Spectator, 2/10

The Iranian launching of 181 ballistic missiles at Israel on Tuesday night followed a similar pattern to the attacks of April 14.  Israeli and allied air defences appear to have performed extremely effectively.  The damage to the military and civilian sites targeted is minor  to non-existent.  One Palestinian Arab man was killed in a village near Jericho, not from the Iranian missiles, it appears, but from debris from an interceptor. 

I live in a Jerusalem neighbourhood on what’s called the ‘Seam Line’ between the Jewish and Arab populations.  We generally have cordial relations with our Arabic speaking neighbours, and as I stood outside my front door last night trying to get some pictures of the missiles flying over in the night sky, I was entirely unsurprised to hear the honking of car horns and shouts of celebration from the Arab houses a little further down the street.  So it goes, and so far, so predictable. 

The question now  is what comes next.  The Israeli response following the April 14 attacks was small, and largely symbolic.  President Joseph Biden at that time advised Israel to ‘take the win’, referring to the successful mobilization of a region-wide, US-led air defence system that was mobilized for the first time on that night.  Israel sufficed with a  symbolic attack on an Iranian air defence system, largely to prove to Teheran that it could do a lot more than that.  And there the matter was left. 

This time, the response is unlikely to be merely symbolic.  The reason is that, the Middle East being what it is, if Israel again suffices with a little nudge to Iran indicating what it could do if it really tried, this is likely to be interpreted as hesitation, and hence weakness.  It will transmit to the Iranians that they can now see it as part of the rules of the game that every time Israel takes major action against an Iranian proxy in the context of the current war, (such as the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh or the killing of Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah), or makes a move against an Iranian official, a massive Iranian missile response must be factored in. 

This is not a ‘norm’ that Israel can accept.  Hence, it must seek now to signal to Iran that such aggression will be met with a determined, escalatory response.  Such a response is now likely.  The natural next question is what form might that take? What assets does Israel have to hand, which could deliver the appropriate message to Iran, and what are the Iranian vulnerabilities which might be exploited?

In terms of the assets which Israel could bring to bear, there are two immediately apparent instruments which Israel possesses which can be mobilized. 

The first is Israeli air superiority.  Israel’s raid on the Hodaidah and Ras Isa ports in Yemen last week was the latest demonstration that the Israel Air Force is able to effectively project power to distances which bring targets within Iran to well within its range.  This was also demonstrated, of course, in the pinpointed response to the attacks in April.  Israel’s F15, F16 and F35 fighter jets, together with its refueling planes, have the capacity to reach any target in Iran. 

Nor does a response using air power need to be limited to the realm of piloted aircraft, with the attendant possible dangers to personnel.  Israel is a pioneer and a world leader in the use of drones.  Its Heron TP, Hermes 900 and Shoval systems could all if desired be employed against targets in Iran. 

Its also worth noting that while Israel’s missile  defence systems are better known, Jerusalem also, in the Jericho 3 system possesses a ballistic missile capacity of its own, also capable of reaching Iran.

Regarding the second set of available instruments: ample evidence exists to suggest that Israel possesses an irregular capacity on Iranian soil, which is available for activation when needed.  It is almost certain that this capacity includes the involvement of Iranian citizens.  The regime in Teheran is not popular, and finding individuals willing to work against it isn’t difficult, though of course details in this regard are elusive. 

The existence of this Israeli capability is apparent mainly from the results: sudden deaths suffered by scientists and officials involved with Teheran’s nuclear programs, mysterious explosions and power outages, theft of materials and so on.  If needed, it could presumably be engaged as an element in the current war.  In this regard, it’s worth noting that while this capacity has most notably been used in recent years against people involved with the nuclear program, it could also theoretically be used against other Iranian officials and individuals associated with the regime. 

What are Israel’s potential targets, should it choose to respond?  Of course, facilities related to the Iranian nuclear program should be noted here, but it is more likely in the current stage that Israel would focus on strategic targets essential to the functioning of the Iranian economy. The oil sector would be one vulnerable area in this regard.  The oil terminal on Kharg Island and the Bandar Abbas port would be two sites that may well appear in Israel’s target bank related to this sector and to Iran’s vulnerability regarding its export capacity. 

The key need deriving from the October 1 attacks is for a shift in perception with regard to the current situation in the Middle East.  The competition between the Iran-led regional bloc on the one side, and Israel and its western and pro-western allied countries on the other has long dominated strategic affairs in the region.  For the last two decades, this contest has largely been played out through feints, the use of proxies, clandestine and intelligence warfare, and diplomatic stratagems.  That chapter in this long and historic battle of will now appears to be drawing to a close.  A phase of open confrontation looks set to take its place.