Jonathan Spyer

Jerusalem Post, 14/2

Northern Sinai has long played host to a variety of smuggling networks and jihadi organizations. Since General Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi’s military coup of July 3rd, 2013 in Egypt, however, there has been an exponential increase in attacks emanating from this area.

This increasingly lawless region is now the home ground for an emergent Islamist insurgency against the Egyptian authorities. Since July, 2013, more than 300 reported attacks have taken place in Sinai. The violence is also spreading into the Egyptian mainland, with attacks in recent weeks on a security facility in Cairo, and the killing of an Interior Ministry official in the capital.

Some of the groups engaged in the fighting are linked to global jihadi networks, including al-Qaeda. Others have connections to elements in Hamas-controlled Gaza. The precise links between the various organizations engaged are difficult to trace.

This emergent reality in northern Sinai has serious implications for Israel. While the main focus of the jihadi activity is directed against Sisi’s administration in Cairo, some of the groups centrally involved have a track record of attacks against Israeli targets. In al-Qaeda’s official propaganda channels, the north Sinai area is described as a new front in the war against ‘the Jews and the Americans.’

The most significant group operating in northern Sinai today is the Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem) organization. This organization has been active since 2011. It originated in Gaza, and made its way to Sinai following the ousting of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 2011.

The group’s name will raise a wry smile for Israeli and Jewish readers. The Arabic term ‘Beit al-Maqdis’ (House of the Holy) for Jerusalem derives from the older Hebrew name for the Jewish Temple – Beit Hamikdash, with the same meaning.

Contemporary Islamists and jihadis, of course, would fiercely deny that any Jewish Temple ever stood in Jerusalem.

But this absence of logical consistency appears to have little impact on the organization’s energy for violent activity.

Ansar Beit al-Maqdis was responsible for repeated attacks on the El-Arish-Ashkelon gas pipeline in 2011-12, which eventually led to the suspension of supplies via this route.

The group also carried out the cross-border terror attack on August 18, 2011, in which eight Israelis were murdered, and an additional strike into Israel on September 21, 2012, which took the life of an IDF soldier.

More recently, Ansar Beit al-Maqdis claimed responsibility for the rocket attack on Eilat on January 20, 2014. The rocket was intercepted by the Iron Dome system.

The organization’s main focus in recent weeks has been on increasingly high-profile attacks against Egyptian targets. These have included an attempt on the life of Egyptian Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim on September 5, 2013, and a series of bomb attacks in Cairo in January,2014. On January 25, 2014, the group claimed responsibility for downing a military helicopter over northern Sinai.

The weapon used in this attack, a Russian Igla air-defense system, was reportedly smuggled out from Gaza, where the group maintains links with Salafi Jihadi elements.

So what exactly is Ansar Beit al-Maqdis?

According to a former militant of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization, Nabil al-Naeim, the group is funded by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, following a deal brokered with powerful Brotherhood strongman Khairet al-Shater.

Naeim suggested that Ansar Beit al Maqdis is supplied with weapons by the Brotherhood via the Gaza tunnels and Libya. He maintains that the Hamas authorities in Gaza are aware of the deal.

The alleged Brotherhood links were also asserted by Sameh Eid, described in an al-Arabiyya article as an ‘expert on Islamist groups.’ Eid referred to the group as the ‘military wing of the Muslim Brotherhood,’ and said that Shater had threatened the Egyptian authorities with ‘escalation in Sinai and the targeting of the Egyptian Army.’

Little hard evidence, however, has yet emerged to support the claims of a direct Muslim Brotherhood link to Ansar Beit al-Maqdis.

The Egyptian authorities have an obvious interest in linking the violence erupting out of northern Sinai with the Muslim Brothers. Having brought down the Muslim Brotherhood government, General Sisi’s subsequent strategy has been to deny the Brotherhood any way back into political activity, preferring to force it along a path of confrontation on which it is likely to be defeated by the army.

It is certainly possible, of course, that the Brotherhood has now as a result elected to begin to link itself to armed groups and to prepare for insurgency. But hard facts have not yet emerged to support this contention.

Clear links between Ansar Beit al-Maqdis and the al-Qaeda network, however, do exist. In recent testimony to the House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Tom Joscelyn of the Federation for the Defense of Democracies noted that the group uses al-Qaeda’s official channels for its propaganda – such as al Fajr Media Center.

Also, al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has on many occasions praised its operations. Ansar Beit al-Maqdis also often features al Qaeda leaders and ‘martyrs’, including Osama Bin Laden, in its videos.

This shows that at the very least, a clear ideological identification is there, along with probable organizational links at one or another level.

Ansar Beit al-Maqdis is only the most active and prominent of a whole number of jihadi networks operating against the Egyptian authorities from Sinai. Joscelyn in his testimony notes evidence that elements of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are active in Sinai. He also mentions a third grouping directly linked to al Qaeda, the Muhammad Jamal network, as also active on the peninsula.

What does all this add up to?

An Islamist insurgency is now under way in northern Sinai. It involves groups with roots in the Gaza Strip. If some accounts are to be believed, both the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Hamas authorities in Gaza are involved in it on one or another level. Almost certainly, the regional networks of al Qaeda form a significant part of it. The Islamists have already begun to strike west into Egypt proper.

What this means is that any hopes that Sisi’s coup would lead to a rapid return to quiet and order in Egypt should rapidly be abandoned. Rather, the new regime is facing a similar test to that endured by Mubarak in the 1990s and Nasser in the 1950’s. Islamism in Egypt is not going to quietly accept the verdict of July 3rd, 2013.

For Israel, the emergent insurgency raises the prospect of two de facto al Qaeda controlled areas adjoining its border – one in southern Syria and the other in the Salafi playground that is now northern Sinai.

Jerusalem Post, 24/1

The international conference that convened this week in the Swiss town of Montreux in an attempt to find a way toward resolving the war in Syria is one of the more strange international gatherings of recent years.

The aims of the combatant sides in Syria remain entirely irreconcilable.

Neither the Assad regime nor the rebellion against it is strong enough to strike a decisive blow against its opponent.

Neither side is sufficiently weak to feel compelled to accept whatever outcome its enemy wishes to impose on it.

In such a situation, diplomacy becomes reduced to the rituals of protocol.

Form replaces content. And the purpose of bringing the sides together becomes unclear.

This conference has all the familiar paraphernalia of an important diplomatic event. Foreign ministers are gathered. Speeches will be delivered. An atmosphere of grave seriousness will prevail. But the basis for substantive progress appears entirely absent.

Conceived over a year ago, the conference is intended to set in motion the implementation of the ‘Geneva Communique’ of June 30, 2012. In its key passage, this document calls for the ‘establishment of a transitional governing body with full executive powers that could include members of the government and opposition, and should be formed on the basis of mutual consent.’

The Syrian dictator, whose foreign minister Walid Mouallem is present at the conference, has made clear that he does not accept this goal if it means that he should step down.

As regime information minister Omran al-Zoabi expressed it succinctly on the first day of the conference: ‘Assad isn’t going.’

Assad himself told Russian MPs at a meeting in Damascus earlier this month that his departure would not be under discussion at the conference. “If we had wanted to surrender, we would have surrendered from the very start. We stand at the guard of our motherland,’ the dictator informed his guests. ‘This issue lies beyond the sphere of discussion.’

Assad has made clear that as far as he is concerned, the main subject that will lie within the sphere of discussion in Geneva will be his ‘war on ‘terrorism.’ His message is that the regime is locked in combat with the same Sunni jihadi enemies that threaten the west.

From Assad’s point of view, such a stance makes perfect sense.

He is in no danger of imminent defeat. The war in Syria has been at a bloody stalemate for about a year now. The regime controls the capital, Damascus and a contiguous land area stretching up to the Mediterranean cost in the west. Assad also still maintains his grip on the main cities of the country, with the exception of Raqqa in the east (controlled by the al-Qaeda affiliated ISIS group) and Aleppo, which is divided between the government and the rebels. Assad’s allies, Iran and Russia, appear to still be standing firmly behind him. He has no incentive for compromise.

As for the rebels, they have similarly solid reasons not to submit.

They control an area of roughly equal size stretching from the border with Iraq up to the Turkish border in the north west.

Since early January, the opposition-controlled area has been engulfed in an internal civil war, with the al-Qaeda affiliated ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) resisting attacks from the Saudi-supported fighters of the Islamic Front. This fighting made possible relatively minor gains by government forces in the northern Aleppo area.

But the rebels, too, are not facing imminent defeat. They have no shortage of men willing to engage on their behalf. Assad failed to capitalize or expand on some modest military successes in the summer. So they too see no pressing reason to compromise their core demand – that Bashar Assad cannot form part of any transitional administration.

Rebel controlled areas have borne the brunt of extraordinarily brutal tactics employed by the regime over the last three years. These have included the use of chemical weapons against civilian targets, as took place in eastern Ghouta on August 21, 2013, with the loss of 1429 lives, according to US figures. A newly released report claims that the regime has carried out the mass slaughter of 11,000 detainees.

The dictator’s uncompromising position led to a very great reluctance on the part of the opposition to take part in the conference at all. A no-show by the western financed opposition would have turned the gathering into a farce. As a result of western threats and pressure, the Syrian National Coalition eventually agreed to show up.

But this coalition in any case exerts little or no authority over the overwhelmingly Sunni Islamist fighting groups that are conducting the actual war in Syria.

They will not be there in Geneva, and will certainly not feel bound by any commitments made by the external leadership.

The Kurdish PYD, which rules the largely peaceful Kurdish enclave in the north east of the country, is also not invited.

So there are fundamental disagreements between the two sides attending the conference. On the rebel side, the most important and influential factions won’t be attending at all. The government side has no intention of conforming to the conference’s key premise (Assad’s resignation and his replacement by a transitional authority.) The opposition representatives have no intention of compromising on this demand.

The chances of such a gathering leading to any type of diplomatic breakthrough are surely close to zero.

What then is the point of all this?

The Geneva II conference is happening, it appears, for the not particularly edifying reason that the west doesn’t want to entirely ignore Syria, and can’t quite think of anything else to do.

The Geneva II conference’s main contribution to the diplomacy of the region is thus likely to be to pave the way for the Geneva III conference. And ‘all the way up to Geneva 17, before this thing’s finished,’ as one Syrian observer put it. In Syria itself, meanwhile, the bloodletting looks set to continue.

Jerusalem Report, January, 2014.

Ukraine events showcase Russian strength, Western confusion with the Jews caught on the fringe

Kiev’s Euro-Square (the renamed Independence Square) was roiling with anger and confusion in the frozen late afternoon of December 17. Word had just come through of the deal between Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych and his Russian counterpart, Vladmir Putin, to cut gas prices and purchase Ukrainian government bonds.

Putin had apparently outflanked the protestors who were demanding Yanukovych’s resignation and new elections. Having pressured the government of Ukraine not to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, the Russian leader made a counter offer of his own: Russia would slash the price Ukraine would pay for gas by a third; and Moscow would also acquire $15 billion in Ukraine bonds. The offer was a generous one, but it was clear that its rationale was not economic in nature. Moscow was willing to pay whatever price was necessary to keep Ukraine in the fold.

The demonstrators were not impressed. A middle-aged man from a group of veterans of the Afghan War who had turned up to perform security duties at the square grimaced with disgust when I asked him about the deal. “This changes nothing,” he insisted. “We want a change of government, and new national elections –
parliamentary and presidential – and the EU Association agreement.”

Kiev was tense amid the sub-zero temperatures. The security forces had cordoned off a whole area close to European Square with buses used to block roads. At Mariinsky Park, about a kilometer from the square, meanwhile, a rival, pro-Yanukovych demonstration was hastily assembled. The talk throughout the city was of the protests, and where it was all heading.

The protests erupted after Yanukovych failed to sign an Association Agreement with the EU on November 21. Ukrainians were aware that the refusal constituted a move in the broader tug of war between those who wish to take Ukraine further toward the West and those determined to couple it to Russia. So the square demonstrations quickly took on the colors of a general protest movement of all those forces opposed to the move toward Russia.

The government attempted to destroy the protest camp on November 30, and again on December 10. These attacks further polarized the situation, and increased the number of protestors in the square. They began to call for the resignation of Yanukovych and the holding of new presidential and parliamentary elections.

Many Ukrainians noted that the EU was no longer all it was cracked up to be. In particular, they observed the situation of recent new members of the EU, and noticed that their situation had not drastically changed or improved as a result of their membership.

But for the thousands of people in European Square the main issue was not the specific short-term benefits; it was about the longer-term future.

As journalist and anti-corruption activist Nikolai Vorobyev tells The Jerusalem Report, “People here haven’t read the association agreement. It’s over 100 pages long and it’s almost certain that Yanukovych himself hasn’t read it too. The issue for the protesters is simple: They want to move closer towards Europe, towards civilization, and away from Russia.”

The roots of anti-Semitism run deep in Ukrainian political culture, particularly in its nationalist variant (the Nazis, enthusiastically abetted by Ukrainian collaborators, murdered a million and a half Jews in the Ukraine in World War II).

On New Year’s Eve, a large anti-government gathering took place in Independence Square – or euro-square, as the anti-government protestors have renamed it. There was a show in which the Nativity story was presented in a modern Ukrainian context. Among the various stock figures was a stereotypical Hasidic Jew, played by Bohdan Benyuk, a deputy from the far right Svoboda party. The Jew was presented as a swindler, speculator and coward, who nevertheless eventually joins the demonstrators against Herod, i.e. Yanukovych.

“The Jewish community is highly concerned by a very significant participation of Svoboda party and ultranationalists in these anti-Semitic manifestations, the President of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee Oleksandr Feldman, tells The Report. “This reminds us of the horrors of Holocaust when Ukrainian ultranationalists were actively taking part in the killing of Jews. I myself was highly upset a few days ago watching a live nativity scene from Maidan? performed by Ukrainian politicians and celebrities depicting anti-Semitic lies.”

Feldman, a Member of the Ukraine Parliament, is a firm supporter of association with Europe, “I strongly believe that Ukraine should and will follow the path of European integration as this is the will of majority of people, its historical destiny and also would be mutually beneficial for all the parties. Also it would be good for Jews,” he concludes.

The demonstrators at European Square look at the EU and see societies that, for all their problems, retain independent judiciaries, working parliaments, and functioning civil societies. They look eastwards and see Putin’s combination of corruption and authoritarian rhetoric. And they know which one they want.

Elena, a 27-year-old IT worker from Kiev who joined the demonstrations, also asserted that the Association Agreement was not the main issue: “There are no rights in Russia and we don’t want to live in that kind of country,” she tells The Report. “This is really the main reason. But what made people crazy angry was using riot police against a peaceful demonstration, and officials completely supporting that way of acting.”

The stark East-West discrepancy was reflected in the nature of the rival political mobilizations in Kiev.

In European Square, the mix was a chaotic one, from civil society and democracy activists to shaven-headed radical Ukrainian nationalists. The makeshift security detail of army veterans and volunteers handled entry and exit through the crude barricades guarding the protest area. Far into the night, one could see people arguing, debating and singing. It had the unmistakable, fragile look of a civil society in revolt.

Ukraine is an uneasy amalgam of sharply differing political traditions. It consists of the linked borderlands of two empires – the Russian and Austro-Hungarian. The dividing line between East and West runs through it. In the Ukrainian-speaking west, a strong nationalist tradition espouses deep hostility towards Moscow and a fervent desire to move towards Europe. In the Russian-speaking industrial east, however, there is an equally strong determination to retain and strengthen the link with Russia. This was reflected in the events of the last weeks, as the government bussed in its own supporters and constructed its alternative to the protests in European Square

The protestors in the square are themselves divided. Many of them are young civil society activists with a liberal orientation. But there is also a sizeable contingent of Ukrainian nationalists. One may see the red and black flags of the Banderisty, nationalist paramilitary associations from the west. These groups are of an openly anti-Russian and anti-Semitic orientation. Many of them trace their lineage back to units that fought on the German side in World War II and took part in atrocities against Jews and Poles.

Stas, a butcher from the western Ukrainian town of Rivne, and a member of the nationalist Ukrainian National Assembly, showed me the collection of clubs and fire extinguishers that he and his associates, shaven-headed men in camouflage jackets, had assembled in their tent on the square. “For defense against the Berkut [special police],” he tells The Report me. “The entire government, police and prosecutors,” he told me, “are criminals. We will be here to fight them to the end.”

At the rival, pro-Yanukovych gathering in Mariinsky Park, the participants were mainly tough-looking young men from the Donbass region – Yanukovych’s eastern heartland; coalminers and factory workers given time off to remind the world that Yanukovych also has supporters. Pro-government demonstrators were paid $50 a day for their activities, according to Kiev residents.

Mariinsky Park, the “anti-square,” as Kiev residents called it, was deserted by nightfall. The Donbass men were not there to debate politics and policy into the night. They finished their day at an agreed time, and could be found in large groups round Arsenalna Metro station a little further south, smoking and drinking bottled beer, entirely impervious to the freezing temperatures.

It was civil society, with all its flaws, versus Putin-style political technology, which conjures up political manifestations, for an agreed price.

On Wednesday, December 25, following the announcement of the Putin-Yanukovych deal, an opposition journalist, Tatyana Chernovil, was dragged from her car in Kiev and badly beaten by unknown assailants. Chernovil, 34, a campaigner against corruption, had just written an article about Ukrainian Interior Minister Vitaly Zacharchenko. The article asked how Zacharchenko was able to afford the massive estate where he lives on the salary of a public employee.

This incident offered some insight into the reasons behind the passion and fury of the protests in the square. The Yanukovych government regularly engages in the intimidation of its critics and opponents. This large, fertile country of 46 million has long lagged behind its neighbors to the west in the development of democratic norms. The ongoing protests at Independence Square were intended to kick-start a process of reform.

Instead, the trajectory of the protest campaign and the swift agreement between Yanukovych and Putin is an object lesson in the balance of power in international affairs. They showcase the determination of Moscow to preserve and advance its geopolitical interests, the relative fecklessness of the West by comparison, and, as a result, the helplessness of the Ukrainian people in the face of the tactics of their Moscow-supported government.

The power game between Russia and the EU in this regard is not a game of chess. It has real life consequences such as the assault on Tatyana Chernovil. It is an example of what happens when a country is absorbed into the alliance of states led by Moscow – namely, corruption as a norm, assaults on civil society, and the removal of all structures of defense protecting ordinary citizens from the will of the powerful.

The official Ukrainian political opposition is also no cause for celebration. Inna Korsun, an activist with the Democratic Alliance movement, noted that a crucial difference between the current protests and the Orange Revolution of 2004 was that this time around, the protestors did not see the heads of the official opposition as their leaders. “People don’t want to march under opposition flags, don’t support Yulia Timoshenko [the jailed former opposition leader], and so on,” she states to The Report.

The wariness towards the official opposition derives from the great disappointment that followed the Orange Revolution. Squabbles between the rival camps of Timoshenko and then-president Victor Yushenko and accusations of corruption rapidly soured the hopes of that time.

“There’s a need for a new leader, someone from the young people in European Square,” says Korsun. But she readily admitted that no such leader or organized movement had yet emerged.

Currently, the liberal Udar (Punch) party of heavyweight boxing champion and Kiev Mayor Vitaly Klitschko remains the main organized force backing the protests. The far-right, anti-Semitic Svoboda party of Oleh Tyahnybok is also in evidence in the square. The third organized element is the Batkivschnya (Fatherland) party, which is close to Timoshenko.

None of these forces or any other organized political grouping exercises complete control over European Square. It is diffuse and leaderless, with only a confused message and no clear strategy. But for the most part, at its root, and despite the worrying presence of far-right elements, it represents a longing for normality among Ukrainians, for the kind of imperfect but ordered societies that they see to their west.

It is hard to see even this modest ambition being achieved any time soon.

The events in Ukraine show the extent to which Russia and the West are thinking in entirely different terms. To the bureaucrats in Brussels, the addition of another impoverished, populous, former communist country to a closer relationship with the Union would be at best a mixed blessing. The EU is in any case a troubled entity, with sharp divisions between its richer and poorer member states.

In the US, the Kiev protests might have been expected to spur some echoes of titanic struggles of the past. There was a time when enthusiastic crowds in public squares in central and Eastern Europe, challenging the encroachment of authoritarianism and arguing about their country’s future direction, might have found the clear and active support of Washington DC. That time appears to have gone. Only Senator John McCain came to visit from the front rank of American politicians – with no particular consequence.

The determined outside support in the Ukrainian crisis has come from the other side – from Moscow, for the government, and against the protestors. The people who may well have been implicated in the assault on Tetyana Chornovil appear to have won in Ukraine – at least for the moment.

Meanwhile, the protesters in frozen European Square, gathered under EU flags, continue through the night to shout their demand for membership in a club of Western states that appears neither willing nor able to come to their aid.

Tower Magazine, January, 2014.
Evidence is currently mounting regarding a major US policy shift in the Middle East, based on a general rapprochement with Iran. As this strategy takes shape, traditional US allies in the region are becoming increasingly worried. Much attention has been focused on the implications of the shift for Israel, with many observers saying that Israel is increasingly isolated by the US and more alone than it has ever been. But Israel, in fact, is far from alone. Nor does it appear to be the primary victim of the shift in policy. Instead, those who have the most to lose are the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia. Control of the Gulf, which is vital to global energy supplies and thus the global economy as a whole, has been the linchpin of American policy in the Middle East for the last half-century. A strong alliance with the Arab monarchies that dominate the Gulf was the core of this policy, and this is what appears to be changing; a move with massive implications for the Gulf states and the region in general.
The reason for this is the fact that a central element of Iranian regional policy is the ambition of expanding Iran’s sphere of influence into the Persian Gulf. At the moment, the US appears to be engaged in an attempt to meet Iranian demands “halfway.” As a result, the Arab states of the Gulf are now terrified at the prospect of abandonment. This fear is compounded by what they see as the Obama administration’s naiveté and lack of sophistication in regard to the Middle East.

There are currently strong indications that some Gulf countries, and Saudi Arabia in particular, have concluded that the Americans are indeed abandoning the region. As a result, these Gulf states are doing their best to assemble alternative alliances in order to meet the challenge. Other countries, such as Oman, appear ready to accommodate the new reality, placing themselves between the US and the Iranians in hopes of playing the role of power broker. Clearly, major change is underway.

***

From the point of view of strategic analysis, prior to 2011 the Mideast looked like a dangerous but clearly demarcated place. The key challenge to the regional order was the attempt by a bloc of states and movements led by Iran to challenge the US-led dispensation in the region, which had held sway since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

The Iranians want to replace the Americans as the dominant force in the Gulf by cajoling or intimidating the energy-rich Arab monarchies of the area into moving away from reliance on the US and toward Iranian tutelage. In addition, they have ambitions of expanding their influence as far as the Mediterranean and the Levant. The latter goal only became conceivable when the US toppling of Saddam Hussein conveniently removed its primary obstacle.

Iran’s long-standing alliance with Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, and its creation and sponsorship of the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, combined with its growing closeness to Iraq’s post-Saddam Shia-dominated government has produced a contiguous line of pro-Teheran states stretching from Iran’s western border to the Mediterranean Sea and, importantly, Israel’s northern border. Essential to this strategy is the Iranian nuclear project, which is intended to be a kind of insurance policy against any determined action by Iran’s regional or global rivals.

This dangerous but clear “cold war” situation has now given way to a far more complex and unstable map of conflicting interests. There is a single element, however, which has determined these changes: The decision by the United States to abandon its leadership position in a coalition of regional allies dedicated to challenging the pro-Iran bloc and the lesser but still substantial challenge of radical Sunni Islam.

This decision cannot be found in any public declaration by the Obama administration. But it is apparent in the practical policy moves made by Washington in a number of key areas over the last two years. These new policies have produced deep concern and, in some cases, a search for realignment among key members of the bloc formerly led by the US. These key members are Israel, the military regime in Egypt, the Gulf monarchies, and Saudi Arabia. No single pattern of response has emerged among these countries. All are carefully weighing their options and drawing their own conclusions.

***

The US preference for seeking alternatives to its pre-2011 stance in the region has manifested itself in two areas: Its response to the “Arab spring” uprisings of 2011 and the subsequent rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its current rapprochement with Iran.

In regard to the Arab spring, the American decision to abandon Hosni Mubarak, who had been a loyal ally for thirty years, was the pivotal moment. The result of this decision was a chaotic year of Muslim Brotherhood rule, which was then ended by a Saudi-supported coup and the return of military government in July, 2013. General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s coup was not welcomed by the US. Other key members of what had been the US-led alliance, however, regard him as having ended the disastrous rule of an Islamist regime in the Arab world’s most populous country. Both the Saudis and the Israelis have good and close relations with the new military regime in Cairo.

The Gulf Arabs, and above all the Saudis, were deeply worried by what the American response on Egypt seemed to indicate. Washington’s perception of its own interests appeared to have undergone a kind of paradigm shift; one that made future discussions regarding specific threats and opportunities deeply problematic: Allies like Mubarak would no longer benefit from their association with the US. Enemies like the Muslim Brotherhood would no longer be punished.

The first indication of America’s former regional allies’ reaction to this shift was in 2011, when the Saudis hastily assembled a Gulf military coalition to crush an incipient Shia uprising in Bahrain. This indicated that, believing themselves rebuffed by the US, the Gulf states would now seek new alliances and show a greater willingness to take action on the basis of these new ad hoc alignments. Saudi efforts to support the Syrian rebels against Assad’s pro-Iranian regime and to undermine Muslim Brotherhood-linked elements among the rebels in 2012 and 2013 were a further reflection of this new proactive stance.

Here, too, US absence was clearly a major factor. America’s failure to swiftly declare itself in favor of the Syrian rebellion and assist the rebels left Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia as the rebellion’s primary supporters, which led in turn to the takeover of the rebellion by Islamist and jihadi elements, as well as its subsequent divisions and dysfunctions. This sense of a lack of shared perceptions regarding Syria was compounded by America’s failure to take military action against Assad in the summer of 2013, after it became clear that the regime had used chemical weapons against its own citizens. The Gulf states’ primary concern was US credibility. In August 2012, President Obama had defined the use of chemical weapons by the regime as a “red line,” but now appeared to be blithely disregarding this commitment.

The move confirmed US-aligned countries’ suspicion that the current administration simply had little understanding of or interest in the means by which alliances are maintained in the Middle East. That is, the need for credibility, sticking by friends, and facing down enemies appeared to be lost on the Obama administration. This impression was, of course, compounded by recent US behavior on the all-important issue of Iran’s nuclear program.

The recent Geneva deal concluded by the P5 + 1 powers and Teheran is widely regarded in the Gulf as a significant victory for Iran. It awards significant sanctions relief to the Iranians while enabling them to continue enrichment of uranium, keep existing equipment, and avoid inspection of possible military aspects of the program. Another factor is different perceptions of the precise point at which Iran may be considered as having “gone nuclear.” The US defines it as the point at which the Iranians can place a nuclear warhead on a missile. The Gulf states see it as the point at which Iran becomes able to use enriched uranium to build a nuclear device of any kind. The latter is imminent and, in fact, may already have been reached.

But the Geneva agreement is not the only factor. It appears to be accompanied by a broader process of outreach to the Iranians. Evidence has emerged, for example, of a new, indirect channel of communication between the US and Hezbollah. A recent report in the Kuwaiti newspaper al-Rai said that a backchannel between UK officials and Hezbollah’s “political wing” has been revived in accordance with the improving relations between London and Teheran. It is now serving as a means of conveying messages between Washington and Teheran. An unnamed diplomatic source quoted by al-Rai explained that this dialogue is “designed to keep pace with the changes in the region and the world, and the potential return of Iran to the international community.”

So the evidence seems to point to an effort to transform relations between the West and the Iranians, perhaps as a way of facilitating a new regional order which will enable a much lighter American hand in the Middle East.

***

Saudi and Gulf dismay at what they see as US disengagement from the region has been expressed publicly to a certain extent, despite their usual preference for behind-the-scenes diplomacy. Most significantly, the Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Prince Mohammed bin Nawaf bin Abdulaziz, addressed the issue head-on in a New York Times article. “We believe that many of the West’s policies on both Iran and Syria risk the stability and security of the Middle East,” the ambassador wrote. “This is a dangerous gamble, about which we cannot remain silent, and will not stand idly by.”

Rather than challenging the Syrian and Iranian governments, some of our Western partners have refused to take much-needed action against them. The West has allowed one regime to survive and the other to continue its program for uranium enrichment, with all the consequent dangers of weaponization.… For all their talk of “red lines,” when it counted, our partners have seemed all too ready to concede our safety and risk our region’s stability.

As a result of this, said the ambassador, Saudi Arabia may have “no choice but to become more assertive in international affairs: more determined than ever to stand up for the genuine stability our region so desperately needs.”

The ambassador’s article is the bluntest public expression yet of just how worried the Saudis and the other Gulf states actually are; but it is not the first indication of their concerns. Bahraini Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, for example, said in a recent interview with the Daily Telegraph that America’s “transient and reactive” foreign policy could force it to lose influence in the region. “America seems to suffer from schizophrenia when it deals with the Arab world,” said the prince. He referred specifically to the American stance in relation to Egypt, Syria, and Iran. He also contended that US behavior was leading to the exploration of alternative alliances by former regional allies. “The Russians have proved they are reliable friends,” he said. “As a result, some states in the region have already started to look at developing more multilateral relations rather than just relying on Washington.” This process was seen in practice in the recent visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Egypt—the first such visit in 40 years.

In a similar, rare public expression of Gulf sentiment, Nawaf Obeid, a senior adviser to the Saudi royal family, accused Washington of deceiving Riyadh over the Iran nuclear deal. “We were lied to, things were hidden from us,” Obeid told an audience in London that was also quoted in the Daily Telegraph. He went on to vow continued Saudi resistance to Iranian machinations across the region. In particular, he expressed Saudi determination to turn back the Iranians in Syria. “We cannot accept Revolutionary Guards running around Homs,” he said.

Washington is aware of these concerns and has sought to assuage them. In a recent address to the Manama Dialogue security forum in Bahrain, for example, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said that the US “has a ground, air and naval presence of more than 35,000 personnel in and immediately around the Gulf…. We know diplomacy cannot operate in a vacuum. Our success will continue to hinge on America’s military power, and the credibility of our assurances to our allies and partners in the Middle East.”

These references to the US military presence and the current administration’s determination to uphold its commitments in this regard are important. The presence of the Fifth Fleet in the Gulf, headquartered in Bahrain, is what physically enables the continued flow of Gulf oil. It is the most important physical evidence of the US commitment to its allies’ security.

Yet Hagel’s words failed to substantially address the concerns of the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia, and other US allies. They are not primarily worried about the possibility of US troop withdrawals from the Gulf. These represent the physical manifestations of American strength in the region. The main concern is the strategic direction of US policy. The Fifth Fleet may remain in the Gulf, but if Iran is given carte blanche to push forward with its nuclear program while receiving sanctions relief, as Geneva seems to allow, and if this goes hand in hand with the advancement of its cause in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and beyond, then this physical presence will have only limited meaning. The danger is not one of an Iranian force crossing the Persian Gulf to attack the Saudis directly. Rather, it is one of regional subversion, support of proxies, and the consequent building of alliances and the establishment of client states. This strategy has brought Iran into alliances with Iraq and regime-controlled Syria, as well as rule by proxy in Lebanon. The Defense Secretary’s words address none of this.
That the administration’s talk of its continued commitment to its Gulf allies has not been convincing was conclusively demonstrated by Saudi Arabia’s astounding decision to refuse a seat on the United Nations Security Council, despite America’s prodigious efforts to secure a place on the council for its ally. The New York Times reported the widespread—and almost certainly accurate—perception that the move “underscored the depth of Saudi anger over what the monarchy sees as weak and conciliatory Western stances toward Syria and Iran, Saudi Arabia’s regional rival.” Given that the Saudis must have anticipated the stunned reaction from the international community indicates that the rebuff may constitute the kingdom’s informal declaration of independence from its formerly solid alliance with the US.

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The Iranians are well aware of the Gulf countries’ concerns, and appear to be crafting their own policy in order to benefit from them. They have a distinct advantage in that the Gulf countries are not united in their anti-Iranian stance. To a certain extent, Saudi Arabia is unique, even if Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are currently aligned with its policies. The difference between the Saudis and the small emirates and monarchies of the Gulf is that the latter are likely to accommodate themselves to a rising Iran, whereas Riyadh sees itself as locked in an ongoing regional conflict with the Iranians.

Iranian policy in this regard is quite logical: To bring the small Gulf countries into alignment with it through a combination of threats and inducements. Diaku Hoseyni, an Iranian analyst, explained the rationale behind this in a recent article in the journal Esfahan-e Emruz. “Having lost hope that the United States will carry out a military strike on Iran,” he wrote, “smaller countries would prefer to control the danger posed by a powerful and dissatisfied country in their neighborhood, by expanding their friendly relations with Iran.”

There is evidence to support Hoseyni’s contention. For example, Oman played a key role in facilitating the secret US-Iran backchannel that made the Geneva agreement possible. Oman’s links to Iran also led to the sultanate’s rejection of a Saudi-proposed union of the six Gulf states in December. The union would have brought Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates into an upgraded version of the current Gulf Cooperation Council. Riyadh’s intention was to unify the Gulf states in order to resist the Iranian challenge. Oman, by rejecting the proposal, signaled that it does not wish to be part of a Saudi-led coalition against Iran. Instead, it will seek to maintain relations with all sides and adapt itself to any new balance of power.

But Oman, together with Qatar, has always been an “outlier” among Gulf countries on the question of Iran. The core “anti-Iranian” alliance among Gulf countries consists of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain. There are now indications that the Iranians are engaged in a subtle attempt to draw some of these countries into its orbit. Media reports in recent days have revealed progress in talks between Iranian and UAE representatives over three Iranian-occupied islands in the Hormuz area—Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands. These islands are claimed by the UAE and, according to the latest reports, the deal would return them to UAE sovereignty, with Iran retaining “seabed” rights.

While the deal may not materialize, the very fact that the talks are taking place and Iran appears ready for compromise is telling. Iran is signaling to the small Gulf emirates that they can benefit from associating with Teheran. To achieve this, Iran is willing to be flexible on non-essential issues. The carrot is going hand-in-hand with the stick.

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The Middle East’s bloc of Shia Muslim powers, led by Iran, is far more formidable than its Sunni opponents. Wherever the rivalry between them has reached a flashpoint, the Shia have gained the upper hand. The Iranians have won in Lebanon and Iraq, and are winning in Syria. The Sunni Arab states are either mired in internal turmoil (Egypt) or are too weak to effectively resist Iranian ambitions without outside (American and, perhaps, Israeli) assistance. From the point of view of the current US administration, logic appears to support the idea of distancing oneself from former allies and reaching an accommodation with the new strong force in the region—Iran and its proxies.

The Gulf states are aware of this and deeply worried by it. But for supporters of the accommodationist point of view, this is not such a terrible thing. Working on the assumption that Iran, while a formidable foe, has goals that can be satisfied without completely overturning the regional status quo, the accommodationists presumably believe that the Gulf states will eventually calm down and get used to the new situation.

But all of this depends on a very large assumption: Namely, that Iranian ambitions can be satisfied within the current framework. If it turns out that Iran’s anti-Western stance and activities are not merely posturing, and that Teheran does indeed intend to replace US hegemony in the Gulf with a new hegemony of its own, then what is currently going on is inelegant capitulation in the face of an aggressor. In Riyadh (and Jerusalem), that’s what it looks like.

Given the record of Iranian obfuscation on the nuclear issue and largely successful subversion across the region, the Saudi (and Israeli) view has a lot going for it. The US does indeed appear to have adopted a strategy rooted in illusion. The question now is what the formerly US-led bloc will do in order to organize itself effectively against the Iranian challenge and eventually turn it back.