Analysis: The Gardeners of Beirut

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 23/10/2008

An anecdote recently told me by a senior source in the Arab media indicates the process by which Hizbullah is rebuilding its strength south of the Litani River. The source, who is well connected in Lebanon, related the story of a family who left their home in one of the villages of the south during the 2006 war. They now return from Beirut to the south for weekends. Recently, on returning to their southern residence, they noticed that their garden had been dug up, and that an unfamiliar tree had mysteriously appeared in the area. The family made inquiries as to who or what had been responsible for this item of uninvited landscape gardening on their property. They were quietly advised not to further pursue the issue, and the matter was dropped. This example was cited as a typical instance of what is currently taking place in southern Lebanon.

This story, from a trustworthy source, suggests the extent to which Hizbullah is able to expect – or impose – silence and consent among the population of the south. It appears to offer supporting evidence to the suspicion that Hizbullah is using populated areas of southern Lebanon as the framework within which it is rebuilding its independent military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. But it also hints at the problematic “peaceful coexistence” which appears to be maintained between Hizbullah and the bodies tasked with implementing UN Resolution 1701 south of the Litani River – namely, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces.

On June 27 of this year, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued his latest report on the implementation of Resolution 1701. The report noted Israeli claims that Hizbullah was in the process of rebuilding its military capacity in the south. It confirmed that UNIFIL, in collaboration with the LAF, would “immediately investigate” any claims of violations of Resolution 1701. However, the UN secretary-general found “no evidence of new military infrastructure in the area of operations.” A possible explanation for UNIFIL’s failure to become aware of incidents such as the one described above is to be found by observing this force’s own patterns of deployment in the area, and its relations with the Lebanese army (LAF).

A visitor to southern Lebanon will be immediately struck by the absence of international and LAF forces in populated areas. UNIFIL does not conduct patrols, establish checkpoints or maintain a presence of any kind within the towns and villages south of the Litani. Indeed, the UN forces have little unmediated security-related contact of any kind with the population of the area. Thus, while UNIFIL, according to its own figures, carries out around 400 foot, vehicle and air patrols in each 24-hour period, these take place exclusively along recognized patrol paths and in rural areas. UN forces maintain no independent checkpoints and are involved in a minimum of joint checkpoints with the LAF (fewer than 10 such positions in the entirety of southern Lebanon, according to available figures.) The result of this pattern of activity is that UNIFIL has made some significant discoveries of ordnance in rural areas. However, given the physical absence of UN forces from any of the areas where evidence of Hizbullah infrastructure-building has emerged, it is not surprising that UNIFIL reports “no evidence” that such activity is taking place.

In general, the two sides appear to do their best to stay out of each other’s way. The reason for the emergence of this pattern was succinctly expressed recently in private by an Italian official, who noted that the Italian government possessed no mandate from the public for the arrival of Italian soldiers in body bags from southern Lebanon.

Accidents have happened, however, most famously in an incident near the village of Jibal al-Butm in the western sector on the night of March 30-31. On that occasion, a UNIFIL patrol noted a suspicious truck towing a trailer and began to follow it. Two cars containing armed men then blocked the further progress of the UNIFIL patrol. The troops, in the words of a UN report, “challenged” the armed men. Unfortunately, while the challenge was going on, the suspicious truck disappeared. The armed men then also left the area. The UN’s report on the incident dryly notes that despite a Lebanese army investigation into the incident, efforts to “locate or identify the perpetrators have proved unsuccessful.”

The role of the Lebanese army in events in the south must also be considered. The LAF, it may be assumed, has a far better idea than does UNIFIL of what is happening on the ground. It maintains a far more visible presence, though it also avoids open patrolling in populated areas. But the LAF is the same army that existed throughout a decade and a half of effective Syrian control in Lebanon. In that time, Syria spread its control throughout the organs of the Lebanese state. No purge of the LAF took place after the Syrian departure, and it may be assumed that significant elements of the army continue to act according to a pro-Syrian agenda.

This, among other things, would include turning a blind eye to Hizbullah activity in the south. So Resolution 1701 notwithstanding, no force currently exists to effectively challenge or limit the activities of the Hizbullah “para-state” in southern Lebanon. As a result, the infrastructure for the next war is currently being built, woven into the fabric of civilian life, a few miles north of the border.

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Analysis: US Raid shows Assad’s Over-Estimation

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 29/10/2008

This week’s US raid across the Iraqi-Syrian border resembles a number of similar actions carried out by American forces against al-Qaida targets over the last year in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan. It demonstrates a US willingness to ignore national borders when dealing with states and organizations that themselves display a studied indifference to such niceties. The raid is the latest in a string of recent events that leave the Bashar Assad regime looking vulnerable and weakened. The target of the incursion, according to US sources quoted in the international media, was one Badran Turki al-Mazidih, also known as Abu Ghadiyah. Abu Ghadiyah was an Iraqi-born Sunni jihadi operative, hailing from Mosul.

Since 2005, he had led a network that played a key role in moving foreign volunteers, weapons and cash for the Sunni insurgency across the border between Syria and Iraq. Abu Ghadiyah appears to have been linked to the network established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He ascended to his senior position after one of Zarqawi’s key lieutenants, Suleiman Khalid Darwish, was killed by US forces in Iraq in June 2005. Since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Syria’s relationship with the Sunni insurgency has been a source of tension. Damascus international airport has been the main international thoroughfare for young militants en route to the battlegrounds of central Iraq. Syria’s 740 km.-long border with Iraq was the key entry point for these men. According to Maj.-Gen. John Kelly, commander of Multinational Force-West in Iraq, “The Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi intelligence forces feel that al-Qaida operatives and others operate, live pretty openly on the Syrian side… And periodically we know that they try to come across.” The majority of the volunteers were on their way to carry out suicide bombings in Iraq. Wanted leaders of the insurgency – such as Mishan al-Jabouri – have also set up home openly in Syria. Support for insurgent and paramilitary organizations as a tool of policy toward neighboring countries is a tried and tested approach for the regime in Damascus.

Indeed, it has been a weapon in Syria’s arsenal at some point in time with every country with which it has a border. Thus, the Assad regime supported the Kurdish PKK in Turkey in the 1990s. In the 1970s, Syria supported Palestinian insurgency in Jordan. Syria offers a safe haven and support to the leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as a number of secular Palestinian armed groups engaged in violence against Israel. Syria of course arms and supports Hizbullah in Lebanon as well as offering backing for Palestinian armed groups. So Syrian support for Sunni jihad in Iraq fits a pattern. This support is of a cynical nature. The Syrian regime has been known to recruit foreign fighters on its soil for operations in the Syrian interest by threatening to turn them over to their own countries’ security services if they refuse. Syria also likes to think it can turn the tap of support on and off at will. Thus, when Damascus has wanted to demonstrate to the West its supposed cooperation in the “War on terror” it has not hesitated to round up a few random foreign jihadis, including some who may have had no involvement in violent operations.

Underlying this Syrian approach has been the assumption that Damascus would be permitted to operate according to different rules than those expected of other states. Where this assumption has been challenged – as by the Turks in 1998 – Damascus has tended to retreat. It now appears that Washington wishes to issue its own challenge to this pattern of behavior. In this, the US is following tactics adopted in northern Pakistan against al-Qaida. Over the last year, the US has doubled its rate of cross-border strikes against targets in North Waziristan. Ten such operations are known to have taken place this year. The latest US action is also in line with an increased willingness on the part of Israel to respond in kind to Syrian support for organizations engaged in violence against Israelis. The Israeli raid on a suspected Syrian plutonium reactor in September 2007, and perhaps the subsequent killings of Hizbullah’s Imad Mughniyeh and Syria’s Gen. Muhammad Suleiman on Syrian soil offer examples. The extent to which Syria is able to control the jihadi elements that it has allowed to gather and flourish on its soil is open to question.

The bombing last month in Damascus – which bore signs of being the work of Sunni jihadis – appeared to offer further evidence of the Syrian regime’s growing inability to police its own territory. All this adds up to an emerging sense of the Assad regime as an entity now beginning to pay the price for its over-estimation of itself and its allies. Assad was evidently thrilled by the defiance of jihadi forces of both Shi’ite and Sunni hue. He may now be discovering that supporting their activities does not come without a cost. Still, there is probably no reason for the regime to worry unduly yet.

Assad faces embarrassment at home, but no serious domestic force threatens his rule. The Europeans are continuing the wooing of the regime accelerated by Israel’s opening of negotiations. The Syrians may also hope that the shifting political landscape in both the US and Israel will suffice to make any current indications of a changing approach conveniently short-lived. Whether they will be proven right remains to be seen.

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Analysis: Israel’s reluctant Allies

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 25/12/2008

There has recently been a significant increase in tension between major Arab states. The ongoing crisis in Gaza is the focus for the deterioration in relations, though it is only one aspect of a larger picture. The crisis is in relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Syria on the other. The intra-Arab wrangling is itself linked to the broader strategic issue of Syria’s relations with non-Arab Iran. Among the strategic goals of the Iran-led regional alliance is the destruction of Israel. The doctrine of muqawamma – resistance – is the rhetorical framework by which Iran and its allies explain their activities.

The “status-quo” Arab states, meanwhile, have in the past sought to combine fiercely anti-Israel rhetoric with a decidedly pro-western orientation. Iran and the muqawamma forces are currently calling this bluff. The tensions derive from this process. How does Gaza fit into this? Egypt has been watching the situation in the Strip with growing concern since the Hamas coup of June 2007. This past May, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said that the meaning of Hamas rule in Gaza was that Egypt now has a “border with Iran.” In November, Cairo-sponsored talks were planned, to facilitate reconciliation between Hamas and the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority. The objective was to bring Hamas back under the PA wing – thus returning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to its strictly Israeli-Palestinian dimensions. This, it was hoped, would remove from Egypt the embarrassment of appearing to side with Israel against Hamas by keeping the Rafah crossing – which Egypt controls – sealed. But Hamas declined to attend the talks. The Hamas entity in Gaza’s is underwritten by Teheran and Damascus, which provide both financial and military aid. The pick of Hamas’s fighters train at Revolutionary Guard facilities in Iran. Since the Hamas takeover of Gaza, several hundred of these men have made their way clandestinely from Gaza to Egypt, Egypt to Syria and then Syria to Iran to learn the techniques of light infantry and guerrilla warfare. No less importantly, Iranian money keeps the Islamist mini-state of Gaza afloat. Exact amounts are difficult to gauge. But the Iranians pledged $250 million to Gaza after Ismail Haniyeh visited Teheran in December 2006.

Given the end of the cease-fire and the growing possibility of renewed open conflict between Israel and Gaza, positions have hardened. In Teheran, demonstrators called for Mubarak’s execution. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem accused Egypt of blatant bias toward Fatah. Muhammad Ali Ibrahim, an Egyptian MP and editor of the government-sponsored Al-Gumhouriyya newspaper, expressed the essence of the Egyptian position in the following terms: “The steps taken by Syria today are not promoting the Palestinian cause but rather the interests and goals of the Iranians. Forgetting its Arab identity, Syria is handing the region to Teheran on a golden platter.” Hamas-controlled Gaza currently forms one of the most active “fronts” in the new regional stand-off. Gaza also encapsulates the salient characteristics of the new reality. The shooting war is being conducted largely between the pro-Iranian forces and Israel.

The pro-Iranian axis seeks to shame the mainstream Arab states and inflame their publics, by use of the shared currency of anti-Israel sentiment. The mainstream Arab elites of Egypt and Saudi Arabia are deeply embarrassed at the turn of events. They want the return of the cozy status quo, in which they could indulge in anti-Israel rhetoric of their own, while relying on American support to keep themselves in power. But this option is becoming increasingly untenable. Hamas’s control in Gaza threatens to reveal the extent to which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become subsumed within a larger regional conflict – one which, de facto, places Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel on the same side. Hence the latest Egyptian attempt to prevent a major Israeli operation into Gaza. Hamas, by destroying the barrier at Rafah during such a confrontation, could present Egypt with the choice of either accepting a mass of unwanted Palestinian refugees onto its territory, or joining the fight against the allies of Iran alongside Israel. Egypt is desperate to avoid either option.

So the war of words between Iran and Syria on the one hand, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the other, is real and heartfelt. The former are laying claim to the immensely popular cause of hatred of Israel. The latter regimes have played their own part, for their own reasons, in creating the public climate in the Arabic-speaking world in which this hatred occupies center stage. Their bluff is now being called by Iran and its allies. Rhetoric aside, Egypt and Saudi Arabia hope to emerge intact from the roiling conflict between Iran and its allies and Israel and the west. They will probably succeed in doing so, since for the West the alternative to indulging them is to risk their falling and being replaced with something worse. But as current events in Gaza are demonstrating, the heavy lifting in the work of facing down the Iranian attempt at building regional hegemony, if it is to be achieved at all, will be carried out by the west – and first and foremost by Israel.

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Analysis: Al-Qaida-style Extremism gains real Power within Hamas

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 02/12/2008

Al-Qaida-type Salafi Islam is rising in popularity within the ranks of Hamas. This trend is particularly noticeable in the movement’s armed wing, the Izzadin Kassam Brigades. Observation of this process shows that attempts to draw a clear dividing line between the “nationalist” Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Islamism of Hamas and the Salafi trend can no longer be sustained. The growth of Salafism within Hamas is part of a larger pattern of increasingly extreme Islamic piety and practice in Gaza. The existence of Salafism within Hamas is not a new development. Indeed, Hamas leaders have long been aware of the potential threat this outlook represents to their authority.

As long ago as December 2001, the Israeli authorities intercepted a document produced by Hamas prisoners in Israeli custody which warned of the spread of al-Qaida-type ideology among Hamas members. However, supporters of Salafism now appear to be achieving positions of real power within Hamas. In mid-2006, Izzadin Kassam commander Muhammad Deif was badly wounded by an IDF missile strike and subsequently left the Gaza Strip for a long period of recuperation. His replacement at the helm of the Brigades was Ahmad al-Ja’abari, who carried out his tasks in close cooperation with two allies, Ali Jundiyeh and Nizar Rayyan. All three of these men are known supporters of Salafism. Rayyan is considered to be the key tactical planner of the Brigades at the current time. He is believed to have formulated Hamas’s operational plan for the takeover of Gaza in July 2007. He is also thought to have formulated Hamas’s plan for resisting a major IDF operation into Gaza. He is in charge of weapons production for the Brigades, and is also believed to command its suicide units. Rayyan maintains close relations with a Saudi Salafi cleric resident in Ramallah who is a supporter of al-Qaida.

One level below, the majority of the five brigade commanders of Izzadin Kassam are also Salafis. Among them, Muhammad as-Sanwar, commander of the Khan Yunis Brigade, is a particularly significant figure. He was among the planners of the Kerem Shalom attack in 2006 in which then-Cpl. Gilad Schalit was kidnapped. Deif returned to the Strip via the Sinai-Gaza tunnels in November 2007. Deif himself is known as a very strict Muslim, but the nature of his links to the Salafis are unclear. However, in early 2008, he complained to friends that his own influence in the Izzadin Kassam Brigades had declined, since the “Salafists had taken completely over.” Salafi supporters within Izzadin Kassam are organized, and are known to have made contact with the al-Qaida leadership. As early as 2006, a group of 200 Salafi-oriented Izzadin Kassam members opposed to a cease-fire with Israel made contact with al-Qaida. As a result, an open letter from al-Qaida was sent to Hamas. The letter contained advice for combating the cease-fire.

Friction over the cease-fire resurfaced in June 2008. Salafi elements within the Izzadin Kassam Brigades made clear their opposition to the renewed tahadiyeh (period of calm) with Israel. At that time, an Izzadin Kassam-associated Web site published a list of nine attacks carried out in 2002-2005 for which Hamas had never previously taken responsibility. The Salafis remain firmly entrenched within Izzadin Kassam at all levels. There have been reports, however, of an internal power struggle, with Deif seeking to replace Ja’abari, or at least to reduce his influence. In July 2008, a group of Salafi members of the Brigades split off to form a new group, al-Jaljaleh (Thunder). Friction also exists between the Brigades and other Hamas-controlled military organizations, such as the Executive Force in Gaza. The Executive Force, formed after the Hamas election victory in 2006, is responsible for a variety of policing and paramilitary functions in the Strip. On June 25, 2008, the Executive Force sought to arrest a number of Izzadin Kassam members suspected of criminal activity. Ja’abari refused to hand them over, and the men remained at liberty. This friction notwithstanding, the rise of supporters of al-Qaida ideology within Hamas cannot be seen in a vacuum.

Rather, it is an element of a broader process of the Islamization of many aspects of public life taking place in the Gaza Strip. This may be seen, for example, in the many incidents of women in “immodest” dress being stopped by members of the Executive Force in the weeks following the July 2007 coup. This has led to the near disappearance of non-hijab wearing women from the streets of Gaza. There have also been reports of enforced observance of Ramadan, and harassment of unmarried couples seen together by members of the Force.

All these incidents are signs that the rise to power of Hamas, and within it of extreme Salafi elements, are events of more than simple immediate political significance. After the July 2007 coup, Rayyan declared that “the secular era in Gaza has ended without leaving a trace.” Events in the subsequent 18 months show little to disprove this declaration.

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Analysis: Arab Order and flying Shoes

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 16/12/2008

US President George W. Bush’s visit to Iraq this week reflected the mixed legacy of his presidency. The Iraq invasion is likely to be remembered as the defining issue of the Bush era and recent events show real progress in the country. At the same time, the flying shoes that greeted the president at his joint press conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on Sunday, and the instant canonization of the shoe thrower as the latest poster child for Arab “defiance” show the extent to which the prevailing regional political culture that the invasion was supposed to help end remains alive and kicking – in Iraq as elsewhere. Iraq appears on the way to uneasy stability. There has been an estimated drop of 80 percent in attacks by insurgents since March. Last month, Iraqi civilian deaths were the lowest since the US invasion, 290. These figures reflect the relative success of the US troop surge.

No less important a contributor has been the sahwa (awakening) movement in the provinces of Sunni Arab central Iraq. The new US-Iraqi security pact marks the start of the final act of the US occupation. The pact calls for all American troops to be withdrawn by the end of 2011. The first stage is set for next year, with the withdrawal of US forces from Baghdad and other major cities. As the US begins to draw down its forces in Iraq, the emergent political order in the country is one of Shi’ite domination and interethnic tension. Yet the tensions are being played out – for the moment – within the framework of a working political system based on democratic elections. If this system can hold during and after the US withdrawal, it will represent a significant achievement. It will mean that for the first time since decolonization, one of the main countries of the Arab world will be under democratic rule. Thus far the credit side of the ledger.

As the US president’s reception in Iraq indicates, however, deep problems remain. Muntadar al-Zeidi’s flying shoes are the latest semi-comic emblem of a particular, familiar political culture with deep roots in the Arab world. This outlook sees all events through the prism of a wounded sense of nationalism, and a furious resentment against the West and Israel. This outlook currently finds its active political expression mainly through movements of Islamic revival, but it is not confined to them or solely produced by them. Indeed, to a great extent the rise of Islamism is a product of this political-cultural ambience, rather than the other way around. This political culture sanctifies anti-Western fury, and continues, half a century after decolonization, to see the Arabs as hapless victims of the West. As a result, it gives its greatest honor and respect to those who are able to articulate a sense of furious resentment. If this can be accompanied by the successful application of political violence, then popular deification is assured.

The tremendous popularity of Hizbullah’s Hassan Nasrallah, and even the non-Arab Mahmoud Ahmedinejad among broad masses of Arabs is a product of this political culture. Zeidi and his shoes will henceforth form a very tiny presence in its pantheon. It is this political culture that is capable of producing the curious spectacle of the furious demonstrations against Bush by members of the Iraqi Shi’ite community in the past days. Much may be legitimately criticized about the conception and execution of the invasion of Iraq. But it is an empirically undeniable fact that the individual more responsible than any other for the enfranchisement and elevation to power of the Shi’ites of Iraq is George W. Bush. That is to say that the man who has established a situation in which the Iraqi Shi’ite Zeidi is able to work freely as a journalist, worship freely as a Shi’ite and vote freely as a citizen was the same one whom Zeidi chose to hurl his shoes at.

The probable lesson the US and its allies will take from the Iraq invasion is that ambitious projects for the reform and reshaping of the Arab world are not worth undertaking. Regional order, or something approaching it, will once more be maintained through “off shore balancing” in the form of relations with existing, imperfect but stable regimes in the region, such as the National Democratic Party regime in Egypt and the Saudi monarchy. A Shi’ite regime of one kind or another is likely to emerge in Iraq in the coming years, and the key issue will be whether it allies with the US-dominated existing Arab order, or with Iran. But the combination of post-9/11 rage and genuine desire for reform that powered the US invasion of Iraq of 2003 is, for better or for worse, gone.

The strange spectacle of an Iraq now closer to democracy than any other Arab state, into which the chief architect of its liberty must steal like a thief in the night, and in which he is subjected to insults by a member of the very community he brought to power, is its problematic legacy. It is also the latest evidence of the astonishing hardiness and longevity of that peculiar political culture of self-righteous fury that bestrides the Arabic-speaking world, and that constitutes perhaps the single largest barrier to its rational and mature development.

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Analysis: The Elections and the Pan-Arab Media

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 11/02/2009

Reactions in the pan-Arab media to the election results in Israel follow predictable patterns. There is a particular interest in the growth of Avigdor Lieberman’s party. At the same time, there is a tendency to stress that Israeli parties generally seen in the world as moderate are no less extremist in reality than those more usually characterized in these terms. There are some differences in emphasis and terminology between papers and channels associated with more Western-leading governments and those associated with the pro-Iranian axis. But since sympathy with Israel is a charge of which pro-Western Arab governments and media are keen to prove themselves innocent, the differences are less marked than might be expected.

Regarding news coverage, the Hizbullah-controlled Al-Manar Web site ran an analysis of the elections as its main story throughout most of Wednesday. Hizbullah takes great pride in what it regards as its serious and detailed coverage of Israeli issues. The Al-Manar Web site had a whole section on the elections under the title “The enemy entity – elections.” The headline story notes the “growth of the forces of the Right and the decline of the Left.” The accompanying article includes quotes from Ma’ariv, Yediot Aharonot and Haaretz and notes the discrepancy between the number of seats won by the Likud and Kadima, and the size of the left- and right-wing blocs. Al-Manar awards 66 seats to the right-wing bloc and 44 to that of the Left – interestingly subtracting the Arab lists and Hadash from the left bloc. The article notes that “Zionist President” Shimon Peres now has to decide which of the party leaders to ask to form a government. Should he ask Netanyahu to do so, Al-Manar helpfully points out to its readers, this will be the “first time in the history of the Zionist entity” that the party with the largest number of parliamentary seats has not been asked to form the government.

Al-Jazeera, meanwhile, runs as its main story on the elections an article alleging that “Violence, fraud mar Israel’s elections.” The article consists of a series of accusations of minor irregularities in election procedure in various parts of the country, involving a number of different parties. It appears to be taken from the Iranian government’s Press TV service.

In the London-published, Arab nationalist daily Al-Hayat, columnist Mostafa Zein dismisses all differences between parties in Israel, saying that “it is not a matter of Left or Right, but rather a matter of a racist Israeli society that organized itself in parties.” Zein runs through a litany of massacres to which he apportions more or less equal blame to the Israeli Left and Right – both of which, he concludes, serve “the colonialist racist thinking.” It is worth bearing in mind that while Al-Manar, and to a considerable extent Al-Jazeera are aligned with the Iranian bloc in the Middle East, this is not true of Al-Hayat, which takes a staunchly Arab nationalist, broadly pro-Saudi line on regional matters. In pro-Saudi outlets, Al-Arabiya has as its main analysis piece on the elections an article titled ‘The end of the two-state solution,’ by Jordanian commentator Osama al-Sharif. The article predicts the rise of a narrow, right wing coalition in Israel. Sharif considers that Israel is “veering dangerously to the right,” – “bad news for the rest of the world.” the author contends. However, in keeping with the pro-Saudi line, the article laments the fact that the rightward shift in Israel deals a blow “to the efforts of moderate Arabs to stem Iran’s influence.” The article also acknowledges that Israel’s fears of Iran are genuine. Another article arguing along broadly similar lines appeared in the English-language Beirut Daily Star newspaper.

The article, authored by Rami Khouri, argues that the “shift to the right” in Israel is progressively reducing chances for the two-state solution. Khouri identifies an emerging “militant, even racist” Right in Israel which he considers to constitute in effect a “separate state,” analogous to the separate Hamas entity in Gaza. According to Khouri, this “right-wing, militant, super Jewish-nationalist Israeli settler-colonial state” exists in the West Bank settlements, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, whereas its more moderate opponent holds sway in “greater Tel Aviv and adjacent regions.” Khouri apparently wants to draw a parallel between political divides in Israel, and the schism which has led to the emergence of two separate Palestinian entities.

The strained nature of this comparison notwithstanding, it conforms to the general parameters of coverage of the Israeli elections and Israeli political developments in the pan-Arab media. Pro-Iranian outlets such as Al-Manar adopt an across-the-board hostility to Israel, reflected in the terminology used. Among outlets and commentators associated with Arab states aligned with the West, meanwhile, one may find professions of allegiance to peace and the two-state solution, accompanied by laments that Israeli actions and preferences are making peace impossible. This is reflected in coverage of the elections – with one side regarding the entire electoral procedure as the activity of a criminal entity, while the other sees only one side in the elections (a side which unfortunately tends to take in all the major parties) as warmongering and criminal.

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Analysis: Turkey’s shift toward Iran, Syria is no short-term Blip

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 19/02/2009

Last weekend, a conference held under the title “Gaza the victory” took place at hotel near Istanbul’s Ataturk airport. The conference brought 200 Sunni clerics and activists together with senior, Damascus-based Hamas officials. Closed meetings held after the main conference sessions focused on the creation of a “third jihadist front” against Israel – the first two being Iraq and Afghanistan, in the view of the conference delegates. The gathering was addressed by Muhammad Nazzal, a top Hamas official from Damascus. In an echo of the attempts by Islamists across the Middle East to pressure Egypt during the recent Gaza operation, Nazzal called on regional governments to “open the borders and let the fighters through.” The gathering in Istanbul is significant for two reasons.

First, it showcases the continued efforts by Islamist movements to present the Gaza events as a watershed dividing the path of “resistance,” which they favor, from the path of “collaboration” that they accuse leading Arab states of following. Second, and perhaps more important, the location of the conference is a further indication of the move of the Islamist AKP government in Turkey toward a more and more open alignment with anti-Western and anti-Israeli forces in the region. The conference organizers themselves were aware of the significance of the event’s location. One of them told a BBC journalist attending the event, “During the past 100 years relations [between Arabs and Turks] have been strained, but Palestine has brought us together.” Speakers at the conference made constant reference to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision to storm off the stage in protest during a recent debate in Davos, Switzerland, on the Gaza operation.

The current Turkish government’s willingness to engage with and host regional and Palestinian Islamist forces is not new. Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal made a controversial trip to Ankara less than a month after Hamas’s victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006. Interestingly, Mashaal was asked to come directly by the AKP government, after the more secular-minded Turkish Foreign Ministry refused to extend an invitation to him. At the time, some analysts sought to present the invitation to Mashaal as a one-off gesture without deeper significance for the Israeli-Turkish relationship. Subsequent events have disproved this interpretation. Turkey’s response to the Gaza offensive has highlighted a deep rift in relations. Erdogan in the course of the operation questioned Israel’s UN membership. The atmosphere in Turkey during Operation Cast Lead became deeply charged against Israelis and Jews – with a number of ugly incidents recorded across the country. Erdogan attended the emergency summit in Doha on January 16 that was convened by Syria and Qatar to offer support to Hamas.

Turkey’s courting of Hamas and hosting of Islamist gatherings form part of a more general regional policy pursued by the AKP government in Ankara. The AKP seeks to build Turkey’s regional “strategic depth” – in its preferred phrase – by building up relations with Syria and Iran. This is presented as a desire to counter-balance, rather than replace, Ankara’s already deep links with the West. However, in the current situation of sharp polarization and cold war in the region, it is becoming increasingly unfeasible for countries to maintain close relations with both the US-led and the Iranian-led camps. The prospect of Turkey moving toward the Iranian-led alliance can no longer be dismissed as fanciful. Turkish analysts have noted the rise of a “Muslim nationalist” orientation in the country, of which the political dominance of the AKP over the last half decade forms the political expression. From this perspective, a regional policy which stresses alliances with other Muslim governments and movements across the region is a natural choice.

Growing warmth in Turkey’s relations with Iran and Syria, and the sympathy shown their key client organization Hamas last weekend in Istanbul are all elements of this emerging policy. Of course, it is much too soon to write off the relationship between Turkey and Israel. There are powerful forces within the country which oppose the AKP’s “strategic depth” orientation. Nevertheless, Turkey’s position on recent events has brought great cheer to the Iranian-led camp, and is leading to corresponding new efforts at courtship from Teheran. Senior Iranian officials praised Turkey’s stance during the Gaza crisis, and called for a strategic alliance between the two countries. Yahya Safavi, former commander of the Revolutionary Guards and now security adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said earlier this month that “Erdogan’s… courageous words at the Davos summit against the war crimes of the Zionist regime… are evidence of the Islamic awakening among the Turkish people – a result of the influence of Iran’s Islamic Revolution.” Majlis speaker and former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani visited Turkey during the Gaza crisis, holding closed talks with Erdogan. Following the meetings, both men called to enhance the already extensive economic links between Iran and Turkey.

Where is Turkey heading? What can be said with certainty is that Ankara’s long-maintained policy of equidistance between Israelis and Palestinians has been dispensed with by the current leadership. The AKP government is aligning itself not only with the Palestinians, but with Hamas. In the longer term, this may portend a slow shift toward greater alignment with the Iranian-led regional alliance. Such a shift, if it occurs, will be of primary significance to the strategic balance in the region.

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Analysis: Possible first Fruits of a new Era

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 25/02/2009

President Barack Obama, in his first international media interview following his election, told Al-Arabiya that “if countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us.” In addition to the new policy of seeking to reduce pressure on Iran, the US is currently engaged in what looks like an extended courtship of the Assad regime in Syria. Obama mentioned neither Syria nor Iran in his latest speech to Congress. But the speech coined a phrase which handily sums up the essence of the administration’s apparent approach to the region: “In words and deeds,” the President told Congress, “we are showing the world that a new era of engagement has begun.” In words and deeds, the response of Iran and Syria to the Obama approach is also becoming apparent.

Since the election of Obama, Iran has this month carried out two high-profile acts indicating that its drive to achieve nuclear weapons capability has – so far at least – failed to be swayed by the new era. At the beginning of the month, Teheran announced that it had successfully launched its first satellite into orbit. The launch was testimony to the advances made by Iran’s long-range ballistic missile program. It was also testimony to the importance the Iranian regime attaches to acts of open defiance and demonstrations of strength. This week, Iran announced that it is to begin a test run of its Russian-built light water reactor at Bushehr. The plant, which began construction in 1998, is due to begin functioning in the first half of this year. Russia has resisted international calls to suspend involvement. The test run, which coincides with a visit to Teheran of the head of Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, represents an additional message from the Iranians regarding their position on the relative importance of extended hands and clenched fists.

Under the radar, there is concern at the increasing opacity of the Iranian nuclear program. The Iranians have chosen a unique interpretation of their obligations vis-Ã -vis the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and its investigations. More and more, Iran simply declines to provide information. The result is that there are now real fears that a secret uranium enrichment site in addition to the site at Natanz might have been constructed. Regarding the not-yet-operating heavy water plant at Arak – again, Iran is simply refusing to answer questions. Teheran’s impunity derives from a reading of the current international atmosphere which is probably correct.

The courting of Syria, meanwhile, is showing no signs of being knocked off track by the latest revelations from the IAEA regarding just what it was that the Israeli air force bombed at al-Kibar in September, 2007. A report from the agency issued last week dismissed Syrian attempts to claim that traces of uranium found at the site were residue left by Israeli munitions. Inspectors have complained that Syria is denying access to parts of the site, and has failed to provide requested documentation concerning the site’s use. Syrian spokesmen have explained the reluctance to grant access as deriving from fears that Israel might try to use information provided to gain knowledge of Syrian “military installations.” As if on cue, and in the latest evidence of the Syrian regime’s feline sense of humor, a missile facility has now appeared at the site bombed in 2007. The facility will no doubt, in addition to defending Syria’s skies from its enemies, serve an additional function as a reason why the site cannot be made open to inspectors from the IAEA.

Despite all this, the charm offensive is continuing. In addition to three high profile congressional delegations to Damascus, a series of quieter gestures are signaling to the Syrians that the sanctions regime put in place by the previous administration may be discreetly wound down. The Treasury Department last week permitted $500,000 to be transferred to a Syrian charity. The Department of Commerce approved the supplying of spare parts to Syria’s superannuated Boeing 747 aircraft, and so on. Thus far deeds. In terms of words – the picture does not differ greatly. The Syrians were reputedly angered by a suggestion from Congressman Benjamin Cardin during the visit of the first congressional delegation that Damascus might share some responsibility for its international isolation – because of its “partnership of terrorism.” An editorial in the al-Watan newspaper described such remarks as “far from the Arab, international and American reality.” The newspaper succinctly summarized Syria’s position as follows: “the Syrians are looking forward to a change in American policy, not to a change in Syrian policy.” Iranian spokesmen have struck a similar tone. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hassan Qashqavi responded to Obama’s earlier declaration by contending that Iran had “never clenched its fists.” Rather, it was the Bush administration which had shown its “clenched fist to Mid-East nations.”

The new era of engagement thus appears so far to be providing the Iranians with valuable leeway for the pursuit of their nuclear ambitions, and the Syrians with similar space to avoid being brought to account for their own apparently now discontinued program. In addition, the new era is giving the spokesmen of both dictatorships plenty of opportunity for engaging in the scolding and proclamations of moral superiority of which they are so fond. It is unlikely that this is what the new US president had in mind. It is therefore probable that the new era will be an unusually short one.

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Analysis: Is the US backing down on Iran’s Uranium Enrichment?

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 09/04/2009

US President Barack Obama’s speech to the Turkish parliament on Monday was greeted with enthusiasm throughout the Arab world. The speech represented an attempt to mend fences, and was testimony to the administration’s belief in the healing power of words. Obama ticked all the required boxes. He stressed his intention to “actively pursue” the goal of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. He declared that the US “is not and will never be at war with Islam.” He even spoke of the important role played by Islam in the development of the United States. (No doubt some junior member of staff is currently engaged in the unenviable task of finding some examples of this formerly little-remarked-upon phenomenon.) The rhetoric was designed largely to change the atmospherics of the relationship between the US and the Arab states. The content of the administration’s regional policy – beyond a general desire for dialogue and “engagement” – has yet to be properly clarified. However, as the empirical evidence accumulates, a picture is beginning to emerge on key issues.

The administration is serious regarding its project of engagement with Iran. The Iranians, meanwhile, are equally serious about their project to develop a nuclear capability. It therefore appears likely that both of these projects will be seriously and energetically pursued, with the former having little effect on the latter. In his speeches in Turkey, Obama failed to reiterate the previous administration’s call for a complete cessation of uranium enrichment by Iran. Rather, the president said his message to Iran was “don’t develop a nuclear weapon.” This could be interpreted as meaning that the administration may be prepared to tolerate Iran’s uranium enrichment program, on condition that it takes place under IAEA supervision, and does not seek to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels. US officials have been wary of committing themselves as to whether this is indeed the administration’s intention. When queried on the matter, State Department spokesman Robert Wood recommended waiting until the policy review process is completed. But should this prove to be the administration’s position, it would be seen in Iran as a major victory for the regime.

Iran has been at loggerheads for the last half-decade with the major western powers over its uranium enrichment program. A series of UN Security Council resolutions since 2006 have reiterated the international demand for an absolute and open-ended cessation of uranium enrichment by Teheran. This goal has been shared, at least declaratively, by the US, EU, Russia and China. In the intervening period, Iran has defied international will. Teheran has installed more than 5,500 centrifuges to enrich uranium in its plant at Natanz. Iran now possesses a stockpile of more than 1,000 kg. of low-enriched uranium. A US acceptance of this situation as a fait accompli would send a strong signal to the regime in Iran and to its allies that this is an administration that accepts the establishment of facts on the ground – at least by its enemies. It appears that the administration realizes this, which is why it will prefer to wait until after the Iranian presidential elections in June, in the hope that it can offer any concessions to someone other than President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. But whether it is Ahmedinejad or Mirhossein Moussavi who holds the Iranian presidency after June, if the intention of the Obama administration is to accept ongoing Iranian uranium enrichment as a starting point from which to request Iranian cooperation, this would represent the rewarding of defiance. The result of this will be to invite more defiance.

The administration has now announced that it will take part in direct talks with the Iranians, alongside the UK, France, Germany, China and Russia. This latest development represents a further abandonment of the previous administration’s policy regarding uranium enrichment. Bush had made the cessation of enrichment a condition for talks between Iran and the US. A new round of talks is currently being prepared, and is expected to take place within four to six weeks. Ahmedinejad has gracefully accepted Obama’s offer of friendship, on condition that it is based on “honesty, justice and respect.” In the coming days, meanwhile, Iran is expected to announce the latest advance in its nuclear program – the perfection of techniques for the manufacture of uranium fuel. Of course, the possibility of increased sanctions will be held out, should Iran refuse to cooperate with the latest diplomatic charm offensive. Nevertheless, the overall picture is not encouraging.

Behind the smiles and the bowing and the rhetoric, the various regional players are currently assessing their room for maneuver in the climate being created by the Obama administration. The Iranians will note the softening of the US stance on uranium enrichment, the offer of direct talks, and the declarations of friendship and respect for Iran’s ancient culture. They are likely to conclude that all this adds up to increased space and increased time in which to pursue their ambitions.

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Analysis: Sinai Saga casts Light on new regional Dynamic

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post-16/04/2009

The latest revelations of Hizbullah involvement in northern Sinai cast a sudden light on a silent war currently under way across the Middle East and beyond it. The events in Sinai showcase a number of defining factors of this new, Middle Eastern Cold War. Firstly, the Sinai events confirm that where there is disorder, weak central government and ongoing local conflict – there is Iran. Northern Sinai provides a near-perfect environment for the activities of the clandestine arms of Iranian government and its proxies. As a result of long-term indifference on the part of the Egyptian authorities, an entire local economy based on smuggling and lawlessness has grown up among the Beduin of the northern Sinai.

Over the last decade, Sunni global jihad groups have moved in to take advantage of the tempting prospects offered by the combination of lawlessness, light government, nearness to Israel and the close proximity of large numbers of western and Israeli tourists. Sunni jihadi terror attacks took place in Taba in 2004, Sharm e-Sheikh in 2005 and Dahab in 2006. It is now clear that Sunni global Jihad groups were not the only ones to see the potential in northern Sinai. The infinitely more serious networks of Iran and its proxy Hizbullah have made use of the smugglers’ trail that leads from Sudan through Egypt and into Sinai to bring the weapons intended to turn the Hamas enclave in Gaza into an Islamist fortress. The growing boldness of Iran and its proxies evidently led to the idea of making use of the ideal conditions available for terrorists in Sinai to build active Shia-led Islamist terror cells in the area.

The Egyptian authorities have made half-hearted efforts in the past to prevent weapons smuggling to Gaza. This new threat, however, appears to have constituted a red line – leading to determined action. In particular, the possibility of an attack on shipping in the Suez Canal served to concentrate the minds of the Egyptians. This highlights a second notable factor: namely the extensive current cooperation, behind the scenes, of the Egyptian authorities with their Israeli and US counterparts. Again – the offer of advice, information and assistance from Israel and the US is not new. On the contrary, Israeli and US officials have been exasperated in the past by the failure of the Egyptians to take seriously or act upon information readily made available to them. As the lines of the new regional situation become clearer, and as it becomes plain to the Egyptians that they are not going to be able to sit the conflict out – so cooperation is growing.

The final and perhaps most important lesson to be drawn from the latest events relates to the nature and role of the Lebanese Hizbullah organization. A debate continues to rage in policy circles – encouraged by fellow travelers and sympathizers with this movement – as to whether it should be seen as primarily a domestic Lebanese political movement, or as essentially a creature of Iranian government. This debate has important policy implications. Elections are to take place in Lebanon on June 7. It is possible that the Hizbullah-led March 8 alliance will form the next government in Beirut. Should Hizbullah win, it will be claimed by its friends in the West that by participating in the elections, the movement has shown that it is primarily a Lebanese political actor. If and when these claims are raised, it is to be hoped that US and European policy-makers will keep in mind the events of the past days in Sinai.

Hizbullah second in command Sheikh Naim Kassem told The Los Angeles Times earlier this week that he was encouraged by what he perceived as the “changing perception” of his organization in the West. He noted growing calls for “engagement” with Hizbullah emanating from a number of European capitals, and assured his interviewer that Hizbullah carries out no military operations outside of Lebanon. It is now clear that between giving saccharine interviews to eminent western newspapers, Sheikh Naim Kassem was also directly responsible for the Hizbullah cell in Sinai, led by Muhammad Mansour. Al-Ahram this week quoted Egyptian officials responsible for monitoring communications between the cell and the Hizbullah leadership in Lebanon who confirmed this. A clearer indication of the absurdity of Hizbullah’s claims – and the credulity of those western officials prepared to countenance them – would be hard to imagine. Hizbullah has reportedly received $1 billion in the last months from Teheran for its election campaign. Its operatives have now been caught in the searchlight – exposed as wrapped up in Iran’s ongoing project to ignite the region.

Hizbullah constitutes one of the pieces on the chessboard to be moved at will by the guiding Iranian hand. So a new cold war is under way – and like the old one, it is being fought on a variety of blurred, interlocking fronts: military, paramilitary, political and diplomatic. The most important weapon – vital for all other advantages to be used – is clarity of thought. The latest revelations of meddling in Sinai by Iran and its Lebanese proxy may, it is hoped, contribute to the slow spread of this vital asset.

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