There has been much online talk in recent months about the possibility of ‘civil war’  in the UK.  The instinctive response to such talk, or my instinctive response, anyway, is to dismiss it as absurd. The United Kingdom is an old, well established state. Its institutions and its political ways have deep foundations. In particular, a certain habit of political moderation and pragmatism has long been one of the country’s most notable characteristics. Observing recent developments in Britain, however, I think that this response, alas, might need to be retired.  Brits won’t be putting on Cavalier or Roundhead outfits and running at each other in a field any time soon.   Nevertheless, amused bemusement, while enjoyable, is probably no longer sufficient, or advised. 

I think that there are two emergent and growing camps on opposite sides of the political divide in the UK, the first of which has lost or never had any commitment to the norms of democratic politics, and the second of which is increasingly disillusioned with the idea that adherence to these norms can produce anything, because the game is rigged. The question of whether serious civil strife will take place in the UK I think depends on whether these camps will grow, (a very real possibility), or conversely, whether the center can hold, because the issues that have caused the growing polarization will be addressed in whole or in part by the political mainstream. On the one hand, because of the long history of political stability in the UK, it feels inevitable that the latter course of events must take place. On the other hand, there is a growing sense, and not only regarding the UK, that we have entered a new political age in which it would be foolish to feel secure in such assumptions.  

The first of the aforementioned camps consists of mobilized adherents of political Islam, and their supporters from within the UK’s Muslim communities, in alliance with elements of the white radical left.  The cause of Hamas in Gaza and support for the destruction of Israel is the ‘flagship’ issue for this camp, but Gaza is a mobilizing tool rather than the substantive core of this alliance.  Anti Jewish sentiment is currently being expressed increasingly openly in the discourse of this camp, usually in the form of criticism of perceived ‘Jewish supremacy,’ replacing the previous coded attacks on ‘Zionism.’ 

The Islamists are in the business of establishing a sectarian logic to British life, in which Islam will come to demand a sort of cultural and political autonomy. Once this is formed, the issue will be to extend its boundaries both literally, in terms of areas of de facto control at street level, and figuratively, in terms of developing a Muslim power bloc in the politics of the country. 

The radical left aligns itself with this dynamic camp, because it sees it as an instrument which can damage and deplete the existing power structure in the UK, to which the radical left is centrally opposed.  The radical left, whose adherents are delusional, doesn’t realise that the existing power structure is also its own defense against the intention of the Islamists to introduce norms currently prevalent in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will realize this, if at all, only the way that the leftist fellow travellers of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979 did: ie when its too late. Still, there now exists at the more extreme  edge of the left a burgeoning subculture committed to political violence, as may be witnessed in the actions of the now proscribed Palestine Action group over the past year.  This may I think be compared in its nature to those parts of the ‘New Left’ of the late 1960s and 70s who in the first years of the 1970s began to engage in political violence.  The most notable places in which this phenomenon took root were Germany and Italy, to a much lesser extent in France and the US, and in Britain at that time hardly at all. This does not however, indicate a kind of  permanent immunity in the UK from phenomena of this kind.  Regarding the Islamists, elements within this camp have an existing pattern of murderous political violence which has included a number of major acts of terror on British soil in recent years. 

On the opposing edge of British political life, there is an emergent reaction reflecting the perception that the existing elites are not sufficiently defending against the advance of the Islamist/radical left camp.  The issue of uncontrolled illegal immigration, mainly from the Islamic world, has become the central mobilizing cause for this group, along with the perception that the current government is biased in favor of the Islamists/left and against their opponents and is prepared, either because of fear of the Islamist/far left camp or partial identification with it,  to use law enforcement as a tool in silencing dissent. 

I think the signs are already clear that this camp will take the form of a kind of British ethnic nationalism (ie a nationalism seeking to bring together the indigenous English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish populations).  I recall a statement by one articulate online voice from within this gathering who said that he judges membership of the English community by ‘whether your face would have fitted in the shield wall at Senlac Hill.’   This is powerful, evocative language, designed to appeal to ethnic identification.  Anyone who knows the British Isles knows exactly which faces the speaker is talking about, and which he is excluding. Sentiments of this kind are likely to be at the heart of this trend.  (ie atavistic appeals to indigenous identity, rather than commitment to this or that political arrangement). This at its more radical end is likely to involve bigotry against all non-indigenous populations and it is already possible to find examples of antisemitism in the statements of some parts of this camp.  It will be at the most radical end of this group that one will find the possibility of reactive political violence directed against the other side, or possibly also against illegal immigrants. 

I should make clear that I am not arguing for the moral equivalence of these two camps.  Its clear that the Islamist/radical left group represent an attempt to subvert and destroy a particular cultural and political space and to replace it with something else.  That is, it is this camp which is the ‘aggressor.’  The other one is an attempt at defense.  Having said that, this defensive status doesn’t mean that one should ignore the various elements gathered around these particular colours, including ones whose ascendance may mean the worst for well-established non-indigenous minority groups, including the Jewish community. 

 It isnt by any means certain that the center will collapse or significantly further erode in the UK. For the last three hundred years, British ruling elites have excelled at co-opting radical trends and inducing them to play within the system, rather than against it. This is the ‘sweet moderation, heart of this nation’ that Billy Bragg sang about, not as fatuously as it might first appear, a generation ago. Still, erosion  is a possibility and if it does happen, then the prospect of significant internecine violence by members of these camps exists.  So ‘Civil war’ isn’t I think around the corner in the UK, but the prospect of home grown, possibly severe political violence emerging from the clash between these two growing gatherings seems to me to be a very realistic one.  Indeed, to slightly mis quote England’s best poet of the post 1945 period, I tend to think this may well happen, and soon.