We’ll take the Dowry – You keep the Bride

Posted on March 27, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 31/07/2008

A fourth round of indirect talks between Syrian and Israeli representatives was concluded in Istanbul this week and as the Turkish mediators kept themselves in shape conveying messages between the hotel rooms of the two countries’ delegations, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was keen to stress the urgency of the hour. The time was approaching, the prime minister said, when gestures would no longer be enough. Rather, it would soon be time for the Syrians to make their choice between the “Iranian grip” and their partnership in the “axis of evil,” and rejoining the “family of nations” in pursuit of peace and “economic development.” Actions and statements from Syria and its allies, however, convey a distinctly less pressing sense of the negotiations.

More indirect contacts have been tentatively scheduled for later this month, but for the Syrians, the already considerable benefits derived from the very act of talking are more important than the talks themselves. Damascus’s allies in Iran have also given no sign of real concern that their most important Arab allies are about to jump ship. Damascus’s main aim in entering the talks was to use them as a means to rebuild relations with the US and other Western powers, in particular France. These reached a nadir in recent years, most importantly because of Syrian subversion in Lebanon, and suspicions of Damascus’s involvement in the murder of former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri and a string of subsequent political murders in that country. Syria is determined to prevent the functioning of the international tribunal into the Hariri murder.

The talks with Israel are intended to demonstrate Syria’s willingness to conform with Western hopes for a peace breakthrough in the region. They are part of a sort of “carrot and stick” strategy pursued by Syria, whereby its clients – for example Hizbullah – make tangible gains through the brute employment of political violence. Once it has been established that Syria and its friends cannot be ignored, Damascus then sets out to reap diplomatic gains by offering a cautious hand of reconciliation. But this hand of reconciliation is intended to add a layer to the gains achieved through violence – not to bargain them away. This strategy has served Syria well in the past. It has been likened to an arsonist who offers his service to the fire brigade. With regard to Syria’s contact with Israel, the terms have been clear from the outset. Damascus is in no hurry. Syrian officials, speaking in Arabic, have made clear that they believe the negotiations would likely take between one and three years for completion, and that no summit meeting would be likely in the foreseeable future. The Syrians have also made clear that Damascus’s long-standing alliance with Iran is not a subject of discussion in the talks, which are concerned with regaining the Golan Heights by Syria only.

As Samir Taqi, the Syrian “independent researcher” who handled the initial contacts preceding the negotiations put it, “It would be naive to think Syria will neglect or abandon its strategic alliances that do not stem from the Arab-Israeli conflict.” So far, the strategy seems to be paying dividends. For the cost of the flight tickets and hotel rooms in Istanbul, Assad has ended Syria’s isolation. He and his wife found themselves feted in Paris in early July where Syria was welcomed into French President Sarkozy’s new Mediterranean Forum. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem beamed after his meetings with French officials that the Hariri tribunal had not even been mentioned. The reception in Washington has been more cautious, of course. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welsh made it clear that he was not prepared to meet with Syrian official Riad Daoudi as part of talks with an “unofficial” Syrian delegation in the US last week. But here, given Syria’s projected time frame for negotiations with Israel, it is evident that Damascus is looking beyond its foes in the Bush Administration. Assad evidently expects a more friendly face in the White House by early 2009, and this offers a further reason for Syria’s lack of haste.

With all this rapprochement going on, the alliance with Iran seems safe and sound. Muallem was in Teheran this week, and met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad. The two reconfirmed what Ahmedinejad called their “regional cooperation,” and the Iranian president lauded the foiling of “the Zionist regime” and America’s plans in Lebanon and Syria. Thus, the act of talking in Istanbul seems a worthy investment. But it is the side benefits of the conversation which interests Damascus. This was perhaps most eloquently summed up yesterday on the Web site of the official Syrian newspaper Tishreen’s. While the regional newspaper Sharq al-Awsat devoted two editorials this week to dissecting the negotiations, on the same day that the talks resumed, Tishreen’s homepage failed even to acknowledge that they were taking place. Instead, the lead story on its Web site informed readers that “his excellency President Bashar Assad met with a delegation of American churchmen yesterday. In the meeting, we are told, his excellency stressed the importance of dialogue between nations.” There could be few more eloquent demonstrations of Syrian intentions. When it comes to negotiating with Israel, Assad is keen to take the dowry, while showing little enthusiasm for embracing the bride.

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Assad’s Shopping List

Posted on March 27, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 20/08/2008

President Bashar Assad of Syria began a trip to Russia this week. Russian news agency RIA Novosti has quoted the Syrian Information Ministry as confirming that the trip will last two days. According to the statement, the purpose of the trip is to discuss bilateral relations and the latest world and regional developments, particularly relating to the Middle East peace process and to Iraq. Assad’s trip to Moscow comes at a particularly opportune time. Russia is in the process of completing what looks like a successful, contemptuous defiance of international will over its actions in Georgia. In the Caucasus, Moscow has thrown down a direct challenge to the US-dominated post Cold-war international order. Syria, meanwhile, is part of an Iran-led regional bloc which seeks to issue a similar challenge in the Middle East, albeit on a smaller scale. But Assad is not in Moscow purely to compare notes with the Russians. Rather, his trip has a list of clear and practical objectives. During the Cold War, the USSR was of course Syria’s main arms supplier. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Damascus was left with an outstanding debt of $13.4 billion to Moscow for weapons purchased.

Throughout the 1990s, with Syria stagnant and Russia plunged into economic and political chaos, this outstanding debt cast a chill over relations between the two countries. This chill has now thawed. In 2005, Moscow agreed to write off 73 percent of the debt. This reduced Syria’s foreign debt to less than 10% of its GDP, allowing Damascus once more to focus on arms procurement. Large-scale purchases of arms from Russia began that same year. Over the following two years, according to Israeli sources, Syria purchased 50 Pantsir SE-1 and Tor-M1 air-defense systems from Moscow. Sophisticated anti-tank guided weapons systems were also acquired. There are conflicting reports as to whether the Pantsir air defense systems had been fully deployed at the time of the successful IAF raid on a suspected Syrian plutonium reactor in September, 2007. The raid, in any case, undoubtedly represented a significant failure for the Syrians. The Syrian response has been to accelerate the pace of arms purchases from willing Russia. In May, a senior Syrian delegation headed by air force commander General Akhmad al-Ratyb visited the Russian capital. The delegation secured the purchase of Mig-29 SMT fighter aircraft. This time around, the leading item on Assad’s shopping list is thought to be the sophisticated S-300 long range anti-aircraft missile system. This state-of-the-art system has already been purchased from Russia by Iran. Iran is expected to deploy it by March, 2009. The Iranian intention, clearly, is for this system to be used in defense of Teheran’s nuclear program.

Assad, in his previous visit to Moscow in December, 2006, made unsuccessful attempts to purchase the S-300. Israeli diplomats have been working to try to prevent a successful Syrian acquisition this time around. The outcome is not yet clear. The S-300 is thought to be the leading item on Assad’s list of planned purchases in Moscow. A series of public statements by Russian officials over the past days stressing (and exaggerating) Israel’s defense relationship with Georgia could be interpreted as a negative sign, but nothing is yet certain.

What lies behind Russia’s growing interest in arms supplies to the Middle East? This is part of a larger picture – Russia’s return as a player on the global diplomatic stage. The Russians would like to leverage their supply of arms to Iran and Syria into influence, forming an alternative address for diplomatic mediation – or for help in challenging enemies. Either way, Russia intends not to have its voice ignored. The days when all other countries automatically accepted US predominance on issues of Middle East statecraft have passed. Of course, Russia is still far too weak a state to be able to provide a real challenge to the western system of alliances in the Middle East. Syria, too, for all its rhetoric, possesses armed forces which still suffer from acute structural and educational problems, as well as the problem of norms which limit their ability to successfully absorb and operate ultra-modern systems. Still, something is changing.

The regional alliance of Iran and its allies is currently acting as a ‘spoiler’ in many flashpoints across the region – Iraq, Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian arena, Kuwait and the Israel-Syria-Hizbullah triangle. In all these linked arenas, influence is being built through the exacerbation of conflict, and the preventing of peaceful development. Iran and Syria have had the good fortune to meet a major power – Russia – whose interests happen to currently coincide with the strengthening of anti-status-quo powers in the Middle East. The result is a relationship based on mutual benefit. President Assad will be hoping to reap tangible gains from this as he makes his way through meetings with the power elite in Moscow over the next two weeks.

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7 years after 9/11, al-Qaida is in Disarray

Posted on March 27, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 11/09/2008

# Seven years after September 11, 2001, al-Qaida as an organization is seen by many analysts to be in some disarray. One prominent observer of the network depicts it as having been reduced to a core of 200-300 operatives. Yet al-Qaida as an idea and as a franchise remains healthy and is still a threat. Responding to this changed reality, the al-Qaida leadership is investing increased resources in propaganda, with the intention of radicalizing large numbers of young Muslims throughout the world. And these efforts are proving successful, though it is doubtful whether this success will produce real-world political benefits for al-Qaida.

The 9/11 attacks were meant to draw the United States into the Middle East, opening an extended war of attrition. Al-Qaida’s model for this was the jihadis’ war against the USSR in Afghanistan. Those attacks succeeded in drawing the US in. However, the score card so far is largely against the Sunni jihadists. Consider: Between 2003-2006, al-Qaida attempted to launch an insurgency in Saudi Arabia. This period saw a series of attacks on Western facilities such as the US Consulate in Jeddah and the headquarters of the Vinnell Corporation. Individual westerners were targeted by gunmen. The Abqaiq oil processing facility (through which 60 percent of Saudi Arabia’s oil passes) was attacked. But the Saudi response proved effective. By the end of 2006, over 260 terrorists had been killed or captured. All but one of the 26 men on the kingdom’s most-wanted list were dead or in jail, and the country was quiet. The attempt to spark an insurgency which could have made al-Qaida a serious contender for power in Saudi Arabia was a failure.

A wave of terror attacks in Egyptian-controlled Sinai took place in the years following 9/11. These included the most bloody act of terror in modern Egypt’s history – the bombings in Sharm e-Sheikh in July 2005. Yet the authorities have succeeded so far in isolating the threat in Sinai. The jihadis are not broken in Egypt. But the idea of al-Qaida posing a threat to the regime in the birthplace of Ayman al-Zawahiri today seems fanciful.

In Jordan, al-Qaida activities peaked in 2004-5, with the ambitious attempt to bomb the General Intelligence Department Headquarters in Amman. Three bloody bombings of civilians at hotels in the capital in 2005 succeeded in awakening a wave of revulsion toward al-Qaida, and the Jordanian-born terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

A similar wave of alienation and disgust among ordinary Iraqi Sunnis has set back al-Qaida’s fortunes in that country. The emergence of the “Sahwa” (awakening) movement, which has contributed to the sharp decline in attacks on US forces, derived in part from the excesses committed by non-Iraqi al-Qaida fighters. The violent attempt by al-Qaida men to impose their own brand of Islamic norms on local Sunnis resulted in alienation and failure. All of these examples must be placed in context. Al-Qaida has not been defeated. It is down, but not out. It maintains a strong infrastructure in the lawless, tribal region of northwest Pakistan. From there, al-Qaida operatives are able to aid the resurgent Taliban in attacking NATO forces in Afghanistan. From this heartland, the network is able also to continue to offer training and instruction to would-be jihadis from the west and elsewhere.

The potentially disastrous consequences of this have been revealed in the details of the foiled plot to detonate liquid explosives in seven airliners over the Atlantic in July, 2006. And the network has, of course, succeeded in committing a series of atrocities in the west since 9/11. But al-Qaida is not simply an entity committed to inflicting personal tragedy on as many individuals and families as it can manage. Rather, it lays claim to a political strategy. As an international network committed to bringing down governments as a stage in the creation of a global Caliphate, al-Qaida has achieved little of tangible weight in the last seven years. As an idea and a franchise, by contrast, al-Qaida and its brand of Salafi Islam have flourished. This has been reflected in the proliferation of “copycat” groups laying claim to the feared name of al-Qaida from southeast Asia via the Gaza Strip and North Africa to the capital cities of western Europe. This process has not taken place by chance, but is partly the result of the accelerated propaganda efforts undertaken by the Pakistan-based al-Qaida leadership in recent years. In 2001, al-Qaida’s media communications abilities were sparse and primitive.

Today, there are reckoned to be around 4,500 overtly pro al-Qaida Web sites promoting the group’s messages. The network is adept at producing sophisticated videos, including footage of terror attacks, which are then disseminated worldwide. The result is that the “brand names” of bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and al-Qaida remain the most recognizable symbols of Sunni jihadi Islam in the world. And movements inspired by them – such as the Jaish al-Islam and Jaish al-Umma in Gaza, the Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon and many others – continue to emerge. Al-Qaida has combined sometimes nightmarishly effective tactical ability with a somewhat other-worldly, incoherent political and strategic program. Political Islam is transforming the politics of the Middle East, and represents a key strategic challenge to the west. But the particular version of it represented by the perpetrators of 9/11 is today more of a murderous side-show than the nerve center of the future Caliphate which it likes to imagine itself.

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The Gardeners of Beirut

Posted on March 27, 2011 by jonathanspyer

23/10/2008

An anecdote recently told me by a senior source in the Arab media indicates the process by which Hizbullah is rebuilding its strength south of the Litani River. The source, who is well connected in Lebanon, related the story of a family who left their home in one of the villages of the south during the 2006 war. They now return from Beirut to the south for weekends. Recently, on returning to their southern residence, they noticed that their garden had been dug up, and that an unfamiliar tree had mysteriously appeared in the area. The family made inquiries as to who or what had been responsible for this item of uninvited landscape gardening on their property. They were quietly advised not to further pursue the issue, and the matter was dropped. This example was cited as a typical instance of what is currently taking place in southern Lebanon.

This story, from a trustworthy source, suggests the extent to which Hizbullah is able to expect – or impose – silence and consent among the population of the south. It appears to offer supporting evidence to the suspicion that Hizbullah is using populated areas of southern Lebanon as the framework within which it is rebuilding its independent military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. But it also hints at the problematic “peaceful coexistence” which appears to be maintained between Hizbullah and the bodies tasked with implementing UN Resolution 1701 south of the Litani River – namely, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces. On June 27 of this year, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued his latest report on the implementation of Resolution 1701. The report noted Israeli claims that Hizbullah was in the process of rebuilding its military capacity in the south. It confirmed that UNIFIL, in collaboration with the LAF, would “immediately investigate” any claims of violations of Resolution 1701. However, the UN secretary-general found “no evidence of new military infrastructure in the area of operations.”

A possible explanation for UNIFIL’s failure to become aware of incidents such as the one described above is to be found by observing this force’s own patterns of deployment in the area, and its relations with the Lebanese army (LAF). A visitor to southern Lebanon will be immediately struck by the absence of international and LAF forces in populated areas. UNIFIL does not conduct patrols, establish checkpoints or maintain a presence of any kind within the towns and villages south of the Litani. Indeed, the UN forces have little unmediated security-related contact of any kind with the population of the area.

Thus, while UNIFIL, according to its own figures, carries out around 400 foot, vehicle and air patrols in each 24-hour period, these take place exclusively along recognized patrol paths and in rural areas. UN forces maintain no independent checkpoints and are involved in a minimum of joint checkpoints with the LAF (fewer than 10 such positions in the entirety of southern Lebanon, according to available figures.) The result of this pattern of activity is that UNIFIL has made some significant discoveries of ordnance in rural areas. However, given the physical absence of UN forces from any of the areas where evidence of Hizbullah infrastructure-building has emerged, it is not surprising that UNIFIL reports “no evidence” that such activity is taking place. In general, the two sides appear to do their best to stay out of each other’s way. The reason for the emergence of this pattern was succinctly expressed recently in private by an Italian official, who noted that the Italian government possessed no mandate from the public for the arrival of Italian soldiers in body bags from southern Lebanon.

Accidents have happened, however, most famously in an incident near the village of Jibal al-Butm in the western sector on the night of March 30-31. On that occasion, a UNIFIL patrol noted a suspicious truck towing a trailer and began to follow it. Two cars containing armed men then blocked the further progress of the UNIFIL patrol. The troops, in the words of a UN report, “challenged” the armed men. Unfortunately, while the challenge was going on, the suspicious truck disappeared. The armed men then also left the area. The UN’s report on the incident dryly notes that despite a Lebanese army investigation into the incident, efforts to “locate or identify the perpetrators have proved unsuccessful.” The role of the Lebanese army in events in the south must also be considered.

The LAF, it may be assumed, has a far better idea than does UNIFIL of what is happening on the ground. It maintains a far more visible presence, though it also avoids open patrolling in populated areas. But the LAF is the same army that existed throughout a decade and a half of effective Syrian control in Lebanon. In that time, Syria spread its control throughout the organs of the Lebanese state. No purge of the LAF took place after the Syrian departure, and it may be assumed that significant elements of the army continue to act according to a pro-Syrian agenda.

This, among other things, would include turning a blind eye to Hizbullah activity in the south. So Resolution 1701 notwithstanding, no force currently exists to effectively challenge or limit the activities of the Hizbullah “para-state” in southern Lebanon. As a result, the infrastructure for the next war is currently being built, woven into the fabric of civilian life, a few miles north of the border.

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US Raid shows Assad’s over-Estimation

Posted on March 27, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 29/10/2008

This week’s US raid across the Iraqi-Syrian border resembles a number of similar actions carried out by American forces against al-Qaida targets over the last year in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan. It demonstrates a US willingness to ignore national borders when dealing with states and organizations that themselves display a studied indifference to such niceties. The raid is the latest in a string of recent events that leave the Bashar Assad regime looking vulnerable and weakened. The target of the incursion, according to US sources quoted in the international media, was one Badran Turki al-Mazidih, also known as Abu Ghadiyah. Abu Ghadiyah was an Iraqi-born Sunni jihadi operative, hailing from Mosul. Since 2005, he had led a network that played a key role in moving foreign volunteers, weapons and cash for the Sunni insurgency across the border between Syria and Iraq. Abu Ghadiyah appears to have been linked to the network established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He ascended to his senior position after one of Zarqawi’s key lieutenants, Suleiman Khalid Darwish, was killed by US forces in Iraq in June 2005. Since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Syria’s relationship with the Sunni insurgency has been a source of tension. Damascus international airport has been the main international thoroughfare for young militants en route to the battlegrounds of central Iraq.

Syria’s 740 km.-long border with Iraq was the key entry point for these men. According to Maj.-Gen. John Kelly, commander of Multinational Force-West in Iraq, “The Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi intelligence forces feel that al-Qaida operatives and others operate, live pretty openly on the Syrian side… And periodically we know that they try to come across.” The majority of the volunteers were on their way to carry out suicide bombings in Iraq. Wanted leaders of the insurgency – such as Mishan al-Jabouri – have also set up home openly in Syria. Support for insurgent and paramilitary organizations as a tool of policy toward neighboring countries is a tried and tested approach for the regime in Damascus. Indeed, it has been a weapon in Syria’s arsenal at some point in time with every country with which it has a border. Thus, the Assad regime supported the Kurdish PKK in Turkey in the 1990s.

In the 1970s, Syria supported Palestinian insurgency in Jordan. Syria offers a safe haven and support to the leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as a number of secular Palestinian armed groups engaged in violence against Israel. Syria of course arms and supports Hizbullah in Lebanon as well as offering backing for Palestinian armed groups. So Syrian support for Sunni jihad in Iraq fits a pattern. This support is of a cynical nature. The Syrian regime has been known to recruit foreign fighters on its soil for operations in the Syrian interest by threatening to turn them over to their own countries’ security services if they refuse. Syria also likes to think it can turn the tap of support on and off at will. Thus, when Damascus has wanted to demonstrate to the West its supposed cooperation in the “War on terror” it has not hesitated to round up a few random foreign jihadis, including some who may have had no involvement in violent operations. Underlying this Syrian approach has been the assumption that Damascus would be permitted to operate according to different rules than those expected of other states. Where this assumption has been challenged – as by the Turks in 1998 – Damascus has tended to retreat.

It now appears that Washington wishes to issue its own challenge to this pattern of behavior. In this, the US is following tactics adopted in northern Pakistan against al-Qaida. Over the last year, the US has doubled its rate of cross-border strikes against targets in North Waziristan. Ten such operations are known to have taken place this year. The latest US action is also in line with an increased willingness on the part of Israel to respond in kind to Syrian support for organizations engaged in violence against Israelis. The Israeli raid on a suspected Syrian plutonium reactor in September 2007, and perhaps the subsequent killings of Hizbullah’s Imad Mughniyeh and Syria’s Gen. Muhammad Suleiman on Syrian soil offer examples.

The extent to which Syria is able to control the jihadi elements that it has allowed to gather and flourish on its soil is open to question. The bombing last month in Damascus – which bore signs of being the work of Sunni jihadis – appeared to offer further evidence of the Syrian regime’s growing inability to police its own territory. All this adds up to an emerging sense of the Assad regime as an entity now beginning to pay the price for its over-estimation of itself and its allies. Assad was evidently thrilled by the defiance of jihadi forces of both Shi’ite and Sunni hue. He may now be discovering that supporting their activities does not come without a cost. Still, there is probably no reason for the regime to worry unduly yet.

Assad faces embarrassment at home, but no serious domestic force threatens his rule. The Europeans are continuing the wooing of the regime accelerated by Israel’s opening of negotiations. The Syrians may also hope that the shifting political landscape in both the US and Israel will suffice to make any current indications of a changing approach conveniently short-lived. Whether they will be proven right remains to be seen.

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Assad’s looming Downfall?

Posted on March 27, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post-25/03/2011

In southern Syria, the uprising against President Bashar Assad is continuing. On Wednesday, six people, including a doctor from a prominent local family, were killed when the security forces entered the Omari mosque in Daraa. Later in the day, security forces fired live ammunition at people protesting these killings, leading to a number of additional deaths. Thursday’s death toll was far higher. Accurate figures for the number now killed in Daraa are impossible to obtain.

Following the killings in the mosque, the Assad regime’s official media began to spread a somewhat surreal version of events. The official Sana news agency quoted an “official source” as saying an “armed gang” had attacked a medical team in an ambulance near the mosque. The armed gang, according to the source, was also responsible for the stockpiling of weaponry in the Omari mosque.

Sana noted the determination of the security forces to continue their pursuit of “the armed gangs which terrify civilians, and execute killings.” The report went on to note that “more than 1 million SMS” messages had been sent out – “mostly from Israel” – which were “inciting” Syrian citizens to use the mosques as launch pads for riots. Sana’s official source also noted that SMS messages had been sent to Syrian citizens abroad threatening to kill them if they reported the crimes of the armed gangs. So far, so bizarre.

THE CLUMSY propaganda of the regime’s mouthpieces at first glance might seem to have something pathetic about it. The “Syria Revolution 2011” page is on Facebook, updating every few minutes with fluent, impassioned messages.

News and rumors of events in Banias, Aleppo, Deraa and its surrounding villages spread across the globe at the touch of a button. The most that the Assad regime can manage by way of information warfare, meanwhile, is this absurd, clunky, Ceausescu-style finger pointing.

Talking to Syrian oppositionists, the sense that the Assad regime is running out of options is indeed very strong. Some say the prospect of a “Hama rules” style bloodbath is now simply a bogeyman, a bluff on the part of a regime running out of steam. One veteran member of Syrian’s exiled opposition noted that the people of Syria had lost their fear. This meant the fall of the Assad regime could now only be a matter of time, whatever measures it took.

Despite the undoubted aesthetic inferiority of the Assad regime’s information campaigns, however, it would be a major mistake to start dusting off the eulogies for the Alawite/Ba’athist family dictatorship in Damascus just yet.

This may be the first time Bashar Assad has faced concerted internal opposition, but it is not the first time his regime has looked on the ropes. In 2004, when the Americans entered Baghdad, there were many who predicted the demise of the Assad family regime.

Syria was forced into a humiliating withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005.

What followed was a deft campaign by Syria of ruthless political violence, mobilization of proxies, intimidation and burgeoning alliance with Iran which has led, five years later, to a resurgence by the regime, riding high for the last two years. Assad did not accept what looked like the verdict of history in 2004/5. There is no reason to suppose he will meekly do so now.

The “toolbox” the Syrian regime utilized in the 2005-8 period served it well. It still possesses it. This same box of tricks is the common property of the various members of the Iran-led Muqawama (resistance) bloc in the region, which includes the Hamas enclave in Gaza, Hezbollah’s Lebanon and Iran itself.

Recent events suggest that this set of options is currently being utilized by various members of this bloc to telling effect. Its members believe these methods will not only succeed in insulating them from any internal fallout from the Arab spring, but will also enable them to press forward, making gains from enemies weakened by the internal dissent.

The Iranian hyperactivity of recent weeks fits this pattern – the weapons ships, the convoys in Sudan, the arms-laden planes intercepted on their way to Syria.

Hamas, too, appears to want to change the subject of the conversation in Gaza by provoking a new fight with Israel.

This is the camp of which Assad is a part. These are its methods.

There has even been speculation on Arabic websites regarding a possible Syrian angle to the bombing in Jerusalem. Islamic Jihad and the smaller secular terror groups are domiciled in Damascus, after all. And Syria, too, has an interest right now in changing the subject of regional focus.

Impossible to know, of course. But not impossible.

SEEN FROM this point of view, the events and messages of the week in Syria no longer look quite so anachronistic. The killings in the Omari mosque are serving to slowly spread an atmosphere of tension and fear across the town.

Sana’s absurd explanations only add to the sense of strangeness and slightly unhinged ambiguity which is the Syrian regime’s natural element.

The “strategy of tension” brought the Assad regime back from the doldrums after 2005. Not all at once, but over time. Proxies, provocations, the artful application of sudden violence, ambiguity, military activity disguised as politics, politics disguised as military activity. This is what the Syrian regime does. This is what the regional alliance of which it is a part does. And is doing. And is gaining from. The notion that there is only Hama-style massacres or the victory of Facebook revolution is simplistic.

There is another set of rules by which Syria, Hamas, Iran and their friends operate. Call them Muqawama rules.

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Muqawama Rules

Posted on March 25, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post, 25/3/11

In southern Syria, the uprising against President Bashar Assad is continuing. On Wednesday, six people, including a doctor from a prominent local family, were killed when the security forces entered the Omari mosque in Daraa. Later in the day, security forces fired live ammunition at people protesting these killings, leading to a number of additional deaths. Thursday’s death toll was far higher. Accurate figures for the number now killed in Daraa are impossible to obtain.

Following the killings in the mosque, the Assad regime’s official media began to spread a somewhat surreal version of events. The official Sana news agency quoted an “official source” as saying an “armed gang” had attacked a medical team in an ambulance near the mosque. The armed gang, according to the source, was also responsible for the stockpiling of weaponry in the Omari mosque.

Sana noted the determination of the security forces to continue their pursuit of “the armed gangs which terrify civilians, and execute killings.” The report went on to note that “more than 1 million SMS” messages had been sent out – “mostly from Israel” – which were “inciting” Syrian citizens to use the mosques as launch pads for riots. Sana’s official source also noted that SMS messages had been sent to Syrian citizens abroad threatening to kill them if they reported the crimes of the armed gangs. So far, so bizarre.

THE CLUMSY propaganda of the regime’s mouthpieces at first glance might seem to have something pathetic about it. The “Syria Revolution 2011” page is on Facebook, updating every few minutes with fluent, impassioned messages.

News and rumors of events in Banias, Aleppo, Deraa and its surrounding villages spread across the globe at the touch of a button. The most that the Assad regime can manage by way of information warfare, meanwhile, is this absurd, clunky, Ceausescu-style finger pointing.

Talking to Syrian oppositionists, the sense that the Assad regime is running out of options is indeed very strong. Some say the prospect of a “Hama rules” style bloodbath is now simply a bogeyman, a bluff on the part of a regime running out of steam. One veteran member of Syrian’s exiled opposition noted that the people of Syria had lost their fear. This meant the fall of the Assad regime could now only be a matter of time, whatever measures it took.

Despite the undoubted aesthetic inferiority of the Assad regime’s information campaigns, however, it would be a major mistake to start dusting off the eulogies for the Alawite/Ba’athist family dictatorship in Damascus just yet.

This may be the first time Bashar Assad has faced concerted internal opposition, but it is not the first time his regime has looked on the ropes. In 2004, when the Americans entered Baghdad, there were many who predicted the demise of the Assad family regime.

Syria was forced into a humiliating withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005.

What followed was a deft campaign by Syria of ruthless political violence, mobilization of proxies, intimidation and burgeoning alliance with Iran which has led, five years later, to a resurgence by the regime, riding high for the last two years. Assad did not accept what looked like the verdict of history in 2004/5. There is no reason to suppose he will meekly do so now.

The “toolbox” the Syrian regime utilized in the 2005-8 period served it well. It still possesses it. This same box of tricks is the common property of the various members of the Iran-led Muqawama (resistance) bloc in the region, which includes the Hamas enclave in Gaza, Hezbollah’s Lebanon and Iran itself.

Recent events suggest that this set of options is currently being utilized by various members of this bloc to telling effect. Its members believe these methods will not only succeed in insulating them from any internal fallout from the Arab spring, but will also enable them to press forward, making gains from enemies weakened by the internal dissent.

The Iranian hyperactivity of recent weeks fits this pattern – the weapons ships, the convoys in Sudan, the arms-laden planes intercepted on their way to Syria.

Hamas, too, appears to want to change the subject of the conversation in Gaza by provoking a new fight with Israel.

This is the camp of which Assad is a part. These are its methods.

There has even been speculation on Arabic websites regarding a possible Syrian angle to the bombing in Jerusalem. Islamic Jihad and the smaller secular terror groups are domiciled in Damascus, after all. And Syria, too, has an interest right now in changing the subject of regional focus.

Impossible to know, of course. But not impossible.

SEEN FROM this point of view, the events and messages of the week in Syria no longer look quite so anachronistic. The killings in the Omari mosque are serving to slowly spread an atmosphere of tension and fear across the town.

Sana’s absurd explanations only add to the sense of strangeness and slightly unhinged ambiguity which is the Syrian regime’s natural element.

The “strategy of tension” brought the Assad regime back from the doldrums after 2005. Not all at once, but over time. Proxies, provocations, the artful application of sudden violence, ambiguity, military activity disguised as politics, politics disguised as military activity. This is what the Syrian regime does. This is what the regional alliance of which it is a part does. And is doing. And is gaining from. The notion that there is only Hama-style massacres or the victory of Facebook revolution is simplistic.

There is another set of rules by which Syria, Hamas, Iran and their friends operate. Call them Muqawama rules.

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Analysis: The Gardeners of Beirut

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 23/10/2008

An anecdote recently told me by a senior source in the Arab media indicates the process by which Hizbullah is rebuilding its strength south of the Litani River. The source, who is well connected in Lebanon, related the story of a family who left their home in one of the villages of the south during the 2006 war. They now return from Beirut to the south for weekends. Recently, on returning to their southern residence, they noticed that their garden had been dug up, and that an unfamiliar tree had mysteriously appeared in the area. The family made inquiries as to who or what had been responsible for this item of uninvited landscape gardening on their property. They were quietly advised not to further pursue the issue, and the matter was dropped. This example was cited as a typical instance of what is currently taking place in southern Lebanon.

This story, from a trustworthy source, suggests the extent to which Hizbullah is able to expect – or impose – silence and consent among the population of the south. It appears to offer supporting evidence to the suspicion that Hizbullah is using populated areas of southern Lebanon as the framework within which it is rebuilding its independent military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. But it also hints at the problematic “peaceful coexistence” which appears to be maintained between Hizbullah and the bodies tasked with implementing UN Resolution 1701 south of the Litani River – namely, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces.

On June 27 of this year, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued his latest report on the implementation of Resolution 1701. The report noted Israeli claims that Hizbullah was in the process of rebuilding its military capacity in the south. It confirmed that UNIFIL, in collaboration with the LAF, would “immediately investigate” any claims of violations of Resolution 1701. However, the UN secretary-general found “no evidence of new military infrastructure in the area of operations.” A possible explanation for UNIFIL’s failure to become aware of incidents such as the one described above is to be found by observing this force’s own patterns of deployment in the area, and its relations with the Lebanese army (LAF).

A visitor to southern Lebanon will be immediately struck by the absence of international and LAF forces in populated areas. UNIFIL does not conduct patrols, establish checkpoints or maintain a presence of any kind within the towns and villages south of the Litani. Indeed, the UN forces have little unmediated security-related contact of any kind with the population of the area. Thus, while UNIFIL, according to its own figures, carries out around 400 foot, vehicle and air patrols in each 24-hour period, these take place exclusively along recognized patrol paths and in rural areas. UN forces maintain no independent checkpoints and are involved in a minimum of joint checkpoints with the LAF (fewer than 10 such positions in the entirety of southern Lebanon, according to available figures.) The result of this pattern of activity is that UNIFIL has made some significant discoveries of ordnance in rural areas. However, given the physical absence of UN forces from any of the areas where evidence of Hizbullah infrastructure-building has emerged, it is not surprising that UNIFIL reports “no evidence” that such activity is taking place.

In general, the two sides appear to do their best to stay out of each other’s way. The reason for the emergence of this pattern was succinctly expressed recently in private by an Italian official, who noted that the Italian government possessed no mandate from the public for the arrival of Italian soldiers in body bags from southern Lebanon.

Accidents have happened, however, most famously in an incident near the village of Jibal al-Butm in the western sector on the night of March 30-31. On that occasion, a UNIFIL patrol noted a suspicious truck towing a trailer and began to follow it. Two cars containing armed men then blocked the further progress of the UNIFIL patrol. The troops, in the words of a UN report, “challenged” the armed men. Unfortunately, while the challenge was going on, the suspicious truck disappeared. The armed men then also left the area. The UN’s report on the incident dryly notes that despite a Lebanese army investigation into the incident, efforts to “locate or identify the perpetrators have proved unsuccessful.”

The role of the Lebanese army in events in the south must also be considered. The LAF, it may be assumed, has a far better idea than does UNIFIL of what is happening on the ground. It maintains a far more visible presence, though it also avoids open patrolling in populated areas. But the LAF is the same army that existed throughout a decade and a half of effective Syrian control in Lebanon. In that time, Syria spread its control throughout the organs of the Lebanese state. No purge of the LAF took place after the Syrian departure, and it may be assumed that significant elements of the army continue to act according to a pro-Syrian agenda.

This, among other things, would include turning a blind eye to Hizbullah activity in the south. So Resolution 1701 notwithstanding, no force currently exists to effectively challenge or limit the activities of the Hizbullah “para-state” in southern Lebanon. As a result, the infrastructure for the next war is currently being built, woven into the fabric of civilian life, a few miles north of the border.

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Analysis: US Raid shows Assad’s Over-Estimation

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 29/10/2008

This week’s US raid across the Iraqi-Syrian border resembles a number of similar actions carried out by American forces against al-Qaida targets over the last year in the North Waziristan area of Pakistan. It demonstrates a US willingness to ignore national borders when dealing with states and organizations that themselves display a studied indifference to such niceties. The raid is the latest in a string of recent events that leave the Bashar Assad regime looking vulnerable and weakened. The target of the incursion, according to US sources quoted in the international media, was one Badran Turki al-Mazidih, also known as Abu Ghadiyah. Abu Ghadiyah was an Iraqi-born Sunni jihadi operative, hailing from Mosul.

Since 2005, he had led a network that played a key role in moving foreign volunteers, weapons and cash for the Sunni insurgency across the border between Syria and Iraq. Abu Ghadiyah appears to have been linked to the network established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. He ascended to his senior position after one of Zarqawi’s key lieutenants, Suleiman Khalid Darwish, was killed by US forces in Iraq in June 2005. Since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Syria’s relationship with the Sunni insurgency has been a source of tension. Damascus international airport has been the main international thoroughfare for young militants en route to the battlegrounds of central Iraq. Syria’s 740 km.-long border with Iraq was the key entry point for these men. According to Maj.-Gen. John Kelly, commander of Multinational Force-West in Iraq, “The Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi intelligence forces feel that al-Qaida operatives and others operate, live pretty openly on the Syrian side… And periodically we know that they try to come across.” The majority of the volunteers were on their way to carry out suicide bombings in Iraq. Wanted leaders of the insurgency – such as Mishan al-Jabouri – have also set up home openly in Syria. Support for insurgent and paramilitary organizations as a tool of policy toward neighboring countries is a tried and tested approach for the regime in Damascus.

Indeed, it has been a weapon in Syria’s arsenal at some point in time with every country with which it has a border. Thus, the Assad regime supported the Kurdish PKK in Turkey in the 1990s. In the 1970s, Syria supported Palestinian insurgency in Jordan. Syria offers a safe haven and support to the leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as a number of secular Palestinian armed groups engaged in violence against Israel. Syria of course arms and supports Hizbullah in Lebanon as well as offering backing for Palestinian armed groups. So Syrian support for Sunni jihad in Iraq fits a pattern. This support is of a cynical nature. The Syrian regime has been known to recruit foreign fighters on its soil for operations in the Syrian interest by threatening to turn them over to their own countries’ security services if they refuse. Syria also likes to think it can turn the tap of support on and off at will. Thus, when Damascus has wanted to demonstrate to the West its supposed cooperation in the “War on terror” it has not hesitated to round up a few random foreign jihadis, including some who may have had no involvement in violent operations.

Underlying this Syrian approach has been the assumption that Damascus would be permitted to operate according to different rules than those expected of other states. Where this assumption has been challenged – as by the Turks in 1998 – Damascus has tended to retreat. It now appears that Washington wishes to issue its own challenge to this pattern of behavior. In this, the US is following tactics adopted in northern Pakistan against al-Qaida. Over the last year, the US has doubled its rate of cross-border strikes against targets in North Waziristan. Ten such operations are known to have taken place this year. The latest US action is also in line with an increased willingness on the part of Israel to respond in kind to Syrian support for organizations engaged in violence against Israelis. The Israeli raid on a suspected Syrian plutonium reactor in September 2007, and perhaps the subsequent killings of Hizbullah’s Imad Mughniyeh and Syria’s Gen. Muhammad Suleiman on Syrian soil offer examples. The extent to which Syria is able to control the jihadi elements that it has allowed to gather and flourish on its soil is open to question.

The bombing last month in Damascus – which bore signs of being the work of Sunni jihadis – appeared to offer further evidence of the Syrian regime’s growing inability to police its own territory. All this adds up to an emerging sense of the Assad regime as an entity now beginning to pay the price for its over-estimation of itself and its allies. Assad was evidently thrilled by the defiance of jihadi forces of both Shi’ite and Sunni hue. He may now be discovering that supporting their activities does not come without a cost. Still, there is probably no reason for the regime to worry unduly yet.

Assad faces embarrassment at home, but no serious domestic force threatens his rule. The Europeans are continuing the wooing of the regime accelerated by Israel’s opening of negotiations. The Syrians may also hope that the shifting political landscape in both the US and Israel will suffice to make any current indications of a changing approach conveniently short-lived. Whether they will be proven right remains to be seen.

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Analysis: Israel’s reluctant Allies

Posted on March 23, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Jerusalem Post- 25/12/2008

There has recently been a significant increase in tension between major Arab states. The ongoing crisis in Gaza is the focus for the deterioration in relations, though it is only one aspect of a larger picture. The crisis is in relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and Syria on the other. The intra-Arab wrangling is itself linked to the broader strategic issue of Syria’s relations with non-Arab Iran. Among the strategic goals of the Iran-led regional alliance is the destruction of Israel. The doctrine of muqawamma – resistance – is the rhetorical framework by which Iran and its allies explain their activities.

The “status-quo” Arab states, meanwhile, have in the past sought to combine fiercely anti-Israel rhetoric with a decidedly pro-western orientation. Iran and the muqawamma forces are currently calling this bluff. The tensions derive from this process. How does Gaza fit into this? Egypt has been watching the situation in the Strip with growing concern since the Hamas coup of June 2007. This past May, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said that the meaning of Hamas rule in Gaza was that Egypt now has a “border with Iran.” In November, Cairo-sponsored talks were planned, to facilitate reconciliation between Hamas and the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority. The objective was to bring Hamas back under the PA wing – thus returning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to its strictly Israeli-Palestinian dimensions. This, it was hoped, would remove from Egypt the embarrassment of appearing to side with Israel against Hamas by keeping the Rafah crossing – which Egypt controls – sealed. But Hamas declined to attend the talks. The Hamas entity in Gaza’s is underwritten by Teheran and Damascus, which provide both financial and military aid. The pick of Hamas’s fighters train at Revolutionary Guard facilities in Iran. Since the Hamas takeover of Gaza, several hundred of these men have made their way clandestinely from Gaza to Egypt, Egypt to Syria and then Syria to Iran to learn the techniques of light infantry and guerrilla warfare. No less importantly, Iranian money keeps the Islamist mini-state of Gaza afloat. Exact amounts are difficult to gauge. But the Iranians pledged $250 million to Gaza after Ismail Haniyeh visited Teheran in December 2006.

Given the end of the cease-fire and the growing possibility of renewed open conflict between Israel and Gaza, positions have hardened. In Teheran, demonstrators called for Mubarak’s execution. Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem accused Egypt of blatant bias toward Fatah. Muhammad Ali Ibrahim, an Egyptian MP and editor of the government-sponsored Al-Gumhouriyya newspaper, expressed the essence of the Egyptian position in the following terms: “The steps taken by Syria today are not promoting the Palestinian cause but rather the interests and goals of the Iranians. Forgetting its Arab identity, Syria is handing the region to Teheran on a golden platter.” Hamas-controlled Gaza currently forms one of the most active “fronts” in the new regional stand-off. Gaza also encapsulates the salient characteristics of the new reality. The shooting war is being conducted largely between the pro-Iranian forces and Israel.

The pro-Iranian axis seeks to shame the mainstream Arab states and inflame their publics, by use of the shared currency of anti-Israel sentiment. The mainstream Arab elites of Egypt and Saudi Arabia are deeply embarrassed at the turn of events. They want the return of the cozy status quo, in which they could indulge in anti-Israel rhetoric of their own, while relying on American support to keep themselves in power. But this option is becoming increasingly untenable. Hamas’s control in Gaza threatens to reveal the extent to which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become subsumed within a larger regional conflict – one which, de facto, places Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel on the same side. Hence the latest Egyptian attempt to prevent a major Israeli operation into Gaza. Hamas, by destroying the barrier at Rafah during such a confrontation, could present Egypt with the choice of either accepting a mass of unwanted Palestinian refugees onto its territory, or joining the fight against the allies of Iran alongside Israel. Egypt is desperate to avoid either option.

So the war of words between Iran and Syria on the one hand, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the other, is real and heartfelt. The former are laying claim to the immensely popular cause of hatred of Israel. The latter regimes have played their own part, for their own reasons, in creating the public climate in the Arabic-speaking world in which this hatred occupies center stage. Their bluff is now being called by Iran and its allies. Rhetoric aside, Egypt and Saudi Arabia hope to emerge intact from the roiling conflict between Iran and its allies and Israel and the west. They will probably succeed in doing so, since for the West the alternative to indulging them is to risk their falling and being replaced with something worse. But as current events in Gaza are demonstrating, the heavy lifting in the work of facing down the Iranian attempt at building regional hegemony, if it is to be achieved at all, will be carried out by the west – and first and foremost by Israel.

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