The Common Hatred

Posted on March 9, 2011 by jonathanspyer

15/08/2009

The arrest this week of the “Zeitoun terror cell” is a significant moment in the ongoing battle between the Egyptian security forces and homegrown Islamist extremism.

The cell, we are told, plotted to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Egypt, Shalom Cohen. It is also thought to have been involved in a series of acts of terror in Egypt earlier this year.

The uncovering of the Zeitoun cell points to a revival of domestic Sunni Islamist terrorism in Egypt. Parallel to this, though separate from it, recent months have also seen the unearthing of a Hizbullah network active in Egypt.

It is important to keep in mind the major differences in orientation between these two trends of Islamism. The emerging picture, however, also points to significant aspects of commonality between the two structures.

The Zeitoun cell emerged from the domestic Egyptian extreme Sunni Islamist scene. A series of actions associated with this trend have taken place in recent months.

A French tourist was killed in a bomb explosion at Cairo’s Al-Azhar/Khan el-Khalili in March. The Saint Virgin’s Coptic Church in the Zeitoun district was bombed on May 12. These acts bear the typical hallmarks of activity of Egyptian Sunni extremists – namely, anti-Christian sectarianism, hostility to the presence of tourists in Egypt and the belief that the possessions of non-Muslims may be taken at will.

The members of the cell have admitted to being in communication with representatives of the al-Qaida network abroad. Their intention was to reassemble in Saudi Arabia after undertaking actions in Egypt, and from there to join the Sunni insurgency in Iraq.

As is often the case with groups claiming association with al-Qaida, the real capabilities of the Zeitoun cell are not clear. Its members said in court that their plan for the assassination of the Israeli ambassador had been ongoing since 2007. They also admitted that the tight security around the embassy had prevented it from being put into operation.

It should be borne in mind, in order to avoid the confusion found in the statements of some Israeli spokesmen in the last days, that it is this Egyptian Sunni group which is suspected of planning to kill Ambassador Cohen.

Parallel to this, a Hizbullah-led structure has also been revealed in Egypt in recent months. In April, Egypt announced the arrest of 49 people said to be involved with a network led by Hizbullah member Mohammed Mansour and personally sanctioned by movement General-Secretary Hassan Nasrallah. This structure was accused of preparing to commit crimes against Egypt.”

This included “observing the movement of ships in the Suez Canal, and the tourist villages in the northern and southern Sinai Peninsula, in order to attack them, providing Hamas in Gaza with arms and money,” and “spreading Shi’ite ideas in Egypt and inciting the Egyptians against their government.”

The Salafi trend in Sunni Islam of which al-Qaida forms a part is violently opposed to the Shi’ite Islam of Hizbullah and Iran. Nor is this opposition purely theoretical. Iraq teetered on the verge of sectarian civil war between Sunni and Shi’ite three years ago, and such a conflict may yet emerge.

The Sunni insurgency that the members of the Zeitoun cell hoped to join is as much opposed to the Iraqi Shi’ites as it is to the US.

Indeed, the key strategic fault line in the region today pits Shi’ite Iran and its allies against the traditionally dominant Sunni powers of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Egyptian and Saudi fear of Iran is what is driving the behind the scenes cooperation of these countries with Israel.

But the genuine nature of the Sunni-Shi’ite split notwithstanding, it is worth noticing that both the Zeitoun cell and the Hizbullah network led by Mohammed Mansour sought to make war against Israel.

That is, there is one issue, and probably one issue alone, which can trump the split between Sunni and Shi’ite, and it is the joint enmity toward the Jews and Israel. Shi’ite Iran knows this very well, which is precisely why it seeks to launch a bid for the “ownership” of the Palestinian issue.

The only real inroads in the Arab world beyond the Shi’ites which Iran has made have all been in connection with its proxy war with Israel. Mansour’s network, we are told, included Sudanese, Palestinians and Egyptians. Even more significantly, two members of the Muslim Brotherhood have been accused of association with it. “Our enemy and Hizbullah’s enemy is the same,” as Brotherhood parliamentary leader Hussein Ibrahim recently put it, in explaining his movement’s attitude toward the Lebanese Shi’ite group.

All of which goes to prove that while it is crucial in analytical terms to be clear as to who precisely is responsible for what, the details should not be allowed to obscure the relative clarity of the larger picture.

Israel is the single largest contributor to Islamic ecumenicalism in the Middle East. Sunni and Shi’ite Islamists, at least for a while, can bury their differences in the service of the common hatred.

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Terrorism: Hizballah’s brand is Tarnished

Posted on March 9, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 29/09/2009

A famous Hizbullah marching song, “Hizbullah ya ayuni” (Hizbullah – my eyes), contains the following verse: “And today through the blood of the brave, the merciful creator has given us victory, and the whole world and all people have begun to speak of our glory.” Unfortunately for the Lebanese Shi’ite Islamist movement, the main world news story in which it currently features concerns matters of a distinctly inglorious type, with which it would undoubtedly prefer not to be associated.

The revelations concerning the activities of the so-called Lebanese Bernie Madoff – Salah Ezz el-Din of the south Lebanese village of Ma’aroub – are serving to tarnish the image of selflessness and idealism in which Hizbullah likes to present itself. The movement has long sought to differentiate itself from the notoriously corrupt, distinctly nonidealistic political and financial practices with which Lebanon is often associated. Ezz el-Din’s activities suggest that on close observation, Hizbullah may be less different from its surroundings than its admirers (especially in the west) like to think.

Ezz el-Din, a Lebanese Shi’ite in his 50s, is accused of embezzlement and defrauding investors of hundreds of millions of dollars. The means by which he chose to part his victims from their money are familiar. He promised quick returns on investments in what he claimed were construction, oil and gas projects outside of Lebanon. He is reported to have guaranteed investors 20 percent-25% profits within 100 days on certain investments.

It now appears that Ezz el-Din was running a Ponzi scheme – paying clients with funds gleaned from newer investors. The sums involved are large – though nowhere near Madoff-like proportions. He is believed to have defrauded investors of around $500 million.

But Ezz el-Din was no ordinary financier. Rather, he enjoyed close links to Hizbullah. He ran a variety of enterprises associated with the group – most importantly the Dar al-Hadi Publishing House – named after Hadi Nasrallah. Hadi Nasrallah was the son of Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah who was killed fighting the IDF in southern Lebanon, and is somewhere near the top of the movement’s pantheon of “martyrs.” The publishing house which bore his name was responsible for the publication of a number of books by senior Hizbullah officials.

The perception of Hizbullah patronage was a major factor in encouraging investors to place their trust in Ezz el-Din. As one disappointed client put it, “people put money with him because he was wearing the Hizbullah cloak.” The presence of people like him does not fit with the puritanical image of Hizbullah. But it is not especially out of place with the broader pattern of the movement’s activities.

As a major Lebanese political force, Hizbullah offers patronage to powerful families and individuals from the Lebanese Shi’ite community. The organization effectively operates a state within a state. Its areas are off limits to the army and police. This is particularly useful for individuals close to the movement engaged in criminal activities.

The lucrative hashish trade in the movement’s heartland in the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon offers an example of this patronage. Families engaged in this trade receive the protection of Hizbullah, ensuring that neither the authorities nor their rivals interfere with their activities. In return, Hizbullah takes a generous helping of the considerable profits.

The movement controls 13,000 acres in the Bekaa, which produce at least 300 tons of hashish annually. Hizbullah is reckoned to rake in profits of $180 million annually from this trade.

Most of the hashish is exported to Europe. Not all, though. The problem of drug abuse among residents in the Hizbullah-controlled Dahiyeh area of south Beirut is well known in Lebanon. Not all residents of the Dahiyeh are Shi’ite puritans.

Hizbullah is not reinventing the wheel. Rather, it is behaving in the manner of other Lebanese political forces. These activities are not particularly demonic – though the less powerful members of the various Lebanese communities are most likely to be hurt by them. But they serve to indicate the extent to which Hizbullah’s pose of purity and incorruptibility and standing above the base practices of its rivals is largely a product of good public relations, rather than any observable reality.

The gradual tarnishing of the Hizbullah brand is, of course, good news for Israel. With past enemies – Arab nationalist regimes, the Yasser Arafat-led PLO – it was in the end the unbridgeable gap between proclamations and reality which served to initiate their slow decay and decline more than any single military defeat.

In this regard, another explanation for the Ezz al-Din affair is predictably doing the rounds in southern Lebanon. Haj Kamal Shour, who lost $1.03 million investing with the financier told reporters that he was sure that the “Israeli Mossad and Zionist lobby” were in some unaccountable way behind it all.

The reliable Zionist foe is enlisted to explain away failures and corruption scandals. But wasn’t that exactly the political style that Hizbullah, with its selfless martyrs and its blood-curdling marching songs, was supposed to be doing away with? As Lebanon’s former colonial governors might have put it – the more things change, the more they stay the same.

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Talk softly, and carry a large Carrot!

Posted on March 9, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post-29/07/2009

The region is currently witnessing a concerted attempt by Saudi Arabia to mend its relations with the Syrian regime. This effort derives from Riyadh’s fear of Iran, and its sense that now may be an opportune moment to begin to prize Teheran’s regional allies away from it.

The tool that Saudi Arabia wishes to employ to achieve this task is its own economic power, set against the backwardness and urgent needs of the Syrian economy. It is said that if you have only a hammer, all problems start to look like nails. It might also be said that if you have only a (very weighty) check book, then everything starts to look like it’s for sale.

Syria, however, is not currently interested in trading its alliance with the Iranians. Damascus would be happy to institute a measured cooperation on certain issues with the Saudis, as part of its more general desire to emerge from isolation, and benefit from Saudi investment. But a major turnaround of Syria’s regional stance remains a fantasy, albeit one which seems to have an astonishing longevity in many circles.

The Saudis want to see an orderly process of coalition-formation in Lebanon, where the March 14 movement, led by Saudi-born Sa’ad Hariri, recently won elections. All factors likely to disrupt the process are linked in one way or another to Damascus. Hence the desire to bring the Syrians on board.

In addition, the Saudis have long been disturbed by the growing regional ambitions of the Shi’ite Islamist regime in Teheran. The split between pro-Iranian and pro-US Arab states has come to dominate intra-Arab diplomacy. During Israel’s Gaza operation earlier this year, the divisions made it impossible for the Arab League to even convene a quorate meeting to condemn Israel.

The Iranian regime is in trouble. So the time seems ripe to tempt its friends to abandon it.

The Saudis have little coercive power. What they do have is money, and lots of it. So the central tool being employed by Riyadh to coax Syria back into the Arab fold is financial support. Once the largest foreign investors in Syria, Saudi investments dropped massively after the nadir in relations between the two countries that followed the assassination of Rafik Hariri in Lebanon in 2005. Investments have now, however, begun to creep up again, according to Western media reports. A Saudi construction firm recently announced the opening of a $110 million industrial park. The Syrians, whose oil sector is in steady and irreversible decline, are in dire need of help for their economy.

Diplomatic moves have accompanied the return of investment. The Saudis have announced the return of their ambassador to Damascus. There were even rumors of a visit by King Abdullah himself to Syria, though these appear to have been based on nothing of substance. But clearly a genuine effort by the Saudis to return Syria to the Arab fold is under way.

That effort is being augmented by enthusiastic French and to a lesser degree US engagement with Syria. Claude Geant, the French presidential secretary, recently met with President Assad in Damascus. He later said that Syria is a “strong country, and no Middle East problem can be resolved without Damascus being involved.”

US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman, meanwhile, told Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper that the possibility of “real cooperation” between Washington and Damascus existed, in pursuit of “objectives of common interest.”

There are a number of basic flaws in the thinking behind this courtship.

Regarding the Lebanese coalition negotiations – despite the Syrian tendency to imply that Damascus has the power to restrain or unleash all anti-Western forces across the Middle East, this is not in fact the case in Lebanon. Hizbullah has a close relationship with the Syrian regime, but the movement is not a puppet of the Syrians. Rather, it is a creation and client of Iran.

More fundamentally, not one scrap of evidence has emerged to suggest that Syria is in any way inclined to transform its regional stances because of Saudi largesse, or French and American promises.

On the contrary, Syrian spokesmen at every opportunity reaffirm their commitment to the alliance with Iran. Solemn repetition by sundry “experts” and analysts that it would be in Damascus’s “interest” to break from Teheran does not constitute evidence.

The unrest in Iran is continuing, but the idea that Iranian plans for regional hegemony are in eclipse is hugely premature. In the meantime, all sides are watching events in Teheran closely, and waiting.

Syria needs foreign investment, from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. But Saudi money, and smooth-talking French envoys, are already, it seems, finding their way to Damascus – at a time when the Syrian strategic alliance with Iran remains very much alive. So what is the urgent incentive for the Syrians to reconsider it?

Ultimately, the Saudis have a limited range of options available to them, so their stance is not surprising. Still, the fact remains that talking softly while offering a large carrot is not the advisable means of ensuring Syrian cooperation, compliance or strategic realignment.

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Iranian Lobbying Failed

Posted on March 9, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 11/07/2009

President Shimon Peres’s landmark visit to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan this week represents a significant advance for Israeli ambitions in Central Asia. In the wake of the recent decision to permit Israel to open an embassy in the Turkmen capital of Ashghabad, the visit reflects the importance Jerusalem attaches to this strategically significant part of what is sometimes known as the “greater Middle East.”

Israel’s stance reflects a series of hopes, interests and concerns. The most important of these are: the desire to contain Iranian influence, and joint opposition to radical Islam. Israeli technological expertise is of particular interest to energy-rich, rapidly developing Central Asian economies, forming the basis for growing economic relations. In turn, Azerbaijan has emerged as a major energy supplier. The country supplies just under 20 percent of Israel’s oil.

Israel’s desire to build strong connections with non-Arab Muslim countries in the region is of long standing and reflects an obvious strategic interest. Yet in the past, Central Asian states have preferred to keep their friendship with the Jewish state far from the spotlight.

Israel has maintained diplomatic relations with both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan since 1992. With regard to containing Teheran, relations with Shi’ite Azerbaijan, which shares a border with Iran, are of particular significance. Azerbaijan has close ethnic links with Iran. Far more Azeris live in Iran than in Azerbaijan itself.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is an ethnic Azeri. Yet relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have grown tense over the last decade for a number of reasons. The Islamic republic, for strategic reasons of its own, tacitly supported Armenia in the Azeri-Armenian war over the province of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Teheran dislikes the secular nature of Azerbaijani politics, and has offered support and training to Azeri mullahs and organizations preaching a pro-Iranian Islamist message. Iran and Azerbaijan also have competing interests related to energy issues in the Caspian Sea.

As a result, Baku has drawn close to Jerusalem on the basis of a shared threat. Israeli defense industries have made very significant inroads. Israel played the central role in rebuilding and modernizing the Azeri military after its losses in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Azerbaijan has also become one of the key arenas in the ongoing silent war between Israel and Iran. Both countries are thought to possess major espionage networks on Azeri soil. Israel is reported to maintain listening and surveillance posts on the Azerbaijan-Iran border. The recent foiling of a joint Hizbullah/Iranian plot to bomb the Israeli Embassy by the authorities in Baku shows the depth of activity.

Kazakhstan, which has no border with Iran, has sought to develop strong trade and strategic relations with the Islamic republic. Part of Peres’s mission was to seek a firm Kazakh commitment that it would cease the sale of uranium ore to Iran. Astana’s stance appears to reflect a desire to play a part in diplomatic mediation in the region and beyond it, on the basis of its image as a moderate Muslim state.

The more diffuse threat of radical Islam offers a further natural basis for friendship. In the Shi’ite but secular-governed Azerbaijan, this threat takes the form of Iran-supported local Shi’ite Islamist parties, and the presence of Hizbullah.

In largely-Sunni Kazakhstan, meanwhile, Saudi-supported Islamic extremists and the pan-Islamic Hizb al-Tahrir party constitute a significant irritant to the authorities, making them more inclined to greater friendliness toward Israel. The response to domestic Islamic extremism has been determined and uncompromising.

Kazakhstan’s commitment to purchase satellite and surveillance technology from Israel reflects the growing role of Israeli defense industries in the country – a role which was shaken in April by claims that Israel had sold faulty military hardware to Kazakhstan.

Despite the extensive cooperation and common interest, Jerusalem has been frustrated by the unwillingness of both Kazakhs and Azeris to move toward a more open and overt relationship. There has long been a sense that both countries preferred to benefit from close links with Israel in a variety of areas, while keeping the public profile of the relationship as low as possible. Such a stance reflected the desire of both countries to maintain good relations with the Arab and wider Muslim world.

Israeli officials hoped that Peres’s visit would be of importance in laying the basis for changing this stance. The Iranian response to the visit suggests that Teheran shared the sense of this possibility.

The Iranians lobbied hard to have the visit to Azerbaijan called off. Iran’s chief of staff visited Baku two weeks ago in an attempt to persuade the Azeris to cancel the trip. He was unsuccessful. In response to the Peres visit, Iran has recalled its ambassador for consultations. In Kazakhstan, the Iranian decision to walk out of an interfaith conference while Peres was speaking represents an additional indication of Iranian displeasure, and hence a further diplomatic point for Israel. The bottom line: Iranian lobbying failed.

Inducing Muslim countries with which Israel has shared interests and firm connections to overcome the desire to “camouflage” or downplay their relations with Israel represents a perennial challenge for Israeli diplomacy. The latest developments in Central Asia suggest that, in this region at least, real progress has begun to be made.

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Smoke, Mirrors and Fire in Lebanon

Posted on March 9, 2011 by jonathanspyer

04/06/2009

This week, nine more Lebanese citizens were arraigned on charges of espionage and collaboration with Israel. This brings the total of people charged in connection with the alleged Israeli “spy ring” in Lebanon to 35. Around 100 people have now been arrested in connection with the investigation. Among those charged are a former general, two Lebanese Army colonels and an official of the ruling March 14 movement.

Reliable information in such matters is, of course, extremely difficult to obtain. The Israeli authorities remain silent. There is a growing sense, however, confirmed by conversations with a number of former senior Israeli officials, that there is likely to be at least some factual basis behind the allegations.

A number of simple facts may immediately be noted: Firstly, it is no secret that the Israeli security services – Military Intelligence, Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) and the Mossad – are active in information gathering in Lebanon.

Secondly, the Lebanese security service which has been responsible for carrying out the investigation is the ISF (Internal Security Forces) led by Gen. Ashraf Rifi. Rifi, a Sunni, is generally considered in Lebanon to be pro-March 14, and had personal links to murdered former prime minister Rafiq Hariri. The ISF has benefited from US patronage and has been built up and expanded by March 14, (just as its rival, the General Security Directorate (GSD), is seen as linked to the Hizbullah-led opposition.)

It has been suggested in some international media outlets that the emerging revelations are the result of an attempt by Hizbullah and its allies to divert attention from recent evidence of Hizbullah involvement in a terror cell uncovered in Egypt.

The fact that Ziad Homsi, a former March 14 mayor, was among those arrested was used to bolster this claim.

The available evidence suggests that some of the information leading to the arrests came from Hizbullah. The location of some of the alleged spies in the Hizbullah-dominated south of the country further suggests the movement’s likely involvement in tracking and apprehending the suspects.

But the central role of the ISF and Rifi in the investigation would militate against the notion that the affair is a fictional production laid on by Hizbullah and the opposition in order to discredit March 14.

According to one Israeli source, the sheer volume of evidence produced, and in particular the visual evidence displayed, further leads to the conclusion that there is something more than mere electoral provocations behind the affair. The reported departure of a number of individuals suspected of espionage across the heavily defended Israeli-Lebanese border also backs up the allegations.

Rifi himself, without entering into detail, claims that an unidentified technical breakthrough began the process of uncovering the Israeli network. Certainly, the ISF has undergone a marked improvement in its equipment and capabilities over the last couple of years. This has derived from an extensive program of EU and US security assistance to Lebanon, intended to improve the performance of the county’s security forces.

The pre-2005 ISF was a neglected, stunted, largely ignored force with little capacity for gathering information. Only in the last two years has it become an organization that could be imagined pulling off a major intelligence coup.

Israeli security officials raised the possibility after 2005 that US military assistance to Lebanon might end up being used against Israel to benefit the common enemies of Washington and Jerusalem. It is distinctly possible that this is exactly what has taken place.

Given the close links of the ISF and March 14, it is also conceivable that the timing of the revelations was connected to next week’s elections – designed to enable March 14 to clothe itself in patriotic finery, and depict itself as no less of a “resistance” force against Israel than Hizbullah.

One Israeli analyst suggested that the evidence regarding Israeli espionage in Lebanon might eventually rival those of the 1950s Lavon Affair in their importance. This claim was probably hyperbole. What appears to be emerging in Lebanon looks like a more mundane – though important – story of the uncovering of an information-gathering ring. Such an occurrence is an accepted, though unfortunate, turn of events for those involved in such activities.

Some hints in the media point to a problem in demarcating areas of operation between Israeli organizations as a contributing factor. The inevitably murky nature of such matters – magnified by the divided and complex nature of Lebanon – make the drawing of any firm conclusions a risky enterprise. But it does appear that behind the smoke and mirrors of this latest Lebanese affair, a solid outline is beginning to emerge.

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Iran-Syria Alliance in Harmony

Posted on March 9, 2011 by jonathanspyer

01/06/2009

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran and President Bashar Assad of Syria reconfirmed the close alliance between their two countries during the Iranian president’s visit to Damascus this week.

Ahmadinejad’s visit came on the eve of the return of two senior US officials, Jeffrey Feltman and Daniel Shapiro, to Damascus. Their visit is part of ongoing US efforts at engagement with Syria. The tone struck by Ahmadinejad and Assad this week, however, did not suggest a mood for compromise.
Syrian President Bashar Assad, in his address to the joint press conference held by the two presidents after their meeting, accurately summed up the Iranian-Syrian alliance as based upon both “principles and interests.”
It is sometimes suggested that the Syrian-Iranian alliance is a marriage of convenience between two essentially incompatible regimes. This view is incorrect. The alliance is of long standing, is rooted in shared interests and expresses itself in a shared ideological conception – that of the idea of muqawama (resistance) to the supposed ambitions of the West and Israel in the region.

Ahmadinejad’s and Assad’s statements following their meeting offer evidence of the depth and nature of the alliance.

The Iranian president mocked US attempts at engagement, saying “We don’t want honey from bees that sting us. Efforts must be made to rid the region of the presence of foreigners.” He went on to demand US withdrawal from “Afghanistan and the borders of Pakistan.”

Ahmadinejad’s speech radiated the sense that Iranian defiance was bringing results. The Iranian president noted that those who once sought to put pressure on Syria and Iran were now obliged to seek the assistance of these countries.

“Harmony and steadfastness,” he said, “are the secret of victory.” He went on to demand reform of the United Nations, reiterating a claim he made in his recent Geneva speech that the international body failed to reflect a world in which the balance of forces was changing.

The Syrian president struck a similar tone. Assad said that Ahmadinejad’s visit confirmed once more the “strategic relationship” between the two countries. He expressed the support of Syria and Iran for Palestinian “resistance.”
Assad then detailed Syria and Iran’s common satisfaction regarding current developments in Iraq, and noted Syria’s support for the Iranian nuclear program. He also cast an eye over the history of the relationship between the two countries. He noted that Syria had supported Iran at the time of the Islamic Revolution and in the subsequent Iran-Iraq War, and that Damascus had in return benefited from Iranian support when under pressure in recent years.

The words of the two presidents, for those listening closely, are instructive in grasping both the principles and the interests underlying the Syrian-Iranian alliance.

Regarding principles – the two speeches reflect the joint adoption of a secular language of nationalist, anti-Western assertion which is reminiscent of earlier times.

These ideas may have faded from view in the West in recent years, but they retain popularity among broad populations in the Arab world. The Iranians – non-Sunnis and non-Arabs – want to enlist this appeal to their own banner, presenting themselves as the natural representative of all those countries and forces opposing the West in the region.

Syria, meanwhile, has long been the chief guardian among the Arabs of the archaic slogans of third-worldism and defiance. Iranian rhetoric of this kind sits well with the Syrians. The Assad regime, of course, is committed ultimately to its own survival, and not to any ideological path. But there is no sense that an alliance based on an appeal of this kind is in any way unnatural or uncomfortable for the Syrians. On the contrary, it fits perfectly the defiant stance that has enabled the Syrian Ba’athists to punch above their weight in the region for a generation.

Regarding interests, Assad’s whistle-stop tour through the history of the relationship reminds us of its longevity.

The mullahs in Teheran and the Ba’athist family dictatorship in Damascus have stuck together for a long time.

The Syrian dictator’s expressions of quiet satisfaction at the current turn of events in Iraq, and Ahmadinejad’s characteristic tone of triumphalism confirm that the partnership continues to bear fruit.

The next arena for the meeting point of Syrian and Iranian principles and interests is Lebanon, which may shortly be added to the regional alliance headed by these countries. Next month’s Lebanese elections formed the backdrop to Ahmadinejad’s visit, and perhaps explain the hurried return of Feltman and Shapiro. No doubt the two US officials will reassert the need for noninterference in the upcoming polls, which the Hizbullah-led alliance is favored to win.

Lebanon has long been the ideal arena for the meeting of Iranian and Syrian principles and interests. It is worth remembering that as far back as 1982, it was Syrian facilitation of the entry of 1,500 Iranian Revolutionary Guards into the Lebanese Bekaa which made possible the subsequent foundation of Hizbullah. This long investment may be about to pay off.

In any case, the general direction of events in the region appears to the liking of the two good friends from Damascus and Teheran – offering the prospect of many good years of friendship to come.

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Duplicitous Assad is getting away with Murder

Posted on March 9, 2011 by jonathanspyer

23/11/2008

British Foreign Secretary David Miliband has just completed an official visit to Syria. This was the first visit of a senior British elected official to Damascus since 2001. Following the visit, the British media revealed that Miliband has agreed to the renewal of high-level intelligence links with Syria.

Miliband’s visit was clearly intended as a signal to the incoming US administration of London’s support for the view of Syria as a potential guarantor of peace and stability in the region – if it can be tempted with the right inducements. This view is currently helping Damascus rebuild both its relations with the West, and its power in the neighborhood.

Syria is trying to market itself as a key ally in the struggle against al-Qaida style Islamist terrorism in the region. There is a certain irony to this, since Syria has itself been acting as a key facilitator for the Sunni jihadis in the last years. Maj.-Gen. John Kelly, head of Multinational Forces West in Iraq, said recently that al-Qaida fighters have been living “pretty openly” on the Syrian side of the border. Both Iraqi and Jordanian officials have confirmed that recent warnings and appeals to Damascus regarding the presence of senior al-Qaida figures in Syria have gone unheeded.

But a particular group of Sunni Islamists are now being presented by the Syrian regime as evidence of Damascus’s status as a fellow sufferer from the al-Qaida scourge. A week ago, Syrian state television broadcast interviews with members of a cell of the Fatah al-Islam organization. The 10 members of the cell admitted carrying out a bombing in southern Damascus on September 27. They said they had carried out this act as part of an effort to bring down the Bashar Assad regime.

Fatah al-Islam is the mysterious Sunni Islamist organization that emerged last year in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in Lebanon. The organization fought a bloody battle with the Lebanese army in the camp. At the time, many Lebanon-watchers noted the extensive links of the group’s leader, a Palestinian called Shaker al-Abssi, with the Syrian authorities.

Abssi, who had previously belonged to a pro-Syrian group called Fatah Intifada, had been released early from a Syrian jail before reappearing as the Fatah al-Islam commander. A Lebanese citizen, Ahmed Merie, testified that he had acted as a liaison between Abssi and Gen. Assef Shawkat, head of Syrian Military Intelligence. According to Merie, Shawkat supplied a skilled bomb maker to the terrorist group.

The Syrians have also been touting the Sunni jihadi threat as the reason for increased Syrian-Lebanese security cooperation. Many see this as coded language for the rebuilding of effective Syrian security control of its neighbor.

Miliband, in Damascus, held up the establishing of formal diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon as an example of the encouraging transformation in Syrian attitudes. But a recent report in the pro-Syrian Al-Akhbar newspaper explained that the formalization of relations was made possible because of the effective domination of the Lebanese government by pro-Syrian elements since the Doha agreement of June 2008.

The international investigation into 2005’s murder of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik al-Hariri had been the key threat hanging over the regime’s head in the last three years. The possibility of senior Syrian officials being called before an international court to answer charges was a nightmare scenario from Damascus’s point of view. The contempt in which the Syrians now hold the tribunal, as well as the regime’s feline sense of humor, may be gauged by the fact that the ubiquitous Assef Shawkat, himself formerly a chief suspect in the investigation into the Hariri killing, is now in charge of the joint Syrian-Lebanese campaign against “terrorism.” Shawkat also serves as liaison with Lebanon’s intelligence chief on this issue.

The newly-minted Syrian victims of Islamist terror, meanwhile, were quite clear with their British guest that their alliance with Iran, and support for Hizbullah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, would continue. Syrian officials, including President Assad, have stated since the indirect talks with Israel began that these links are not up for discussion.

So let’s take a glance at the score sheet. Links with the Europeans are being steadily rebuilt, on the basis of Syria’s declared opposition to Sunni Islamist forces – some of which Damascus itself appears to have created, others of which it has provided with a safe haven.

The Syrian security forces who left Lebanon by the front door in 2005 are reentering by the back door of cooperation with a government increasingly dominated by pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian forces. This cooperation is also taking place in the name of a joint struggle against “terrorism.”

The regime is now preparing for the next goal – rapprochement with the US. All this is happening with a tacit understanding that Syria’s strategic alliance with the West’s main regional enemy remains off-limits for discussion. The process is also currently unaffected by growing evidence of a clandestine Syrian nuclear program in progress at least until the Israeli raid of September 2007.

So will Israel find itself in a few months chided for intransigence toward our fellow anti-terrorists in Damascus for conditioning a withdrawal from the Golan on other, “unrelated,” issues? This will depend on whether President-elect Obama can be persuaded that Gen. Assef Shawkat – suspect in the Hariri murder, one time facilitator of Fatah al-Islam – is now a comrade in the battle against Islamist terror.

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On the Iranian Presidential Elections

Posted on March 9, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 01/04/2009

Presidential elections are set to take place in Iran on June 12. One consultant to a presidential candidate billed the race the “most significant poll so far since the revolution.” The same source said that the elections “rank in significance on a global scale with November’s American election.”

But behind the rhetoric, the picture is rather different. Iran is ruled by the system devised by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini known as vilayet e-faqih, which affords supreme executive power to a Supreme Leader, or ‘rahbar,’ appointed for life.

The Supreme Leader has responsibility for foreign policy – including for the administration of the country’s nuclear program. The president has no control over such matters.

In addition, the presidential candidates are subject to a vetting process, which restricts the range of options available to the voter.

And while the office of the presidency does possess some executive power on internal affairs, the holder of this power must take account of more general trends within the ruling oligarchy.

In recent years, the trend in the regime’s organs of power has been toward the growing influence of radical conservatives. Even a victory for one of the “reformist” candidates in the June election would not have a decisive affect on this ongoing process.

Current President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad is the representative of a radical conservative element within the ruling elite, known as “Osulgarayan” (principalists) – who see their goal as reviving the flame of the 1979 revolution. This is a generational as much as an ideological group, representing those men for whom the 1979 revolution and the subsequent Iran-Iraq War were their formative experiences.

Since his election in 2005, Ahmedinejad has done his best to advance the interests of this group. He has purged suspected liberals from jobs in the diplomatic corps, in government service as a whole and in the universities – replacing them with individuals closer to the views of the principalists.

He has reintroduced harsh measures of domestic repression, jailing scores of dissidents. He has lavishly rewarded the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a key element of the radical conservative forces, with lucrative government contracts.

Mohammad Khatami, who has withdrawn his candidacy, won the presidency in 1997 because of his ability to draw in elements of the population who might not otherwise have turned out to vote – seeing no chance of change. His subsequent failure to implement far-reaching reforms during his term in office, made it questionable as to whether he would have been able to repeat this success.

His replacement as the main “reformist” candidate, Mir Hossain Mousavi, is even less likely to be able to do so. Mousavi is a pragmatic conservative and technocrat – not the type to attempt a frontal challenge to the growing radical conservative camp.

The radical conservatives are much stronger in all organs of the state than they were in 1997 – the last time that a reformist president failed to implement reform. They now control the Majlis (legislature), as well as the security services, courts and the state broadcasting monopoly.

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has generally been seen as leaning toward this bloc, rather than toward the traditional clerical leadership. So even a victory for Mousavi or the other “reformist” candidate, former Majlis speaker Mehdi Karroubi, would not represent the breaking of the advance of the radical conservatives – but rather a modest shift in the current internal balance of power.

Among potential conservative candidates, meanwhile, Ahmedinejad and Teheran’s mayor, former IRGC air force general and National Police Commissioner Muhammad Bagher Ghalibaf, are both representatives of the advance of the principalist trend, though they differ in terms of style. Ghalibaf is considered a more sophisticated operator than Ahmedinejad, and might avoid some of the latter’s more superfluously provocative statements.

But there are no differences in terms of content. Both are for a repressive Islamic stance at home, and an aggressive drive for regional hegemony abroad – all in the name of a return to the spirit of 1979.

There is little enthusiasm among the broad mass of Iranians for this revolutionary revivalism. With inflation at 31%, a huge budget deficit exacerbated by the current president’s populist economic policies, and collapsing oil revenues, the concerns of the principalists have a slightly other-worldly feel to them.

At the same time, there is a general sense of public apathy because of the feeling that “reformist” candidates can do little to stem the advance of this trend.

The predictable result of all this is a growing indifference toward the elections, particularly in areas of natural support for reformists.

Turnout in recent polls has rarely exceeded 30% in Teheran – center of Iran’s large, educated middle class. In the rural heartlands of the conservatives, meanwhile, it regularly exceeds 60%.

Thus, no matter who wins the presidential race in June, the key results are already known: the Islamist regime will remain, the advance of the radical conservative element within it will not be broken, the Iranian nuclear drive will not be slowed, and the Iranian populace will continue, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, to acquiesce to this situation.

In short – whoever you vote for, the clerical government wins.

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An Iron Fist in a Velvet Glove

Posted on March 9, 2011 by jonathanspyer

24/10/2008

The decree by President Bashar Assad announcing the establishing of full diplomatic relations between Damascus and Beirut represents the latest stage in the emergence of Syria from diplomatic isolation.

On a symbolic level, the announcement appears to suggest Syria’s reconciliation with the fact of Lebanese independence, after 60 years of rejection. However, the move should be seen in the context of realpolitik, rather than simply in terms of its undoubted historic symbolism.

Syrian relations with Lebanon have been in the process of warming since Assad’s meeting with Lebanese President Michel Suleiman in Paris in July. The meeting was rapidly followed by the announcement in August of a joint intention to establish diplomatic ties. Assad’s announcement Wednesday is the latest move in this process.

Assad has been willing to move forward on this track because it is bringing tangible results for the Syrian interest. Last spring, a violent trial of strength between Lebanon’s pro-Western government and pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian opposition resulted in an advance for the opposition. The Doha Agreement of May 21, 2008, saw Hizbullah successfully defending its independent military capacity, while at the same time gaining its key demand of veto power over cabinet decisions.

The Doha Agreement thus gave Syria’s chief ally in Lebanon power to stop any decision by Beirut not to its liking. With this gain secured, Syria found itself offered an exit from the international isolation to which it had been consigned since the murder of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri in 2005.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy seized the initiative in reaching out to Damascus following the opening of indirect talks between Israel and Syria in Istanbul. The Syrian president found himself feted in Paris. Lucrative trade associations with the EU were dangled.

The official normalization of relations between Syria and Lebanon was clearly a key goal of the French president. Assad’s announcement indicates that the Syrian leader has looked at the situation and concluded that – given the fruits to be reaped from the current process – compliance with the French leader’s wishes was in the Syrian interest.

The question now being asked is: Does the Syrian announcement mean that ties between Damascus and Beirut will be normalized? Will the traditional Syrian attitude toward Lebanon as an arena properly dominated by Damascus be replaced by regular diplomatic relations between neighbors?

Lebanese commentators are expressing cautious optimism. However, the more likely prognosis is that Syria will continue to exercise its will in Lebanon through a combination of diplomacy and other means. Syria apparently expects that the Lebanese opposition will make significant gains in the elections scheduled for March.

Damascus is also understood to expect that a Barack Obama victory in the US presidential election will mark the end of Syrian international isolation.

The independent military capacity wielded by Hizbullah – pointed at Israel and, where necessary, at pro-Western forces in Lebanon – continues to be supplied via Damascus. This capacity holds the final word in Lebanon. Nothing can happen without its consent.

The combination of the campaign of violent subversion waged by Syria and its allies in Lebanon over the last three years, and the smooth diplomatic response to the overtures of Israel and France in the last months, is thus paying dividends. Syrian influence in Lebanon has been rebuilt, while Damascus simultaneously emerges from international isolation. The Syrians know that the iron fist works best when concealed in a velvet glove. The latest announcement by the Syrian president reflects this understanding.

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Making Mischief in Damascus

Posted on March 9, 2011 by jonathanspyer

01/10/2008

As the days pass since the car bombing in the southern suburbs of Damascus, furious speculation is continuing as to who was responsible.

No organization has taken responsibility – leaving the rumor mill free to grind on.

The Syrian authorities, following an initial attempt to point the finger at Israel, have now concluded that Sunni jihadists carried out the bombing. The Syrian al-Watan newspaper is claiming that the authorities have located and detained members of the cell responsible for the attack. According to al-Watan, none of the individuals being held are Syrian citizens.

The Syrian government may now be expected to cast itself in the role of an ally of the west in the War on Terror. We will be reminded in the coming weeks of the “secular” nature of the Syrian regime. Hafez Assad’s fight with the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s will be recalled.

However, the true relationship between the current Syrian regime and the forces of the Sunni jihad is as opaque and ambiguous as might be expected from the Assad regime.

A Federal District Court in Washington DC last week issued an opinion in favor of the plaintiffs in a case brought against Syria by relatives of Jack Armstrong and Jack Hensley.

Armstrong and Hensley were US civilian engineers who were kidnapped and beheaded in Iraq in 2004 by the al-Tawhid wal-Jihad organization. This group, headed at the time by the Jordanian Islamist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, is also known as “al-Qaida in Iraq.”

The court found evidence of substantial assistance given by Syria to this organization.

Syrian assistance to Zarqawi included providing him with a Syrian passport. The court found that Syria acted as a “logistical hub” for al-Qaida in Iraq, providing safe haven for training activities and facilitating the transport of fighters overland en route to Iraq.

The Zarqawi organization planned some of its most notorious operations from Syrian soil. These included the murder of American diplomat Lawrence Foley in Jordan in 2002, and a failed plot in 2004 to destroy Jordanian intelligence headquarters using a chemical weapon. The latter operation, if it had succeeded, would have resulted in tens of thousands of fatalities.

The court found that Syrian President Bashar Assad personally appointed the head of the Iraqi Ba’ath party, Fawzi al-Rawi, to meet with Zarqawi’s lieutenants to discuss operations against the Americans.

Rawi, who drew a Syrian government salary, was also responsible for channelling funds to al-Qaida in Iraq.

A Salafi preacher, Abu Qaqa’a, who was also a Syrian government employee, was permitted to conduct recruiting activities for al-Qaida in Syria. In addition, training camps were maintained in Syria, according to the testimony of al-Qaida fighters captured by US forces in Iraq.

Senior operatives of the Zarqawi group crossed to their main training camp in Rawha, Iraq, with the assistance of Syrian Military Intelligence officials.

In finding for the plaintiffs, the US District Court ordered Syria to pay them the sum of $412,909,587.

The evidence produced in this trial indicates Syria’s willingness to make alliance with jihadi terror groups in the furtherance of its policy goals. The alliance with Zarqawi, of course, was intended to bring about a defeat of the US project in Iraq.

It is also noteworthy that some of the names of the operatives recalled in the trial later surfaced in a different context.

The court notes that the individual responsible for financing the Zarqawi operation to kill US diplomat Lawrence Foley was one Shaker al-Absi, a Palestinian.

Following the murder of Foley, Absi fled to Damascus, from where Syria refused Jordanian requests for his extradition. The court notes that Syria claimed to be holding Absi in custody. In fact, he was running a training camp for fighters bound for Iraq.

Absi then re-surfaced two years later, as the head of the mysterious “Fatah al-Islam” group in the Nahr al Bared refugee camp in Lebanon. This previously unknown organization engaged in a bloody and protracted fight with the Lebanese army in 2007.

At the time, Fatah al-Islam was depicted in the western media as an independent jihadi organization. The evidence now suggests that its leader, in addition to being an operative of the global jihad, was also acting on behalf of the Syrian regime.

A number of Lebanese commentators believe that the latest bombings in Damascus are part of a larger Syrian plan to facilitate a climate whereby Syria may re-introduce its forces into Lebanon, under the pretext of acting to restore order.

It is impossible, of course, to confirm these theories. However, the bomb in Tripoli on Monday, along with the gathering of Syrian forces along the Syrian-Lebanese border indicate that such thoughts should not be dismissed out of hand.

What may be said with certainty is that Syria, which is now seeking to portray itself as the victim and target of Sunni jihadi terrorism, has been an enthusiastic sponsor and supporter of groups belonging to that trend in the very recent past.

Now, it appears, this particular golem has risen against its master. Or has it?

Middle East analyst Fouad Ajami once said that Syria’s main asset, which enabled it to play a role in regional affairs out of proportion to its size or wealth, was its “capacity for mischief.” Observation of Syrian activities in Iraq and Lebanon over the last half decade indicates that this capacity remains undiminished.

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