Analysis: Al-Qaida-style Extremism gains real Power within Hamas

Jerusalem Post- 02/12/2008

Al-Qaida-type Salafi Islam is rising in popularity within the ranks of Hamas. This trend is particularly noticeable in the movement’s armed wing, the Izzadin Kassam Brigades. Observation of this process shows that attempts to draw a clear dividing line between the “nationalist” Muslim Brotherhood-inspired Islamism of Hamas and the Salafi trend can no longer be sustained. The growth of Salafism within Hamas is part of a larger pattern of increasingly extreme Islamic piety and practice in Gaza. The existence of Salafism within Hamas is not a new development. Indeed, Hamas leaders have long been aware of the potential threat this outlook represents to their authority.

As long ago as December 2001, the Israeli authorities intercepted a document produced by Hamas prisoners in Israeli custody which warned of the spread of al-Qaida-type ideology among Hamas members. However, supporters of Salafism now appear to be achieving positions of real power within Hamas. In mid-2006, Izzadin Kassam commander Muhammad Deif was badly wounded by an IDF missile strike and subsequently left the Gaza Strip for a long period of recuperation. His replacement at the helm of the Brigades was Ahmad al-Ja’abari, who carried out his tasks in close cooperation with two allies, Ali Jundiyeh and Nizar Rayyan. All three of these men are known supporters of Salafism. Rayyan is considered to be the key tactical planner of the Brigades at the current time. He is believed to have formulated Hamas’s operational plan for the takeover of Gaza in July 2007. He is also thought to have formulated Hamas’s plan for resisting a major IDF operation into Gaza. He is in charge of weapons production for the Brigades, and is also believed to command its suicide units. Rayyan maintains close relations with a Saudi Salafi cleric resident in Ramallah who is a supporter of al-Qaida.

One level below, the majority of the five brigade commanders of Izzadin Kassam are also Salafis. Among them, Muhammad as-Sanwar, commander of the Khan Yunis Brigade, is a particularly significant figure. He was among the planners of the Kerem Shalom attack in 2006 in which then-Cpl. Gilad Schalit was kidnapped. Deif returned to the Strip via the Sinai-Gaza tunnels in November 2007. Deif himself is known as a very strict Muslim, but the nature of his links to the Salafis are unclear. However, in early 2008, he complained to friends that his own influence in the Izzadin Kassam Brigades had declined, since the “Salafists had taken completely over.” Salafi supporters within Izzadin Kassam are organized, and are known to have made contact with the al-Qaida leadership. As early as 2006, a group of 200 Salafi-oriented Izzadin Kassam members opposed to a cease-fire with Israel made contact with al-Qaida. As a result, an open letter from al-Qaida was sent to Hamas. The letter contained advice for combating the cease-fire.

Friction over the cease-fire resurfaced in June 2008. Salafi elements within the Izzadin Kassam Brigades made clear their opposition to the renewed tahadiyeh (period of calm) with Israel. At that time, an Izzadin Kassam-associated Web site published a list of nine attacks carried out in 2002-2005 for which Hamas had never previously taken responsibility. The Salafis remain firmly entrenched within Izzadin Kassam at all levels. There have been reports, however, of an internal power struggle, with Deif seeking to replace Ja’abari, or at least to reduce his influence. In July 2008, a group of Salafi members of the Brigades split off to form a new group, al-Jaljaleh (Thunder). Friction also exists between the Brigades and other Hamas-controlled military organizations, such as the Executive Force in Gaza. The Executive Force, formed after the Hamas election victory in 2006, is responsible for a variety of policing and paramilitary functions in the Strip. On June 25, 2008, the Executive Force sought to arrest a number of Izzadin Kassam members suspected of criminal activity. Ja’abari refused to hand them over, and the men remained at liberty. This friction notwithstanding, the rise of supporters of al-Qaida ideology within Hamas cannot be seen in a vacuum.

Rather, it is an element of a broader process of the Islamization of many aspects of public life taking place in the Gaza Strip. This may be seen, for example, in the many incidents of women in “immodest” dress being stopped by members of the Executive Force in the weeks following the July 2007 coup. This has led to the near disappearance of non-hijab wearing women from the streets of Gaza. There have also been reports of enforced observance of Ramadan, and harassment of unmarried couples seen together by members of the Force.

All these incidents are signs that the rise to power of Hamas, and within it of extreme Salafi elements, are events of more than simple immediate political significance. After the July 2007 coup, Rayyan declared that “the secular era in Gaza has ended without leaving a trace.” Events in the subsequent 18 months show little to disprove this declaration.

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Analysis: Arab Order and flying Shoes

Jerusalem Post- 16/12/2008

US President George W. Bush’s visit to Iraq this week reflected the mixed legacy of his presidency. The Iraq invasion is likely to be remembered as the defining issue of the Bush era and recent events show real progress in the country. At the same time, the flying shoes that greeted the president at his joint press conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on Sunday, and the instant canonization of the shoe thrower as the latest poster child for Arab “defiance” show the extent to which the prevailing regional political culture that the invasion was supposed to help end remains alive and kicking – in Iraq as elsewhere. Iraq appears on the way to uneasy stability. There has been an estimated drop of 80 percent in attacks by insurgents since March. Last month, Iraqi civilian deaths were the lowest since the US invasion, 290. These figures reflect the relative success of the US troop surge.

No less important a contributor has been the sahwa (awakening) movement in the provinces of Sunni Arab central Iraq. The new US-Iraqi security pact marks the start of the final act of the US occupation. The pact calls for all American troops to be withdrawn by the end of 2011. The first stage is set for next year, with the withdrawal of US forces from Baghdad and other major cities. As the US begins to draw down its forces in Iraq, the emergent political order in the country is one of Shi’ite domination and interethnic tension. Yet the tensions are being played out – for the moment – within the framework of a working political system based on democratic elections. If this system can hold during and after the US withdrawal, it will represent a significant achievement. It will mean that for the first time since decolonization, one of the main countries of the Arab world will be under democratic rule. Thus far the credit side of the ledger.

As the US president’s reception in Iraq indicates, however, deep problems remain. Muntadar al-Zeidi’s flying shoes are the latest semi-comic emblem of a particular, familiar political culture with deep roots in the Arab world. This outlook sees all events through the prism of a wounded sense of nationalism, and a furious resentment against the West and Israel. This outlook currently finds its active political expression mainly through movements of Islamic revival, but it is not confined to them or solely produced by them. Indeed, to a great extent the rise of Islamism is a product of this political-cultural ambience, rather than the other way around. This political culture sanctifies anti-Western fury, and continues, half a century after decolonization, to see the Arabs as hapless victims of the West. As a result, it gives its greatest honor and respect to those who are able to articulate a sense of furious resentment. If this can be accompanied by the successful application of political violence, then popular deification is assured.

The tremendous popularity of Hizbullah’s Hassan Nasrallah, and even the non-Arab Mahmoud Ahmedinejad among broad masses of Arabs is a product of this political culture. Zeidi and his shoes will henceforth form a very tiny presence in its pantheon. It is this political culture that is capable of producing the curious spectacle of the furious demonstrations against Bush by members of the Iraqi Shi’ite community in the past days. Much may be legitimately criticized about the conception and execution of the invasion of Iraq. But it is an empirically undeniable fact that the individual more responsible than any other for the enfranchisement and elevation to power of the Shi’ites of Iraq is George W. Bush. That is to say that the man who has established a situation in which the Iraqi Shi’ite Zeidi is able to work freely as a journalist, worship freely as a Shi’ite and vote freely as a citizen was the same one whom Zeidi chose to hurl his shoes at.

The probable lesson the US and its allies will take from the Iraq invasion is that ambitious projects for the reform and reshaping of the Arab world are not worth undertaking. Regional order, or something approaching it, will once more be maintained through “off shore balancing” in the form of relations with existing, imperfect but stable regimes in the region, such as the National Democratic Party regime in Egypt and the Saudi monarchy. A Shi’ite regime of one kind or another is likely to emerge in Iraq in the coming years, and the key issue will be whether it allies with the US-dominated existing Arab order, or with Iran. But the combination of post-9/11 rage and genuine desire for reform that powered the US invasion of Iraq of 2003 is, for better or for worse, gone.

The strange spectacle of an Iraq now closer to democracy than any other Arab state, into which the chief architect of its liberty must steal like a thief in the night, and in which he is subjected to insults by a member of the very community he brought to power, is its problematic legacy. It is also the latest evidence of the astonishing hardiness and longevity of that peculiar political culture of self-righteous fury that bestrides the Arabic-speaking world, and that constitutes perhaps the single largest barrier to its rational and mature development.

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Analysis: The Elections and the Pan-Arab Media

Jerusalem Post- 11/02/2009

Reactions in the pan-Arab media to the election results in Israel follow predictable patterns. There is a particular interest in the growth of Avigdor Lieberman’s party. At the same time, there is a tendency to stress that Israeli parties generally seen in the world as moderate are no less extremist in reality than those more usually characterized in these terms. There are some differences in emphasis and terminology between papers and channels associated with more Western-leading governments and those associated with the pro-Iranian axis. But since sympathy with Israel is a charge of which pro-Western Arab governments and media are keen to prove themselves innocent, the differences are less marked than might be expected.

Regarding news coverage, the Hizbullah-controlled Al-Manar Web site ran an analysis of the elections as its main story throughout most of Wednesday. Hizbullah takes great pride in what it regards as its serious and detailed coverage of Israeli issues. The Al-Manar Web site had a whole section on the elections under the title “The enemy entity – elections.” The headline story notes the “growth of the forces of the Right and the decline of the Left.” The accompanying article includes quotes from Ma’ariv, Yediot Aharonot and Haaretz and notes the discrepancy between the number of seats won by the Likud and Kadima, and the size of the left- and right-wing blocs. Al-Manar awards 66 seats to the right-wing bloc and 44 to that of the Left – interestingly subtracting the Arab lists and Hadash from the left bloc. The article notes that “Zionist President” Shimon Peres now has to decide which of the party leaders to ask to form a government. Should he ask Netanyahu to do so, Al-Manar helpfully points out to its readers, this will be the “first time in the history of the Zionist entity” that the party with the largest number of parliamentary seats has not been asked to form the government.

Al-Jazeera, meanwhile, runs as its main story on the elections an article alleging that “Violence, fraud mar Israel’s elections.” The article consists of a series of accusations of minor irregularities in election procedure in various parts of the country, involving a number of different parties. It appears to be taken from the Iranian government’s Press TV service.

In the London-published, Arab nationalist daily Al-Hayat, columnist Mostafa Zein dismisses all differences between parties in Israel, saying that “it is not a matter of Left or Right, but rather a matter of a racist Israeli society that organized itself in parties.” Zein runs through a litany of massacres to which he apportions more or less equal blame to the Israeli Left and Right – both of which, he concludes, serve “the colonialist racist thinking.” It is worth bearing in mind that while Al-Manar, and to a considerable extent Al-Jazeera are aligned with the Iranian bloc in the Middle East, this is not true of Al-Hayat, which takes a staunchly Arab nationalist, broadly pro-Saudi line on regional matters. In pro-Saudi outlets, Al-Arabiya has as its main analysis piece on the elections an article titled ‘The end of the two-state solution,’ by Jordanian commentator Osama al-Sharif. The article predicts the rise of a narrow, right wing coalition in Israel. Sharif considers that Israel is “veering dangerously to the right,” – “bad news for the rest of the world.” the author contends. However, in keeping with the pro-Saudi line, the article laments the fact that the rightward shift in Israel deals a blow “to the efforts of moderate Arabs to stem Iran’s influence.” The article also acknowledges that Israel’s fears of Iran are genuine. Another article arguing along broadly similar lines appeared in the English-language Beirut Daily Star newspaper.

The article, authored by Rami Khouri, argues that the “shift to the right” in Israel is progressively reducing chances for the two-state solution. Khouri identifies an emerging “militant, even racist” Right in Israel which he considers to constitute in effect a “separate state,” analogous to the separate Hamas entity in Gaza. According to Khouri, this “right-wing, militant, super Jewish-nationalist Israeli settler-colonial state” exists in the West Bank settlements, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, whereas its more moderate opponent holds sway in “greater Tel Aviv and adjacent regions.” Khouri apparently wants to draw a parallel between political divides in Israel, and the schism which has led to the emergence of two separate Palestinian entities.

The strained nature of this comparison notwithstanding, it conforms to the general parameters of coverage of the Israeli elections and Israeli political developments in the pan-Arab media. Pro-Iranian outlets such as Al-Manar adopt an across-the-board hostility to Israel, reflected in the terminology used. Among outlets and commentators associated with Arab states aligned with the West, meanwhile, one may find professions of allegiance to peace and the two-state solution, accompanied by laments that Israeli actions and preferences are making peace impossible. This is reflected in coverage of the elections – with one side regarding the entire electoral procedure as the activity of a criminal entity, while the other sees only one side in the elections (a side which unfortunately tends to take in all the major parties) as warmongering and criminal.

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Analysis: Turkey’s shift toward Iran, Syria is no short-term Blip

Jerusalem Post- 19/02/2009

Last weekend, a conference held under the title “Gaza the victory” took place at hotel near Istanbul’s Ataturk airport. The conference brought 200 Sunni clerics and activists together with senior, Damascus-based Hamas officials. Closed meetings held after the main conference sessions focused on the creation of a “third jihadist front” against Israel – the first two being Iraq and Afghanistan, in the view of the conference delegates. The gathering was addressed by Muhammad Nazzal, a top Hamas official from Damascus. In an echo of the attempts by Islamists across the Middle East to pressure Egypt during the recent Gaza operation, Nazzal called on regional governments to “open the borders and let the fighters through.” The gathering in Istanbul is significant for two reasons.

First, it showcases the continued efforts by Islamist movements to present the Gaza events as a watershed dividing the path of “resistance,” which they favor, from the path of “collaboration” that they accuse leading Arab states of following. Second, and perhaps more important, the location of the conference is a further indication of the move of the Islamist AKP government in Turkey toward a more and more open alignment with anti-Western and anti-Israeli forces in the region. The conference organizers themselves were aware of the significance of the event’s location. One of them told a BBC journalist attending the event, “During the past 100 years relations [between Arabs and Turks] have been strained, but Palestine has brought us together.” Speakers at the conference made constant reference to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s decision to storm off the stage in protest during a recent debate in Davos, Switzerland, on the Gaza operation.

The current Turkish government’s willingness to engage with and host regional and Palestinian Islamist forces is not new. Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal made a controversial trip to Ankara less than a month after Hamas’s victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006. Interestingly, Mashaal was asked to come directly by the AKP government, after the more secular-minded Turkish Foreign Ministry refused to extend an invitation to him. At the time, some analysts sought to present the invitation to Mashaal as a one-off gesture without deeper significance for the Israeli-Turkish relationship. Subsequent events have disproved this interpretation. Turkey’s response to the Gaza offensive has highlighted a deep rift in relations. Erdogan in the course of the operation questioned Israel’s UN membership. The atmosphere in Turkey during Operation Cast Lead became deeply charged against Israelis and Jews – with a number of ugly incidents recorded across the country. Erdogan attended the emergency summit in Doha on January 16 that was convened by Syria and Qatar to offer support to Hamas.

Turkey’s courting of Hamas and hosting of Islamist gatherings form part of a more general regional policy pursued by the AKP government in Ankara. The AKP seeks to build Turkey’s regional “strategic depth” – in its preferred phrase – by building up relations with Syria and Iran. This is presented as a desire to counter-balance, rather than replace, Ankara’s already deep links with the West. However, in the current situation of sharp polarization and cold war in the region, it is becoming increasingly unfeasible for countries to maintain close relations with both the US-led and the Iranian-led camps. The prospect of Turkey moving toward the Iranian-led alliance can no longer be dismissed as fanciful. Turkish analysts have noted the rise of a “Muslim nationalist” orientation in the country, of which the political dominance of the AKP over the last half decade forms the political expression. From this perspective, a regional policy which stresses alliances with other Muslim governments and movements across the region is a natural choice.

Growing warmth in Turkey’s relations with Iran and Syria, and the sympathy shown their key client organization Hamas last weekend in Istanbul are all elements of this emerging policy. Of course, it is much too soon to write off the relationship between Turkey and Israel. There are powerful forces within the country which oppose the AKP’s “strategic depth” orientation. Nevertheless, Turkey’s position on recent events has brought great cheer to the Iranian-led camp, and is leading to corresponding new efforts at courtship from Teheran. Senior Iranian officials praised Turkey’s stance during the Gaza crisis, and called for a strategic alliance between the two countries. Yahya Safavi, former commander of the Revolutionary Guards and now security adviser to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said earlier this month that “Erdogan’s… courageous words at the Davos summit against the war crimes of the Zionist regime… are evidence of the Islamic awakening among the Turkish people – a result of the influence of Iran’s Islamic Revolution.” Majlis speaker and former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani visited Turkey during the Gaza crisis, holding closed talks with Erdogan. Following the meetings, both men called to enhance the already extensive economic links between Iran and Turkey.

Where is Turkey heading? What can be said with certainty is that Ankara’s long-maintained policy of equidistance between Israelis and Palestinians has been dispensed with by the current leadership. The AKP government is aligning itself not only with the Palestinians, but with Hamas. In the longer term, this may portend a slow shift toward greater alignment with the Iranian-led regional alliance. Such a shift, if it occurs, will be of primary significance to the strategic balance in the region.

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Analysis: Possible first Fruits of a new Era

Jerusalem Post- 25/02/2009

President Barack Obama, in his first international media interview following his election, told Al-Arabiya that “if countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us.” In addition to the new policy of seeking to reduce pressure on Iran, the US is currently engaged in what looks like an extended courtship of the Assad regime in Syria. Obama mentioned neither Syria nor Iran in his latest speech to Congress. But the speech coined a phrase which handily sums up the essence of the administration’s apparent approach to the region: “In words and deeds,” the President told Congress, “we are showing the world that a new era of engagement has begun.” In words and deeds, the response of Iran and Syria to the Obama approach is also becoming apparent.

Since the election of Obama, Iran has this month carried out two high-profile acts indicating that its drive to achieve nuclear weapons capability has – so far at least – failed to be swayed by the new era. At the beginning of the month, Teheran announced that it had successfully launched its first satellite into orbit. The launch was testimony to the advances made by Iran’s long-range ballistic missile program. It was also testimony to the importance the Iranian regime attaches to acts of open defiance and demonstrations of strength. This week, Iran announced that it is to begin a test run of its Russian-built light water reactor at Bushehr. The plant, which began construction in 1998, is due to begin functioning in the first half of this year. Russia has resisted international calls to suspend involvement. The test run, which coincides with a visit to Teheran of the head of Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, represents an additional message from the Iranians regarding their position on the relative importance of extended hands and clenched fists.

Under the radar, there is concern at the increasing opacity of the Iranian nuclear program. The Iranians have chosen a unique interpretation of their obligations vis-Ã -vis the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and its investigations. More and more, Iran simply declines to provide information. The result is that there are now real fears that a secret uranium enrichment site in addition to the site at Natanz might have been constructed. Regarding the not-yet-operating heavy water plant at Arak – again, Iran is simply refusing to answer questions. Teheran’s impunity derives from a reading of the current international atmosphere which is probably correct.

The courting of Syria, meanwhile, is showing no signs of being knocked off track by the latest revelations from the IAEA regarding just what it was that the Israeli air force bombed at al-Kibar in September, 2007. A report from the agency issued last week dismissed Syrian attempts to claim that traces of uranium found at the site were residue left by Israeli munitions. Inspectors have complained that Syria is denying access to parts of the site, and has failed to provide requested documentation concerning the site’s use. Syrian spokesmen have explained the reluctance to grant access as deriving from fears that Israel might try to use information provided to gain knowledge of Syrian “military installations.” As if on cue, and in the latest evidence of the Syrian regime’s feline sense of humor, a missile facility has now appeared at the site bombed in 2007. The facility will no doubt, in addition to defending Syria’s skies from its enemies, serve an additional function as a reason why the site cannot be made open to inspectors from the IAEA.

Despite all this, the charm offensive is continuing. In addition to three high profile congressional delegations to Damascus, a series of quieter gestures are signaling to the Syrians that the sanctions regime put in place by the previous administration may be discreetly wound down. The Treasury Department last week permitted $500,000 to be transferred to a Syrian charity. The Department of Commerce approved the supplying of spare parts to Syria’s superannuated Boeing 747 aircraft, and so on. Thus far deeds. In terms of words – the picture does not differ greatly. The Syrians were reputedly angered by a suggestion from Congressman Benjamin Cardin during the visit of the first congressional delegation that Damascus might share some responsibility for its international isolation – because of its “partnership of terrorism.” An editorial in the al-Watan newspaper described such remarks as “far from the Arab, international and American reality.” The newspaper succinctly summarized Syria’s position as follows: “the Syrians are looking forward to a change in American policy, not to a change in Syrian policy.” Iranian spokesmen have struck a similar tone. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hassan Qashqavi responded to Obama’s earlier declaration by contending that Iran had “never clenched its fists.” Rather, it was the Bush administration which had shown its “clenched fist to Mid-East nations.”

The new era of engagement thus appears so far to be providing the Iranians with valuable leeway for the pursuit of their nuclear ambitions, and the Syrians with similar space to avoid being brought to account for their own apparently now discontinued program. In addition, the new era is giving the spokesmen of both dictatorships plenty of opportunity for engaging in the scolding and proclamations of moral superiority of which they are so fond. It is unlikely that this is what the new US president had in mind. It is therefore probable that the new era will be an unusually short one.

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Analysis: Is the US backing down on Iran’s Uranium Enrichment?

Jerusalem Post- 09/04/2009

US President Barack Obama’s speech to the Turkish parliament on Monday was greeted with enthusiasm throughout the Arab world. The speech represented an attempt to mend fences, and was testimony to the administration’s belief in the healing power of words. Obama ticked all the required boxes. He stressed his intention to “actively pursue” the goal of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. He declared that the US “is not and will never be at war with Islam.” He even spoke of the important role played by Islam in the development of the United States. (No doubt some junior member of staff is currently engaged in the unenviable task of finding some examples of this formerly little-remarked-upon phenomenon.) The rhetoric was designed largely to change the atmospherics of the relationship between the US and the Arab states. The content of the administration’s regional policy – beyond a general desire for dialogue and “engagement” – has yet to be properly clarified. However, as the empirical evidence accumulates, a picture is beginning to emerge on key issues.

The administration is serious regarding its project of engagement with Iran. The Iranians, meanwhile, are equally serious about their project to develop a nuclear capability. It therefore appears likely that both of these projects will be seriously and energetically pursued, with the former having little effect on the latter. In his speeches in Turkey, Obama failed to reiterate the previous administration’s call for a complete cessation of uranium enrichment by Iran. Rather, the president said his message to Iran was “don’t develop a nuclear weapon.” This could be interpreted as meaning that the administration may be prepared to tolerate Iran’s uranium enrichment program, on condition that it takes place under IAEA supervision, and does not seek to enrich uranium to weapons-grade levels. US officials have been wary of committing themselves as to whether this is indeed the administration’s intention. When queried on the matter, State Department spokesman Robert Wood recommended waiting until the policy review process is completed. But should this prove to be the administration’s position, it would be seen in Iran as a major victory for the regime.

Iran has been at loggerheads for the last half-decade with the major western powers over its uranium enrichment program. A series of UN Security Council resolutions since 2006 have reiterated the international demand for an absolute and open-ended cessation of uranium enrichment by Teheran. This goal has been shared, at least declaratively, by the US, EU, Russia and China. In the intervening period, Iran has defied international will. Teheran has installed more than 5,500 centrifuges to enrich uranium in its plant at Natanz. Iran now possesses a stockpile of more than 1,000 kg. of low-enriched uranium. A US acceptance of this situation as a fait accompli would send a strong signal to the regime in Iran and to its allies that this is an administration that accepts the establishment of facts on the ground – at least by its enemies. It appears that the administration realizes this, which is why it will prefer to wait until after the Iranian presidential elections in June, in the hope that it can offer any concessions to someone other than President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. But whether it is Ahmedinejad or Mirhossein Moussavi who holds the Iranian presidency after June, if the intention of the Obama administration is to accept ongoing Iranian uranium enrichment as a starting point from which to request Iranian cooperation, this would represent the rewarding of defiance. The result of this will be to invite more defiance.

The administration has now announced that it will take part in direct talks with the Iranians, alongside the UK, France, Germany, China and Russia. This latest development represents a further abandonment of the previous administration’s policy regarding uranium enrichment. Bush had made the cessation of enrichment a condition for talks between Iran and the US. A new round of talks is currently being prepared, and is expected to take place within four to six weeks. Ahmedinejad has gracefully accepted Obama’s offer of friendship, on condition that it is based on “honesty, justice and respect.” In the coming days, meanwhile, Iran is expected to announce the latest advance in its nuclear program – the perfection of techniques for the manufacture of uranium fuel. Of course, the possibility of increased sanctions will be held out, should Iran refuse to cooperate with the latest diplomatic charm offensive. Nevertheless, the overall picture is not encouraging.

Behind the smiles and the bowing and the rhetoric, the various regional players are currently assessing their room for maneuver in the climate being created by the Obama administration. The Iranians will note the softening of the US stance on uranium enrichment, the offer of direct talks, and the declarations of friendship and respect for Iran’s ancient culture. They are likely to conclude that all this adds up to increased space and increased time in which to pursue their ambitions.

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Analysis: Sinai Saga casts Light on new regional Dynamic

Jerusalem Post-16/04/2009

The latest revelations of Hizbullah involvement in northern Sinai cast a sudden light on a silent war currently under way across the Middle East and beyond it. The events in Sinai showcase a number of defining factors of this new, Middle Eastern Cold War. Firstly, the Sinai events confirm that where there is disorder, weak central government and ongoing local conflict – there is Iran. Northern Sinai provides a near-perfect environment for the activities of the clandestine arms of Iranian government and its proxies. As a result of long-term indifference on the part of the Egyptian authorities, an entire local economy based on smuggling and lawlessness has grown up among the Beduin of the northern Sinai.

Over the last decade, Sunni global jihad groups have moved in to take advantage of the tempting prospects offered by the combination of lawlessness, light government, nearness to Israel and the close proximity of large numbers of western and Israeli tourists. Sunni jihadi terror attacks took place in Taba in 2004, Sharm e-Sheikh in 2005 and Dahab in 2006. It is now clear that Sunni global Jihad groups were not the only ones to see the potential in northern Sinai. The infinitely more serious networks of Iran and its proxy Hizbullah have made use of the smugglers’ trail that leads from Sudan through Egypt and into Sinai to bring the weapons intended to turn the Hamas enclave in Gaza into an Islamist fortress. The growing boldness of Iran and its proxies evidently led to the idea of making use of the ideal conditions available for terrorists in Sinai to build active Shia-led Islamist terror cells in the area.

The Egyptian authorities have made half-hearted efforts in the past to prevent weapons smuggling to Gaza. This new threat, however, appears to have constituted a red line – leading to determined action. In particular, the possibility of an attack on shipping in the Suez Canal served to concentrate the minds of the Egyptians. This highlights a second notable factor: namely the extensive current cooperation, behind the scenes, of the Egyptian authorities with their Israeli and US counterparts. Again – the offer of advice, information and assistance from Israel and the US is not new. On the contrary, Israeli and US officials have been exasperated in the past by the failure of the Egyptians to take seriously or act upon information readily made available to them. As the lines of the new regional situation become clearer, and as it becomes plain to the Egyptians that they are not going to be able to sit the conflict out – so cooperation is growing.

The final and perhaps most important lesson to be drawn from the latest events relates to the nature and role of the Lebanese Hizbullah organization. A debate continues to rage in policy circles – encouraged by fellow travelers and sympathizers with this movement – as to whether it should be seen as primarily a domestic Lebanese political movement, or as essentially a creature of Iranian government. This debate has important policy implications. Elections are to take place in Lebanon on June 7. It is possible that the Hizbullah-led March 8 alliance will form the next government in Beirut. Should Hizbullah win, it will be claimed by its friends in the West that by participating in the elections, the movement has shown that it is primarily a Lebanese political actor. If and when these claims are raised, it is to be hoped that US and European policy-makers will keep in mind the events of the past days in Sinai.

Hizbullah second in command Sheikh Naim Kassem told The Los Angeles Times earlier this week that he was encouraged by what he perceived as the “changing perception” of his organization in the West. He noted growing calls for “engagement” with Hizbullah emanating from a number of European capitals, and assured his interviewer that Hizbullah carries out no military operations outside of Lebanon. It is now clear that between giving saccharine interviews to eminent western newspapers, Sheikh Naim Kassem was also directly responsible for the Hizbullah cell in Sinai, led by Muhammad Mansour. Al-Ahram this week quoted Egyptian officials responsible for monitoring communications between the cell and the Hizbullah leadership in Lebanon who confirmed this. A clearer indication of the absurdity of Hizbullah’s claims – and the credulity of those western officials prepared to countenance them – would be hard to imagine. Hizbullah has reportedly received $1 billion in the last months from Teheran for its election campaign. Its operatives have now been caught in the searchlight – exposed as wrapped up in Iran’s ongoing project to ignite the region.

Hizbullah constitutes one of the pieces on the chessboard to be moved at will by the guiding Iranian hand. So a new cold war is under way – and like the old one, it is being fought on a variety of blurred, interlocking fronts: military, paramilitary, political and diplomatic. The most important weapon – vital for all other advantages to be used – is clarity of thought. The latest revelations of meddling in Sinai by Iran and its Lebanese proxy may, it is hoped, contribute to the slow spread of this vital asset.

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Analysis: Hamas and the Sudanese Connection

Jerusalem Post-26/03/2009

The latest reports of an alleged IAF strike on a Hamas arms convoy in Sudan in January draw attention to an arms network running from Iran, via the Persian Gulf and Yemen to Sudan, Egypt, and finally, Hamas-ruled Gaza. The existence of this network has been noted by analysts in the past. It forms part of a larger, overt, close relationship maintained by both Iran and Hamas with the regime of Omar al-Bashir in Khartoum.

Reva Bhalla, an analyst at the Austin, Texas-based private intelligence company Stratfor, was the first to publicly note the transfer of arms from Iran to Hamas via Sudan. Speaking to reporters in early January, she suggested the involvement of Hizbullah agents in an Iranian-created network bringing arms from Sudan to the Gaza Strip. Bhalla depicted the network in the following terms: “You’ll have a bunch of Hizbullah agents who will procure arms through Sudan. They’ll enter Egypt under forged documents, pay off disgruntled Beduin in the Sinai with things like light arms, cash, Lebanese hashish – which they can sell in the black market – and pay off Egyptian security guards as well so that they can travel covertly into Gaza to pass off the weapons shipments through Hamas’s pretty extensive underground tunnel network.” It is impossible to verify the precise accuracy of these details. However, the involvement of Sudan in the Iranian-Hamas war effort would fit with the larger pattern of Sudan’s regional alliances and activity. The close connections between Teheran, Khartoum and Hamas are a matter of public record. Brigadier Bashir’s regime is, with the exception of the Hamas enclave in Gaza, the only overtly Islamist and pro-Iranian government in the Arabic-speaking world.

Sudan is an acknowledged member of the Iran-led regional alliance, which includes Syria, Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Sudan has maintained close relations with Iran since the 1989 coup which brought Bashir to power. The coup was carried out in cooperation with the Islamist National Islamic Front, whose members went on to hold key positions in the new regime. Iranian supplies of weapons and oil began soon after. Hassan al-Turabi, a Muslim Brotherhood-associated Sudanese Islamist activist, was the key figure in building the Iran-Sudan link in the early days of the regime. The new Sudanese armed forces were built on the model of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Two thousand guard members are reported to have visited Sudan to aid in the creation and training of the new Sudanese army.

Since 1989, Sudan has become a center for terrorist training, offering a base to Osama bin Laden and his followers in the early 1990s. An estimated 10 camps are maintained in Sudan to train Islamist terrorist and paramilitary forces. Hamas members and others are reported to have taken part in military exercises in these camps. Sudan’s documented close relations with Hamas are the main reason that the country appears on the US State Department’s list of countries supporting terrorism. Sudan’s membership in the pro-Iranian regional alliance was in evidence earlier this month, when a senior delegation of Iranian, Syrian, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah officials traveled to Khartoum to express solidarity with the Sudanese leader, after an arrest warrant was issued for his arrest by the International Criminal Court at the beginning of March. The warrant seeks Bashir’s arrest on charges of crimes against humanity relating to his regime’s activities in the Darfur region of Sudan. Around 300,000 people are thought to have died as a result of the regime’s campaign of ethnic cleansing against non-Arab Sudanese in the west of the country.

The solidarity delegation was led by Ali Larijani, speaker of the Iranian parliament. Larijani described the arrest warrant against Bashir as an “insult to all Muslims,” and spoke of Iran’s support for the Sudanese “government and people.” So the Bashir regime in Sudan is tied into the Iranian-led alliance diplomatically, militarily and ideologically. Evidence indicates that Sudan has acted as a key node in the arms trail leading from Iran to Gaza. The latest allegations of Israeli military action to disturb the flow of arms to the Hamas-administered Iranian enclave on the eastern Mediterranean will therefore come as no surprise to close observers of the region.

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Analysis: A Conflict with no Name

Jerusalem Post- 14/01/2009

Israel’s Gaza operation is serving to mark in bold relief the fault lines between two regional blocs whose rivalry dominates the region. These are the bloc of broadly pro-Western states, including Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and an Iran-led alliance that includes Syria, Yemen, Hizbullah and Hamas. Egypt’s fury at Hamas, and the desire to prevent Iran and Syria from making gains at Cairo’s expense in the current crisis is leading to an increasing willingness to openly condemn Hamas and its allies.

In recent weeks, a series of articles have appeared in the pro-government Egyptian daily Al-Goumhurriya (the Republic). The articles were written by the paper’s editor, Muhammad Ali Ibrahim, who is also a member of parliament for the ruling National Democratic Party. Al-Goumhurriya, a semi-official newspaper, is noted for its unswervingly pro-regime line. While this often prevents it from being an exciting read, it gives the paper an importance as a useful indicator of thinking within the regime.

Ibrahim’s articles are collectively titled “Hamas, Syria, Iran: the new axis of evil.” In them, the author builds a stark and damning case against the Iran-led bloc. Ibrahim accuses Iran and its allies of deliberately sabotaging Egypt’s mediation efforts to prevent a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Teheran, says the author, wants to prevent a resolution of the conflict, so that Iran can “trade Hamas for political gain” at some later date. The articles lump Hamas together with Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood, condemning all three in the following terms: “Hamas believes, as do the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Hizbullah and other religious organizations, that everything it does is always right… Religious movements contain elements similar to Nazism, as do many tyrannical parties that brought disaster upon their respective nations…” Ibrahim goes on to accuse Hamas of “trying to bring destruction” upon the Palestinians. The author declares that Hamas is indifferent to the fate of the Palestinians, since it believes that it is “more important to strengthen the Syria-Iran axis of evil, which sponsors the religious movements in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine.”

The Al-Goumhurriya editor claims that Hamas’s actions make it part of “Tel Aviv’s plan to eliminate the Palestinian problem.” Having thus handily accused the Iran-led “axis of evil” of the ultimate crime (de facto alliance with Israel), Ibrahim goes on to ridicule Hizbullah, accusing it of waging war “only in front of the television cameras.” Qatar, too, does not escape Ibrahim’s censure. Again, the author seeks to contrast Qatar’s nationalist posturing with its close relations with the US, and its sales of natural gas to Israel. (All translations from Al-Goumhurriya by MEMRI: The Middle East Media Research Institute, http://www.memri.org) Ibrahim’s article is being seen as of real significance by many Middle East analysts. Veteran scholar and Jerusalem Post contributor Barry Rubin called it “one of the most important articles I’ve seen in the Arab press in the last 20 years.” The article reflects a new clarity in the language of the regime in Cairo, as it addresses head-on the current rift in the Arab world. Naturally, Israel is still presented in a distorted and rhetorical way. Egypt attempts to strip the pro-Iranian bloc of its self-proclaimed mantle of “resistance” to Israel by claiming that Hamas is objectively in league with “Tel Aviv.” Egypt’s continued verbal adherence to one-sided criticism of Israel was further demonstrated in remarks made by the republic’s heir apparent, Gamal Mubarak, in a recent trip to Rafah. But this familiar absurdity should not detract from the significance of what is happening.

The old prism through which Middle Eastern affairs has been viewed is becoming less and less relevant. Is what is taking place in Gaza a war between the Israeli and Palestinian camps, or the Israeli and Arab camps? These are the familiar boxes in which one is instinctively inclined to place it. But on a fundamental level, it is neither. Egypt’s increasing willingness to acknowledge this fact derives not from sentiment, but from realpolitik. Cairo is aware that if Hamas is seen to emerge victorious or unscathed from the events in Gaza, this will hand a massive victory to Iran and Syria, which seek to undermine Egypt’s position as the leading Arab state. Mubarak told European foreign ministers last week that “Hamas must not be allowed to emerge from the fighting with the upper hand.” Egypt and Saudi Arabia, once rivals for the leadership of the Arab world, are today united in attempting to stem the power of Iran, Syria and their clients.

Egypt’s attitude is of immediate practical significance because if a real regime of control can be imposed at Rafah, this can serve to “dry up” Hamas-ruled Gaza – turning it into a small Islamist failed state, rather than the Iranian-supplied fortress that the opposing bloc is planning. Mubarak and Intelligence Minister Omar Suleiman flew to Saudi Arabia earlier this week. Their intention was to prevent, together with the Saudis, the convening of an emergency Arab summit proposed by Qatar to discuss the situation in Gaza. The details of the diplomacy are less important than its broader meaning.

A new and unfamiliar conflict is emerging in the region. It does not yet have a name. A major battle between two of its key protagonists is taking place in Gaza. This conflict finds Israel on the same side as the two main states of the Arab world. The conflict has so far been characterized by a series of victories for the opposing side. Behind the scenes, there is shared determination and hope that the fight in Gaza may end in a first significant setback for the Iran-led axis.

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Analysis: Obama: An Innocent Abroad

Jerusalem Post- 21/05/2009

The London-based Arabic newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi has published what it claims are key details of the new Middle East peace plan to be presented by President Obama in his speech in Cairo on June 4. Details of the plan made the front page of two leading Israeli newspapers. If the revelations prove accurate, they reveal a US administration as yet unacquainted with several basic facts of life concerning politics and strategy in the Middle East. There were those in Israel who suspected Obama of being a kind of wolf in sheep’s clothing, preparing with a friendly smile to offer up Israel as a sacrifice to its regional enemies. The picture emerging from the alleged details of his plan suggest a different, though not necessarily more comforting characterization: When it comes to the Middle East, Obama is an innocent abroad.

Observe: We are told that the new plan represents a revised version of the 2002 Arab peace plan and is to offer the following: a demilitarized Palestinian state approximating the armistice lines of June 5, 1967. Territorial exchanges may take place on the West Bank. This state will be established within four years of the commencement of negotiations. On Palestinian refugees: The refugees and their descendants will be naturalized in their countries of current residence, or will have the right to move to the new Palestinian state. In parallel to the negotiations with the Palestinians, separate negotiating tracks with the Syrians and Lebanese will be established. If the Obama plan does indeed include these elements, its failure is a certainty, because it has been formulated without reference to regional realities.

Currently, west of the Jordan River there are three political entities: Israel, the West Bank Palestinian Authority, and a Hamas-run, quasi-sovereign body in the Gaza Strip. Entities 1 and 3 are in a state of war with each other. Entity 2’s existence is underwritten by entity 1, without which it would be devoured by entity 3. The Obama plan, it would appear, simply fails to take into account the fact of Hamas-run Gaza’s existence. Yet the decision this week by West Bank PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas to form a narrow government is testimony to the Hamas-led statelet’s durability. There is no Palestinian force able, or other force willing, to destroy it. It has made clear that it does not intend to negotiate itself out of existence. For as long as it is there, armed by Iran and opposed to all moves toward reconciliation, all plans based on authoritative peace negotiations between Israel and the PA are divorced from reality.

The refugee question is to be addressed by naturalization or a “return” to the borders of the new Palestinian state. There is no significant Palestinian faction which will agree to this. The Islamist factions, obviously, will reject it out of hand. It will also be opposed by Fatah. This movement is in any case in a state of disarray and disunity. But the trends at rank and file level in it are toward greater religiosity and greater radicalism. The issue of the “return,” far more than the issue of the “Palestinian state,” is the foundation stone of Palestinian nationalism as imagined by Fatah. There is no way that the movement could abandon it. If it did, it would be almost certain to cede the leadership of the Palestinian national movement. Regarding the issue of the “naturalization” of refugees and their descendants, it is not quite clear how Lebanon and Syria, home to large Palestinian populations, are to be persuaded to grant full citizenship to their residents of Palestinian origin. Opposition to the tawteen (naturalization) of Palestinian residents is one of the very few issues on which all Lebanese political factions are united. A government dominated by Hizbullah is likely to emerge following the Lebanese elections on June 7. Its default position will be support for the Iranian-led regional bloc, and opposition to all attempts at a negotiated peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Certainly, such a government will feel no inclination toward helping out the US administration by abandoning a key, consensual Lebanese political stance.

Syria will also not abandon a core pro-Palestinian position in order to accommodate Washington. As for the view of even Washington’s allies among the Palestinians for this option – naturalization was overtly rejected by Mahmoud Abbas on a visit to Lebanon last year. Above and beyond the details, the plan revealed in Al-Quds al-Arabi fails to acknowledge the salient fact of current Middle East strategy: namely, the division of the region into an Islamist “resistance” bloc led by Iran, and a loose coalition of all those states opposed to this bloc.

There is a conspiracy theory according to which Obama, with Machiavellian cunning, knows that his plan is unworkable, and intends to use its failure to cast blame and accusation on Israel. Who knows? Perhaps evidence will yet emerge in support for this thesis. It seems more likely, however, that the president remains enthralled by the sunny illusions of the peace process of the 1990s, and is about to give them another run around the block. He has four years to follow the well-trodden path from innocence to experience. The problem is that further afield, there are other, more urgent clocks ticking.

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