Analysis: Hizbullah Turns up the Temperature in the North

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post-30/07/2009

Israel’s border with Lebanon is currently at its most tense since the cease-fire which ended the war of 2006. This tension has been brought on by the combination of a number of factors.

Ongoing internal political frictions in Lebanon and a series of recent setbacks suffered by the Iran-led regional bloc are both key elements contributing to the situation. Inflammatory rhetoric and orchestrated provocations by Hizbullah supporters in the south, against the ominous background of the movement’s ongoing rearmament, are helping to ratchet up the uncertainty.

Coalition negotiations have been deadlocked in Lebanon in recent weeks. Hizbullah has conceded to the opposition’s demand that its bloc receive only 15 ministerial portfolios (one less than the number required for a veto). This does not settle the matter, however. The focus now turns to efforts to ensure that at least one of the ‘independent’ ministers linked to President Suleiman is of a pro-Hizbullah orientation, ensuring the de facto continuation of the movement’s power to block government decisions not to its liking.

Feeling itself under internal pressure, Hizbullah has sought once again to cast itself as the force of ‘resistance’ in Lebanon.

It was this role which originally propelled the movement from its status as a secondary, pro-Iranian Shia force to its current prominence. During the past several years, Hizbullah’s problem has been finding issues which could justify its continued belligerent stance against Israel. The two matters on which it has chosen to focus are Israeli control of the Mount Dov (Shabaa Farms) area, and the matter of Lebanese citizens supposedly incarcerated in Israel. Both these issues are now once more being deliberately placed in the foreground.

It is worth remembering that the 2006 war was sparked by an attempt by Hizbullah to kidnap IDF soldiers in order to exchange them for Samir Kuntar and a number of other Lebanese jailed in Israel for involvement in terror. The attack in July 2006 was not the first attempt of this kind. Each was accompanied by a ratcheting up of rhetoric by the Hizbullah leadership, which sought to focus attention on the prisoners.

On July 17, Nasrallah gave a speech to mark the first anniversary of the release of Samir Kuntar and other Lebanese captives from Israeli custody. In the speech, he raised the issue of another supposed Lebanese ‘prisoner’ who, he claimed, remains in Israeli hands. The individual named, one Yahya Skaff, was killed while taking part in a Palestinian terror operation in Israel in 1978. It was long rumored in Lebanon that he was in fact alive and in Israeli custody. Skaff’s remains were returned to Lebanon, but Hizbullah maintains that tests were unable to confirm the identity of the remains.

Nasrallah’s speech suggests that the movement wants to inflate this issue so that it may serve as ‘justification’ for further aggression against Israel.
In addition, Hizbullah is turning up the temperature in the Mount Dov area. Against the backdrop of the explosion at Khirbat Silm, the movement has carried out a series of provocations – including a crossing into the Mount Dov area by Hizbullah-supporting civilians, who placed a movement banner and a Lebanese flag on an unmanned Israeli observation post in the Kafr Shuba hills.

The present escalation is taking place against the backdrop of Hizbullah’s continued re-arming, both south and north of the Litani River. Israel is carefully monitoring this process. There are certain red lines beyond which Israel may consider some form of preventive action necessary, according to sources. These would include the acquisition and deployment by Hizbullah of an anti-aircraft capacity.

The situation on the northern border must be viewed through a regional prism, as well as a narrow Israeli-Lebanese one. The region remains divided between a bloc of states and movements aligned with Iran, which includes Hizbullah, and a de facto counter-alliance of pro-US states including Israel. Israel is the totemic enemy of the pro-Iranian bloc, which is committed to its destruction.

It has not been a good year for the pro-Iranian bloc. An important asset for the Iranians and their allies has been their sense of themselves as the ‘sunrise’ power in the region – the force of tomorrow. This perception had been aided by a string of achievements in the past few years. But 2009 has witnessed the cessation and partial reverse of this process – with a number of setbacks for Teheran and its various assets.

Israel’s Gaza operation dented their sense that they had discovered a means of nullifying Israel’s conventional advantage through the use of attrition and war against civilians. This setback was then followed by defeat for Iran’s Lebanese clients in the June elections. Following this, the unrest after the rigged elections in Iran itself made a mockery of the Teheran-led bloc’s claim to represent the regional popular will against its opponents. The charging of a number of Hizbullah activists, recently apprehended in Egypt, has added to the movement’s woes.

Could this combination of local and regional frustrations be leading Hizbullah, creation and chief asset of the Iranians, down a road of dangerous brinkmanship – in an effort to recover some of its lost momentum and charisma?

What is clear is that the events sparked by the Khirbat Silm explosion have not yet run their course, the potential for miscalculation is very real, and hence further deterioration cannot be ruled out.

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Iran Hasn’t Won the Cold War Yet

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 07/01/2010

The salient strategic fact in the Middle East today is the Iranian drive for regional hegemony. This Iranian objective is being promoted by a rising hardline conservative elite within the Iranian regime, centred on a number of political associations and on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards corps.

This elite, which is personified by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has received the backing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Their aim is a second Islamic revolution that would revive the original fire of the revolution of 1979. They appear to be aiming for the augmenting of clerical rule with a streamlined, brutal police-security state, under the banner of Islam. Building Iranian power and influence throughout the Middle East is an integral part of their strategy.

The Iranian nuclear program is an aspect of this ambition.

A nuclear capability is meant to form the ultimate insurance for the Iranian regime as it aggressively builds its influence across the region.

This goal of hegemony is being pursued through the assembling of a bloc of states and organisations under Iranian leadership. This bloc, according to Iran, represents authentic Muslim currents within the region, battling against the US and its hirelings. The pro-Iranian bloc includes Syria, Sudan, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas among the Palestinians, and the Houthi rebel forces in northern Yemen.

A de facto rival alliance is emerging, consisting of states that are threatened by Iran and its allies and clients. This rival alliance includes Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait.

Israel, despite lacking official diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, is also a key member of this camp. Unlike the pro-Iranian bloc, which has a simple guiding ideology of resistance to the West, the countries seeking to counter Iran are united by interest only.

The rivalry between these two camps now informs and underlies all-important developments in the Middle East. It is behind the joint Israeli-Egyptian effort to contain the Iran-sponsored Hamas enclave in the Gaza Strip. It is behind the fighting in north Yemen, as Saudi troops take on Shia rebels armed and supported by Iran. The rivalry is behind the face-off between pro-American and pro-Iranian forces in Lebanon. The insurgencies in Afghanistan and in Iraq are also notable for the presence of weaponry traceable to Iran in use by insurgents against Western forces.

Who is winning in this ongoing Middle East cold war? The rhetoric of the Iranians, of course, depicts their advance as unstoppable. The reality is more complex, and the past year has seen gains and losses for both sides.

First, within Iran the electoral victory of Ahmadinejad and the subsequent backing given to him by Khamenei represented a major advance for the Iranian hardline conservatives. Ahmadinejad subsequently confirmed his victory by forming a cabinet that is packed with conservatives and Revolutionary Guardsmen.

But the refusal of large sections of the Iranian people to accept the possibly rigged election and the unprecedented scenes of opposition in the streets of Iranian cities in recent weeks have severely tarnished this achievement.

The ongoing unrest in Iran probably does not constitute an immediate danger to the regime. But it surely indicates that large numbers of Iranians have no desire to see their country turned into the instrument of permanent Islamic revolution and resistance envisaged by the hardline conservatives. The domestic unrest thus hits significantly at the emerging regime’s legitimacy, and their ability to promote their regime as a model for governance to the Arab and wider Muslim world.

Iran made major advances in Lebanon last year. The formation of the new Lebanese government in November in essence confirms Hezbollah’s domination of the country. Hezbollah is the favoured child of the Iranian regime and its partner in subversive activity globally. There is now no serious internal force in Lebanon able to oppose its will.

In Gaza, the Iranian-sponsored Hamas regime is holding on. The Iranian investment is central to Hamas’s ability to stay in power. The movement just announced a budget of $US540 million ($590m) for 2010. Of this, just $US55m is to be raised through taxes and local sources of revenue. The rest is to come from “aid and assistance”. Hamas does not reveal the identity of its benefactors. But it is fairly obvious that the bulk of this funding will come from Iran. The Palestinian issue remains the central cause celebre of the Arab and Muslim world. The Iranian regime’s goal is to take ownership of it.

But there have been setbacks here too. The Iranian resistance model failed in a straight fight with the Israeli Defence Forces in the early part of the year. Hamas’s 100-man “Iranian unit” suffered near destruction in Gaza. The Hamas regime in Gaza managed to kill six IDF soldiers in the entire course of Operation Cast Lead. This is a failure, recorded as such by all regional observers.

In addition, someone or the other appears to be trying to demonstrate to the Iranians that the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy is a two-way street. Hence the killing of 29 Revolutionary Guards in a bombing in October near the Iran-Pakistan border, and the mysterious explosion in Damascus last month that killed a number of Iranian pilgrims.

So at the beginning of 2010, the lines are clearly drawn in the Middle East cold war, and the contest is far from over.

Ultimately, like other totalitarians before them, the Iranian hardline conservatives are likely to fail through overreach. The inefficient, corruption-ridden and oppressive state they are coming to dominate is likely to prove an insufficient instrument to sustain their boundless ambition. Still, this process probably has a long way to run yet. Much will depend on the sense of purpose, will and resourcefulness of the Western and regional countries that this regime has identified as its enemies.

This is a contest for the future of the region. It has almost certainly not yet reached its height.

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Analysis: Lebanon Election Results Offer Some Relief, but No Major Changes

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post-08/06/2009

It is now clear that the pro-Western March 14 alliance has won an unexpected victory in parliamentary elections in Lebanon, and senior sources in the Hizbullah-led March 8 bloc have conceded defeat in statements to Western reporters.

Contrary to most forecasts, the vote appears to have produced a legislature very similar in representation to the one that preceded it.

March 14 is thought to have won 69 or 70 seats in the 128-member parliament. If one adds the one or two independent, pro-March 14 MPs to the total, the movement now controls around 71 seats. In the outgoing parliament, they controlled 70.

What were the factors that led to March 8/Hizbullah being upset, and what implications do the results have for stability in Lebanon and for Israel?

Most importantly, the results represent a defeat for the party of former general Michel Aoun. Aoun’s Free Democratic Party is the Christian element in the Hizbullah-led March 8 bloc. Aoun, who once led an anti-Syrian rebellion, is now a firm member of the pro-Syrian alliance in Lebanon.

The focus in these elections was the Christian community, because the allegiances of the Druse, Sunni and Shi’ite Lebanese were clear and predictable. The Sunnis and Druse overwhelmingly backed the pro-Western March 14, while the Shi’ites – their loyalties divided between Hizbullah and the pro-Syrian Amal movement, were almost exclusively aligned with March 8. As a result, around 100 of the 128 seats in parliament were effectively allocated in advance.

The Christians, however, were divided. Aoun expected that his personal standing and his strong showing in 2005 would allow his party to sweep the board in Christian areas. The pro-March 14 Christians – the Lebanese Forces Party of Dr. Samir Geagea and the Phalange – were widely disregarded.

Though the emergence of a number of “independent” Christian candidates in the weeks prior to the elections had led to rumors of a possible upset, it appears that the Christians affiliated with March 14 performed surprisingly well, though without entirely eclipsing Aoun.

March 14 swept the board in the symbolically important Beirut 1 District, which contains five seats. March 14 also won the seats of Batroun (where a Lebanese Forces candidate unseated Michel Aoun’s son-in-law) Koura, Bsharreh and Tripoli.

Why did so many Christian Lebanese turn against Aoun and March 8?

Many Lebanese analysts consider that fears in the community over the consequences of a drift further toward the Iranian and Syrian regional bloc played an important part. In this regard, the events of May 2008, when Hizbullah sent its forces onto the streets of Beirut, were seen as playing a role.
A recent speech by Hassan Nasrallah, in which he described those May events as a “glorious day” for the “resistance” and warned March 14 against any future interference with Hizbullah’s independent military infrastructure, may well have helped to concentrate Christian minds regarding the danger represented by Hizbullah.
Some have also suggested that the memory of the destructive 2006 war with Israel, sparked by a Hizbullah kidnapping of IDF soldiers and shelling of Israeli communities in the North, also played its part.
The election results mean that March 14 will be the dominant factor in the governing coalition which will now be formed. However, the opposition will also be represented in the new government. Negotiations over the make-up and nature of the coalition are likely to be protracted.

Lebanese analysts are pointing to the issue of the opposition’s demand for a “blocking third” of cabinet seats as a possible source of strife.

The veto was granted to Hizbullah and its allies in the Doha negotiations which followed the May fighting last year. However, March 14 leader Sa’ad Hariri has said that he is not interested in renewing the veto arrangement.

This is likely to prove a central issue in negotiations. Given Hizbullah’s and its allies’ and patrons’ proven capacity for using violence to reinforce their arguments, the potential for further strife remains real.

It is important to remember that while the averting of an electoral victory for the pro-Iranian, pro-Syrian bloc is significant, it has no bearing on the wider issue of Hizbullah’s possession of an independent military capacity, and its consequent ability to pursue an independent foreign and military policy.

Hizbullah would certainly have preferred the March 8 bloc it leads to have performed better. But the movement itself fielded only 11 candidates. Beyond this, it was content to concede the Shi’ite representation to the allied Amal movement.

For Hizbullah and its Iranian patron, the key interest at present is the rebuilding and expansion of its independent military capacity, and the shadow state which has emerged around it.

Hizbullah successfully defended the borders of this shadow state from internal interference in May 2008. Iran invested heavily in repairing it after the war of 2006, and its guns remain pointed at Israel.

So amid the justified relief at the setback suffered by the pro-Iranian bloc in the vote, it should be borne in mind that the results represent a continuation of the problematic preelection reality, rather than any major transformation.

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The Forgotten Minority

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 09/07/2010

On March 21, 2010, the Syrian security forces opened fire with live ammunition on a crowd of 5,000 in the northern Syrian town of al-Raqqah. The crowd had gathered to celebrate the Kurdish festival of Nowruz. Three people, including a 15-year-old girl, were killed. Over 50 were injured. Dozens of injured civilians were held incommunicado by the authorities following the events. Some remain incarcerated. This incident was just one example of the repression taking place of the largest national minority in Syria – namely, the Syrian Kurdish population.

Kurds constitute 9 percent-10% of the population of Syria – that is, around 1.75 million in a total population of 22 million. Since the rise of militant Arab nationalism to power in Damascus, they have faced an ongoing campaign for their dissolution as a community.

All this is taking place far from the spotlight of world attention. The current US Administration pursues a general policy of considered silence on the issue of human rights in Middle East countries. The Syrian regime remains the elusive subject of energetic courting by the European Union and by Washington.

As a result, the Kurds of Syria are likely for the foreseeable future to remain the region’s forgotten minority.

The severe repression suffered by the Syrian Kurds has its roots in the early period of Ba’ath rule in Syria. The Arab nationalist Ba’athis felt threatened by the presence of a large non-Arab national majority, and set about trying to remove it using the methods usually associated with them.

In 1962, a census undertaken in the area of highest concentration of Kurdish population in Syria – the al- Hasaka province – resulted in 120,000-150,000 Syrian Kurds being arbitrarily stripped of their citizenship.

They and their descendants remain non-persons today.

They are unable to travel outside the country, to own property, or to work in the public sector. People in this category today number about 200,000 – though no official statistics exist for them. They are known as ajanib (foreigners).

A large additional group of around 100,000 Kurds in Syria remain entirely undocumented and unregistered.

This group, known as maktoumeen (muted), similarly live without citizenship or travel and employment rights.

The bureaucratic struggle of the Syrian regime to wish away its non-Arab population has been accompanied by practical measures on the ground to alter the demographic balance of the country.

In the 1970s, a campaign of “Arabization” of Kurdish areas commenced, on the order of president Hafez Assad. The intention was to create a “belt” of Arab population along the northern and northeastern borders of Syria with Turkey and Iraq, where most of the country’s Kurds live. The purpose of this was to prevent Kurdish territorial contiguity. Kurdish place names were changed to Arab ones, Kurds were deprived of their land and instructed to re-settle in the interior. Kurdish language, music, publications and political organization were banned. It was forbidden for parents to register their children with Kurdish names.

The vigorous policy of Arabization later largely faded into bureaucratic torpor. But for a while it produced the desired result – of a divided, demoralized, repressed and largely silent population.

THIS SITUATION no longer pertains. In March 2004, following the recognition of Kurdish autonomous control of northern Iraq, something resembling an uprising began among the Kurds of Syria.

The spark that ignited the wave of protests that month was the shooting dead of seven Kurds by the security forces following a clash between Kurds and Arabs at a football match in Qamishli, a city of high Kurdish population close to the Turkish border. Further shootings took place at the funerals of the dead, and unrest spread across the Jazira, and as far as Aleppo and Damascus. The army moved into the Kurdish areas with heavy armor and air cover, and the protests were crushed.

Despite conciliatory noises made by President Bashar Assad following the 2004 unrest, nothing of substance has been done to change the conditions endured by Kurds in Syria. As a result, the situation since 2004 has been one of simmering tension between the Syrian regime and its Kurdish subjects, with occasional flareups.

In August, 2005, and again in October, 2008, and then again earlier this year, there were clashes between Kurdish citizens and the security forces in Qamishli, with some deaths and many arrests.

Syrian oppositionists speak of the emergence of a young, increasingly nationalistic younger generation, estranged from the Arab opposition in Syria as well as from the regime. As yet, no single movement has emerged to reflect this sentiment. Twelve different political parties exist among the Kurds of Syria, a reflection of the peculiar divisiveness to which regional opposition movements in general, and Kurdish ones in particular, remain prone.

For a variety of reasons, the Kurds have difficulty making their voices heard on the international stage. Their oppressors are fellow Muslims, rather than Christians or Jews, so the powerful alliance of Muslim states on the international stage is not interested. Arab states are by definition indifferent or hostile to their concerns.

And with their regular lucklessness, they now face a situation where the rising powers in the region – Turkey and Iran – and their enthusiastic smaller partner Syria all have sizable Kurdish populations and a shared interest in keeping them suppressed.

The misfortune of the Syrian Kurds is compounded by the fact that contrary to the accepted cliché, the enemy of their enemy is not their friend. This is because the enemy of the Syrian Kurds’ enemy is the west and the United States. These are today led by a philosophy which believes in accommodating, rather than confronting rivals. As a result, the systematic, half-century old campaign of the Syrian Arab Republic to nullify the existence of its Kurdish minority looks set to continue apace.

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Hamas Fans Flames of Islamic Anger Following “Day of Rage”

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 19/03/2010

Hamas leaders are seeking to escalate Palestinian unrest over the supposed Israeli threat to Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. In addition to reflecting the movement’s ideological goals, this effort makes good political sense.

Hamas seeks to supplant the West Bank Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad. It knows that by returning the focus of the conflict to the explosive issue of Islamic pride and outrage over the loss of holy places, it can present itself as the natural leader of the Palestinians, and its opponents as irrelevancies or, worse, collaborators.

For this reason, Hamas spokesmen and leaders in the West Bank, Gaza and beyond have been busily fanning the flames of Arab and Muslim anger since the “Day of Rage” in Jerusalem on Tuesday. The main focus, notably, is the supposed threat to the Aksa Mosque represented by the rebuilding of the Hurva Synagogue, rather than that of construction in the Ramat Shlomo neighborhood or broader Palestinian grievances.

Speaking at a conference organized by the Hamas authorities in Gaza City on Wednesday, Gaza Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh told his audience that “what is happening now exposes the reality of Jerusalem’s future and the Jews’ plans.”

He urged Palestinians not to fear a “religious or nonreligious war” and declared that Jerusalem will “always remain Islamic.”

Haniyeh went on to call for an emergency session of the Islamic Conference Organization countries to support Palestinian protests in Jerusalem. He castigated the PA for preventing protesters from “defending their lands and holy sites.”

This basic message was repeated in statements by other senior Palestinian officials in the last days. In Damascus, Hamas Political Bureau head Khaled Mashaal announced the launching of an “open-ended campaign for Jerusalem and the Islamic and Christian holy sites in Palestine.”

Mashaal praised the role of ‘1948’ Palestinians (that is, Arab citizens of Israel) in the protests so far. He said that Israel was “playing with fire” and risked triggering a region-wide war.

The movement’s ambassador in Lebanon, Osama Hamdan, told the Al-Jazeera satellite channel that the opening of the Hurva Synagogue formed part of a larger Israeli attempt to “invent” a Jewish history for Jerusalem. Hamdan asserted that no landmarks unambiguously indicating an ancient Jewish presence in the city had been found, so Israel had instead chosen to focus on the Hurva, built at the time of the Ottomans.

Izzadin Kassam, the armed wing of Hamas, said in a statement on its Web site that the latest events in Jerusalem would lead to “dire explosions.”

Abu Obaida, spokesman for Izzadin Kassam, predicted that the opening of the Hurva (ruin) Synagogue would itself lead to Israel’s ruin, and that any tampering with al-Aksa would mean Israel’s demise.

The flood of rhetoric from Hamas leaders and spokesmen in the last days derives from a concerted attempt to regain the political initiative on the Palestinian side. With the split in the Palestinian movement showing no signs of being healed any time soon, Hamas is seeking to foment a new uprising, based on Islamic fury, in which it can wave the banner of the Aksa Mosque. Since Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, Hamas has been mainly engaged in rebuilding and reconsolidating its power in the Strip. Its failure to secure the release of a large number of Palestinian prisoners in a deal for the return of St.-Sgt. Gilad Schalit represented a significant setback.

The rival PA in the West Bank has been making the running in the last months. Its tactics of diplomatic agitation and isolation of Israel appear to be delivering results. Hamas would like to switch the focus, back to the area in which it is able to excel – namely, the use of religious symbols to foment political violence.

The nervous response of the PA – with some spokesmen supporting the protests and others warning against a renewed intifada – indicates that it is aware of the challenge. Some in Fatah would like to try and turn the protests to their own advantage. But the more shrewd among them are aware that renewed open confrontation will benefit Hamas, not the PA.

Will Hamas succeed?

The mobilizing of anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish opinion on the basis of an imaginary threat to the Aksa Mosque has a long history in this conflict. The most recent example was the decision to trigger the second intifada in 2000 after Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount. But as far back as 1929, agitators used arrangements for prayers at the Western Wall to incite country-wide attacks on Jews.

The results have been middling this time around – so far. Burning tires and rock-throwing youths offer attractive front page images for media outlets. But observers of the events in Jerusalem noted the relatively small number of participants in the current protests, and a heavy preponderance of activists of Islamist organizations. Much will depend in the coming days on whether the Israeli security forces can contain the unrest without providing Hamas with new martyrs around whom it can mobilize.

But whether or not the next months see heightened unrest, the fact that the “moral high ground” in Palestinian politics can still be achieved by furious opposition to the reopening of a synagogue in the heart of the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City offers a sobering lesson as to the true nature of the forces driving the conflict.

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Behind the Axis: The North Korean Connection

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 29/05/2010

North Korean spokesmen reacted furiously last week to claims by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman that Pyongyang is supplying weapons technology to Iran and Syria. Representatives of the regime of Kim Jong-Il described Lieberman as an “imbecile.” The official Korean Central News Agency in a memorable phrase accused the foreign minister in an official statement of “faking up sheer lies.”

The indignant denials notwithstanding, recent studies indicate that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as North Korea is officially known, is indeed playing a crucial but little remarked upon role in facilitating the arming of the Iran-led regional axis, including in the area of weapons of mass destruction. The North Korean role is multifaceted, and evidence has emerged of direct links to terror organizations such as Hizbullah and extensive strategic relations with both Iran and Syria.

A recent study by Christina Lin, a former US Department Defense official and specialist on China, looked into North Korea’s strategic partnership with Iran. Lin noted that North Korea has been described as the “the most important single leak” in the international anti-proliferation effort in the Middle East.

Iranian-North Korean strategic cooperation dates back to the first days of the Islamic Republic. Its basis is clear. Iran needs access to advanced military technology to underwrite its regional ambitions. Its main suppliers are Russia and China. But both these countries are active members of the international system, and hence are to some degree constrained by international pressures. North Korea, on the other hand, is an isolated country, indifferent to Western attempts to control the access of Middle East radicals to advanced armaments.

North Korean assistance plays a vital role in the Iranian missile program. Its flagship Shihab missile project is a product of the relationship. The Shihab is based on North Korea’s Nodong missile series. Iran is reported to have purchased 12 Nodong missile engines from North Korea in 1999, beginning the development of the Shihab-3. The Shihab-3, which has a range of 1,300-1,500 kilometers, places Israel within range.

More recently, Iranian officials were present at the testing of the advanced Taepodong-2 missile in North Korea in July 2006. This missile is the basis for the Iranian development of the Shihab-6, which has not yet been tested. These are intercontinental, nuclear capable ballistic missile systems, thought to have a range of 5,000-6,000 kilometers.

One report has also suggested that Iran and North Korea are jointly seeking to develop a reentry vehicle for the Nodong/Shihab-3, which would be intended to carry a nuclear warhead.

In addition, an Iranian opposition report in 2008 identified the presence of North Korean experts at a facility near Teheran engaged in attempts to develop a nuclear warhead to be placed on intermediate range ballistic missiles such as the Shihab-3 and the Nodong. The report was cited by Agence France Presse.

The North Korean strategic link with Iran is not limited to Teheran. Rather, evidence suggests that it extends to cooperation with other, more junior members of the Iran-led regional alliance. Thus, Iranian defector Ali Reza Asghari is reported to have confirmed that Iran helped finance the participation of North Korean personnel in the Syrian plutonium reactor at al-Kibar destroyed by Israel in September 2007. Iranian scientists were also present at the site, the goal of which was to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Three North Korean scientists were reported to have been among the dead following an explosion at a Syrian chemical weapons facility near Aleppo in July 2007, suggesting North Korean involvement in other areas of the WMD endeavors of Iran and its allies.

And one must not forget also the extensive evidence which has emerged to suggest a North Korean role in the construction of the Hizbullah underground tunnel network which played a vital role in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. The network, according to the Intelligence Online Web site, was created by Hizbullah militants trained in the construction of underground facilities by North Korean experts. The tunnels in Lebanon are said to bear a striking resemblance to similar facilities discovered by the South Koreans in the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas.

So despite North Korean official anger at Lieberman’s remarks, the evidence is well-documented and overwhelming. Pyongyang is a vital factor in the arming of the Iran-led strategic axis in the Middle East.

But why is North Korea playing this role? There is, after all, little ideological common ground between the Shi’ite Islamists in Teheran and Baalbek and the servants of the bizarre “Juche” philosophy used by Kim Jong-il to justify his dictatorship.

The factors underpinning North Korean support for Iran and its allies are as simple as they are powerful: common enemies and hard cash. As a known rogue WMD proliferator, and as perhaps the most repressive regime currently on the planet, North Korea faces diplomatic and economic isolation. Like Iran, it is the subject of UN Security Council sanctions because of its nuclear program. Iran is prepared to pay good money for military and scientific assistance, and to underwrite Pyongyang’s own research and development programs, from which it stands to benefit. North Korea and Iran play a similar role in their respective regions of opposition and subversion toward the US and its allies. A cynic might add that the tendency of both regimes to indulge in the faking up of sheer lies is a further point of commonality between them.

These firm foundations mean that – short of action taken to disturb it – the friendship between the Kim Jong-il dictatorship in North Korea and the Iran-led “resistance bloc” in the Middle East is likely to flourish and continue to mutually benefit both partners in the years ahead.

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Who Killed Khaled Sultan al-Abed?

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 14/06/2010

Once viewed as perhaps the most locked-down and policed city in the Middle East, the Syrian capital of Damascus has been the scene of a number of bombings and assassinations in the last few years. Most famously, of course, Hizbullah master-operative Imad Mughniyeh was killed by a car bomb in February 2008.

Last year, in a much messier affair, a number of Iranian pilgrims were killed in a bus bombing which the Syrian authorities did their clumsy best to conceal.

In the last month, an additional item must be added to the list of curious and unexplained acts of lethal violence to have taken place in the Syrian capital.

On May 16, Khaled Sultan al-Abed, a businessman and a senior member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, was shot dead outside his home in the same smart Damascus neighborhood in which Mughniyeh met his end. Mezzeh, which is also home to a number of foreign embassies, is one of the most closely watched as well as one of the most fashionable districts of Damascus.

Abed was the official head in Syria of Iran Khodro, a car franchise established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. He had been resident in Damascus for 10 years, owned a 25 percent stake in the company, and had reportedly succeeded in forging close ties with prominent figures in the Syrian business community.

However, according to a report by veteran journalist Georges Malbrunot in Le Figaro this week, this position and Abed’s additional extensive business activities in Syria were intended to serve as a cover for his other duties – those of a liaison officer between the Iranian regime and Hizbullah.

The Syrian authorities are clearly deeply embarrassed at this latest breach of the daily tranquility of their capital. The murder was not reported by official news sources, and Syrian officials have made no comment upon it. An investigation into the killing of Abed has reportedly been launched.

WHO MIGHT have carried it out? A number of competing theories have emerged. One of these appeared on a Syrian opposition Web site and was picked up in Haaretz last week. According to this theory, Abed’s murder was carried out by a Sunni organization and is related to growing fear among Sunnis in Syria and beyond at the growth of Iranian influence in Syria.

This view would gibe with a larger perspective, accepted by many in Israel’s defense establishment, which identifies widespread dissatisfaction and fear at many levels in the Syrian establishment and society with the growing link with Iran. According to this explanation, certain elements are trying to sow discord between Iranians and Syrians, and are serving notice that Damascus should not be considered uncontested ground for the free activities of the Shi’ite Islamist Iranian regime.

Some versions of this theory suggest that even senior figures in the Syrian regime are deeply concerned at the growing link with Iran, and may be involved – explaining how the killing was able to take place in one of the most densely policed areas of the Syrian capital, with no one being apprehended.

However, proponents of this view need to ask themselves whether elements close to the regime would wish to suggest its vulnerability in quite so blatant a way. Police states such as Syria, after all, derive what legitimacy they possess from their ability to police effectively.

This ability is surely starkly called into question by the recent murder of Abed and the other incidents to have taken place in Damascus recently.

An alternative explanation, given greater credence by both Malbrunot and other sources, sees the killing of Abed as the latest act in Israel’s “shadow war” against Iran.

Malbrunot noted Abed’s close links with the Kuds force, the clandestine external wing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Both he and other sources hinted at the possibility that the murdered man may have been involved in the transfer of Iranian weaponry to Hizbullah. An unnamed source claims that “one thing is for sure: Most of those murdered in Syria in recent years were on the list of those wanted by Israel.” Is this a coincidence, Malbrunot asks by way of conclusion.

In the usual manner of things Syrian, the real perpetrators of the murder and their motives are likely to remain shrouded in mystery and to remain the subject of much speculation.

But as with many such affairs, perhaps the most interesting aspects are ultimately those clearly visible to the naked eye. A senior operative in the most clandestine element of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is gunned down in broad daylight in the heart of one of the most heavily watched areas of the Syrian capital. The Syrian authorities delay the announcement of the killing and make no comment upon it.

Rumors of who might be responsible abound.

The regime of Bashar Assad has shown itself to be an enthusiastic practitioner of the “strategy of tension” in Lebanon, in Iraq and elsewhere over the last half decade.

It appears that someone or other is currently keen on demonstrating to the Syrian leader that this can also be a game played by two sides.

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Losing the Scent in South Lebanon

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center -20/07/2010

Last week, the IDF released evidence of Hizbullah stockpiling of weaponry in populated civilian areas of southern Lebanon. The IDF material showed an aerial map of the Shi’ite town of El Khiam. The map showed details of a developed military infrastructure woven into the fabric of the town’s civilian population.

While the precise details were new, the fact of Hizbullah’s use of civilian areas as bases for its military reconstruction after 2006 is by now no longer a major revelation.

The fact of this activity is not seriously in doubt. It is in direct contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war. The mechanisms by which Hizbullah and its allies act to neutralize the 12,000 strong international force tasked with preventing the movement’s military activities in Lebanon’s south have also been in evidence over the last couple of weeks.

Tensions have been steadily rising between elements of the UNIFIL forces deployed in south Lebanon (specifically – the French contingent) and supporters of Hizbullah’s “resistance.” A number of incidents have taken place. On June 29, UNIFIL conducted a 36-hour deployment exercise.

In the days that followed, members of the French contingent were attacked in the village of Touline by a crowd which pelted them with rocks, sticks and eggs.

On Saturday, July 3, in the village of Kabrikha, a gathering of around 100 civilians blocked the road, preventing a French UNIFIL patrol from entering the village. The soldiers were reportedly disarmed, and a number were injured. The Lebanese army eventually intervened to separate the crowd from the patrol. Villagers interviewed after the incidents claimed that UNIFIL troops had tried to enter homes – a claim which a spokesman for the UN forces denied.

Michael Williams, UN special coordinator for Lebanon, meanwhile, described the incidents as “clearly organized.”

Williams was correct. Mobs of 100 civilians do not suddenly appear by accident in southern Lebanon. It is not an area known for its liberal attitudes toward freedom of political association. In the Shi’ite villages of the area, the only force able to march, demonstrate and make its presence felt is the “resistance” – that is Hizbullah – and its allies.

Sure enough, as UNIFIL commander Alberto Asarta Cuevas sought assurances in the days that followed, Hizbullah leaders issued a number of statements expressing puzzlement at UNIFIL’s recent increase in activity. The movement’s deputy chief Naim Qassem laconically advised UNIFIL to “watch what it does.” Hussein Haj Hassan, a movement member who serves as minister of agriculture in the current Lebanese government, described UNIFIL’s behavior as “incomprehensible.” “One wonders what they want,” he added.

In the Lebanese manner, a rumor then began to do the rounds that the UNIFIL deployment exercise was in fact a trial run of a move whereby international forces moved to prevent rocket fire on Israel. A Hizbullah-associated MP, Muhammad Raad, said that that if a particular country affiliated with UNIFIL wanted to “give the Israelis a card,” it should not seek to do so at the expense of southern Lebanon. It was unacceptable, said Raad, that “some UNIFIL units” might be taking orders from their own minister of defense, rather than from the UN.

In reality, Israeli commanders could only dream of such activity being undertaken by the UN force. But such an interpretation has the unmistakable quality of a further warning to the international forces not to overstep the recognized rules of the game between them and Hizbullah. Hizbullah expects a “live and let live” attitude both from the international forces and from the Lebanese army regarding its military activities and preparations in the south.

FOLLOWING A series of consultations with the Lebanese government and armed forces, UNIFIL commander Asarta this week issued a contrite statement, apologizing to the residents of the south for the inconvenience to them caused by his force’s activities. He expressed his “love” for Lebanon. It was later announced that henceforth, UNIFIL would no longer use sniffer dogs in patrols (a point which had reportedly particularly annoyed the villagers). Also, it was reiterated that UNIFIL would not enter houses and yards in populated areas, except with prior coordination and the involvement of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Given that the UNIFIL activity that prompted the actions and statements by Hizbullah did not differ in a major way from previous practices, a number of theories have been raised as to why the “resistance” chose to draw attention to it in the way that it did.

In an interview with the Lebanese An-Nahar newspaper, Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces movement, speculated that the decision to move against the French UNIFIL contingent related to anger at France’s decision to vote in favor of further sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. According to such an interpretation, the latest events would be by way of a friendly reminder to the French of the vulnerability of their troops in southern Lebanon.

Geagea also noted French support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. This is the body charged with investigating the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. The latest reports suggest that the tribunal is soon to issue indictments. Hizbullah is now considered to be the main suspect in the killing. But whatever the precise reasons for Hizbullah’s latest move against the French element in UNIFIL, the recent events once more demonstrate the relative helplessness of the UN force.

The photos released by the IDF last week may have reassured Israelis by demonstrating the extent of its “coverage” of southern Lebanon. But they also showed the degree to which Hizbullah has been able to rebuild and rearm undisturbed south of the Litani since 2006. Some 160 Shi’ite villages have been turned into armed camps similar to El Khiam, we are told. All of this has taken place under the sensitive noses of the (now demobilized) UNIFIL sniffer dogs. The dogs, or someone else, have also apparently chewed up and digested UN Resolution 1701.

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Al-Qaida-Style Islamism Comes to Gaza

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 19/08/2009

Quiet has now returned to the Gaza Strip after the weekend violence which claimed the lives of 28 people. The last of the funerals of the Jund Ansar Allah fighters killed in the suppression of the organization by Hamas authorities has taken place. This episode demonstrated the tight hold which Hamas maintains on the Gaza Strip.

The weekend’s events also highlight an important but little discussed phenomenon taking place in the Strip, and to a lesser extent in the West Bank – namely, the growth of al-Qaida-style Salafi Islamism among a segment of the Palestinian population. Jund Ansar Allah did not emerge suddenly, or in a vacuum, and its defeat does not mark the final word on this matter.
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Who are the Salafis? Salafiyya is an extreme trend within Sunni Islam. Salafis maintain that anyone who fails to uphold any aspect of Sharia law is no longer a Muslim, and is to be considered kufar (non-Muslim). Jihadist Salafis consider that it is incumbent upon Muslims to depose and fight all governments controlled by the kufar.

A myriad of small, armed Salafi groupings exist in the Gaza Strip, of which Jund Ansar Allah was one. These groups are part of a broader subculture, estimated to command the loyalty of at least 50,000 people, and probably many more. The Taliban style of dress adopted by supporters of Salafism is becoming increasingly familiar in Gaza.

There are two main modes of Salafi activity in Gaza – namely, al-Salafiya Da’awiya – that is, civilian Salafism, which engages in missionary work and preaching, and Al-Salafiya Jihadiya, of which al-Qaida is the most well-known global representative, and which is committed to violent action.

There is no hermetic division between these two modes. Rather, activity in the former is a gateway to later involvement in militancy, and missionary work builds the basis of support in society which is essential for successful military action.

A number of Gaza mosques are known to be controlled by the Salafis. Sheikh Al Salam Bin Taymiyah mosque in Khan Yunis, which was the center of operations for the Jund Ansar Allah group, was one of these. Abu Noor al-Makdisi, who led the Jund Ansar Allah group and died during the weekend’s events, was the imam at this mosque. Other mosques linked to the Salafis include the al-Sahabah Mosque in Daraj, Gaza City, and the al-Albani Mosque in the Jabalya refugee camp.
Salafi activity is reportedly well-financed, with money coming in from the Gulf. As one source put it “millions of petrodollars are flowing in every month.”
The myriad Salafi armed groupings include the Jaish al-Islam (army of Islam), al-Saif al-Haq Islamiyya (Swords of Islamic Righteousness), Jaish al-Umma (Army of the Nation) and the Jaljalat (thunder) group, formed by disaffected former Hamas fighters during the period of the cease-fire, in June 2008.
Jund Ansar Allah, which was founded in November, 2008, emerged from this milieu.

The relations of the Hamas rulers of the Strip to this Salafi sub-culture are complex.

Since Hamas took power in the Strip, the Salafis have engaged in numerous acts of violence against people and institutions believed to be kufar. These have included attacks on Internet cafes, book shops, beauty parlors and institutions representing the Strip’s small Christian community. Young women and men suspected of engaging in “immoral” behavior have been murdered.

The Hamas authorities officially oppose such behavior, but have done little to stop or deter it.

There is also a certain crossover between Hamas structures and the Salafis. Many members of Hamas’s al-Kassam brigades are known to support Salafi ideas. These reportedly include Ahmed al-Jabari, commander of the organization, and the majority of his brigade commanders.
Hamas, however, draws the line at activity which appears to challenge its own authority or right to rule. The suppression of Jund Ansar Allah took place after its leader denounced Hamas as kufar and proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic Emirate in Gaza.

The swiftness and brutality of Hamas’s subsequent action attracted attention. But it was not the first time that Gaza’s rulers have made clear to the Salafis that it is worth their while to respect the limits placed on them. The al-Albani mosque in Jabalya, for example, was raided on May 17, 2008 by Hamas’s Executive Force. Thirty men and women were injured in the raid. The mosque’s imam had delivered a sermon that afternoon insulting and ridiculing Hamas.

A key question concerning the Salafi subculture in Gaza is the extent of the presence of global al-Qaida among it. Most experts believe that the al-Qaida network is present to only a very limited extent in the Strip. The al-Qaida idea, however, is flourishing, with a large number of the often quite primitively-armed and poorly-trained Salafi groups competing to be considered the “official franchise” of al-Qaida in Gaza.

Abu Noor al-Makdisi is dead, and the movement he built has now been dispersed by the uncontested Hamas rulers of the Gaza Strip. The Salafi subculture from which his group emerged, however, is very much alive. It is likely to make its voice heard again, in the unfolding story of the Islamic Palestinian state currently under construction in Gaza.

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Growing Islamization in Gaza

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 29/09/2009

Deriving accurate and reliable information from within the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip is not easy. The Strip is largely closed to journalists, and its inhabitants are reluctant to speak in detail of events there.

Nevertheless, reliable sources confirm that one observable trend taking place there is the growing dominance of Islam. This process is being driven forward by the growing strength of Salafi and extreme Sunni elements.

A slow introduction of Islamic norms and practices into society began immediately following the Hamas victory in PLC elections in January 2006. This process was accelerated following Hamas’s seizure of exclusive control of Gaza in 2007.

However, there are clear internal differences in the movement regarding the pace of change. Hamas’s current leadership has tended to favor a slow encouragement of Islamic practices and rules, without straying too far from the desires of the broader public.

More hardline and Salafi elements within the movement want a stricter and more formal introduction of Islamic norms. Events over the last 18 months indicate that the latter camp is now making the running, with Hamas’s leadership under pressure from extreme forces both within the movement and beyond it.

This change is being felt in the very fabric of daily life in Gaza. A transition of the status of Islamic observance from social norm to legal compulsion is under way.

The most obvious sign of this is the creation of the new “Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice” security force, which operates under the command of the Ministry of the Waqf (Islamic Endowment).

This force is tasked with enforcing Islamic codes of behavior. Its members patrol beaches, parks and public areas, ensuring proper Islamic modesty.

One source describes how a man wearing shorts while sitting on his own balcony in southern Gaza was spotted and advised that this must not happen again. Rules banning men from bathing topless, and women (who may still bathe separately from men and fully covered) from laughing or smiling while bathing, are also in the process of enforcement.

A special all-female unit within the police has also been created, with responsibility for enforcing female modesty and handling female suspects. This force, numbering 100-150 officers, wear niqab and gloves, with only an eye slit visible.

Other forms of social control are also being strengthened. Every mosque now has an Amir al-jamia or “head of the community” who according to sources functions as a kind of political commissar on behalf of the authorities. It is his task to observe the prayer habits of all members of the mosque, and to intervene and offer help where insufficient devotion is diagnosed.

More familiar methods of increasing public dependence on the authorities may also be observed. Preferential access to desperately needed social services for those close to the rulers of the Strip is becoming increasingly apparent. In the spring of 2009, Hamas established the “Islamic National Bank.”

An Islamic insurance company and Islamic investment bank have since also been set up. Increasingly, Hamas’s ample social welfare budgets are channeled through these bodies. Similarly, Islamic charity organizations are increasingly replacing elected local governments as the providers of social services. The result is to establish channels of material dependence between the public and the Hamas organization.
Few women may now be seen in Gaza without the hijab. More and more are now wearing the jilbab (the long, shapeless black dress associated with Islamic piety).

The wearing of the hijab is now said to have become an accepted social norm – perceived as a requirement when outside of the home even by Gaza’s few remaining Christian women. From the summer of 2009, the wearing of the hijab and jilbab became required in Gaza’s secondary schools (according to some sources, certain schools have chosen to ignore this instruction).

It is not only dress in schools, but also the content of study which is becoming increasingly religious in character. Many secular teachers have been fired. Hamas summer camps, which provide cheap alternatives for poor families in the summer months, involve intensive Koran study and competitions which again can provide access to much-needed funds and jobs.

The promotion of Islamic norms in Gaza extends to the widespread banning of books and restricting of access to “immoral” internet sites. In 2007, there was an outcry when a book of Palestinian folk-tales, “Speak bird, speak again” was banned in the Gaza Strip because of its supposedly lewd content.

Today, such bans are the norm, and no longer merit much attention.

The increasing use of Islamic Sharia law in judicial proceedings in Gaza is an additional facet of the growing influence of Islam on life there. The formal judicial system remains in existence. But it is being filled with Islamic content.

For example, the local reconciliation committees, which were once a forum where clans resolved issues by mediation, have now largely been transformed into Islamic reconciliation committees concerned with the dispensing of advice and guidance based on Sharia law.

It is important to note that these developments do not represent the playing out of some Hamas master plan for the creation of an Islamic republic. Rather, they are taking place because of grass-roots agitation and insistence on the part of ultra-religious elements both within Hamas and outside it.

The Hamas leadership depends on Islamic legitimacy, and is thus vulnerable to claims that is it is merely a nationalist group waving the flag of Islam. Hamas jealously guards its political power – also from its Salafi rivals. But in matters of Islamic observance, it appears willing to bow to their wishes and pressure.

The result is that without any recognized body deciding upon it, an Islamic mini-state in the full sense is currently emerging in Gaza.

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