, and the IDF is conducting operations into Gaza City, the seat of the symbols of the Hamas government in Gaza.

What is the prime minister aiming for? No coherent plan for the replacement of Hamas has been outlined. It is generally accepted that carrying out a military operation intended to topple Hamas would require the mobilization of further reservists, and a time frame of several weeks, would probably entail considerable Israeli loss of life and could end with an Israeli re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Olmert, who is due to depart from the political stage with the general election on February 10, is unlikely to be thinking along these lines.

It is therefore most likely that the prime minister too intends Israel to emerge from the current round of fighting with the Hamas regime in Gaza severely weakened but still in power. If this assumption is correct, the current military activity in southern Gaza is intended as a means to ensure a more favorable outcome for Israel in the arrangements that will follow the fighting.

The key demand around which Israel’s diplomatic stance appears to be coalescing is for more efficient measures to prevent renewed Hamas re-armament following the conclusion of operation Cast Lead. Israel watched with trepidation in the ceasefire period as Hamas sought to emulate the example of Hezbollah. The tunnels of northern Sinai served as the main route by which ordnance was transported into Gaza. By these means, Hamas transformed its arsenal in the ceasefire period, acquiring sophisticated Grad and Iranian Fajr-3 missiles.

Israel would like to see an international force deployed at the southern crossing between Gaza and Egypt to ensure the effective prevention of further Hamas arms smuggling. Egypt so far is staunchly resisting the introduction of foreign troops. An alternative would be for a beefed-up Egyptian force on the border, possibly with technical support from US or European personnel.

In parallel, a Hamas delegation is also in Cairo, holding talks with Egyptian intelligence minister Omar Suleiman. Hamas has so far rejected the terms of the Egyptian initiative. The movement’s refusal to renew the ceasefire in December derived from its demand for the opening of the crossings connecting Gaza to Israel and Egypt. There is no prospect of Israel agreeing to this. It is therefore possible that Israel and Egypt will agree terms for new arrangements on the border, with Hamas left out of the arrangements, and remaining as an existing but weakened ruling force in Gaza.

Hamas has lost heavily in the course of operation Cast Lead. The movement’s backers in Iran and allies in Hezbollah are understood to be disappointed and angry about its failure so far to inflict serious damage on the IDF in Gaza, and its generally lackluster military performance. There are indications of splits between the Gazan and Damascus-based leaderships of the movement. The former are now more inclined to accept a ceasefire. The latter, under Iranian influence, are determined to fight on, regardless of the cost.

Hamas’s rhetoric of “muqawamma” (resistance) predicted a different outcome. The movement’s willingness to take casualties was meant to deter Israel from taking effective action, or force it to reverse itself before its goals were achieved. As things stand at present, the resistance model has therefore received a significant dent in the last days in Gaza.

If operation Cast Lead ends with minimal IDF losses, a severe blow struck at Hamas, no concessions to Islamist Gaza and significantly improved arrangements on the Egypt-Gaza border, this will constitute a significant achievement for Israel. The preference of the Israeli prime minister for continuing the ground operation, however, suggests that while the goal probably remains reducing rather than destroying Hamas, it does not mean that the current round of fighting is at its endgame.

Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged Egypt, Ehud Barak, Ehud Olmert, Fajr-3 missiles, Gaza, Grad, Hamas, IDF, Iran, Omar Suleiman, Tzipi Livni | Leave a comment

Jonathan Spyer

Lebanon 2006: Unfinished War

The Question of Power in Lebanon

Homecoming for a Child-killer

Subtly and determinedly, Syria is taking over Lebanon

Assad’s Shopping List

Damascus Gets What it Needs

Syria’s Goose Lays a Golden Egg

Hezbollah’s Delusions

Welcome to the New Israeli Politics

What is Israel’s Endgame in Gaza

Recent Posts

Archives

Categories

Meta

RSS Feed