Analysis: The energetic Hamas Lobby

Posted on March 21, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 22/04/2009

A meeting was meant to take place on Wednesday in the Grimond Room at Portcullis House, adjoining the House of Commons in London. The planned meeting was titled “Talk with Hamas” and was meant to feature a video link to Damascus. Khaled Mashaal, leader of Hamas, was supposed to address members of Parliament and journalists via the link, but he failed, due to a technical glitch. This planned meeting was the latest event in an ongoing and organized campaign to break the Western boycott of Hamas and transform policy toward the organization. Much energy is being expended in the UK. But London is only a way station, with the real prize being the transformation of the US stance.

This campaign is part of a larger effort to change the way that the West sees Islamist movements – and by doing so to bring many of the arguments made by such movements into the mainstream. Who is behind this effort? The invitation to MPs to the Mashaal meeting came from the office of Independent MP Clare Short. However, it was issued in the name of John, Lord Alderdice. This name immediately offers a pointer. Alderdice, a veteran Northern Irish politician, is head of the board of advisers of an organization called Conflicts Forum. Conflicts Forum is jointly led by Alistair Crooke and Mark Perry, former intelligence officers from the UK and US, respectively. It describes its aim as opening “a new relationship between the West and the Muslim world.” What this anodyne phrase means in practice is revealed in a remarkably frank document published by this group, in which it explains the means it intends to use to bring about the basic change in perception that will bring Hamas and Hizbullah into the mainstream. The document notes the need to build a “link-up between activist groups and mobilizers of opinion in order to shift the debate on Islamism from a predominantly defensive posture to a positive assertion of Islamist values and thinking.” It suggests “articulation of Hamas’s and Hizbullah’s values, philosophy and wider political and social programs… Being more proactive in statements and rephrasing discourse to focus on the positive aspects of Islamist ideology.”

The Conflicts Forum publication lays down a precise strategy for the promotion of Hamas and Hizbullah in the West – of which the meeting in the British Parliament forms a part. The various PR devices suggested include “Use influential individuals – key Muslim personalities… use the Internet, DVD, interviews, podcasts… Link with mass organizations in Western countries – social movements, trade unions – to challenge hegemonic discourse. Approach editors of established journals… with a view to the possibility of them doing a special issue on Islamist thinking or on particular issues.” Undoubtedly, the attempted video link between Hamas HQ in Damascus and the Grimond Room in Portcullis House was meant to be a worthy contribution to this extensive effort to “re-brand” Hamas and Hizbullah.

The UK, and the EU as a whole, remain committed to the Quartet conditions which Hamas must meet to become a partner for dialogue. Hamas (or at least its “military wing”) remains on the EU list of proscribed terror organizations. A cursory observation of the backers of Conflicts Forum, however, reveals a curious paradox. In January 2007, the group proudly announced that it had been awarded a grant of €500,000 by the EU, to develop “more inclusive and legitimate approaches to transforming the Middle East conflict.” More specifically, the project entails the “engagement” of “faith-based movements.” So the EU, while currently opposing “engagement” with Hamas, also appears to be offering financial support to a body engaged in lobbying for the organization. How important are the efforts of Conflicts Forum and its associated groups? Are initiatives such as Wednesday’s planned meeting likely to have a tangible effect on policy? Britain has, of course, already announced that it intends to hold talks with Hizbullah.

On Hamas, however, no immediate significant shift in British government policy looks likely. The Hamas Lobby is busy and active. It encompasses former senior diplomats such as Sir Jeremy Greenstock, as well as the Conflicts Forum nexus. Foreign Secretary Miliband has praised the Egyptian role in managing dialogue with Hamas in the following terms: “Others speak to Hamas. That’s the right thing to do, and I think we should let the Egyptians take this forward.” A knowledgeable source noted that many in the Foreign Office consider that engagement with the group is a “matter of time.” Still, for as long as the US remains firmly committed to insisting that Hamas first abide by the three Quartet conditions (committing to nonviolence, recognizing Israel and accepting previous agreements and obligations), the UK is unlikely to openly break ranks. Differences might well surface if a Palestinian unity government were to be formed. But this too currently looks highly improbable. Ultimately, the main obstacle to the success of Lord Alderdice, Clare Short and their friends in Conflicts Forum may well be the nature of their client. Hamas leaders have an unfortunate tendency to be candid regarding their movement’s goals.

This makes presenting the “positive aspects of Islamist ideology” something of a challenge. Hamas “Foreign Minister” Mahmoud Zahar, for example, speaking last week, stated bluntly that “[Hamas] will never recognize the enemy in any way, shape or form.” A few months ago, the same speaker asserted that “they [Jews] have legitimized the murder of their own children by killing the children of Palestine… They have legitimized the killing of their people all over the world by killing our people.” Spinning statements of that kind into moderation would pose a challenge to the smoothest of PR operators. But as the planned Portcullis House meeting showed, Hamas possesses an experienced, well-oiled, well-funded (largely by the European taxpayer) lobby in the heart of London, in which it may take justifiable pride.

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What if Hizbullah Won?

Posted on March 21, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 31/05/2009

With a week to go before Lebanon’s parliamentary elections, it is impossible to accurately predict the result. There are no reliable polls. It is clear, however, that the rival blocs – the pro-Western March 14 alliance and the Hizbullah-led March 8 bloc – are fairly evenly matched, and thus any victory will be achieved by only a narrow margin. A March 14 victory – which remains a possibility – would mean the maintenance of the status quo on the crucial issues. The state-within-a-state maintained by Hizbullah will not be challenged. Hizbullah settled the question of the government’s ability to interfere with its shadow military and security structures in the Beirut events of May 2008. March 14 possesses neither the will nor the instruments to effect such a challenge. In other words, a victory for March 14 would mark a significant symbolic setback for Hizbullah, but little else.

The more interesting question, however, is what a victory for the March 8 bloc would mean. Hizbullah’s long-term strategic goal is the domination of Lebanon, and the establishment of an Islamic republic in the country. However, at the present time, the movement and its backers in Teheran and Damascus are primarily concerned with the safeguarding of the movement’s military and sociopolitical structures. This goal would not be best served by a push for the unambiguous domination of the political system. A government dominated by the March 8 coalition, and including no representation from March 14, would certainly represent a very significant symbolic achievement for the Iran-led regional bloc, of which Hizbullah is a senior member.

But it might also serve to set a Hizbullah-dominated Lebanon on a course of premature confrontation with the United States. It would mean a reduction or elimination of US aid to the Lebanese military. In the 2005-2008 period, the US gave more than $250 million to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Such largesse would be unlikely to survive the formation of an openly Hizbullah-dominated government. Aid to the ailing Lebanese economy from international bodies might also be removed or reduced.

The meetings between Hizbullah representatives and officials of the International Monetary Fund should be seen against this background. A Lebanese government clearly dominated by Hizbullah would also have implications regarding the ongoing war with Israel to which the movement is committed. Hizbullah has benefited in the past by using the official structures of the Lebanese state as a sort of curtain behind which it could hide. It has engineered an enviable situation over the past decade in which while the official organs of the state are unable to interfere with the strategic decisions of Hizbullah, the movement’s unassailable power exists in parallel with the Lebanese state, rather than in place of it or in open domination of it. The advantages inherent in this situation were in evidence during the 2006 war. It is unlikely that the movement will wish to dispense with them. It is for this reason that Hizbullah cares little about its own direct representation in the parliament – and is quite happy to see the “rival” Amal movement retain the plurality of Shi’ite seats. It is also for this reason that Hizbullah has made clear that its preferred government following the elections would be a March 8-dominated coalition, which would nevertheless include significant involvement from March 14. The movement would like to see Sa’ad Hariri, March 14’s leader, take up the post of prime minister – though Hariri has ruled this out. Continued March 14 involvement in the government would provide the preferred fig leaf.

The sectarian complexities of Lebanon notwithstanding, such an arrangement would resemble the situation in the countries of the Warsaw Pact prior to 1989 – in which straw-man governments took responsibility for the day-to-day tasks of administration, while real power resided in the structures of the communist parties and their security services. Hizbullah has nevertheless made clear that if necessary, it can rule alone. In an inflammatory speech given earlier this month, Hassan Nasrallah boasted of his movement’s achievements in fighting March 14 supporters in Beirut in May 2008. He described May 7, 2008, as a “day of glory” for the “resistance,” and boasted that any movement capable of taking on the “mightiest army in the world” (Israelis will be happy to hear that he was referring to the IDF) could also rule a country “100 times greater” than Lebanon. But despite the rhetoric, it is clear that Hizbullah would prefer a broad coalition. The movement wants to avoid any possibility of presiding over a larger and more complex version of the situation which faced the Palestinians following the Hamas electoral victory in January 2006. It also suits Hizbullah’s interests not to be drawn too far into the open in its war with Israel.

Hizbullah may have spun the inconclusive 2006 fighting into a “Divine Victory,” but it knows that if it ends up facing Israel in a conventional situation as the ruler of Lebanon, it could face strategic defeat. The bottom line is that whatever the result on June 7, Hizbullah’s position as a shadow governing power and a state-within-a-state is not under threat. It is Lebanon’s tragedy that power of this kind is impervious to the results of free elections. It can only be broken by other means.

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Deraa demonstrators breach fear barrier – Assad will seek to rebuild it

Posted on March 21, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 21/3/11

Demonstrations flared all weekend in the southern Syrian city of Deraa.

On Friday, four people had died as Syrian security forces sought to quell the protests. On Sunday, participants in mass funerals for the dead called for “freedom and an end to corruption,” and demanded that the US, France and international human rights organizations condemn the Syrian regime’s use of violence against civilians.

The security forces sought to disperse the protests using tear gas. Syrian air force planes encircled the city as demonstrators burned tires. Opposition sources reported that machine gun fire was directed at protesters.

Opposition websites have named the dead in Deraa as Mahmoud al-Jawabra, Wissam Ayyash, Hussam Abd-al Wali and Ayham al-Hariri. An amateur video purporting to show the death of al-Jawabra is in circulation.

The city of Deraa has been declared a closed zone. Reports suggest a very large presence of security forces there. A prominent opposition website is reporting tens of additional wounded, and at least one additional fatality.

Simultaneously, the Syrian authorities are seeking, with some clumsiness, to placate the demonstrators. The regime has appointed a “committee of inquiry.”

Officials are repeating a somewhat ludicrous version of events according to which those who were killed on Friday did not die at the hands of the security forces, but were rather killed by provocateurs who had disguised themselves as Syrian security personnel.

Deraa, a poor city in the Hauran region close to the border with Jordan, has seen the most sizable protests so far. But demonstrations have also taken place in Homs, Damascus and its environs, Der el Zor, the Kurdish city of Qamishli, Banias and Aleppo.

The authorities have clearly been caught by surprise.

President Bashar Assad, leader of one of the most repressive regimes on earth, had complacently explained in recent weeks that Syria would not be affected by the unrest sweeping the Arab world because the regime’s policies were in tune with popular sentiment.

This contention has now been disproved. However, this does not mean that the demise of the Syrian regime is imminent. Nor does it mean that the sentiments of significant sections of the demonstrators differ from those of the regime in certain important areas – particularly regarding Israel and the West.

As events in Deraa already illustrate, the Syrian regime is predictably willing to employ extreme force against its own people – up to and including live ammunition against protesters.

This is not a sign of the regime’s strength, but rather, paradoxically, of its vulnerability.

In Egypt and Tunisia, elements of the regime were able to enter into a certain dialogue with the protesters. Unpopular regime figureheads were replaced, while the military went on to steward the process of reform.

In Syria, the regime has less room to maneuver. The Assad family dictatorship may count with some confidence on the support only of its fellow Alawis – around 12 percent of the population. The regime maintains its grip not through the seeking of legitimacy, but through the imposition of fear.

Syria is an ally of Iran – not of the US – and therefore has less reason to be concerned at the possibility of its patron being displeased by an excessive use of force. Thus, the prospect of this regime employing extreme measures – should the protests continue and spread – is very real.

The Assad regime has long sought to justify itself in the eyes of its people by depicting itself as Israel’s most staunch opponent. An alternative narrative, however, pertains among the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and other Sunni opponents of the regime.

This version has been in evidence among the protesters. A protest reported to have taken place near the town of Kuneitra on the Golan Heights saw protesters referring to Assad as a “traitor” who is “guarding the border of Israel.” An unnamed speaker claimed that the Syrian security services were supported by Israel.

Sentiments of this kind are in line with the Muslim Brotherhood’s characterization of the regime as Israel’s “main protector.” According to this view, Assad’s maintaining of quiet on the Golan Heights is a mark of submission to Israel.

Some Sunni oppositionists even extend this perspective to southern Lebanon, where they claim that the Shi’ite Hezbollah movement also protects Israel by preventing Sunni jihadis from attacking it.

This logic, if it can be referred to as such, shows that Israel is unlikely to be able to stay out of the “conversation” if protest spreads in Syria. It also indicates that a post-Assad Syria – in the event that the regime were to depart the stage – would be unlikely to be more amenable to Israel.

There are already notable indications of attempts by Sunni Islamists to take a leading role in the protests in Syria. Protests in Banias were led by a Sunni cleric, as witnessed in videos circulated afterwards.

Exiled Islamist leaders such as Sheikh Issam al-Attar have issued statements calling for an escalation of the demonstrations. So the protests look set to continue.

The opposition currently believes that Assad is scared. Caught in the headlights.

The Syrian dictator – who proved over the last half decade to be no less capable of cruelty and cunning than was his father – will be looking to dispel this sense in the days ahead.

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Analysis: Suddenly, the Arab World wakes up to Yemen’s Rebellion

Posted on March 21, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 18/12/2009

The 30th summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council, meeting in Kuwait this week, expressed its solidarity with Saudi Arabia in its fight with the Shi’ite Houthi rebels in northern Yemen. The Kuwaiti emir noted that Saudi Arabia is facing “flagrant aggression that targets its sovereignty and security by those who have infiltrated its territory.” The formerly little-noticed conflict between the Houthi rebels and the Yemeni government is now taking on the coloration of an additional hot front in an ongoing region-wide cold war. The conflict in northern Yemen reveals the ongoing Iranian regional effort to convert Shi’ite populations into assets enabling it to apply pressure on neighbors and rivals. The Arab response, meanwhile, shows the very great trepidation felt by the Gulf Arabs in the face of Iranian regional ambitions and expansion.

The term “Houthi rebels” refers to members of the Houthi clan, who have been engaged in an insurrection against the government of Yemen in the Saada district in the north of the country since 2004. The Houthis are members of the Zaidi Shi’ite sect of Islam. (Zaidi Shi’ites venerate the first four Imams of Islam, in contrast to the Twelver Shi’ites dominant in Iran). Led by Abd al-Malik el-Houthi, the rebels are fighting to bring down the government of President Ali Abdallah Saleh, which they regard as too pro-Western. Thousands on both sides have died in the rebellion. The fighting includes the use by both sides of tanks and armored personnel carriers. It has resulted in the displacement of around 150,000 people. The situation escalated in November, when Houthi rebels clashed with Saudi forces in the Jabal Dukhan territory straddling the border. In the ensuing firefight two Saudi border guards were killed and another 10 were wounded. The Saudis responded in force. Saudi aircraft and helicopter gunships carried out a series of attacks on rebel held areas of northern Yemen in the following days, killing around 40 rebels. Saudi forces remain on high alert.

Riyadh identifies the hand of Iran behind the Houthi Shi’ite rebels. Saudi media outlets in the last month – including the Al-Watan and Asharq Al-Awsat newspapers and the Al-Arabiya television network – have repeatedly made the connection. They assert that Iran is seeking to develop the Houthis along the lines of Hizbullah – turning north Yemen into a pro-Iranian enclave on the Saudi border, with the intention of placing pressure on the Saudis. Saudi media outlets now regularly place the Houthis alongside Hizbullah, Hamas and Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq when listing Iran’s clients in subversion across the region. The Iranians deny these claims. But considerable evidence exists to support them.

Regarding the ideological and propaganda level – the Bint Jbeil Web site, maintained by Hizbullah, maintains a forum for what it refers to as the “supporters of truth from Yemen.” The forum includes details and pictures of successful operations carried out by the Houthis, pictures of Houthi leaders and policy statements reflecting the movement’s Shi’ite Islamist outlook. Regarding direct Iranian military links to the Houthis: the generally reliable Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper in the last days quoted unnamed intelligence sources who described a meeting by a Revolutionary Guards official, Hizbullah officers and representatives of the Houthis on the Saudi-Yemeni border last month. The story was carried also by Al-Arabiya. The intention of the meeting was to coordinate the escalation of the insurgency.

Yemen, meanwhile, claims in the last months to have thwarted several attempts by Iranian-commissioned ships to transport weaponry and other equipment to the rebels. The Texas-based private intelligence company Stratfor, which last year revealed the existence of an Iranian network to supply arms to Hamas via Sudan three months before the network became public knowledge, has produced details of what it claims is a similar Iranian supply line to the Houthis. According to the group, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps have been running a network purchasing arms in Eritrea and Somalia. The arms are then transported from the Asab harbor in Eritrea, across the Red Sea to Salif on the Yemeni coast. From there, they are taken to Hajjah and Huth in northern Yemen, before finally reaching the Saada province, where the Houthi insurgency is taking place. Because of the Saudi dispatch of three warships to the Red Sea Coast last month, this route has now been augmented by an additional route from Asab to Shaqra on the southern Yemen coast, and then across land to Saada. Iran’s efforts in Yemen indicate the unfortunate fate of weak states in times of regional cold war.

Yemen has poorly-developed institutions and a divided populace. This has made it particularly vulnerable to penetration by its neighbors and by global jihadi forces. In the 1960s, under very different circumstances, Yemen became an arena for the “Arab Cold War” of that time, as Saudi Arabia and Egypt backed rival sides in the Yemeni civil war.

Today, in the context of a new cold war, the Iranians are using the country to build up the latest recruit to the region-wide Revolutionary Guards franchise of armed clients. As in Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Egypt and among the Palestinians, local grievances are to be utilized to intimidate neighbors and increase the sum total of Iranian influence. In the mountainous, inhospitable terrain of the Saada province, proxy war has returned to Yemen.

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Analysis: Arab States ‘just say no’ to Normalization

Posted on March 21, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 05/08/2009

The idea of gestures of ‘normalization’ from Arab states to Israel is a central component in the US administration’s plan for reviving the Mideast peace process. The notion represents a variant of the Oslo-style approach whereby a series of confidence-building measures will create a climate conducive to the successful conclusion of final-status negotiations. President Barack Obama’s approach seeks to expand the circle of confidence-building, so that the Arab states, and not only the Palestinians and Israelis, will be drawn into it. According to reports, the US is now in the final stages before the announcement of its new, comprehensive peace plan.

In the past week, meanwhile, three Arab states appear to have rejected the possibility of gestures of normalization. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal last Friday openly dismissed the idea of “incrementalism” and “confidence-building measures.” Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh took a more ambiguous but still critical stance regarding such measures early this week in a meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Kuwaiti Emir Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, meanwhile, reiterated his country’s support for the Arab peace initiative after a meeting with Obama. By failing to give any hint of a forthcoming gesture to Israel, or to express any support for the idea of normalization in principle, the emir appeared to be adding Kuwait to the list of Arab countries who prefer to politely decline the administration’s request for assistance.

So far, the score-card for gestures of normalization from the Arab states to Israel stands at close to zero. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait are all close allies of the US. Yet none have yet been willing to make a positive gesture in Washington’s direction on this issue. What lies behind their refusal? One explanation for this holds that the administration’s pressure on Israel is leading to a hardening of Arab positions. Since Obama demanded a complete freeze on all construction in settlements, it would now be futile to expect Arab gestures of normalization unless Israel first accepts this demand. However, the Arab rejection of incremental measures has not been solely predicated on Israel’s refusal of a comprehensive freeze on all construction in West Bank settlements. Rather, the very principle of normalization in the period prior to a final-status accord between Israelis and Palestinians appears to be rejected.

The rejection of this idea derives from two elements. Firstly, the near-universal, though rarely expressed, belief that the current attempt to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is doomed to failure. Secondly, the distinct lack of urgency felt in Arab capitals regarding this issue. Regarding the first issue, the factors that caused the failure of the peace process in the 1990s have not disappeared. They are waiting to trip up any negotiation should final-status talks begin. The demand that Palestinian refugees and their descendants be permitted to make their homes in Israel, the demand for exclusive Muslim sovereignty over the holy places in Jerusalem, the refusal to countenance recognition of Israel as a Jewish state – all these remain part of the non-negotiable core position of the Palestinian national movement. Indeed, in so far as the situation on the ground has changed since 2000, it is for the worse.

The split in the Palestinian national movement between nationalist Fatah and Islamist Hamas increasingly has the look of permanency about it. And since militancy against Israel remains the currency of legitimacy in Palestinian politics, the effect of this is to induce the ageing Fatah movement to dress itself up in radical array once again. This may currently be seen at the Fatah congress in Bethlehem. There is simply no prospect in the foreseeable future of a united Palestinian leadership willing to make the compromises with reality which alone would render a repartition of the country feasible.

For Arab countries aligned with the US, this situation is not so terrible. They suffer no tangible consequence as a result of it. But the Palestinian issue remains the great mobilizing cause for the populations of the Arab states. Since this is the case, Arab regimes do not consider it in their interests to appear to be making concessions to Israel. On the contrary – given that from the Kuwaiti, or Saudi, or even Jordanian point of view there is no urgent practical need to resolve the conflict, the leaders of these countries have an obvious interest in playing to the gallery of their own publics by striking occasional militant poses. These poses must not go beyond a certain point, of course. The American protector must not be unduly provoked. But the Obama administration has made abundantly clear that there will be no price to be paid by the Arab states for their refusal to get on the Obama peace wagon. As a result, these states may happily continue their comfortable stance of verbal support for the Palestinian cause and refusal to undertake any potentially detrimental gesture of rapprochement toward Israel, while continuing to enjoy the benefits of American patronage.

The fact is that, as everyone in the region knows, there is no chance of a final-status accord between Israelis and Palestinians any time soon. And the absence of such an accord is very far from being the most urgent problem facing the region. All sides now await the moment that this knowledge finds its way to the US administration.

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Al-Qaida-style Islamism comes to Gaza

Posted on March 21, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 19/08/2009

Quiet has now returned to the Gaza Strip after the weekend violence which claimed the lives of 28 people. The last of the funerals of the Jund Ansar Allah fighters killed in the suppression of the organization by Hamas authorities has taken place. This episode demonstrated the tight hold which Hamas maintains on the Gaza Strip. The weekend’s events also highlight an important but little discussed phenomenon taking place in the Strip, and to a lesser extent in the West Bank – namely, the growth of al-Qaida-style Salafi Islamism among a segment of the Palestinian population. Jund Ansar Allah did not emerge suddenly, or in a vacuum, and its defeat does not mark the final word on this matter.

Who are the Salafis? Salafiyya is an extreme trend within Sunni Islam. Salafis maintain that anyone who fails to uphold any aspect of Sharia law is no longer a Muslim, and is to be considered kufar (non-Muslim). Jihadist Salafis consider that it is incumbent upon Muslims to depose and fight all governments controlled by the kufar. A myriad of small, armed Salafi groupings exist in the Gaza Strip, of which Jund Ansar Allah was one. These groups are part of a broader subculture, estimated to command the loyalty of at least 50,000 people, and probably many more. The Taliban style of dress adopted by supporters of Salafism is becoming increasingly familiar in Gaza.

There are two main modes of Salafi activity in Gaza – namely, al-Salafiya Da’awiya – that is, civilian Salafism, which engages in missionary work and preaching, and Al-Salafiya Jihadiya, of which al-Qaida is the most well-known global representative, and which is committed to violent action. There is no hermetic division between these two modes. Rather, activity in the former is a gateway to later involvement in militancy, and missionary work builds the basis of support in society which is essential for successful military action. A number of Gaza mosques are known to be controlled by the Salafis. Sheikh Al Salam Bin Taymiyah mosque in Khan Yunis, which was the center of operations for the Jund Ansar Allah group, was one of these. Abu Noor al-Makdisi, who led the Jund Ansar Allah group and died during the weekend’s events, was the imam at this mosque. Other mosques linked to the Salafis include the al-Sahabah Mosque in Daraj, Gaza City, and the al-Albani Mosque in the Jabalya refugee camp. Salafi activity is reportedly well-financed, with money coming in from the Gulf. As one source put it “millions of petrodollars are flowing in every month.” The myriad Salafi armed groupings include the Jaish al-Islam (army of Islam), al-Saif al-Haq Islamiyya (Swords of Islamic Righteousness), Jaish al-Umma (Army of the Nation) and the Jaljalat (thunder) group, formed by disaffected former Hamas fighters during the period of the cease-fire, in June 2008. Jund Ansar Allah, which was founded in November, 2008, emerged from this milieu.

The relations of the Hamas rulers of the Strip to this Salafi sub-culture are complex. Since Hamas took power in the Strip, the Salafis have engaged in numerous acts of violence against people and institutions believed to be kufar. These have included attacks on Internet cafes, book shops, beauty parlors and institutions representing the Strip’s small Christian community. Young women and men suspected of engaging in “immoral” behavior have been murdered. The Hamas authorities officially oppose such behavior, but have done little to stop or deter it. There is also a certain crossover between Hamas structures and the Salafis. Many members of Hamas’s al-Kassam brigades are known to support Salafi ideas. These reportedly include Ahmed al-Jabari, commander of the organization, and the majority of his brigade commanders.

Hamas, however, draws the line at activity which appears to challenge its own authority or right to rule. The suppression of Jund Ansar Allah took place after its leader denounced Hamas as kufar and proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic Emirate in Gaza. The swiftness and brutality of Hamas’s subsequent action attracted attention. But it was not the first time that Gaza’s rulers have made clear to the Salafis that it is worth their while to respect the limits placed on them. The al-Albani mosque in Jabalya, for example, was raided on May 17, 2008 by Hamas’s Executive Force. Thirty men and women were injured in the raid. The mosque’s imam had delivered a sermon that afternoon insulting and ridiculing Hamas.

A key question concerning the Salafi subculture in Gaza is the extent of the presence of global al-Qaida among it. Most experts believe that the al-Qaida network is present to only a very limited extent in the Strip. The al-Qaida idea, however, is flourishing, with a large number of the often quite primitively-armed and poorly-trained Salafi groups competing to be considered the “official franchise” of al-Qaida in Gaza. Abu Noor al-Makdisi is dead, and the movement he built has now been dispersed by the uncontested Hamas rulers of the Gaza Strip. The Salafi subculture from which his group emerged, however, is very much alive. It is likely to make its voice heard again, in the unfolding story of the Islamic Palestinian state currently under construction in Gaza.

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Analysis: US believes Syria is overplaying its Hand in Iraq

Posted on March 21, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 17/09/2009

The scheduled meeting Thursday of the Syrian and Iraqi foreign ministers is unlikely to lead to a swift resolution of the simmering feud between the two countries. The government of Iraq is furious at the mounting evidence of Syrian involvement in the car bombings last month in Baghdad which left 95 dead. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has issued a formal request to the UN Security Council for an inquiry into the bombings.

US officials interviewed in the regional media appear to be offering cautious support to Iraqi claims of direct Syrian involvement in violence in Iraq. General Raymond Odierno, for example, told Al Hayat last week that “there are armed groups” in Iraq that “receive financial and logistical support from Syria.” Syrian actions in Iraq reflect a broader reality which has been noted by a number of insightful Syria-watchers in the last days. Namely, that energetic attempts by the US administration over the last months to induce Syria to alter its approach to its neighbors appear to have failed. The evidence further suggests that the US administration is increasingly aware of this. Seven US delegations have traveled to Damascus since the inauguration of President Barack Obama. But the flurry of diplomacy has not produced the expected change in Syrian behavior patterns. David Schenker, a former Syrian affairs adviser in the office of the US secretary of defense, noted in a recent analysis that Iraq’s accusation of Syrian involvement in the insurgency did not emerge from nowhere. In July of this year, as US and Syrian military officials discussed border security, a number of armed men carrying Syrian passports were arrested by Iraqi authorities in Mosul. This southern Iraqi city has been a hub of the Shia insurgency and a center of suicide attacks. In the same month, Shia militant leader Moqtada al Sadr was welcomed and feted by Assad in Damascus.

The administration had sought to make Iraq a focus for US-Syrian rapprochement. Washington assumed that Syria and the US shared a common interest in a stable, peaceful Iraq. This assumption does not appear to have been borne out. Rather, the Syrian interest is in maintaining instability. The pattern is, of course, repeated in other countries with which Syria shares a border. Syrian encouragement of opposition intransigence is playing a central role in preventing a resolution of the ongoing political deadlock in Lebanon. Syrian domiciling of Hamas is not accompanied by any noticeable efforts to induce that organization to moderate and make possible progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track. And Syria’s refusal to allow its alliance with Iran to be discussed any Israeli-Syrian talks ensures that a renewal of such talks are not currently on the horizon. The result of this series of stances, it now appears, is growing American frustration. Lebanese analyst Tony Badran this week noted a recent article in the Kuwaiti Arabic daily AlRai, which contained evidence of the emerging mood in Washington. The article quoted one American source as saying that the Syrians “don’t know the difference between normalizing relations and behaving like they’ve defeated the US in a world war.”

In an apparent reference to the recent launching of Katyusha rockets at northern Israel, the source continued that “Assad fires a rocket here and there and expects us to run to him, this kind of security blackmail no longer works on the United States.” The article notes that events that followed the meeting between Bashar Assad and US Middle East envoy George Mitchell in July served to confirm the difficulties inherent in dialogue with the Syrian regime. Following the meeting, as Mitchell made his way back to Washington, the Syrians announced that he had promised Assad that the US would lift sanctions on Syria. No such promise had been made, and the administration was furious. The Obama administration has by no means abandoned its ambitious goals in the Middle East. A major push to solve a series of regional conflicts is still expected. However, it appears to be becoming increasingly apparent to the Americans that one of the conditions for the advancement of any such process will be the abandonment of expectations that Damascus can be part of it. Instead, it looks like Damascus will be kept at arms length. The clearest evidence for this direction in Washington is the fact that the US has still not appointed a new ambassador to Damascus, and appears in no hurry to do so.

The Syrians were excited by the election of Obama. They portrayed his first attempts at engagement as proof that their unbending stances worked – and had forced the west to rebuild relations with the regime on its own terms. The Assad regime thus saw no reason to accommodate American requests or desires. This characteristic Syrian over playing of a modest hand appears to now be leading the administration back in the direction of its predecessor’s understanding of the Damascus regime, and to the policy stance that resulted from this: namely, the continued isolation of Syria, and the maintenance of sanctions against it.

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Analysis: The internal Balance of Power

Posted on March 21, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 18/06/2009

One would need a heart of stone not to be moved by the scenes emerging from Iran: Hundreds of thousands of youthful demonstrators, taking to the streets to express their frustration at the restrictions on life under a theocratic oligarchy – with the communications revolution enlisted to bypass the heavy hand of the regime’s censors. Nevertheless, at such a time, it is particularly important to employ the tools of cool and dispassionate analysis.

It is therefore worth keeping three crucial facts in mind, when considering the events in Iran. First, in so far as a real struggle for power is currently taking place, it is happening within the boundaries of the Islamist regime, and not against it. Second, if one were to imagine for a moment the emergence of a real, popular leadership opposed to the regime, and were then to assess its chances of success, the following conclusion would be inescapable: At the present time, the regime possesses both the will and the means to ensure its survival. Third, no such popular leadership currently exists. Consider: Mir Hossein Mousavi, the hero of the demonstrators, is a product of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 no less than is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Mousavi served in the now defunct position of prime minister of Iran from 1981 to 1989. In the latter part of that period, in 1987, the Iranian nuclear program was revived. Mousavi is a committed supporter of the Iranian system of governance known as Vilayet a-Faqih (rule of the jurist), and of the brutal repression which this system brings in its wake. He represents the establishment, conservative wing of the regime, as personified by former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

This element has been singled out for particular criticism by the younger radical conservatives, or ‘principalists,’ of whom Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the most well known representative. The principalists, strongly represented in the powerful Revolutionary Guards Corps, portray Mousavi and his allies as venal, cynical and corrupt. The Rafsanjani camp, meanwhile, considers Ahmadinejad and his allies to be irresponsible fanatics. In the course of the recent presidential election campaign, Mousavi found it useful to seek the support of those Iranians who have failed to benefit from Ahmadinejad’s populist economic policies. He also sought to represent the many Iranians who are embarrassed and dismayed at Ahmadinejad’s expressions of Holocaust denial and populist anti-Americanism.

The demonstrations currently taking place are demanding the annulment of the election results, in the almost undoubtedly accurate belief that they were falsified to ensure the victory of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the first round of voting. The principalists have the support of the chief holder of power in Iran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who appears to have intervened in their candidate’s favor. But Mousavi and Ahmadinejad, ultimately, are representatives of rival streams within the ruling elite. Mousavi is no less supportive of the Iranian nuclear drive and of support for Hizbullah and Hamas than is Ahmadinejad. His election would have made no difference for policy in these areas. Khamenei, who holds his (unelected) position for life, makes the decisions on questions of strategy. Some have claimed that Mousavi is no longer the key issue. Events have taken on a momentum of their own, it is being said. The huge crowds are seen as heralding a classic pre-revolutionary situation – in which the discontented masses go to the streets to challenge their rulers, posing the question of who holds power and by what right.

When the question of power is posed in the streets, two questions become paramount: Does the ruling element have the will to order a large-scale repression of popular unrest should the need arise, and will the security forces obey the regime if such an order is given? If the answer to either of these questions is negative, the regime is in real danger. Regarding the first – the Islamist regime in Iran, whatever its internal fissures and its many failures – is not a tired, uncertain, decadent and crumbling affair. Its leaders believe in their right to rule and possess a large popular constituency. Regarding the second question – Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the regime he leads hold the unquestioned loyalty of those military and security forces sometimes termed the “deep state.” The more excited Western media reports notwithstanding, no evidence has yet emerged from Iran to contradict this picture. Hence, when it comes to the ultimate test, the regime appears to be equipped with the means to preserve its rule.

Events will not, however, necessarily reach the stage of brutal repression. To make a revolution, an additional requisite factor is a revolutionary leadership. Such a leadership does not currently exist in Iran. There is no force or party, outside of the various factions within the regime itself, able to capitalize on the current popular anger. One should also not lose sight of the fact that even in terms of the struggle between the presidential candidates, Ahmadinejad undoubtedly possesses a very considerable popular base among less wealthy, religiously pious Iranians. All these facts taken together point, regrettably, in the direction of a single conclusion. At the present time, the Islamist regime in Iran is almost certainly not in danger.

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Analysis: Shi’ite Missiles, Zionist Cows and the Lebanese Army

Posted on March 21, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 19/07/2009

The explosions in a Hizbullah arms storage facility in the south Lebanese village of Khirbat a-Silm on Tuesday are testimony to the successful efforts of this organization to rebuild its strength south of the Litani River. This success has come although UN Security Council Resolution 1701 expressly forbids a Hizbullah armed presence south of the Litani, and despite the presence of two military forces in the area supposedly committed to ensuring the implementation of the resolution – UNIFIL, and a contingent of the Lebanese Armed Forces. Following the explosion, the Lebanese army maintained that it took place at a facility dating from before July 2006. Hizbullah, for its part, initially tried to claim that the explosions were of Israeli cluster bombs scattered in the area during the 2006 war. The organization is now keeping silent on the matter.

According to the Lebanese media, Hizbullah members deployed in the area following the blast, preventing civilians from entering, as the army and security services began their “investigation.” The explosion came as the Lebanese army was busy focusing on a different threat to national security – namely, violations of Lebanese sovereignty by Israeli forces close to the international border (the “Blue Line”). According to Lebanese media reports, a clash between Lebanese and Israeli forces was narrowly avoided earlier this week, after the Lebanese authorities demanded the removal of an Israeli observation post near the village of Kafr Shuba, which is situated just northeast of the Shaba Farms (Mount Dov).

The Israeli activities appear to be a matter of far greater urgency to the Lebanese authorities than is the ongoing buildup by Hizbullah of its forces. The Lebanese ambassador to the UN recently sent a list of Israeli violations of the Blue Line to the UN Security Council. Among the various violations of Lebanese sovereignty, according to one Lebanese media report, is the crossing of Israeli cows into Lebanon to drink from a watering hole near Kafr Shuba. Against threats of this gravity, the Lebanese army remains ever vigilant. However, when it comes to enforcing Resolution 1701 with regard to Hizbullah, it appears that different standards are maintained.

The Lebanese army’s division of its energies should not come as a surprise. The Lebanese military, in its own words, as seen on its official Web site, regards Israel as its “primary antagonist and enemy.” Regarding Hizbullah, by contrast, despite its supposed role in ensuring that the organization does not rearm south of the Litani, the Lebanese army is an overt supporter of the movement’s right to “resist.” Again, according to the army’s Web site, “the Lebanese Resistance against the Israeli occupation of Lebanese territories is a legal right which ends only with withdrawal of occupation.” And which parts of Lebanon are still occupied by Israel? The Web site of the Lebanese Armed Forces considers that “the enemy is still located on the Shaba Farms, in places of great strategic and economic significance. Therefore, the Lebanese have the right to fight the enemy until it withdraws.”

In practice, relations between the Lebanese army and Hizbullah have been less idyllic than this statement of shared intent might imply. Tensions, however, where they have arisen, have come more as a result of overlapping boundaries than out of a determination by the Lebanese army to fulfill Resolution 1701. The most notable example was the shooting down by Hizbullah of an Lebanese army Gazelle helicopter which entered a Hizbullah “security zone” in August 2008, which killed the navigator. The incident, which had no practical repercussions for Hizbullah, indicated the relative balance of power between the two fraternal forces.

While each recognizes the rights of the other as a legitimate military force, the Lebanese army is encouraged not to stray too close to the activities of the “resistance.” The insertion into Resolution 1701 of a clause facilitating the entry of the Lebanese army into the area south of the Litani River after the 2006 war was presented by the Olmert government of the time as a major achievement. The claim was not entirely baseless. The presence of the army in the south has led to at least a greater semblance of normality along the border. Some achievements have been recorded, in cooperation with UNIFIL – particularly in locating ordnance in rural areas. But the explosion at Khirbat a-Silm, combined with the Lebanese army’s ambiguous response, says it all regarding the failure to prevent, or to seriously attempt to prevent, Hizbullah’s rearming south of the Litani. The undertaking of this mission would go against the very nature of the Lebanese army. The Lebanese army’s officer corps is 30 percent Shi’ite. The majority of its rank and file also belongs to this sect. It is thus a force neither willing nor able to take the necessary measures against the independent military structure maintained by Hizbullah on Lebanese soil.

Hizbullah’s mishap should serve to remind Israeli policy-makers that the security of the residents of the North will be maintained only by effective deterrence, or failing that, effective countermeasures. The Lebanese army, meanwhile, will busy itself challenging the true enemies of Lebanon – namely, the Zionist cows who covet the pure waters of the Kafr Shuba pond.

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Analysis: Hizbullah turns up the Temperature in the North

Posted on March 21, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 30/07/2009

Israel’s border with Lebanon is currently at its most tense since the cease-fire which ended the war of 2006. This tension has been brought on by the combination of a number of factors.

Ongoing internal political frictions in Lebanon and a series of recent setbacks suffered by the Iran-led regional bloc are both key elements contributing to the situation. Inflammatory rhetoric and orchestrated provocations by Hizbullah supporters in the south, against the ominous background of the movement’s ongoing rearmament, are helping to ratchet up the uncertainty.

Coalition negotiations have been deadlocked in Lebanon in recent weeks. Hizbullah has conceded to the opposition’s demand that its bloc receive only 15 ministerial portfolios (one less than the number required for a veto). This does not settle the matter, however. The focus now turns to efforts to ensure that at least one of the ‘independent’ ministers linked to President Suleiman is of a pro-Hizbullah orientation, ensuring the de facto continuation of the movement’s power to block government decisions not to its liking.

Feeling itself under internal pressure, Hizbullah has sought once again to cast itself as the force of ‘resistance’ in Lebanon.

It was this role which originally propelled the movement from its status as a secondary, pro-Iranian Shia force to its current prominence. During the past several years, Hizbullah’s problem has been finding issues which could justify its continued belligerent stance against Israel. The two matters on which it has chosen to focus are Israeli control of the Mount Dov (Shabaa Farms) area, and the matter of Lebanese citizens supposedly incarcerated in Israel. Both these issues are now once more being deliberately placed in the foreground.

It is worth remembering that the 2006 war was sparked by an attempt by Hizbullah to kidnap IDF soldiers in order to exchange them for Samir Kuntar and a number of other Lebanese jailed in Israel for involvement in terror. The attack in July 2006 was not the first attempt of this kind. Each was accompanied by a ratcheting up of rhetoric by the Hizbullah leadership, which sought to focus attention on the prisoners.

On July 17, Nasrallah gave a speech to mark the first anniversary of the release of Samir Kuntar and other Lebanese captives from Israeli custody. In the speech, he raised the issue of another supposed Lebanese ‘prisoner’ who, he claimed, remains in Israeli hands. The individual named, one Yahya Skaff, was killed while taking part in a Palestinian terror operation in Israel in 1978. It was long rumored in Lebanon that he was in fact alive and in Israeli custody. Skaff’s remains were returned to Lebanon, but Hizbullah maintains that tests were unable to confirm the identity of the remains.

Nasrallah’s speech suggests that the movement wants to inflate this issue so that it may serve as ‘justification’ for further aggression against Israel.

In addition, Hizbullah is turning up the temperature in the Mount Dov area. Against the backdrop of the explosion at Khirbat Silm, the movement has carried out a series of provocations – including a crossing into the Mount Dov area by Hizbullah-supporting civilians, who placed a movement banner and a Lebanese flag on an unmanned Israeli observation post in the Kafr Shuba hills.

The present escalation is taking place against the backdrop of Hizbullah’s continued re-arming, both south and north of the Litani River. Israel is carefully monitoring this process. There are certain red lines beyond which Israel may consider some form of preventive action necessary, according to sources. These would include the acquisition and deployment by Hizbullah of an anti-aircraft capacity.

The situation on the northern border must be viewed through a regional prism, as well as a narrow Israeli-Lebanese one. The region remains divided between a bloc of states and movements aligned with Iran, which includes Hizbullah, and a de facto counter-alliance of pro-US states including Israel. Israel is the totemic enemy of the pro-Iranian bloc, which is committed to its destruction.

It has not been a good year for the pro-Iranian bloc. An important asset for the Iranians and their allies has been their sense of themselves as the ‘sunrise’ power in the region – the force of tomorrow. This perception had been aided by a string of achievements in the past few years. But 2009 has witnessed the cessation and partial reverse of this process – with a number of setbacks for Teheran and its various assets.

Israel’s Gaza operation dented their sense that they had discovered a means of nullifying Israel’s conventional advantage through the use of attrition and war against civilians. This setback was then followed by defeat for Iran’s Lebanese clients in the June elections. Following this, the unrest after the rigged elections in Iran itself made a mockery of the Teheran-led bloc’s claim to represent the regional popular will against its opponents. The charging of a number of Hizbullah activists, recently apprehended in Egypt, has added to the movement’s woes.

Could this combination of local and regional frustrations be leading Hizbullah, creation and chief asset of the Iranians, down a road of dangerous brinkmanship – in an effort to recover some of its lost momentum and charisma?

What is clear is that the events sparked by the Khirbat Silm explosion have not yet run their course, the potential for miscalculation is very real, and hence further deterioration cannot be ruled out.

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