The Forgotten Minority

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 09/07/2010

On March 21, 2010, the Syrian security forces opened fire with live ammunition on a crowd of 5,000 in the northern Syrian town of al-Raqqah. The crowd had gathered to celebrate the Kurdish festival of Nowruz. Three people, including a 15-year-old girl, were killed. Over 50 were injured. Dozens of injured civilians were held incommunicado by the authorities following the events. Some remain incarcerated. This incident was just one example of the repression taking place of the largest national minority in Syria – namely, the Syrian Kurdish population.

Kurds constitute 9 percent-10% of the population of Syria – that is, around 1.75 million in a total population of 22 million. Since the rise of militant Arab nationalism to power in Damascus, they have faced an ongoing campaign for their dissolution as a community.

All this is taking place far from the spotlight of world attention. The current US Administration pursues a general policy of considered silence on the issue of human rights in Middle East countries. The Syrian regime remains the elusive subject of energetic courting by the European Union and by Washington.

As a result, the Kurds of Syria are likely for the foreseeable future to remain the region’s forgotten minority.

The severe repression suffered by the Syrian Kurds has its roots in the early period of Ba’ath rule in Syria. The Arab nationalist Ba’athis felt threatened by the presence of a large non-Arab national majority, and set about trying to remove it using the methods usually associated with them.

In 1962, a census undertaken in the area of highest concentration of Kurdish population in Syria – the al- Hasaka province – resulted in 120,000-150,000 Syrian Kurds being arbitrarily stripped of their citizenship.

They and their descendants remain non-persons today.

They are unable to travel outside the country, to own property, or to work in the public sector. People in this category today number about 200,000 – though no official statistics exist for them. They are known as ajanib (foreigners).

A large additional group of around 100,000 Kurds in Syria remain entirely undocumented and unregistered.

This group, known as maktoumeen (muted), similarly live without citizenship or travel and employment rights.

The bureaucratic struggle of the Syrian regime to wish away its non-Arab population has been accompanied by practical measures on the ground to alter the demographic balance of the country.

In the 1970s, a campaign of “Arabization” of Kurdish areas commenced, on the order of president Hafez Assad. The intention was to create a “belt” of Arab population along the northern and northeastern borders of Syria with Turkey and Iraq, where most of the country’s Kurds live. The purpose of this was to prevent Kurdish territorial contiguity. Kurdish place names were changed to Arab ones, Kurds were deprived of their land and instructed to re-settle in the interior. Kurdish language, music, publications and political organization were banned. It was forbidden for parents to register their children with Kurdish names.

The vigorous policy of Arabization later largely faded into bureaucratic torpor. But for a while it produced the desired result – of a divided, demoralized, repressed and largely silent population.

THIS SITUATION no longer pertains. In March 2004, following the recognition of Kurdish autonomous control of northern Iraq, something resembling an uprising began among the Kurds of Syria.

The spark that ignited the wave of protests that month was the shooting dead of seven Kurds by the security forces following a clash between Kurds and Arabs at a football match in Qamishli, a city of high Kurdish population close to the Turkish border. Further shootings took place at the funerals of the dead, and unrest spread across the Jazira, and as far as Aleppo and Damascus. The army moved into the Kurdish areas with heavy armor and air cover, and the protests were crushed.

Despite conciliatory noises made by President Bashar Assad following the 2004 unrest, nothing of substance has been done to change the conditions endured by Kurds in Syria. As a result, the situation since 2004 has been one of simmering tension between the Syrian regime and its Kurdish subjects, with occasional flareups.

In August, 2005, and again in October, 2008, and then again earlier this year, there were clashes between Kurdish citizens and the security forces in Qamishli, with some deaths and many arrests.

Syrian oppositionists speak of the emergence of a young, increasingly nationalistic younger generation, estranged from the Arab opposition in Syria as well as from the regime. As yet, no single movement has emerged to reflect this sentiment. Twelve different political parties exist among the Kurds of Syria, a reflection of the peculiar divisiveness to which regional opposition movements in general, and Kurdish ones in particular, remain prone.

For a variety of reasons, the Kurds have difficulty making their voices heard on the international stage. Their oppressors are fellow Muslims, rather than Christians or Jews, so the powerful alliance of Muslim states on the international stage is not interested. Arab states are by definition indifferent or hostile to their concerns.

And with their regular lucklessness, they now face a situation where the rising powers in the region – Turkey and Iran – and their enthusiastic smaller partner Syria all have sizable Kurdish populations and a shared interest in keeping them suppressed.

The misfortune of the Syrian Kurds is compounded by the fact that contrary to the accepted cliché, the enemy of their enemy is not their friend. This is because the enemy of the Syrian Kurds’ enemy is the west and the United States. These are today led by a philosophy which believes in accommodating, rather than confronting rivals. As a result, the systematic, half-century old campaign of the Syrian Arab Republic to nullify the existence of its Kurdish minority looks set to continue apace.

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Hamas Fans Flames of Islamic Anger Following “Day of Rage”

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 19/03/2010

Hamas leaders are seeking to escalate Palestinian unrest over the supposed Israeli threat to Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem. In addition to reflecting the movement’s ideological goals, this effort makes good political sense.

Hamas seeks to supplant the West Bank Palestinian Authority of Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad. It knows that by returning the focus of the conflict to the explosive issue of Islamic pride and outrage over the loss of holy places, it can present itself as the natural leader of the Palestinians, and its opponents as irrelevancies or, worse, collaborators.

For this reason, Hamas spokesmen and leaders in the West Bank, Gaza and beyond have been busily fanning the flames of Arab and Muslim anger since the “Day of Rage” in Jerusalem on Tuesday. The main focus, notably, is the supposed threat to the Aksa Mosque represented by the rebuilding of the Hurva Synagogue, rather than that of construction in the Ramat Shlomo neighborhood or broader Palestinian grievances.

Speaking at a conference organized by the Hamas authorities in Gaza City on Wednesday, Gaza Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh told his audience that “what is happening now exposes the reality of Jerusalem’s future and the Jews’ plans.”

He urged Palestinians not to fear a “religious or nonreligious war” and declared that Jerusalem will “always remain Islamic.”

Haniyeh went on to call for an emergency session of the Islamic Conference Organization countries to support Palestinian protests in Jerusalem. He castigated the PA for preventing protesters from “defending their lands and holy sites.”

This basic message was repeated in statements by other senior Palestinian officials in the last days. In Damascus, Hamas Political Bureau head Khaled Mashaal announced the launching of an “open-ended campaign for Jerusalem and the Islamic and Christian holy sites in Palestine.”

Mashaal praised the role of ‘1948’ Palestinians (that is, Arab citizens of Israel) in the protests so far. He said that Israel was “playing with fire” and risked triggering a region-wide war.

The movement’s ambassador in Lebanon, Osama Hamdan, told the Al-Jazeera satellite channel that the opening of the Hurva Synagogue formed part of a larger Israeli attempt to “invent” a Jewish history for Jerusalem. Hamdan asserted that no landmarks unambiguously indicating an ancient Jewish presence in the city had been found, so Israel had instead chosen to focus on the Hurva, built at the time of the Ottomans.

Izzadin Kassam, the armed wing of Hamas, said in a statement on its Web site that the latest events in Jerusalem would lead to “dire explosions.”

Abu Obaida, spokesman for Izzadin Kassam, predicted that the opening of the Hurva (ruin) Synagogue would itself lead to Israel’s ruin, and that any tampering with al-Aksa would mean Israel’s demise.

The flood of rhetoric from Hamas leaders and spokesmen in the last days derives from a concerted attempt to regain the political initiative on the Palestinian side. With the split in the Palestinian movement showing no signs of being healed any time soon, Hamas is seeking to foment a new uprising, based on Islamic fury, in which it can wave the banner of the Aksa Mosque. Since Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, Hamas has been mainly engaged in rebuilding and reconsolidating its power in the Strip. Its failure to secure the release of a large number of Palestinian prisoners in a deal for the return of St.-Sgt. Gilad Schalit represented a significant setback.

The rival PA in the West Bank has been making the running in the last months. Its tactics of diplomatic agitation and isolation of Israel appear to be delivering results. Hamas would like to switch the focus, back to the area in which it is able to excel – namely, the use of religious symbols to foment political violence.

The nervous response of the PA – with some spokesmen supporting the protests and others warning against a renewed intifada – indicates that it is aware of the challenge. Some in Fatah would like to try and turn the protests to their own advantage. But the more shrewd among them are aware that renewed open confrontation will benefit Hamas, not the PA.

Will Hamas succeed?

The mobilizing of anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish opinion on the basis of an imaginary threat to the Aksa Mosque has a long history in this conflict. The most recent example was the decision to trigger the second intifada in 2000 after Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount. But as far back as 1929, agitators used arrangements for prayers at the Western Wall to incite country-wide attacks on Jews.

The results have been middling this time around – so far. Burning tires and rock-throwing youths offer attractive front page images for media outlets. But observers of the events in Jerusalem noted the relatively small number of participants in the current protests, and a heavy preponderance of activists of Islamist organizations. Much will depend in the coming days on whether the Israeli security forces can contain the unrest without providing Hamas with new martyrs around whom it can mobilize.

But whether or not the next months see heightened unrest, the fact that the “moral high ground” in Palestinian politics can still be achieved by furious opposition to the reopening of a synagogue in the heart of the Jewish Quarter of Jerusalem’s Old City offers a sobering lesson as to the true nature of the forces driving the conflict.

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Behind the Axis: The North Korean Connection

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 29/05/2010

North Korean spokesmen reacted furiously last week to claims by Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman that Pyongyang is supplying weapons technology to Iran and Syria. Representatives of the regime of Kim Jong-Il described Lieberman as an “imbecile.” The official Korean Central News Agency in a memorable phrase accused the foreign minister in an official statement of “faking up sheer lies.”

The indignant denials notwithstanding, recent studies indicate that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, as North Korea is officially known, is indeed playing a crucial but little remarked upon role in facilitating the arming of the Iran-led regional axis, including in the area of weapons of mass destruction. The North Korean role is multifaceted, and evidence has emerged of direct links to terror organizations such as Hizbullah and extensive strategic relations with both Iran and Syria.

A recent study by Christina Lin, a former US Department Defense official and specialist on China, looked into North Korea’s strategic partnership with Iran. Lin noted that North Korea has been described as the “the most important single leak” in the international anti-proliferation effort in the Middle East.

Iranian-North Korean strategic cooperation dates back to the first days of the Islamic Republic. Its basis is clear. Iran needs access to advanced military technology to underwrite its regional ambitions. Its main suppliers are Russia and China. But both these countries are active members of the international system, and hence are to some degree constrained by international pressures. North Korea, on the other hand, is an isolated country, indifferent to Western attempts to control the access of Middle East radicals to advanced armaments.

North Korean assistance plays a vital role in the Iranian missile program. Its flagship Shihab missile project is a product of the relationship. The Shihab is based on North Korea’s Nodong missile series. Iran is reported to have purchased 12 Nodong missile engines from North Korea in 1999, beginning the development of the Shihab-3. The Shihab-3, which has a range of 1,300-1,500 kilometers, places Israel within range.

More recently, Iranian officials were present at the testing of the advanced Taepodong-2 missile in North Korea in July 2006. This missile is the basis for the Iranian development of the Shihab-6, which has not yet been tested. These are intercontinental, nuclear capable ballistic missile systems, thought to have a range of 5,000-6,000 kilometers.

One report has also suggested that Iran and North Korea are jointly seeking to develop a reentry vehicle for the Nodong/Shihab-3, which would be intended to carry a nuclear warhead.

In addition, an Iranian opposition report in 2008 identified the presence of North Korean experts at a facility near Teheran engaged in attempts to develop a nuclear warhead to be placed on intermediate range ballistic missiles such as the Shihab-3 and the Nodong. The report was cited by Agence France Presse.

The North Korean strategic link with Iran is not limited to Teheran. Rather, evidence suggests that it extends to cooperation with other, more junior members of the Iran-led regional alliance. Thus, Iranian defector Ali Reza Asghari is reported to have confirmed that Iran helped finance the participation of North Korean personnel in the Syrian plutonium reactor at al-Kibar destroyed by Israel in September 2007. Iranian scientists were also present at the site, the goal of which was to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Three North Korean scientists were reported to have been among the dead following an explosion at a Syrian chemical weapons facility near Aleppo in July 2007, suggesting North Korean involvement in other areas of the WMD endeavors of Iran and its allies.

And one must not forget also the extensive evidence which has emerged to suggest a North Korean role in the construction of the Hizbullah underground tunnel network which played a vital role in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. The network, according to the Intelligence Online Web site, was created by Hizbullah militants trained in the construction of underground facilities by North Korean experts. The tunnels in Lebanon are said to bear a striking resemblance to similar facilities discovered by the South Koreans in the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas.

So despite North Korean official anger at Lieberman’s remarks, the evidence is well-documented and overwhelming. Pyongyang is a vital factor in the arming of the Iran-led strategic axis in the Middle East.

But why is North Korea playing this role? There is, after all, little ideological common ground between the Shi’ite Islamists in Teheran and Baalbek and the servants of the bizarre “Juche” philosophy used by Kim Jong-il to justify his dictatorship.

The factors underpinning North Korean support for Iran and its allies are as simple as they are powerful: common enemies and hard cash. As a known rogue WMD proliferator, and as perhaps the most repressive regime currently on the planet, North Korea faces diplomatic and economic isolation. Like Iran, it is the subject of UN Security Council sanctions because of its nuclear program. Iran is prepared to pay good money for military and scientific assistance, and to underwrite Pyongyang’s own research and development programs, from which it stands to benefit. North Korea and Iran play a similar role in their respective regions of opposition and subversion toward the US and its allies. A cynic might add that the tendency of both regimes to indulge in the faking up of sheer lies is a further point of commonality between them.

These firm foundations mean that – short of action taken to disturb it – the friendship between the Kim Jong-il dictatorship in North Korea and the Iran-led “resistance bloc” in the Middle East is likely to flourish and continue to mutually benefit both partners in the years ahead.

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Who Killed Khaled Sultan al-Abed?

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 14/06/2010

Once viewed as perhaps the most locked-down and policed city in the Middle East, the Syrian capital of Damascus has been the scene of a number of bombings and assassinations in the last few years. Most famously, of course, Hizbullah master-operative Imad Mughniyeh was killed by a car bomb in February 2008.

Last year, in a much messier affair, a number of Iranian pilgrims were killed in a bus bombing which the Syrian authorities did their clumsy best to conceal.

In the last month, an additional item must be added to the list of curious and unexplained acts of lethal violence to have taken place in the Syrian capital.

On May 16, Khaled Sultan al-Abed, a businessman and a senior member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, was shot dead outside his home in the same smart Damascus neighborhood in which Mughniyeh met his end. Mezzeh, which is also home to a number of foreign embassies, is one of the most closely watched as well as one of the most fashionable districts of Damascus.

Abed was the official head in Syria of Iran Khodro, a car franchise established by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. He had been resident in Damascus for 10 years, owned a 25 percent stake in the company, and had reportedly succeeded in forging close ties with prominent figures in the Syrian business community.

However, according to a report by veteran journalist Georges Malbrunot in Le Figaro this week, this position and Abed’s additional extensive business activities in Syria were intended to serve as a cover for his other duties – those of a liaison officer between the Iranian regime and Hizbullah.

The Syrian authorities are clearly deeply embarrassed at this latest breach of the daily tranquility of their capital. The murder was not reported by official news sources, and Syrian officials have made no comment upon it. An investigation into the killing of Abed has reportedly been launched.

WHO MIGHT have carried it out? A number of competing theories have emerged. One of these appeared on a Syrian opposition Web site and was picked up in Haaretz last week. According to this theory, Abed’s murder was carried out by a Sunni organization and is related to growing fear among Sunnis in Syria and beyond at the growth of Iranian influence in Syria.

This view would gibe with a larger perspective, accepted by many in Israel’s defense establishment, which identifies widespread dissatisfaction and fear at many levels in the Syrian establishment and society with the growing link with Iran. According to this explanation, certain elements are trying to sow discord between Iranians and Syrians, and are serving notice that Damascus should not be considered uncontested ground for the free activities of the Shi’ite Islamist Iranian regime.

Some versions of this theory suggest that even senior figures in the Syrian regime are deeply concerned at the growing link with Iran, and may be involved – explaining how the killing was able to take place in one of the most densely policed areas of the Syrian capital, with no one being apprehended.

However, proponents of this view need to ask themselves whether elements close to the regime would wish to suggest its vulnerability in quite so blatant a way. Police states such as Syria, after all, derive what legitimacy they possess from their ability to police effectively.

This ability is surely starkly called into question by the recent murder of Abed and the other incidents to have taken place in Damascus recently.

An alternative explanation, given greater credence by both Malbrunot and other sources, sees the killing of Abed as the latest act in Israel’s “shadow war” against Iran.

Malbrunot noted Abed’s close links with the Kuds force, the clandestine external wing of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Both he and other sources hinted at the possibility that the murdered man may have been involved in the transfer of Iranian weaponry to Hizbullah. An unnamed source claims that “one thing is for sure: Most of those murdered in Syria in recent years were on the list of those wanted by Israel.” Is this a coincidence, Malbrunot asks by way of conclusion.

In the usual manner of things Syrian, the real perpetrators of the murder and their motives are likely to remain shrouded in mystery and to remain the subject of much speculation.

But as with many such affairs, perhaps the most interesting aspects are ultimately those clearly visible to the naked eye. A senior operative in the most clandestine element of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is gunned down in broad daylight in the heart of one of the most heavily watched areas of the Syrian capital. The Syrian authorities delay the announcement of the killing and make no comment upon it.

Rumors of who might be responsible abound.

The regime of Bashar Assad has shown itself to be an enthusiastic practitioner of the “strategy of tension” in Lebanon, in Iraq and elsewhere over the last half decade.

It appears that someone or other is currently keen on demonstrating to the Syrian leader that this can also be a game played by two sides.

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Losing the Scent in South Lebanon

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center -20/07/2010

Last week, the IDF released evidence of Hizbullah stockpiling of weaponry in populated civilian areas of southern Lebanon. The IDF material showed an aerial map of the Shi’ite town of El Khiam. The map showed details of a developed military infrastructure woven into the fabric of the town’s civilian population.

While the precise details were new, the fact of Hizbullah’s use of civilian areas as bases for its military reconstruction after 2006 is by now no longer a major revelation.

The fact of this activity is not seriously in doubt. It is in direct contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war. The mechanisms by which Hizbullah and its allies act to neutralize the 12,000 strong international force tasked with preventing the movement’s military activities in Lebanon’s south have also been in evidence over the last couple of weeks.

Tensions have been steadily rising between elements of the UNIFIL forces deployed in south Lebanon (specifically – the French contingent) and supporters of Hizbullah’s “resistance.” A number of incidents have taken place. On June 29, UNIFIL conducted a 36-hour deployment exercise.

In the days that followed, members of the French contingent were attacked in the village of Touline by a crowd which pelted them with rocks, sticks and eggs.

On Saturday, July 3, in the village of Kabrikha, a gathering of around 100 civilians blocked the road, preventing a French UNIFIL patrol from entering the village. The soldiers were reportedly disarmed, and a number were injured. The Lebanese army eventually intervened to separate the crowd from the patrol. Villagers interviewed after the incidents claimed that UNIFIL troops had tried to enter homes – a claim which a spokesman for the UN forces denied.

Michael Williams, UN special coordinator for Lebanon, meanwhile, described the incidents as “clearly organized.”

Williams was correct. Mobs of 100 civilians do not suddenly appear by accident in southern Lebanon. It is not an area known for its liberal attitudes toward freedom of political association. In the Shi’ite villages of the area, the only force able to march, demonstrate and make its presence felt is the “resistance” – that is Hizbullah – and its allies.

Sure enough, as UNIFIL commander Alberto Asarta Cuevas sought assurances in the days that followed, Hizbullah leaders issued a number of statements expressing puzzlement at UNIFIL’s recent increase in activity. The movement’s deputy chief Naim Qassem laconically advised UNIFIL to “watch what it does.” Hussein Haj Hassan, a movement member who serves as minister of agriculture in the current Lebanese government, described UNIFIL’s behavior as “incomprehensible.” “One wonders what they want,” he added.

In the Lebanese manner, a rumor then began to do the rounds that the UNIFIL deployment exercise was in fact a trial run of a move whereby international forces moved to prevent rocket fire on Israel. A Hizbullah-associated MP, Muhammad Raad, said that that if a particular country affiliated with UNIFIL wanted to “give the Israelis a card,” it should not seek to do so at the expense of southern Lebanon. It was unacceptable, said Raad, that “some UNIFIL units” might be taking orders from their own minister of defense, rather than from the UN.

In reality, Israeli commanders could only dream of such activity being undertaken by the UN force. But such an interpretation has the unmistakable quality of a further warning to the international forces not to overstep the recognized rules of the game between them and Hizbullah. Hizbullah expects a “live and let live” attitude both from the international forces and from the Lebanese army regarding its military activities and preparations in the south.

FOLLOWING A series of consultations with the Lebanese government and armed forces, UNIFIL commander Asarta this week issued a contrite statement, apologizing to the residents of the south for the inconvenience to them caused by his force’s activities. He expressed his “love” for Lebanon. It was later announced that henceforth, UNIFIL would no longer use sniffer dogs in patrols (a point which had reportedly particularly annoyed the villagers). Also, it was reiterated that UNIFIL would not enter houses and yards in populated areas, except with prior coordination and the involvement of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

Given that the UNIFIL activity that prompted the actions and statements by Hizbullah did not differ in a major way from previous practices, a number of theories have been raised as to why the “resistance” chose to draw attention to it in the way that it did.

In an interview with the Lebanese An-Nahar newspaper, Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces movement, speculated that the decision to move against the French UNIFIL contingent related to anger at France’s decision to vote in favor of further sanctions against Iran in the UN Security Council. According to such an interpretation, the latest events would be by way of a friendly reminder to the French of the vulnerability of their troops in southern Lebanon.

Geagea also noted French support for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. This is the body charged with investigating the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005. The latest reports suggest that the tribunal is soon to issue indictments. Hizbullah is now considered to be the main suspect in the killing. But whatever the precise reasons for Hizbullah’s latest move against the French element in UNIFIL, the recent events once more demonstrate the relative helplessness of the UN force.

The photos released by the IDF last week may have reassured Israelis by demonstrating the extent of its “coverage” of southern Lebanon. But they also showed the degree to which Hizbullah has been able to rebuild and rearm undisturbed south of the Litani since 2006. Some 160 Shi’ite villages have been turned into armed camps similar to El Khiam, we are told. All of this has taken place under the sensitive noses of the (now demobilized) UNIFIL sniffer dogs. The dogs, or someone else, have also apparently chewed up and digested UN Resolution 1701.

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Al-Qaida-Style Islamism Comes to Gaza

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 19/08/2009

Quiet has now returned to the Gaza Strip after the weekend violence which claimed the lives of 28 people. The last of the funerals of the Jund Ansar Allah fighters killed in the suppression of the organization by Hamas authorities has taken place. This episode demonstrated the tight hold which Hamas maintains on the Gaza Strip.

The weekend’s events also highlight an important but little discussed phenomenon taking place in the Strip, and to a lesser extent in the West Bank – namely, the growth of al-Qaida-style Salafi Islamism among a segment of the Palestinian population. Jund Ansar Allah did not emerge suddenly, or in a vacuum, and its defeat does not mark the final word on this matter.
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Who are the Salafis? Salafiyya is an extreme trend within Sunni Islam. Salafis maintain that anyone who fails to uphold any aspect of Sharia law is no longer a Muslim, and is to be considered kufar (non-Muslim). Jihadist Salafis consider that it is incumbent upon Muslims to depose and fight all governments controlled by the kufar.

A myriad of small, armed Salafi groupings exist in the Gaza Strip, of which Jund Ansar Allah was one. These groups are part of a broader subculture, estimated to command the loyalty of at least 50,000 people, and probably many more. The Taliban style of dress adopted by supporters of Salafism is becoming increasingly familiar in Gaza.

There are two main modes of Salafi activity in Gaza – namely, al-Salafiya Da’awiya – that is, civilian Salafism, which engages in missionary work and preaching, and Al-Salafiya Jihadiya, of which al-Qaida is the most well-known global representative, and which is committed to violent action.

There is no hermetic division between these two modes. Rather, activity in the former is a gateway to later involvement in militancy, and missionary work builds the basis of support in society which is essential for successful military action.

A number of Gaza mosques are known to be controlled by the Salafis. Sheikh Al Salam Bin Taymiyah mosque in Khan Yunis, which was the center of operations for the Jund Ansar Allah group, was one of these. Abu Noor al-Makdisi, who led the Jund Ansar Allah group and died during the weekend’s events, was the imam at this mosque. Other mosques linked to the Salafis include the al-Sahabah Mosque in Daraj, Gaza City, and the al-Albani Mosque in the Jabalya refugee camp.
Salafi activity is reportedly well-financed, with money coming in from the Gulf. As one source put it “millions of petrodollars are flowing in every month.”
The myriad Salafi armed groupings include the Jaish al-Islam (army of Islam), al-Saif al-Haq Islamiyya (Swords of Islamic Righteousness), Jaish al-Umma (Army of the Nation) and the Jaljalat (thunder) group, formed by disaffected former Hamas fighters during the period of the cease-fire, in June 2008.
Jund Ansar Allah, which was founded in November, 2008, emerged from this milieu.

The relations of the Hamas rulers of the Strip to this Salafi sub-culture are complex.

Since Hamas took power in the Strip, the Salafis have engaged in numerous acts of violence against people and institutions believed to be kufar. These have included attacks on Internet cafes, book shops, beauty parlors and institutions representing the Strip’s small Christian community. Young women and men suspected of engaging in “immoral” behavior have been murdered.

The Hamas authorities officially oppose such behavior, but have done little to stop or deter it.

There is also a certain crossover between Hamas structures and the Salafis. Many members of Hamas’s al-Kassam brigades are known to support Salafi ideas. These reportedly include Ahmed al-Jabari, commander of the organization, and the majority of his brigade commanders.
Hamas, however, draws the line at activity which appears to challenge its own authority or right to rule. The suppression of Jund Ansar Allah took place after its leader denounced Hamas as kufar and proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic Emirate in Gaza.

The swiftness and brutality of Hamas’s subsequent action attracted attention. But it was not the first time that Gaza’s rulers have made clear to the Salafis that it is worth their while to respect the limits placed on them. The al-Albani mosque in Jabalya, for example, was raided on May 17, 2008 by Hamas’s Executive Force. Thirty men and women were injured in the raid. The mosque’s imam had delivered a sermon that afternoon insulting and ridiculing Hamas.

A key question concerning the Salafi subculture in Gaza is the extent of the presence of global al-Qaida among it. Most experts believe that the al-Qaida network is present to only a very limited extent in the Strip. The al-Qaida idea, however, is flourishing, with a large number of the often quite primitively-armed and poorly-trained Salafi groups competing to be considered the “official franchise” of al-Qaida in Gaza.

Abu Noor al-Makdisi is dead, and the movement he built has now been dispersed by the uncontested Hamas rulers of the Gaza Strip. The Salafi subculture from which his group emerged, however, is very much alive. It is likely to make its voice heard again, in the unfolding story of the Islamic Palestinian state currently under construction in Gaza.

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Growing Islamization in Gaza

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 29/09/2009

Deriving accurate and reliable information from within the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip is not easy. The Strip is largely closed to journalists, and its inhabitants are reluctant to speak in detail of events there.

Nevertheless, reliable sources confirm that one observable trend taking place there is the growing dominance of Islam. This process is being driven forward by the growing strength of Salafi and extreme Sunni elements.

A slow introduction of Islamic norms and practices into society began immediately following the Hamas victory in PLC elections in January 2006. This process was accelerated following Hamas’s seizure of exclusive control of Gaza in 2007.

However, there are clear internal differences in the movement regarding the pace of change. Hamas’s current leadership has tended to favor a slow encouragement of Islamic practices and rules, without straying too far from the desires of the broader public.

More hardline and Salafi elements within the movement want a stricter and more formal introduction of Islamic norms. Events over the last 18 months indicate that the latter camp is now making the running, with Hamas’s leadership under pressure from extreme forces both within the movement and beyond it.

This change is being felt in the very fabric of daily life in Gaza. A transition of the status of Islamic observance from social norm to legal compulsion is under way.

The most obvious sign of this is the creation of the new “Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice” security force, which operates under the command of the Ministry of the Waqf (Islamic Endowment).

This force is tasked with enforcing Islamic codes of behavior. Its members patrol beaches, parks and public areas, ensuring proper Islamic modesty.

One source describes how a man wearing shorts while sitting on his own balcony in southern Gaza was spotted and advised that this must not happen again. Rules banning men from bathing topless, and women (who may still bathe separately from men and fully covered) from laughing or smiling while bathing, are also in the process of enforcement.

A special all-female unit within the police has also been created, with responsibility for enforcing female modesty and handling female suspects. This force, numbering 100-150 officers, wear niqab and gloves, with only an eye slit visible.

Other forms of social control are also being strengthened. Every mosque now has an Amir al-jamia or “head of the community” who according to sources functions as a kind of political commissar on behalf of the authorities. It is his task to observe the prayer habits of all members of the mosque, and to intervene and offer help where insufficient devotion is diagnosed.

More familiar methods of increasing public dependence on the authorities may also be observed. Preferential access to desperately needed social services for those close to the rulers of the Strip is becoming increasingly apparent. In the spring of 2009, Hamas established the “Islamic National Bank.”

An Islamic insurance company and Islamic investment bank have since also been set up. Increasingly, Hamas’s ample social welfare budgets are channeled through these bodies. Similarly, Islamic charity organizations are increasingly replacing elected local governments as the providers of social services. The result is to establish channels of material dependence between the public and the Hamas organization.
Few women may now be seen in Gaza without the hijab. More and more are now wearing the jilbab (the long, shapeless black dress associated with Islamic piety).

The wearing of the hijab is now said to have become an accepted social norm – perceived as a requirement when outside of the home even by Gaza’s few remaining Christian women. From the summer of 2009, the wearing of the hijab and jilbab became required in Gaza’s secondary schools (according to some sources, certain schools have chosen to ignore this instruction).

It is not only dress in schools, but also the content of study which is becoming increasingly religious in character. Many secular teachers have been fired. Hamas summer camps, which provide cheap alternatives for poor families in the summer months, involve intensive Koran study and competitions which again can provide access to much-needed funds and jobs.

The promotion of Islamic norms in Gaza extends to the widespread banning of books and restricting of access to “immoral” internet sites. In 2007, there was an outcry when a book of Palestinian folk-tales, “Speak bird, speak again” was banned in the Gaza Strip because of its supposedly lewd content.

Today, such bans are the norm, and no longer merit much attention.

The increasing use of Islamic Sharia law in judicial proceedings in Gaza is an additional facet of the growing influence of Islam on life there. The formal judicial system remains in existence. But it is being filled with Islamic content.

For example, the local reconciliation committees, which were once a forum where clans resolved issues by mediation, have now largely been transformed into Islamic reconciliation committees concerned with the dispensing of advice and guidance based on Sharia law.

It is important to note that these developments do not represent the playing out of some Hamas master plan for the creation of an Islamic republic. Rather, they are taking place because of grass-roots agitation and insistence on the part of ultra-religious elements both within Hamas and outside it.

The Hamas leadership depends on Islamic legitimacy, and is thus vulnerable to claims that is it is merely a nationalist group waving the flag of Islam. Hamas jealously guards its political power – also from its Salafi rivals. But in matters of Islamic observance, it appears willing to bow to their wishes and pressure.

The result is that without any recognized body deciding upon it, an Islamic mini-state in the full sense is currently emerging in Gaza.

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A Tale of Two Palestinian Authorities

Posted on April 5, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 24/04/2010

Four years after the Hamas victory in elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, and three years since the movement’s successful coup in Gaza, the split in the Palestinian national movement has an increasing look of permanence about it. This has major implications for the currently frozen diplomatic process.

This week, Dr. Salah al-Bardawil, a leading Hamas official, said that efforts toward Palestinian reconciliation are “frozen.” In an interview with Quds press, Bardawil stated that communication between Hamas authorities in Gaza and the government of Egypt on the issue of reconciliation had ceased. Talks were now restricted to “matters such as permission for patients to leave Gaza for treatment or the return of deceased Palestinians across the Rafah crossing.”

Bardawil’s message was confirmed on Monday by Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal in a speech in Damascus. Mashaal said Hamas had been urged by Arab officials to accept Quartet conditions, including recognition of Israel, in return for changes to an Egyptian-brokered reconciliation agreement. He said that Hamas had reiterated its refusal. Addressing “the Americans, the Zionists, and everyone,” he asserted that Hamas would not “succumb to your terms. We won’t pay a political price no matter how long the blockade lasts. God is with us and he will grant us victory.”

These statements indicate that there is now no process under way toward ending the Palestinian political divide. On the ground, meanwhile, the rival Ramallah and Gaza Palestinian authorities are entrenching themselves.

PARALLEL TO the rise of Hamas in Gaza, and its ongoing popularity in the West Bank, Fatah is currently in a process of severe decline. The movement failed to embark on a major project of reform following its election defeat in 2006. As a result, it remains riven by factionalism and corruption. It is also, increasingly, irrelevant.

The key Palestinian leader in the West Bank today is Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. Fayyad is not a Fatah member, and his government holds power not as a result of that movement’s authority. Rather, Fayyad is in effect an appointee of the West. The security forces led by Gen. Keith Dayton, which keep him in place, are Western organized and financed, and not beholden to any political faction. His gradualist approach is quite alien to Palestinian political culture, and despite the undoubted improvements this approach has brought to daily life in the West Bank, the level of his support is uncertain.

It remains widely believed that without the presence of the “Dayton” forces and more importantly without the continued activities of the IDF in the West Bank, the area would fall to Hamas in a similar process to that which took place in Gaza.

Veteran Palestinian political analyst Yezid Sayigh recently noted that both the Gaza and Ramallah governments are dependent for their economic survival on foreign assistance. The Fayyad government has an annual $2.8 billion budget, of which one half consists of direct foreign aid. The Hamas authorities, meanwhile, announced a budget of $540 million, of which $480 million is to come from outside (Iran). The dependence on foreign capital reflects perhaps the salient element shared by both Palestinian governments – they are both able to continue to exist because of the interests of rival outside powers that they do so.

The split in the Palestinian national movement is ultimately a function of the broader strategic situation of regional cold war. It is thus likely to continue for as long as this regional reality pertains.

The Middle East is currently divided between a loose alliance of states aligned with the US and the West, and an Iran-led “resistance bloc” of states and movements. Hamas is able to maintain its sovereign enclave in Gaza as a result of the willingness of Iran to arm and finance it. The Gaza enclave serves Iran’s purposes well. It gives Teheran an effective veto over any attempt to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It also gives non-Arab Iran a direct point of entry into the single most important regional conflict in the eyes of the masses of the Arab world.

The West, which also attaches massive importance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has itself in turn been prepared to create, finance and underwrite a version of Palestinian politics and governance – that of Fayyad – which is to its liking, once it became clear that the Palestinians themselves were not going to do this.

The result is that Palestinian politics has been thoroughly penetrated by the larger regional standoff. Each of the regional blocs has its own Palestinian authority, which acts as a laboratory and advertisement for its preferred methods. The Gaza version favors strict Islamic governance and armed struggle to the end against Israel. The Ramallah government – according to Sayigh the less representative of the two – stands for alignment with the West and proclaimed acceptance of a negotiated solution.

The proudest achievement of PLO and Fatah leader Yasser Arafat was the establishment of a single, authoritative Palestinian national movement not beholden to or dependent on any outside power. Such a movement no longer exists. The split represents a profound change in Palestinian politics, which calls into question many of the basic assumptions regarding the conflict which have become received wisdom in Israel and the West over the last couple of decades.

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An Increasing Possibility

Posted on April 4, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center-09/11/2009

The possible emergence of a nuclear-armed, Islamist Iran committed to the destruction of the Jewish state is the key security issue currently occupying the attention of Israel’s political and security elite. It is one of the few issues upon which there is near (but not total) consensus. Israel has watched the growing power of radical elements within the Iranian ruling elite in the last half-decade with concern. These elements, of which President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad is the most prominent representative, openly reject Israel’s right to exist. Ahmedinejad’s comments advocating Israel’s destruction and denying the Holocaust are part of a larger project to recover the original fervour of the 1979 Islamic revolution. The expansion of Iran’s regional role is also part of this, and Israeli strategists note that the influence of Iran in all areas of key strategic concern to Israel is being felt, in a negative way. Iran’s alliance with Syria underwrites Damascus’s increasingly bellicose stance. Iran’s creation and sponsorship of Hizbullah has enabled it to come to constitute the powerful militia opponent seen in last year’s war. Iranian assistance to Hamas and Islamic jihad may be in the process of turning these organisations into analogous forces.

Iran’s active policy of subversion toward Israel, and stated desire for its destruction, make the possibility of a nuclear Iran inconceivable to Israeli policymakers. It is not only the scenario of an Iranian nuclear attack that is focusing concerns. Rather, there is concern that a nuclear Iran would use the “immunity” purchased by a nuclear capability to increase its support for countries and organisations hostile to Israel. Some Israeli policymakers, such as the deputy defence minister, Efraim Sneh, regard this as itself an existential issue. Sneh has stressed that a nuclear Iran could render life in Israel untenable – through support for terror groups, and the possibility that all determined Israeli attempts to oppose Iranian aggression would lead to immediate nuclear crisis.

An alternative, minority viewpoint exists within the Israeli policy elite, according to which Israel could successfully deter a nuclear Iran, and therefore the problem, while acute, is of less existential dimensions. Former Mossad Head Efraim Halevy is understood to support this view.

Israel’s response so far on the Iranian nuclear issue has been to support the imposition of tougher sanctions. Senior officials have been involved in recent weeks in an international campaign to bring home to European states the common danger posed by a nuclear Iran.

Nevertheless, should it become apparent that all attempts to reverse Iran’s progress toward a nuclear capability have failed, and Iran indeed stands on the cusp of a nuclear weapons capability, then the possibility of unilateral Israeli military action to prevent a nuclear Iran would come onto the agenda.

It should not be assumed from Ahmedinejad’s claims this week that Iran has begun to operate 3,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium at Natanz, that Israel will now conclude that this moment has been reached. Ahmedinejad made a similar claim in April, and Israel suspects that the Iranian regime is keen to give the impression of greater progress than has in fact been made.

For the moment, therefore, efforts toward further sanctions are likely to continue. But the consensus in the Israeli intelligence community is that Iran may be as close as two years away from a nuclear weapons capability. So if Tehran cannot be brought to abandon its nuclear ambitions through strengthened sanctions and international pressure – then pre-emptive Israeli action to prevent the emergence of a nuclear-powered Islamic Republic of Iran is an increasing possibility.

Regarding the likely results, should such action take place: to some degree, a precedent exists in Israel’s destruction of Iraq’s nuclear programme at Osirak in 1981. The Israeli move then was universally condemned in public, and in private, at least retrospectively, was quietly welcomed as having prevented the need for the world to confront a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein. Once again, it’s important to note that Israel’s hopes regarding the possibilities of toughened sanctions are genuine. But one may also discern in recent statements by President Bush and President Sarkozy a commitment to the prevention of a nuclear Iran of similar firmness to that of Israel. As such, should the moment of decision arrive, and a consensus be reached that sanctions have failed, it is likely that action by Israel will have no major effect on Israel’s relations with its allies.

Regarding the likely Iranian response: the Iranians may choose to increase their already existing aid to insurgents in Iraq, they may seek to strike at Israel through proxy and client organisations such as Hizbullah and Hamas, they may seek to hit at western, Gulf and Jewish targets through terrorism. The fallout in terms of regional anger and protests will no doubt be immense. Israeli strategists conjecturing such issues, however, may well consider that an angry, vengeful but non-nuclear Iran is a more preferable prospect than a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic, triumphant and filled with the ambition for regional hegemony which possession of nuclear weapons would bring.

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Arab Summit, Iranian Agenda

Posted on April 4, 2011 by jonathanspyer

Gloria Center- 05/04/2009

The issues that dominated the 21st Arab League summit in Doha, Qatar, this week testified to the weakness and disunity of the Arab states. Sunni Arabs are the majority population group in the Middle East. Yet the Doha agenda reflected a regional reality dominated by the interests of, and clash between, two strong but non-Arab countries – Israel and Iran.

Current Arab diplomacy is dominated first and foremost by a growing Iranian encroachment on the politics of the Arabic-speaking world, and the divided Arab response to this. This was reflected in all the major issues at and around the summit.

The central diplomatic headline at Doha was the decision by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak not to attend, against a backdrop of growing Egyptian displeasure with Qatar. Egypt’s irritation derives from the increasingly pro-Iranian stance being taken by Qatar. The Gulf Emirate of Qatar offered demonstrative support to Hamas during Israel’s recent Gaza incursion. Qatar hosted an improvised summit during Operation Cast Lead, which was attended by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hamas leader Khaled Meshal.
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Egypt regards Qatar’s stance as hypocritical and somewhat ludicrous – given the emirate’s close defense ties with the United States (the headquarters of U.S. military Central Command is located there). But Cairo is also worried. Qatar is aping the Iranian language of anti-Western defiance and “resistance” – a concept sure to have a receptive audience in the Arabic-speaking world – in an attempt to build its own regional influence.

The Palestinian cause – the great self-proclaimed moral flagship of Arab politics – is currently the subject of a hostile takeover bid by Iran and its clients. The Doha summit issued the expected ringing call on Israel to accept the Saudi initiative while there is still time. It is not entirely clear what the implied threat behind this statement actually consists of. But the truth is that as long as the Palestinian national movement remains in its current state, this demand lacks even the most elementary logic.

The Iranian-armed and sponsored Hamas enclave in Gaza has successfully suppressed its internal rivals and defended its existence against Israel. There are now in effect two Palestinian national movements. One of them is ideologically strong and hungry, favors Israel’s destruction, and is supported by Iran. The other is old and tired and lost, and is propped up by vast amounts of Western funding. The former is in the process of trying to devour the latter, and may succeed. So in partnership with whom is Israel expected to implement the Saudi initiative?

Fear of Iran is driving the Saudi attempt to woo Syria away from its alliance with Tehran. At a “mini-summit” in preparation for Doha earlier in March, Saudi King Abdullah offered Syria’s President Bashar Assad an extensive financial package in return for Damascus abandoning its ties with Iran and returning to the “Arab fold.” The Saudis also pledged to help Syria in its diplomatic efforts to re-acquire the Golan Heights from Israel.

So far, Assad has managed to resist all such temptations. In a recent interview with Al-Jazeera, Foreign Minister Walid Moallem dismissed the very possibility of such a move. The Syrian line, as expressed in an editorial in the government-owned al-Thawra newspaper earlier this week, is that the search for peace must go hand in hand with a policy of muqawama (resistance). The doctrine of “resistance,” of course, is the ideological and rhetorical glue holding together the disparate forces aligned with Iran in the region.

All the above examples might lead one to conclude that Iran is developing into a vast, looming power, about to overshadow the region. But the situation is more complicated than this. Iran’s advances are testimony not to the great strength and vitality of the Tehran regime and its governing idea, but rather to the weakness of Arab states, institutions and political cultures.

Iran’s regional strategy is itself limited by a series of contradictions. The muqawama doctrine is designed to enable Shi’ite, Persian Iran to link up with Islamist and oppositional forces across the Middle East. The Tehran regime stresses the idea of the “Islamic world” and an overriding Muslim identity. It dreams of a bloc of Muslim states led by a nuclear Iran, challenging Israel’s existence and American power.

And indeed, Iranian regional “outreach” has succeeded in building close alliances with a number of Arab states and movements. This project is impacting all aspects of regional politics. But Iran will always suffer from a “legitimacy gap” in the Arab world. It will always be perceived as a foreign, frightening power by many non-Shi’ite Arabs. In the end, the faltering Iranian economy and domestically unpopular regime are probably instruments too weak to carry the grand ambitions of Iran’s rulers.

Still, Doha signaled that for the moment the Iranian star in the region is on the rise, with the leading states of the Arab system – Egypt and Saudi Arabia – reduced to scolding and attempted bribery respectively in their efforts to limit its influence. It is perhaps the final ironic testimony to the Arabs’ weakness that the only regional state capable of mounting a real resistance to the westward march of Iranian power is the one against whom all Arab League members can still momentarily unite in displays of verbal ferocity – namely, Israel.

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