Defending ‘Rojava’

Posted on November 8, 2013 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 8/11:

Kurds Consolidate borders of enclave with victories over al-Qaida in northern Syria

The situation in Syria may appear after two and a half years to have turned into a static and bewildering slaughter. Neither victory nor defeat seem imminent for any of the sides.

But this picture is not entirely accurate. On one front, at least, there is movement in a clear direction. The Kurds of north eastern Syria are consolidating their autonomous enclave bordering Iraq. The Kurds call this area ‘Rojava’, or western Kurdistan. They have in the last two weeks inflicted a series of telling defeats on Al-Qaeda linked rebels on its borders .

The absence of clarity in the direction of the war in Syria derives partly from the fact that there is no longer a single conflict in the country. Rather, the Syrian civil war has in the last year turned from a straight fight between a regime and a rebellion against it into three inter-locking wars involving a variety of participating elements.

The regime and its allies are still engaged against a mainly Sunni rebellion. An internecine civil war has also broken out in the rebellion itself, pitting the al-Qaeda linked Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its hardcore Islamist allies against more locally focused rebel groups.

The third contest is taking place between ISIS and its allies and the Kurdish fighters of the YPG (Peoples’ Protection Units) in the north and east of the country.

The first two wars remain at bloody stalemate. The Kurds, whose goal is survival rather than conquest, are winning the third.

The current Kurdish ‘surge’ began on October 26th with the capture by the YPG of the Yarubiya border crossing in Hasakeh province, between Syria and Iraq. The crossing, known by the Kurds as Tal Kojar, had been held by ISIS since March. The YPG captured it after three days of fighting.

The rebel Syrian National Coalition issued a strange claim following the battle that Iraqi regular fighters had participated alongside the Kurds. In truth, however, the superior organization of the YPG when compared to their Islamist rivals appears to have been the telling factor.

The taking of al-Yarubiya gives the Syrian Kurds full control of an entry and exit point into Iraq for the first time. But its significance goes beyond this.

Hasakeh Province, with a 70% Kurdish majority, is home to the greater part of Syria’s oil reserves. Syria has, according to a 2009 study, 69 billion barrels’ worth of proven oil reserves and probably about 315 billion barrels’ worth of not yet discovered reserves. The great majority of this is in the north east of the country. In March this year, the YPG took over three oil producing towns, most importantly the town of Rumeilan.

Control of Yarubiya gives the Kurds the ability to engage in the export of oil. This fact is not lost both on the jihadis of ISIS, who hope to run their own private oil export operations, and on the Syrian National Coalition, who reminded the Kurds in their statement that the oil belongs to ‘all Syrians.’

Following the Yarubiyeh victory, the Kurds pushed on, capturing 20 villages from ISIS and its allies over the last week. ISIS was joined by additional forces in these battles, including Islamist but non al-Qaeda linked groups.

The YPG’s drive forward concluded in the last days with the complete capture of the strategically importanr and long-contested Ras al-Ain (Sere Kaniyeh) area, on the border with Turkey. The expulsion of ISI from the al-Manageer area of the town left the YPG in full control of Ras al-Ain and the road to neighboring Tal Tamer.

These gains mean that the Kurds have now consolidated a clear western ‘borderline’ for their area of control in north east Syria. Their intention, according to Kurdish sources, is now to push further west, towards Tel Abyad.

There the outcome is much less certain, however. Outside of Hasakeh Province, in the areas of sparser outlying Kurdish population in Raqqa and Aleppo provinces, the YPG has enjoyed less success. Many Kurds from these areas have fled to a Kurdish-held enclave in Afrin, further west and not linked to the main area of Kurdish control.

The YPG victories ultimately derive from the greater discipline and organization of this group, in comparison with its jihadi rivals. This reporter has spent time both with the YPG and with the Syrian Arab rebels. The YPG, who were trained by the PKK, exhibit a far superior tactical knowledge and awareness of basic soldiering. Ammunition is carefully conserved. Units move in a coordinated and controlled way.

The rebels, by contrast, are certainly brave, but are often poorly trained and undisciplined.

What the recent fighting means is that the PYD and the YPG are now in firm control of around 10% of the territory of Syria.

‘Rojava’ forms part of a contiguous area of Kurdish control which stretches from Ras al Ain at its western point, through northern Iraq and all the way to the Iranian border. Sharp political divisions remain, however, between the PKK-oriented forces controlling the Syrian enclave, and the Kurdish Regional Government of Massoud Barzani in Northern Iraq.

Hopes of unity remain elusive. A planned and much discussed Kurdish ‘national congress’ bringing together all forces in the Iraqi Kurdish capital of Erbil later this month may now not take place. The rivalry between the two key pan-Kurdish forces of the PKK and its associated groups and Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party appears to be for the moment insurmountable.

Still, the YPG’s performance in the fighting over the last two weeks confirms that as the de facto partition of Syria takes shape, ‘Rojava’ is becoming an indelible part of the political landscape.

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Assad’s North Korean Connection

Posted on November 1, 2013 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 1/11.

Reports have emerged this week indicating the presence of North Korean military personnel in Syria. They note that 15 North Korean helicopter pilots are operating on behalf of the Assad regime within the country.

The reports have been validated by the pro-rebel but usually reliable Syrian Observatory for Human Rights . They are also not the first evidence that Pyongyang is actively involved on the ground in the Assad regime’s war effort.

Earlier this year, the Saudi-based regional newspaper Sharq al-Awsat carried eyewitness reports revealing the presence of North Korean officers among the Syrian regime’s ground forces in the city of Aleppo. On this occasion, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights was itself the source of the report.

Sharq al Awsat detailed the presence of between 11 and 15 North Korean officers in the city. Rami Abdul Rahman of the Observatory said that the men were artillery officers. They were not, he said, taking part directly in the fighting. Rather, the men were engaged in providing ‘logistical support in addition to the development plans of military operations.”

These sightings are the latest confirmation of the long, close and cooperative relationship maintained between Pyongyang and the regime of the Assads. The connection precedes the current Syrian war. It forms part of North Korea’s broader network of relationships in the Middle East.

Most famously, of course the plutonium reactor under construction at the Al-Kibar facility near Deir ez-Zor, destroyed by Israel in September 2007, was built under North Korean supervision. North Korean participation in the reactor’s construction was confirmed by a high-level Iranian defector, Ali Reza Asghari. According to Der Spiegel, North Korean scientists were present at the site at the time of the bombing.

But Assad’s fledgling nuclear program was not the only project in which Damascus was aided by Pyongyang. Cooperation also took place both in the field of conventional weapons, and in that of non-nuclear WMD.

In an interview on October 3rd with Radio Free Asia, former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Bruce Bechtol noted that North Korea has been supplying weaponry, including chemical weapons, to Syria since the early 1990s.

According to Bechtol, North Korea provides the Syrians with the ability to ‘marry up’ chemical weapons with missile systems. He notes that the North Koreans constructed two chemical weapons facilities for the Syrians, which remain in operation today.

In terms of conventional weapons, North Korea has played a vital part in Syria’s missile program. The North Koreans are acknowledged experts in the process whereby weapons are smuggled. They have continued to transport spare parts for Assad’s missiles into the country throughout the war, by air and by sea, coolly dismissive of the supposed international arms embargo.

According to a 2012 report prepared for the UN Security Council the South Koreans intercepted one shipment in May, 2012, which was carrying graphite cylinders en route to Syria for Assad’s missiles.

The Iraqi authorities claim to have diverted a plane carrying North Korean materiel to Syria, last September.

Bechtol, the former DIA man notes that ‘in the past few months there’s been an uptick in the number of North Korean advisors and logistics personnel on the ground that are helping Syrians resupply themselves’ and in the maintenance of weapons systems earlier supplied by Pyongyang. Such maintenance and resupply, of course, is vital for a country engaged in a long war, in which systems are in daily use.

Why are the North Koreans doing this? The answer lies not in the realm of ideology. The North Koreans are isolated and subject to sanctions. They need money, and will sell to whoever pays them.

So who is paying them? In the case of Syria, the answer is – almost certainly the Iranians. As with Russia, Syria does not get free handouts of arms from its sponsors outside of the region. Rather, it gets free cash handouts from its regional patron, Iran, for whom the survival of the Assad regime is most vital.

This money is then used to pay for Pyongyang’s and Moscow’s hardware and expertise.

Of course, Iran is North Korea’s main customer in the Middle East. So Pyongyang’s evident involvement in the Syrian war is also a matter of long standing alliances, as well as monetary gain.

Most intriguing in the latest development is the involvement of North Korean pilots. It is not clear if these men are actually engaged in combat on behalf of Assad, or in other tasks. But their presence appears to suggest that the dictator’s problems with manpower extend also to his air force. The lack of trustworthy fighters has been the main problem facing the regime since the outbreak of the war.

Iran has sought to solve it through the insertion of large numbers of Hizballah fighters, Iraqi Shia volunteers and also Iranian Revolutionary Guards into the fighting lines. If Pyongyang is now supplying pilots to the regime, then appears it can no longer rely even on its own airmen.

This is quite plausible. On the one hand, the Assad regime is, among other things, an ‘air force’ regime. Hafez Assad was himself a pilot and a commander of the Syrian Air Force. But as with other parts of the armed forces, the most loyal men in the air force are to be found in the most politically sensitive positions, not the most dangerous ones.

So while the very powerful Syrian Air Force Intelligence (Mukhabarat al-Jawiya) is largely officered by Syrian Alawis, the majority of the pilots are Sunnis.

As such, it is perfectly possible that the same problems of trust apply to Assad’s aircrews as those which afflict his ground forces.

The evidence suggesting the presence of North Korean soldiers and aviators in Syria ultimately is further testimony to the determined and effective effort underway from the very start of the war by Assad’s allies to keep him in place. It may also be assumed that the North Koreans have noted and enjoyed the rudderless, wavering US policy toward the same issue over the same period.

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Sisi to Egyptian Islamists: surrender or die

Posted on October 26, 2013 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 26/10:

A suicide bombing this week at Egyptian Military Intelligence headquarters in the city of Ismailiya has been claimed by Ansar Beit al Maqdis. This organization is a Salafi Jihadi group with links to organizations of a similar kind in the Gaza Strip. Eleven people, including six soldiers were wounded in the bombing.

The Ismailiya attack is the latest episode in a growing Islamist insurgency against the de facto rule of General Abd al Fatah al-Sisi and the military in Egypt. It was of particular significance because the city lies just west of the Suez Canal, outside of the Sinai Peninsula. In the poorly policed area of northern Sinai, jihadi groups have been active since the military coup of July 3, and even before it.

But the Ismailiya bombing represents only the second time that Ansar Beit al Maqdis has managed to strike west of the canal. This attack may well be a sign of things to come.

Yet while the growing violence in Egypt undoubtedly constitutes a security headache for the Egyptian regime, it contains no political threat to General Sisi and those around him.

Salafi terrorists are not going to take power in Egypt. They are an irritant, but the political result of their activities is likely to be growing support for Sisi, and calls for harsher measures mirroring Hosni Mubarak’s crackdown on similar groups in the 1990s.

A crackdown would have wide public support. The ongoing activities of the jihadis, meanwhile, at least as long as they do not exceed a certain volume, provide a useful backdrop to the continued presence of the army at the center of public life in Egypt.

The growing pitch of Islamist violence is an indication of the vanishing options that Sisi has left available to the Islamists.

Since the July 3 coup, he has deliberately sought to exclude the Islamists from political life in every possible way, thus leaving them only the options of effective marginalization or a turn to force.

Shortly after the coup, the Muslim Brotherhood was declared an illegal organization and its assets seized. Leaders of the movement, including incumbent President Mohammed Morsy, were arrested. On August 14th, the army engaged in a bloody crackdown on the movement’s sit-in at the Rabia Mosque in Cairo.

Subsequent months have seen a series of stormy and violent demonstrations by the Brotherhood, demanding the release of their leaders and the dropping of all charges against them, and that the group be permitted to return to political activity.

The latest of these took place on October 6th, the day on which Egyptians mark the ‘victory’ of the 1973 October War. Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood sought to make their way to Tahrir Square, while protesting the detention of Morsy and calling al-Sisi a ‘murderer.’

The response of the security forces was harsh and uncompromising. Around 50 people were killed in the subsequent clashes. Scores were wounded, 200 members of the Muslim Brotherhood were detained.

Along with the uncompromising response on the streets, the military government has sought to directly link the stormy Brotherhood demonstrations in the cities with the insurgency erupting in Sinai.

Thus, a statement released to the press by Interior Minister General Mohammed Ibrahim after the Ismailiya attacks asserted that “The Muslim Brotherhood has a new source of funding, as is indicated by the attack on Monday morning against South Sinai Security Directorate using a booby-trapped vehicle driven by a suicide bomber.”

By turning to force, Egypt’s Islamists would be ‘playing’ the security forces on the latters’ home turf, with no hope of victory. But political activity is also closed to them.

In current discussions over amending the Egyptian constitution, meanwhile, it appears that an amendment to article 54, which deals with the foundation of political parties, is set to be approved. The amendment will prohibit the creation of political parties on a religious basis, or political activity based on religion.

Even the Salafi al-Nour party, which is largely cooperating with the military controlled government, initially objected to this (though it now appears to have recanted.)

Other Islamist groups are struggling to come up with a response. The Gamaa al-Islamiya movement, a formerly terrorist group which entered politics after the toppling of Mubarak, expressed the Islamists’ dilemma in the clearest way.

Speaking to al-Ahram newspaper, one of its leaders said that after Mubarak’s fall, they had ‘became engaged in the political process. We made some mistakes, of course. Such is the nature of the political game. But now society wants to ban us. How are we supposed to persuade our youth not to engage in politics and not to turn to violence again?”

The answer, from the point of the view of the present Egyptian authorities, is something like ‘that’s your problem.’ General Sisi’s approach may appear unfamiliar to contemporary western observers because he is not seeking to hold the Islamists to a stalemate and then seek an accommodation. Rather, his goal appears to be strategic victory in his battle with the Muslim Brotherhood and the smaller Islamist factions. To this end, he is offering them two alternatives: accept political oblivion – or choose to resist it, and be destroyed by the army.

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Israel and Saudi Arabia – alliance of interests

Posted on October 25, 2013 by jonathanspyer

PJMedia, 24/10

Recent remarks by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have fuelled renewed speculation of behind the scenes links between Israel and the Gulf monarchies.

Netanyahu, speaking at the UN, said that “The dangers of a nuclear-armed Iran and the emergence of other threats in our region have led many of our Arab neighbours to recognize, finally recognize, that Israel is not their enemy.”

He added: “This affords us the opportunity to overcome the historic animosities and build new relationships, new friendships, new hopes.”

There have been subsequent rumors of visits by senior Gulf officials to Israel, to discuss matters of common interest.

While it is difficult to acquire details of these contacts at the present time, it is a near certainty that they exist, on one level or another. Conversations with Israeli officials suggest that much is happening behind the scenes.

Israel and the key states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (most importantly Saudi Arabia) share core views on the nature of key regional processes currently under way, and their desired outcome. These commonalities have existed for some time, and it is likely that the contacts are themselves not all that new.

There are three areas in which Israel and the countries of the GCC (with the exception of Qatar) are on the same page.

They are: the urgency of the threat represented by the prospect of a nuclear Iran, the danger represented by the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood over the last two years, and the perception that the United States fails to understand the urgency of these threats and as a result is acting in a naïve and erroneous way on both.

On the Iranian nuclear issue, Riyadh is deeply troubled by the current Iranian ‘charm offensive’ and its apparent effects on the west. Most importantly, the Saudis fear the prospect of a nuclear Iran, which could force Riyadh and the Gulf states to bend to its will, in return for guaranteeing the flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz, and avoiding direct encroachment on their sources of energy.

Saudi Arabia faces Iran, directly across the Gulf. It is a far more fragile construction than its Shia, Persian neighbor. Over the decades, Riyadh and the other Gulf states sought to balance Iranian encroachment of this type through alliance with the US.

But the US no longer seems such a reliable ally. So new strong and like-minded friends are needed.

On the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudis feared the spread of this movement across the region, and were infuriated by the role of Qatar in supporting its successes in recent years.

Israel too was deeply concerned at the prospect of a new alliance of Sunni Islamist states, with AKP led Turkey and Morsi’s Egypt chief among them.

Over the past year, the advance of the Muslim Brothers has been halted and partially reversed. In Tunisia and Egypt, the MB administrations have gone. Qatar has a new, less activist emir. The Muslim Brothers and Qatar have grown weaker among the Syrian rebels.

Saudi Arabia has been responsible for some of this, through financial support and political action. It has welcomed all of it. So has Israel.

On the US: the Saudis think that the current US Administration is hopelessly naïve on the Middle East. They were shocked at the abandonment of Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in 2011. They are equally vexed at the current indications of American and western willingness to lift some sanctions against Iran in return for cosmetic concessions that would leave the core of Teheran’s nuclear program intact.

The Saudis were the first to congratulate General Abd al-Fatah al Sissi following his military coup in early July. They are utterly dismayed by the current US withholding of part of Washington’s package of military aid to Cairo because of what the US regards as the insufficiently speedy transition back to elections in Egypt.

Again, Israel shares these perspectives. The absence of American leadership may well be the key factor in causing Israel and the Gulf states to draw closer.

On the face of it, any alliance between Jewish Israel and Salafi Saudi Arabia might appear an absurdity. Israel is a liberal democracy and a Jewish state. Saudi Arabia is a repressive absolute monarchy, based on a particular Salafi Muslim outlook which is deeply anti-Jewish and anti-Christian in nature.

This ideology is not a dead letter for the Saudis. Rather, they invest heavily in spreading their particular rigid form of Islam in the west and elsewhere. Their media and education system are rife with anti-Jewish prejudice.

But a clear distinction is made by the Saudis between the world of ideology/media/culture and the realm of raison d’etat. Hence, there is no reason to think they would not be able to publicly vilify Israel, while maintaining off the radar links with it against more immediate enemies.

In this regard, it is worth remembering the Wikileaks revelation of remarks made in private by Saudi King Abdullah to American General David Petraeus in April, 2008 in which he recommended military action against the Iranian nuclear program. The King referred to Iran as the ‘head of the snake,’ which should be cut off. No similarly venomous remarks on Israel were quoted from the conversation, which took place far from the public eye.

Of course the common interests only go so far. Saudi Arabia supports Salafi Islamist forces in both Syria and Egypt. Saudi money finds its way to Salafi elements among the Palestinians. But the areas of comminality are on issues of cardinal importance to both countries.

The de facto, unseen alliance between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries is one of the most intriguing structures currently emerging amid the whirling chaos of the Middle East.

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Chemical Weapons Mission in Syria Unlikely to Succeed

Posted on October 16, 2013 by jonathanspyer

PJmedia, 16/10

The first reports emerging from the effort to relieve the Assad regime of its chemical weapons capacity suggest that the regime is cooperating with the inspectors from the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The latter organization has been tasked by the United Nations with overseeing the process of destroying Assad’s CW capability.

The process is set to involve two distinct stages. In the first and more straightforward phase, Syria’s ability to produce chemical weapons will be removed. In the second phase, Syria’s actual stockpiles of chemical weaponry are to be destroyed. The first phase of the mission is intended to be completed by November 1. The second phase is likely to take a lot longer.

The OPCW inspectors face a task of unparalleled complexity. Never before has a country in the midst of civil war offered up its chemical weapons capacity to international review and destruction. It is not at all clear that the inspectors will succeed. The sincerity of the Assad regime in facilitating this process remains deeply open to question, and the logistical challenges are also enormous.

Regarding the regime’s sincerity: on the one hand, the regime ought to have every interest in proving cooperative with the inspectors. The agreement whereby Syria agrees to give up its CW with one stroke transformed Assad from the potential target of Western military action to a key partner in an internationally mandated process. The agreement effectively ended any possibility of Western military intervention in the Syrian civil war. For as long as the process of verification and destruction of Syrian CW continues, it is vital that the regime survive. And this process could continue for more than a year.

However, there are two complicating elements. First, allegations have arisen that the regime is attempting to remove parts of its CW capability across the border to Lebanon — where its Hezbollah allies hold sway — and to Iraq.

A former senior officer handling chemical weapons in Assad’s army, Brigadier-General Zaher Shakat, told the British Sunday Telegraph newspaper that he possesses intelligence confirming that at least one convoy of 20 vehicles carrying CW materials has crossed the border between Syria and Lebanon, transferring the material to Hezbollah.

Israeli sources, at this stage, dismiss these reports, suggesting that they form part of Syrian rebel propaganda efforts. At the same time, the possibility that the regime may at a certain stage attempt to remove CW in the direction of Lebanon or Iraq is not ruled out by Israeli officials. In particular, as autumn turns to winter and cloudy skies reduce visibility, the possibility of such actions increases. For Israel, clear evidence of the transfer of CW to Hezbollah would constitute a “red line” likely to produce a military response of the kind already witnessed four times in the course of the last year.

The second problem regarding Syria’s CW capability is a logistical one. Once concentrated in a small number of sites, Syria’s CW capacity is now spread between 50 to 70 separate locations. The movement of material took place when a U.S. strike on Syria seemed imminent, and was carried out by Unit 450 of the Syrian army — the main command and control center for the Syrian CW program.

It will be the task of the OPCW inspectors, in cooperation with the Syrian authorities, to locate all these sites and to oversee the process of the handing over or destruction of the CW materials there — in conditions of civil war. This is an immense challenge.

In this regard, the blithe optimism of U.S. officials and the decision of the Nobel Committee to award the peace prize to OPCW seem premature, and somewhat bizarre.

Secretary of State John Kerry went on the record on October 7, saying:

We’re very pleased with the pace of what has happened with respect to chemical weapons in a record amount of time. … I think that was a terrific example of global cooperation. I think it’s also credit to the Assad regime for complying rapidly as they are supposed to.

OPCW officials also praised the “constructive” attitude being taken by the Assad regime.

Such statements seem to ignore both the demonstrably questionable commitment of the Assad regime to ridding itself of its CW capacity in accordance with the international agreement on this, and the enormous difficulties inherent in the successful implementation of this in conditions of civil war. On balance, it is most likely given his previous pattern of behavior that Assad will seek to drag out the process for as long as possible while giving up something less than the entire inventory of his CW capacity.

Given the previous pattern of behavior of the current U.S. administration and the “international community,” it is likely that Assad will get away with it.

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Brotherhood in retreat

Posted on October 11, 2013 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 11/10

Reports surfaced this week suggesting that Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal is seeking to relocate from his current base in the Qatari capital of Doha. Hamas has indignantly rejected these claims. This shouldn’t be taken as authoritative – the movement also dismissed evidence that it was leaving Damascus in 2012 until the move was complete and could no longer be denied.

If it turns out that the Hamas leadership is indeed on its way out of Qatar, this is the latest indication of the astonishing change of fortunes that has hit the Muslim Brotherhood. History may remember 2013 as the year of the movement’s eclipse, after its very brief moment in the sun in 2011-12.

Observe: at the beginning of this year, the Muslim Brotherhood held power in Egypt and Tunisia. A Syrian insurgency dominated by militias with similar ideas to the Brotherhood and supported by the same patron (Qatar) looked to be heading for victory in Syria’s civil war.

A Brotherhood-related party was in power in Turkey, and the Emirate of Qatar had emerged as the energetic financier and enthusiastic cheerleader of the Brothers’ advance across the region.

Qatar, through its immensely popular al-Jazeera channel, had the ability to sculpt public opinion according to its will, across borders in the Arabic-speaking world.

The Brotherhood/Qatari alliance also seemed well on the way to claiming the commanding stake in Palestinian nationalism. Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the movement, had carved out the only genuinely independent Palestinian entity in the Gaza Strip.

The Palestinian cause and opposition to Israel remain key badges of legitimacy in the politics of the Arab world. Hamas, led by Mashaal, spent 2011 and 2012 relocating itself out of Damascus, and drawing ever closer to Doha. Emir Hamed Bin Khalifa al-Thani then visited Hamas-controlled Gaza in October, 2012, pledging $400 million to the Hamas enclave.

Everything seemed to be going in the right direction.

But the advance of the Muslim Brotherhood was alarming to the conservative Gulf monarchies of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Israel, too, was watching events with concern. Israel was far less vulnerable than the fragile Gulf states, but the rise of the Brotherhood in Egypt seemed to promise trouble somewhere down the road.

In the course of 2013, the advance was reversed.

Most importantly, the Brotherhood was forcibly removed from power in Egypt in a Saudi and UAE supported military coup in July. The new military regime is in the process of destroying Islamist military resistance. The Brotherhood has been declared illegal and will not be permitted to stand in future elections once the civilian political process has been reactivated.

In this age of asymmetric conflicts in which the very concepts of victory and defeat are said to be obsolete, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has suffered something that looks very much like an old fashioned, unambiguous and clear defeat.

In Qatar, meanwhile, Emir Hamed Bin-Khalifa was replaced in June by his son, Tamim. The precise circumstances and reasons for Emir Hamed’s sudden departure from power remain mysterious. Since then, Qatar has virtually disappeared from the regional stage. Its contributions to the Brotherhood in Egypt are drying up.

Hamas, alarmed by the turn of events in Egypt, is reactivating its contacts with Iran and the rival, Shia-dominated Islamist bloc led by Teheran..

In Syria, the Assad regime rallied in the first months of 2013 and its existence is no longer in imminent danger. On the Syrian rebel side, meanwhile, it is now the Saudis who are making the running – officially supporting the ‘moderate’ Supreme Military Council, and enabling the funding of Salafi organizations through private funds. The Qataris and the Muslim Brotherhood are no longer the main players.

And in the latest reversal of fortune, the Al-Nahda party in Tunisia has agreed to dissolve the government which it formed following its election victory in 2011. The government will be replaced by an administration of technocrats pending new elections. This move follows the unrest and political crisis that erupted after the assassination of opposition leader Mohammed Brahmi in July.

In Turkey, meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood related AKP is left to ponder the ruins of its plans and hopes for the region. It had expected the formation of an alliance of like-thinking MB-style Sunni Islamist regimes across the region, in North Africa, the Levant and the Gulf.

After the events of 2013, this is no longer on the cards. Instead, the AKP government must cope with angry protests by non-Islamist Turks, the loss of allies and regional isolation.

This appears to be taking its toll. A broadcast featuring Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayep Erdogan and discussing the crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt had to be stopped recently when the Turkish leader began weeping uncontrollably.

What all this means is that on literally every front on which it made significant advances, the Muslim Brotherhood has now stalled.

Whether or not it turns out that the reports regarding Khaled Mashal’s relocation are true, Hamas is being forced to reposition itself, and to go back to Iran cap in hand. The reason is because this movement too had placed its bets on a Qatar-financed alliance of Muslim Brotherhood oriented states which will now not come into being.

The Muslim Brothers are by no means finished. Their politics retain a natural purchase in the conservative, Sunni Arab Middle East. But the moment when everything seemed possible has decidedly passed. What looked like the potential beginning of a new age ended up as a brief moment in the sun.

The sun is now setting on the Muslim Brotherhood’s hopes of regional domination.

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Bloomberg interview on prospects for Iran negotiations

Posted on October 1, 2013 by jonathanspyer

http://www.bloomberg.com/video/gauging-global-concerns-over-a-nuclear-iran-6KU9l4HPTOy_OoWwxcwBxg.html

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With Morsi gone, Hamas turns back to Iran

Posted on September 29, 2013 by jonathanspyer

A number of recent reports have noted the revival of Iranian financial backing for Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist movement which rules the Gaza Strip. The Iranian decision appears to follow a series of meetings between officials of the Islamic Republic and senior Hamas members in recent days. It is not yet clear what this apparent Iranian rapprochement with Hamas will mean in practice. Iranian arming and support of Hamas never entirely ended, though its levels were drastically reduced after Hamas departed Damascus in November 2012.

But the reason for the rekindled romance between Tehran and Gaza is very clear — this is the latest fallout from the July coup in Egypt.

As time goes on, it is becoming clear that the military coup was a historic moment. Prior to it, there was a growing sense that the onward march of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Sunni Islamism was unstoppable. Indeed, the “Arab Spring” is best understood as beginning not with the self-immolation of the Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010, but rather with the Hamas coup against Fatah in Gaza in June 2007, the first political victory of Muslim Brotherhood-type Islamists against their nationalist rivals. The next key event was the toppling of Bin Ali in Tunisia and the subsequent victory of the Islamist al-Nahda party in 2011. The third — and most important — event was the bringing down of the Western-aligned military regime in Egypt in 2011, and its replacement by a Muslim Brotherhood government.

The fourth advance came in Syria, as military groups dedicated to a Muslim Brotherhood-type Islamist ideology came to dominate the rebellion, and for a moment at the beginning of 2013 appeared to be close to victory against the Assad regime.

The fomentor and financier of much of this was a single Middle Eastern state: the Emirate of Qatar. Qatari financial backing for the Muslim Brotherhood in all of these countries was essential to success. Of course, the ceaseless agitation by the enormously influential al-Jazeera channel — maintained by the Qataris — played a vital role in spreading the message.

Hamas, like many others during 2011 and 2012, saw an emergent Brotherhood and Qatari power alliance in the region. The movement’s domination of Egypt would be the jewel in the crown; Qatar would be the financier. The Hamas enclave in Gaza would take its position as an honored member of this alliance. Since it was safe to assume that vilification and hatred of the Jewish state would form an essential element of the new aligned states, Hamas was looking forward to a secure and well-padded future.

In October, Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa paid an official visit to Gaza, pledging $400 million to the Hamas administration there.

Some of the militants of the Qassam Brigades objected to the growing ties with Qatar. An alliance headed by Qatar — which ultimately relies on the West for its security — and Egypt — which remained formally committed to a peace deal with Israel — would mean the end of Hamas militancy, they claimed. But they lost the argument. Hamas thought it was part of the force set to redefine the politics of the Arab Middle East.

And anyway, how could Hamas — a Sunni Islamist movement — remain aligned with the Shia sectarian bloc that was slaughtering Sunni Muslims by the tens of thousands in Syria? They couldn’t, and they didn’t.

Unfortunately for Hamas, it has all gone horribly wrong.

In retrospect, it seems that late 2012 represented the high-water mark of the Qatar-Muslim Brotherhood project in the region. Since that time, Qatar and the Brotherhood’s various enemies have hit back hard.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates backed a coup in Egypt, which with one stroke nullified the main gain of the Brotherhood and Qatar. The new regime in Egypt has adopted a hardline approach, banning the Brotherhood and besieging Hamas-controlled Gaza.

The Emir of Qatar retired under unclear circumstances in June 2013. The new Emir Tamim appears to be pursuing a far more cautious and modest regional policy — Qatar has been largely invisible in recent months.

In Syria, Iran and its allies mobilized and have halted the advance of the rebels. The Saudis meanwhile, with less success, have sought to curtail the influence of Muslim Brotherhood-associated factions within the rebellion.

The waning of the Qatari tide left Hamas stranded. As mentioned above, it never completely severed the link with the Iranians. Now, with Sisi’s security forces pressing against it in northern Sinai, Hamas has little choice but to turn back to the Iran-led regional bloc.

The turn back to Iran will prevent any possible eclipse of the Hamas regime in Gaza, and end any hopes that the Ramallah Palestinian Authority might have had for its return to exclusive control of Palestinian nationalism. Beyond this, it may well presage a turn back to militancy by Hamas, which has been very quiet since the conclusion of Operation Pillar of Defense in early 2013.

Ultimately, Hamas’ turn back to Iran is a testimony to the group’s new weakness. Of course, the setbacks for the Muslim Brotherhood may not be permanent. It is down, but hardly out. But for the moment, its various component parts are in retreat.

For a moment, it looked like Hamas was riding the tide of history. Then the tide turned.

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Kurdish Independence Now

Posted on September 29, 2013 by jonathanspyer

The civil war in Syria and the increasing fragility of Iraq have thrown the long-term future of these states into question. For years, they were ruled by brutal regimes that held power in the name of Arab nationalism; as a result, they failed to knit together the populations they ruled into a coherent national identity. With the decline of repressive centralized authority in Syria and Iraq, however, older nationalities and identities are reemerging. Chief among them are the Kurds. Indeed, current regional developments make Kurdish statehood a realistic possibility for the first time in living memory.

I have reported on a number of occasions from both Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan. I last visited these areas four months ago, and have an extensive network of friends and contacts there and in the wider Kurdish world. And it has become overwhelmingly clear to me that Kurdish sovereignty would be of benefit to the Kurds, the region as a whole, and Western interests in the Middle East. I find it unfortunate that the emerging Kurdish success story receives so little attention in the West—both among policymakers and the general public.

Kurdish statehood is good for the Kurds. It’s also good for the West.

The Kurds number around 30 million, and are generally considered to be the world’s largest stateless nation. A non-Semitic, non-Turkic people native to the Middle East, the Kurds believe themselves to be descendants of ancient Iranian tribes that predated the Turkish and Arab invasions.

When the Western powers carved up the remains of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, they promised the Kurds autonomy in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres. Subsequent resistance to the treaty by the Turkish nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal led to its renegotiation at Lausanne in 1923, where the West recognized the borders of the new Turkish republic. As a result, the Kurds found themselves divided between the post-Ottoman states of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, with a small population in Iran.

Kurdish politics have been labyrinthine and divided ever since. No single, united pan-Kurdish national movement exists or has ever existed. Instead, the separated Kurdish populations each developed political movements of their own.

Unsurprisingly, the Kurds have developed a long tradition of heroic defeat over the course of the 20th century. Modern Kurdish nationalists like to trace the origins of their movement to the short-lived Mahabad Republic, the first attempt at Kurdish statehood. Officially known as the Republic of Kurdistan, it was declared in the Iranian city of Mahabad in early 1946, and was crushed by the Iranian army several months later.

The leader of the fleeting republic’s armed forces was Mulla Mustafa Barzani, an Iraqi Kurd and father of Massoud Barzani, the current president of Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Kurdish agitation and uprisings continued under Barzani family leadership for years afterward. Most significantly, Mustafa Barzani led an unsuccessful military campaign in northern Iraq from 1961-70.

In 1983, the Iraqi Kurds rose up yet again, now led by Massoud Barzani and his Kurdish Democratic Party, in alliance with the younger Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Jalal Talabani. This uprising was brutally crushed by Saddam Hussein in the infamous “Anfal” campaign, during which Hussein used poison gas against the civilians of the village Halabja in 1988, killing 3-5,000 people.

After the First Gulf War in 1991, a Kurdish autonomous zone was created in northern Iraq. Since the 2003 US invasion, this zone has emerged as a quasi-sovereign entity, with its own armed forces, political system, and economic interests. Traveling there today is to witness a little-known Mideast success story in the midst of regional chaos and meltdown. The autonomous zone is the most peaceful part of Iraq, and the absence of political violence is encouraging investment. Erbil, the capital city, feels like a boom town. There are construction cranes everywhere and brand new SUVs on the streets. Exxon Mobil has signed an agreement with the KRG to search for oil and develop an energy industry in the zone. The US, France, and a number of other countries now have consulates in the capital.

But Kurdish politics don’t start and finish in northern Iraq. The second major nationalist movement began with a 1984 uprising led by the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (the Kurdish Workers Party or PKK) in southeast Turkey, with the goal of founding a Kurdish state. The rebellion and the Turkish response to it went on to claim more than 40,000 lives. But this year, a ceasefire was declared and a peace process begun in hopes of ending the conflict.

Meanwhile, the Syrian civil war has led to the emergence of a Kurdish-ruled enclave in the northeast of the country. This area is controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Party (PYD), an offshoot of the PKK. This embryonic autonomous zone is poorer and more fragile than its Iraqi counterpart. But it too is the quietest and most peaceful part of that war-torn country. PYD-imposed authority is ubiquitous. The Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Protection Units or YPG) militia does as much as possible to prevent the entry of both Islamist rebels and Assad regime soldiers. The militia and the Kurdish security service, the Asayish, maintain an extensive presence and a firm grip on the area.

It is very telling that the Kurdish areas in both Syria and Iraq have become destinations for Arab refugees from elsewhere in these countries. There is a simple reason for this: Generally speaking, where the Kurds are in control, things stay quiet.

The turbulent events of the last decade have brought an unexpected bonanza for the Kurds. Two powerful—if very different—Kurdish autonomous zones have emerged out of the collapsing societies of Iraq and Syria, while Turkey’s Kurds are engaged in negotiations to advance their rights. Only the Kurds of Iran remain firmly behind prison walls.

The question before the Kurds today is how to consolidate these gains and build on them. It is rarely discussed openly, but looming above it all is the question of Kurdish statehood and what it would mean for both the Kurds and the region in general. Will the Kurds continue to develop their quasi-states while avoiding a direct push toward sovereignty? Or are events leading inexorably toward Kurdish independence, with the resulting partition of Iraq and Syria?

The road to sovereignty for the Kurds remains strewn with obstacles. Not least among them is the absence of a united Kurdish national movement. As outlined above, there are two main forces in Kurdish politics today. One of them derives from the Iraqi Kurdish experience, the other from that of Turkey. In recent years, each of these factions has made considerable progress toward forming rival “pan-Kurdish” movements.

The first of these is Massoud Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party in Iraq. While the KDP is based in northern Iraq, it maintains smaller offshoots and sister parties in both Syria and Iran. The second is the PKK, still officially headed by its jailed founder Abdullah Ocalan. Until recently, it was for all practical purposes led by Murat Karayilan, its commander in the Qandil mountains area, and is now headed by movement veteran Cemil Bayek. This movement and its various front organizations are the dominant force among both the Kurds of Turkey and the Kurdish autonomous zone in Syria. The PKK also has sister organizations among the Kurds of Iran and northern Iraq.

The KDP and the PKK have very different visions of the Kurdish future. The KDP is a traditional, conservative organization; it is pro-Western, pro-business, and pro-American in outlook, rooted in the clan and tribal structures of Iraqi Kurdish life. Its leader, after all, is a scion of the most prominent family in Iraqi Kurdish politics.

The PKK, by contrast, is a leftist organization, with its roots in the radical ferment of Turkey in the 1970s. Ocalan, its founder, is from a poor rural family. Although the movement has come a long way from its early days, it still represents a distinct, secular leftist nationalism of a type rarely found in today’s Middle East.

This is reflected in its very progressive approach to the role of women in society and politics, which is in stark contrast to the surrounding culture. Women, for example, serve in frontline units of PKK militias. This is not the case with the Pesh Merga, the armed forces of Iraq’s Kurdish autonomous zone.

Both of these movements are political-military organizations, and suffer from the authoritarian tendencies inherent in such groups. There have been verified instances of political repression in both the Kurdish zones of northern Iraq and northeast Syria.

The PKK remains on US and EU lists of terrorist organizations. But this designation is more a concession to Turkish sensibilities and interests than an objective assessment of the group’s current modus operandi. Whatever may have been the case in the past, the PKK today is a guerrilla organization at war with Turkish security forces, not a group that deliberately targets civilians.

Neither the KDP nor the PKK is openly committed to the achievement of Kurdish statehood, albeit for very different reasons. Iraqi Kurdish officials will privately concede that an independent Kurdish state is their goal, but stress the difficulties of achieving it and the need for a pragmatic, cautious strategy. Some PKK members speak in similar terms, but others stress the views of their leader Ocalan, who is opposed to very idea of the nation-state and advocates a system of “democratic autonomy” or “radical democracy” for the entire Middle East.

These two very different movements are set to dominate the next and possibly decisive chapter in the modern political history of the Kurds.

Neither of these movements is going to replace or defeat the other; so the future of the Kurds is likely to depend on whether they can find a way to cooperate. This will probably be difficult, however, because of the KRG’s burgeoning strategic relationship with Turkey.

For decades, the Turks have seen Kurdish national aspirations as an anathema, but this is no longer entirely the case. Over the last few years, Turkey and the Iraqi Kurdish government have been building a close relationship based on mutual interests. Turkey currently relies on Russia and Iran for its oil supplies, and has deteriorating strategic relations with both. At the same time, the Kurdish zone is rich in oil and borders on Turkey. As a result, Turkey has recently been making private agreements with the Iraqi Kurds for the purchase of crude oil supplies. This is despite vocal objections from the US—which is opposed to any attempt by the Kurdish autonomous zone to secede from Iraq—and, of course, opposition from the central government in Baghdad.

The main obstacles to the burgeoning alliance between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds are the future status of Turkey’s Kurds and the Kurdish enclave in northeast Syria, which shares a long border with Turkey. The situation is even more complex because the PKK uses the Qandil Mountains, which are under the control of the Iraqi Kurds, as a base for its insurgency against Turkey. Although the Kurdish zone’s government does not officially sanction the presence of the PKK, it does nothing to prevent it.

The emergence of a Kurdish enclave in northeast Syria helped push Turkey toward resolving its long conflict with the PKK. Should open hostilities resume, however, there is a real possibility that the long border controlled by the Syrian Kurdish zone and the Assad regime will be used as a base for attacks on Turkey. Partly as a result, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has entered into peace negotiations with the PKK’s jailed leader Abdullah Ocalan; but talks have rapidly run aground. In mid-July, with the peace process frozen, the Kurdish leadership in northeast Syria declared an “interim administrative body” in the area under its control, alarming the Turkish government.

Relations between the Iraqi autonomous zone and its Syrian counterpart are similarly fraught; partly because of their differing relationships with Turkey. The Iraqi Kurds control the border between their own territory and that of the Syrian Kurds. When I crossed this border in March 2013 with a group of Syrian Kurdish fighters, it was necessary to avoid Iraqi Kurdish forces deployed along the border. At the same time, however, it was clear that a sort of ambiguous live-and-let-live attitude existed between the two groups, with each doing its best to ignore the other.

There is no likelihood of armed confrontation between these two nascent Kurdistans. But because of the role played by Turkey, unification seems equally elusive. The Iraqi Kurds needs their flourishing relationship with Turkey in order to continue on its path toward greater autonomy and possible independence. The PKK, however, has been at war with Turkey since 1984. For the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish zones to unify, the PKK must move toward rapprochement with Turkey. This means that Turkey has an effective veto over Kurdish unity and possible independence. To achieve their goals, the PKK and the Iraqi Kurds must find a way to neutralize it.

One way to do so would be for the US and other Western powers to support Kurdish sovereignty as a legitimate goal. This would pave the way for greater Western investment and diplomatic support for Kurdish goals and weaken Turkey’s ability to snuff out a Kurdish bid for independence. A second way is, of course, Kurdish unity. The establishment of a single “national congress”-type organization could defeat Turkey’s strategy of divide and rule. An upcoming conference in Erbil is intended to lay the foundation for such an organization. It remains to be seen if it will succeed.

If Kurdish unity and a strategy for statehood cannot be achieved, the most likely result is two Kurdish quasi-states, existing on adjoining territories but unable to maintain good relations with each other or achieve complete sovereignty. Such quasi-states have become a familiar feature of the Middle East and the post-Cold War world in general. They combine de facto sovereignty with an absence of international recognition. Hamas has been running such an entity in the Gaza Strip since 2007. The Hezbollah state-within-a-state in southern Lebanon is arguably another example—though in that case the quasi-state appears to have largely devoured the legitimate state.

The problem with such entities is that while they can survive on the basis of their monopoly on the use of force, they cannot thrive. Their uncertain status precludes the development of their economies or their civil and political institutions. As a result, they also tend to become centers of paramilitary and criminal activity, such as Gaza and Lebanon, as well as Kosovo, Bosnian Serbia, and Transnistria.

The Middle East remains beset by deeply problematic political trends that undermine political stability and economic development. Extremist political Islam, deeply rooted anti-Western sentiment, widespread and pervasive anti-Semitism, and hostility to non-Muslim minorities are all on the rise across the Arab world, Iran, and Turkey.

In this context, the Kurds represent an anomaly. There is no need to romanticize either the Iraqi zone’s government or the PKK in order to see this. Each of these entities has their own problems. They show certain authoritarian tendencies and the enclaves they rule are unlikely to resemble US or EU-style democracies any time in the near future. But Kurdish political culture is largely free of the kind of extreme dysfunction noted above.

Political Islam exists among the Kurds, but because of the predominance of ethnic identification, it has demonstrably less appeal than among other Mideast peoples. That the two primary rivals in Kurdish politics are both secular nationalist movements is proof of this. In the Iraqi zone, Islamist parties support the Gorran movement, a reformist party that does not even profess political Islam; which testifies to the relative weakness of the area’s Islamic movement. In Syrian Kurdistan, there is no identifiable Islamist movement, and the its militia has been actively engaged in combat with Syrian rebel groups associated with Al Qaeda.

The Kurds are also notably less hostile to the West than many others in the region. For the most part, their grievances are directed not against the US or Europe, but the local oppressors of the Kurds. Indeed, other than Israel, the KRG in northern Iraq is the most pro-Western of all the non-monarchical governments in the region. The ruling KDP is openly and outspokenly pro-Western and pro-American. And unlike the Arab monarchies, its pro-Western orientation is deeply rooted in popular sentiment.

Kurds in Turkey celebrate their holiday of Newroz. Photo: homeros / 123rf
Kurds in Turkey celebrate their holiday of Newroz. Photo: homeros / 123rf

The PKK, however, is more of a question mark. Due to Turkey’s de facto veto over Kurdish independence and the lack of Western support for the Kurdish cause, the PKK might turn toward Turkey’s main rival for support—Iran. This would be a disaster, and an entirely unnecessary one. Western support for Kurdish national aspirations would almost certainly prevent it.

The moral and strategic case for Kurdish sovereignty is therefore a strong one. Western endorsement of the principle of Kurdish statehood, removal of the PKK from lists of terror organizations, and the development of closer relations with the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish enclaves could help break the current stalemate on the issue.

There is neither benefit nor justice in a situation where the legitimate national aspirations of a largely pro-Western people are subject to the veto of the Islamist prime minister of Turkey. This is particularly the case given that Prime Minister Erdogan is adopting an increasingly problematic stance vis-a-vis the West and more and more repressive domestic policies.

Other opponents of Kurdish statehood include the Maliki government in Iraq, the Assad regime in Syria, and Islamist groups among the Syrian rebels. Maliki and Assad are both clients of Iran, and the former is actively aiding the latter in his fight for survival. The Syrian rebels are Islamists and Arab nationalists who are determined to maintain the unity of the Syrian state. All of these forces are hostile to the West, and acquiescence to their rejection of Kurdish rights makes little or no sense.

The Middle East is in the midst of enormous historic changes, and the Kurds stand to be one of the main beneficiaries. Kurdish sovereignty would mean the establishment of a strong, pro-Western state in Middle East that is likely to be characterized by pragmatism, stable governance, and a pro-Western strategic outlook. It would also possess substantial natural resources and a mobilized populace willing to defend it. A Kurdish state in northern Iraq, moreover, would likely absorb the Kurdish enclave in northeast Syria, effectively breaking up Iraq and Syria—two failed states that have been a byword for war, repression, and terrorism for most of the last fifty years.

In order for this to happen, however, the US must adopt Kurdish sovereignty as a strategic goal. At the moment, caution, timidity, and the desire to withdraw from the region make this unlikely. The last of these is probably the most difficult to overcome. After all, if the US and other Western nations do not want to be involved in the Middle East, then there is no point in supporting the emergence of a pro-Western ally in the region. But recent events in Syria and Egypt have shown what happens when the West fails to cultivate allies or abandons reliable clients in the region: Chaos.

Moreover, the forces ready and willing to replace the US as the region’s strategic hegemon—above all, Iran and Russia—do not intend to manage it as custodians of order and stability. Their interest is in the promotion of movements and regimes aligned with them and hostile to the West. At the same time, the rise of the anti-Western Sunni Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic extremists with the support of Turkey and Qatar is leading to war and disorder across the eastern Mediterranean.

A sovereign Kurdish state could be a powerful bulwark against such disorder and a solid, pro-Western ally in this most troubled of regions. It would also realize the Kurds’ desire for long-delayed historic justice. It is an idea whose time has come.

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The Fragmented Forces Behind Assad

Posted on September 27, 2013 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 27/9

The conflict in Syria tends to be seen as one between a disparate, fragmented rebellion and a centralized dictatorial regime. That characterization of the rebellion is correct. The view of the Assad regime as a centralized, monolithic unit, however, is no longer accurate.

The ‘regime’ side in Syria, too, has become an alliance of various forces. These forces are all committed to keeping Bashar Assad in his seat as ‘President of Syria’, whatever that means today. But the evidence suggests that he does not control or command all of them, and indeed may not be setting the strategy for the war against the rebels.

How did this situation arise? The Assad regime was throughout its existence a quintessentially centralized affair – an East Germany on the Mediterranean. To be sure, myriad networks of patronage existed within its structures, but the structures themselves were solid.

The problem for the Bashar Assad regime in its long fight with the insurgency is manpower. The dictator vastly outclasses the forces arrayed against him in terms of hardware. What he lacks is men willing to engage on his behalf. This is because of the sectarian nature of his regime, and its consequent narrow base of support.

On paper, of course, Bashar commands a vast force. The Syrian Arab Army notionally consists of 220,000 troops in 12 divisions plus an additional 280,000 reserves. But in practice, the majority of this force consists of Sunni conscripts and is therefore unusable by the regime.

This chronic shortage of manpower has defined regime strategy throughout the war. Assad ceded around 60% of the country to the rebels and the Kurds in mid-2012 because he lacked sufficient available forces to control it.

Necessity forced him to reduce the area under to his control to a size which he was able to manage with the manpower available to him.

Iran is committed to Bashar’s survival. He is Teheran’s main Arab ally, and a vital land link between Shia Iraq and Hizballah-controlled Lebanon.

Iran is largely, though not solely responsible for the mobilization of external and internal forces on behalf of the Assad regime, which is intended to solve the shortage of available fighting men.

The fighters have been found from a variety of places.

Firstly, the Iranians have committed men of their own.

The IRGC (Revolutionary Guards) maintains an operational base in Damascus. Qods Force commander Qassem Suleimani visits the country regularly to command and coordinate operations.

In June, the British Independent on Sunday newspaper reported that 4000 IRGC personnel were on their way to Syria.

A former Lebanese intelligence officer speaking to this reporter in August said that he estimated that around 5,000 Iranian personnel are currently on Syrian soil.

A Syrian rebel officer, Lieutenant Bilal Khabir, speaking with this reporter, said that Iranian personnel were present with his unit in the earliest days of the uprising, when they were sent to quell demonstrations in Dera’a province.

Secondly, Hizballah fighters are involved. They led the regime’s re-taking of the strategically vital town of al-Qusayr in August of this year.

Today, Hezbollah remains in control of the town. Lebanese media sources estimate that up to 10000 Hizballah fighters are present in Syria at any given time. They are deployed not only in Qusayr and Homs, areas of combat close to the Lebanese border. Rather, evidence has also emerged of movement fighters in Damascus, and in the Aleppo area.

In addition, Iran has sought to improve the combat capabilities of the 50-60,000 mainly Alawi irregular fighters who have fought on Bashar’s behalf since the conflict began.

These ‘Shabiha’ (ghost) forces have been offered training by the IRGC and Hizballah and have been organized under the banner of the ‘National Defense Forces’. They are now playing a vital auxiliary role in a number of areas.

Iraqi Shia militias such as the Ahl al-Haq and Ktaeb Hizballah organizations have also deployed fighters in Syria, mainly in the Damascus area.

Lastly, independent pro-government paramilitary brigades are still operating. These include both Syrian Shia Islamist units, such as the Abu al-Fadl al Abbas Brigades, and non Islamist units operating under a variety of ethnic or ideological labels, or no label at all.

These can include some frankly bizarre elements. Aymenn al-Tamimi, a researcher of paramilitary groupings on both sides in Syria, for example published this week a profile of an organization calling itself the ‘Syrian Resistance,’ led by a superannuated Turkish Alawi leftist by the name of Mihrac Ural.

This group, which operates in the Latakia area, makes use of antique Marxist symbolism, mixed with Alawi sectarianism.

Elements among the ‘Shabiha’ in the regime enclave on the western coast of Syria are also now engaged not only in warfare, but also in significant economic activity of their own, independent of official channels.

Of course, the presence of this array of paramilitary groups should not obscure the extent to which Bashar may still call on formidable forces of his own. The 4th Armored Division, his Special Forces and the Republican Guard all remain available to him, as well as parts of the army, the intelligence services and the air force.

But a large and disparate gathering of forces have been brought in to plug the gap in manpower that is the main strategic threat facing the dictator. Assad desperately needs these forces, he did not establish them and he is not paying for them. So it may be cautiously deduced that he is unlikely to be controlling them.

There remains a major difference between the regional Shia effort to back Assad, and the Sunni help afforded the rebels. The latter is a tangled web of different and often hostile interests – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, private Gulf funders, the Muslim Brotherhood.

The former, however, is coordinated by a single external force, namely Iran.

This does not mean that all the elements involved are merely puppets of the Iranians.

But it almost certainly does mean that they are not taking orders from Bashar Assad. He has become merely one element in a combined effort of Iran-aligned paramilitary forces to maintain their area of control within Syria.

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